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2023 DIGILAW 225 (JHR)

State of Jharkhand, through the Chief Secretary, Government of Jharkhand v. Arvind Kumar

2023-02-22

S.K.MISHRA, SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

body2023
ORDER : [Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.] 1. The instant intra-court appeal, under clause 10 of the Letters Patent, has been preferred against the order/judgment dated 20.01.2021 passed by learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P. (S) No. 1093 of 2020 whereby and whereunder while allowing the writ petition the decision as contained in Resolution dated 25.07.2019 purported to be issued in exercise of power conferred under Rule 14(1) of the Jharkhand Government Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 2016, [hereinafter referred to as ‘Rules, 2016’] by which the punishment of censure has been imposed upon the petitioner as also the decision as contained in Resolution dated 29.01.2020 by which the review application preferred by the petitioner was dismissed upholding the order of penalty dated 25.07.2019, have been quashed and set aside. 2. The brief facts of the case, as per pleadings made in the writ petition, read as hereunder: The petitioner was appointed on 01.03.1993 in the cadre of Bihar Administrative Services pursuant through 37th Combined Competitive Examination conducted by Bihar Public Service Commission. Pursuant to reorganization of State of Bihar, the petitioner's service was allocated to the State of Jharkhand. During the period 10.07.2002 to 06.02.2004, the petitioner was posted as Circle Officer, Jamua in the district of Giridih. It is the case of the petitioner that while he was posted as Circle Officer at Jamua on 27.08.2003 he met with a minor accident in which he sustained minor injuries though it did not restrict his movement and after taking advice from the doctor, he continued to discharge his duties as before, but the Deputy Commissioner, Giridih vide letter dated 09.09.2003 directed the Circle Officer, Giridih, Sadar to assume the charge of the post of Circle Officer, Jamua where the petitioner was working and the petitioner was directed to proceed on leave. Even on 14.09.2003 there had been a camp organized for distribution of land parcha wherein also the petitioner appeared and played its active role in distribution of the land parcha. But the Deputy Commissioner, Giridih recommended for suspension of the petitioner and framed charge against him in prapatra-ka vide letter dated 11.10.2003 alleging inter alia that the petitioner was having a fracture in his leg and on account of the same he had been absenting himself from duty without leave and had been discharging his duties from his residence. But the Deputy Commissioner, Giridih recommended for suspension of the petitioner and framed charge against him in prapatra-ka vide letter dated 11.10.2003 alleging inter alia that the petitioner was having a fracture in his leg and on account of the same he had been absenting himself from duty without leave and had been discharging his duties from his residence. It is further case of the petitioner that the said charge was not even approved by the disciplinary authority and the then Deputy Commissioner found no evidence on the basis of which the charges were imputed against the petitioner. It is further stated that the Deputy Commissioner, realizing the fact that the petitioner was discharging his duties, vide letter dated 03.12.2003 amended the directives as contained in letter dated 09.09.2003 to the extent of giving charge to Circle Officer, Giridih. It is alleged that since no evidence had been furnished along with the proposed memo of charge, the Personnel Department, Govt. of Jharkhand vide letter dated 09.01.2004 wrote to the Deputy Commissioner, Giridih to furnish the documents and evidence forming basis of charges imputed against the petitioner. Since the charges framed by the then Deputy Commissioner, Giridih had not been approved by the disciplinary authority the petitioner had been show caused vide letter dated 14.01.2004, to which, the petitioner replied vide letter dated 31.01.2004 which was forwarded to the Principal Secretary, Land & Revenue vide letter dated 11.02.2006. It is stated that in the meantime, vide letter dated 24.02.2004 again the Personnel Department wrote to the Deputy Commissioner to furnish the very basis of article of imputation as against the petitioner. Thereafter, again vide letter dated 04.06.2004 and 28.05.2007 the Deputy Commissioner was directed to comply the earlier direction but no reply was furnished by the Deputy Commissioner, Giridih. It is further stated that in the meanwhile, the petitioner was granted junior selection grade and was promoted to the rank of Additional Collector w.e.f. 2013 and in the rank of Joint Secretary w.e.f. 2018. But all of a sudden in gross violation of principles of natural justice and the procedure established by law vide Resolution dated 25.07.2019, the petitioner was imposed the punishment of censure in terms of Rule 14(1) of the Rules, 2016, against which the petitioner preferred review which was rejected vide order dated 29.01.2020. But all of a sudden in gross violation of principles of natural justice and the procedure established by law vide Resolution dated 25.07.2019, the petitioner was imposed the punishment of censure in terms of Rule 14(1) of the Rules, 2016, against which the petitioner preferred review which was rejected vide order dated 29.01.2020. The petitioner being aggrieved with the impugned order of punishment dated 25.07.2019 as also review order dated 29.01.2020 preferred writ application before writ Court by filing W.P. (S) No. 1093 of 2020, which was allowed vide order dated 20.01.2021 by which the impugned order of punishment as also the order passed in Review were quashed and aside, against which the instant intra-court appeal has been preferred by the State. 3. Mr. Indranil Bhaduri, learned S.C. IV appearing for the appellants-State has submitted that since the order of punishment of ‘Censure’ is a minor punishment as such there is no requirement to follow the stipulation made under the provisions of Rule 19 of Rules, 2016, but the learned Single Judge without appreciating that aspect of the matter has quashed and set aside the order passed by the disciplinary authority and the reviewing authority. Therefore, the order passed by the learned Single Judge is not sustainable in the eye of law. 4. Per contra, Mr. Rahul Kumar, learned counsel for the writ petitioner has submitted that it is not the fact that the disciplinary authority proceeded to impose minor punishment otherwise there was no occasion for the disciplinary authority to come out with the memorandum of charge and once memorandum of charge was issued which itself suggests that the disciplinary authority has decided to initiate a regular departmental proceeding. However, the disciplinary authority after going through the finding recorded by the enquiry officer has not thought it proper to impose major punishment as per the list of punishment prescribed under Rules, 2016 rather decision was taken to impose minor punishment in the nature of ‘Censure’. Therefore, once memo of charge has been issued for the purpose of initiating a regular departmental proceeding, the stipulation made under Rule 19 of Rules, 2016 was required to be followed but since the same has not been followed, the learned Single Judge taking into consideration the aforesaid fact has quashed the impugned order of punishment, which suffers from no error. 5. 5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents available on record as also the finding recorded by learned Single Judge. 6. The facts, which are not in dispute in this case, is that a regular departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner by serving memorandum of charge as contained in letter dated 11.10.2003 but the enquiry officer was not appointed. It appears from the record that the aforesaid memo of charge was issued on the basis of recommendation of Deputy Commissioner, Giridih, as would appear from letter dated 09.01.2004 and as such the Government sought for evidence from the Deputy Commissioner to proceed with the charge against the petitioner and again request was made on 24.06.2013 wherein nine references of request have been mentioned. Further request was made on 06.12.2013, 10.02.2014 and vide letter dated 15.02.2017, request of 12 reference letters has been disclosed. But the recommending authority-Deputy Commissioner, Giridih did not produce any corroborative fact in order to substantiate the charge. 7. In this context, reference of Rule 19 of Rules, 2016 is required to be made, which provides the provision for imposing minor penalty, whereby and whereunder it is the requirement of the law that the Government servant in writing of the proposal to take action against him and of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour on which it is proposed to be taken, and giving him reasonable opportunity of making such representation as he may wish to make against the proposal. It further appears from the aforesaid provision that considering the representation, if any, submitted by the Government Servant under clause (a) and recording a finding on each imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour. 8. For ready reference, Rule 19 of Rules, 2016 is reproduced hereunder as: “19. It further appears from the aforesaid provision that considering the representation, if any, submitted by the Government Servant under clause (a) and recording a finding on each imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour. 8. For ready reference, Rule 19 of Rules, 2016 is reproduced hereunder as: “19. Procedure for imposing minor penalties : -(1) Subject to the provisions of sub rule (3) of rule 18, no order imposing on a Government Servant any of the penalties specified in clauses (i) to (iv) of rule 14 shall be made except after- a) informing the Government Servant in writing of the proposal to take action against him and of the imputations of misconduct or misbehaviour on which it is proposed to be taken, and giving him reasonable opportunity of making such representation as he may wish to make against the proposal; b) considering the representation, if any, submitted by the Government Servant under clause (a); c) recording a finding on each imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour.” 9. It is, thus, evident that provision as contained under Rule 19 of Rules, 2016 requires to provide an opportunity to the delinquent employee by asking the delinquent employee to make representation but it is not in dispute that no representation was asked for from the employee and there is no requirement of finding on the charge imputated on the conduct of the petitioner. 10. The conduct Rule if has been enacted which in any case is to be followed in strict sense. It is not in dispute that the provision of Rule 19 provides the process for imposing minor punishment. Even for the purpose of imposing minor punishment, the statute stipulates to provide an opportunity before taking any adverse decision by giving an opportunity to file representation by the delinquent employee with respect to the content of the charge and same is required to be considered by recording the finding of imputation of misconduct or misbehavior. 11. Even for the purpose of imposing minor punishment, the statute stipulates to provide an opportunity before taking any adverse decision by giving an opportunity to file representation by the delinquent employee with respect to the content of the charge and same is required to be considered by recording the finding of imputation of misconduct or misbehavior. 11. Here, in the instant case, it appears from the record that the memorandum of charge has been issued on the recommendation of Deputy Commissioner, Giridih but the writ petitioner since was holding the post under the State under Jharkhand Administrative Cadre and as such the Government sought for evidence from the Deputy Commissioner to proceed with the charge and to that effect several correspondences were made vide letter dated 24.06.2013, 06.12.2013, 10.02.2014 and vide letter dated 15.02.2017 but the Deputy Commissioner, Giridih has failed to substantiate that charge since no response to the said letters have been made. The aforesaid issue coupled with the fact of non-observance of provisions of Rule 19 (b) and (C) of the Rules, 2016 clarifies that the petitioner was not provided with an opportunity since no opportunity to file representation was given, therefore, the statutory provision as contained under Rule 19 (b) and (c) has not been followed. 12. It is settled position of law that the disciplinary authority can initiate a departmental proceeding under the governing rule but the process stipulated in the aforesaid governing rule is strictly to be adhered to otherwise the punishment if imposed without adhering to the statutory provision will be said to be not in consonance with the law and will not be sustainable since order of punishment will be treated to be in the teeth of statutory provision. 13. The mandate of the Rule 19 (b) and (c) since is to provide opportunity to the delinquent employee to file representation for its due consideration which is for the purpose of observing the principles of natural justice but in the instant case it is not disputed by learned counsel appearing for the State that the writ petitioner was ever given opportunity to file representation what to say about its consideration as required under the provision of Rule 19 (b) and (c) of Rules, 2016. 14. It is settled position of law that decision is to be taken by the authorities having power to take decision strictly in accordance with law. 15. 14. It is settled position of law that decision is to be taken by the authorities having power to take decision strictly in accordance with law. 15. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Babu Verghese v. Bar Council of Kerala, [ (1999) 3 SCC 422 ], wherein at paragraphs 31 and 32 it has been held as under: “31. It is the basic principle of law long settled that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. The origin of this rule is traceable to the decision in Taylor v. Taylor which was followed by Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor who stated as under: “[W]here a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all.” 32. This rule has since been approved by this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of V.P. and again in Deep Chand v. State of Rajasthan. These cases were considered by a three-judge bench of this Court in State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh and the rule laid down in Nazir Ahmad case was again upheld. This rule has since been applied to the exercise of jurisdiction by courts and has also been recognized as a statutory principle of administrative law.” 16. The Hon'ble Apex Court further in the judgment rendered in Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai v. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala, [ (2002) 1 SCC 633 ], at paragraph 27 as under: “….. it is a normal rule of consideration that when a statute vests certain power in an authority to be exercised in a particular manner then the said authority has to exercise it only in the manner provided in the statute itself….” 17. Reference in this regard also be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Jharkhand v. Ambay Cements, [ (2005) 1 SCC 368 ], wherein at paragraph 26 it has been held as under: “….it is the cardinal rule of interpretation that where a statute provides that a particular thing should be done, it should be done in the manner prescribed and not in any other way. It is also settled rule of interpretation that where a statute is penal in character, it must be strictly construed and followed…..” 18. Reference is also made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Zuari Cement Ltd. v. Regional Director ESIC Hyderabad [ (2015) 7 SCC 690 ], wherein at paragraph 14 it has been held as under: “14. As per the scheme of the Act, the appropriate Government alone could grant or refuse exemption. When the statute prescribed the procedure for grant or refusal of exemption from the operation of the Act, it is to be done in that manner and not in any other manner. In State of Jharkhand v. Ambay Cements, it was held that : (SCC p. 378, para 26) 26…. it is the cardinal rule of interpretation that where a statute provides that a particular thing should be done, it should be done in the manner prescribed and not in any other way.” 19. This Court after having discussed the factual aspect vis-a-vis the legal position has considered the finding recorded by learned Single Judge wherefrom it is evident that the learned Single Judge has found sufficient reason to interfere with the impugned decision of punishment on the ground that statutory provision as contained under Rule 19 (b) and (c) of Rules, 2016 has not been followed and in absence thereof the punishment of ‘Censure’ has been imposed, which led the learned Single Judge to interfere with the order. 20. This Court, therefore, is of the considered view that since the statutory mandate as provided under Rule 19 (b) and (c) of Rules, 2016 has not been followed, and in that circumstances the learned Single Judge interfered with the impugned order, therefore, the same cannot be said to suffer from error. 21. Accordingly, the instant intra-court appeal fails and is dismissed. 22. Consequent upon disposal of intra court appeal the pending Interlocutory Application being I.A. No. 2537 of 2021 stands disposed of.