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Allahabad High Court · body

2023 DIGILAW 2252 (ALL)

Brij Kumar Singh v. State of U. P.

2023-10-04

ASHUTOSH SRIVASTAVA, PRITINKER DIWAKER

body2023
JUDGMENT : Order on Civil Misc. Delay Condonation Application No. 9 of 2020: The Review Application is reported beyond time by 60 days. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-respondent does not oppose the Delay Condonation Application. Consequently, the delay is condoned. The Review Application shall be treated to have been filed within the period of limitation. Order on Civil Misc. Review Application No. 10 of 2020: 1. The present review petition has been filed by the Moradabad Development Authority, respondent No. 4 in the writ petition seeking the review of the judgment and order dated 11.06.2020 passed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 39872 of 2018 whereby and whereunder the writ petition was allowed and the impugned order dated 6.8.2018 was quashed and at the same time, a direction was issued to the respondents to expunge the name of the respondent-State from the revenue records and to restore that of the petitioner who was stated to be the owner of the land in question. 2. Learned counsel for the Development Authority submitted that there is error apparent on the face of the record in as much as the Court erred in law to resort to Section 10(6) of the Act to prove possession though it is not the case of forceful possession since the possession had already been taken on 13.11.1992. It has been further contended that notice under Section 10(5) of the Act was issued on 24.08.1992 which was duly served on the tenure holder and the writ petitioner raised no objection to the said notice under Section 10(5) of the Act and on 13.11.1992 peaceful possession of the land was delivered to the State Government and hence, the possession been taken much before the Repeal Act and thus benefit of the Repeal act could not be given to the petitioner. It has been further contended that the District Judge, Moradabad in his report had stated that the land in question is a vacant land and there is no crops standing over it and the vacant land be construed as vacant land as per the provision of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976, however, this Court erred in law in misconstruing and misinterpreting the same and as such, the judgment and order is liable to be reviewed. 3. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the record. 4. 3. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the record. 4. The core argument advanced by the learned Counsel for the Applicant is that this court erred in law in recording a finding that possession memo dated 13.11.1992 is merely a paper possession and is not actual possession which finding, is against the law propounded by the Apex court in the case of Banda Development Authority vs. Motilal Agarwal, (2011) 5 SCC 394 and this court also did not take into consideration the law propounded by the Apex court in the case of State of Assam vs. Bhasker Jyoti Sharma, (2015) 5 SCC 321 , in which it has been held that non challenge to the notice under section 10 (5) of the Act by the owner of the land for a long time acquire legitimacy to the possession taken by the State Government by sheer lapse of time. 5. Before dealing with the submissions of the learned Counsel it would be trite to discuss the relevant provisions of law that govern review jurisdiction. 6. Section 114 of the CPC which is the substantive provision, deals with the scope of review and states as follows: “Review: Subject as aforesaid, any person considering himself aggrieved: (a) By a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by this Code, but from which no appeal has been preferred. (b) By a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by this Code. (c) By a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, may apply for a review of judgment to the court which passed the decree or made the order, and the court may make such order thereon as it thinks fit.” 7. The grounds available for filing a review application against a judgment have been set out in Order XLVII of the CPC in the following words: “1. Application for review of judgment: (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved: (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred. (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed. Application for review of judgment: (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved: (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred. (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed. (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order. (2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or Order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review. Explanation - The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment.” 8. A glance at the aforesaid provisions makes it clear that a review application would be maintainable on (i) discovery of new and important matters or evidence which, after exercise of due diligence, were not within the knowledge of the applicant or could not be produced by him when the decree was passed or the order made; (ii) on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or (iii) for any other sufficient reason. 9. In Col. Avatar Singh Sekhon vs. Union of India and Others, 1980 Supp. 9. In Col. Avatar Singh Sekhon vs. Union of India and Others, 1980 Supp. SCC 562, the Apex Court observed that a review of an earlier order cannot be done unless the court is satisfied that the material error which is manifest on the face of the order, would result in miscarriage of justice or undermine its soundness. The observations made are as under: “12. A review is not a routine procedure. Here we resolved to hear Shri Kapil at length to remove any feeling that the party has been hurt without being heard. But we cannot review our earlier order unless satisfied that material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. In Sow Chandra Kante and Another vs. Sheikh Habib this Court observed: “A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility.........The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality.” (Emphasis added) 10. In Parsion Devi and Others vs. Sumitri Devi and Others, 1997 (8) SCC 715 , the Apex Court stated that an error that is not self-evident and the one that has to be detected by the process of reasoning, cannot be described as an error apparent on the face of the record for the Court to exercise the powers of review and held as under: “7. It is well settled that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. vs. Govt. of A.P. this Court opined: “11. What, however, we are now concerned with is whether the statement in the order of September 1959 that the case did not involve any substantial question of law is an ‘error apparent on the face of the record’. The fact that on the earlier occasion the Court held on an identical state of facts that a substantial question of law arose would not per se be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be erroneous. The fact that on the earlier occasion the Court held on an identical state of facts that a substantial question of law arose would not per se be conclusive, for the earlier order itself might be erroneous. Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not follow that it was an ‘error apparent on the face of the record’ for there is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterized as vitiated by ‘error apparent’. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error.” 8. Again, in Meera Bhanja vs. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury while quoting with approval a passage from Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma vs. Aribam Pishak Sharma this Court once again held that review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. 9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to review inter-alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of this jurisdiction under Order 47 rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be reheard and corrected. A review petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be an appeal in disguise.” (Emphasis added) 11. The error referred to under the Rule, must be apparent on the face of the record and not one which has to be searched out. While discussing the scope and ambit to review its judgments and in the course of discussing the contours of review jurisdiction under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC in case of Lily Thomas, the Apex Court held: “54. Article 137 empowers this court to review its judgments subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or any rules made under Article 145 of the Constitution. Article 137 empowers this court to review its judgments subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or any rules made under Article 145 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court Rules made in exercise of the powers under Article 145 of the Constitution prescribe that in civil cases, review lies on any of the grounds specified in Order 47 rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides: “1. Application for review of judgment: (1) Any person considering himself aggrieved: (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred. (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed. (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order.’ Under Order XL Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules no review lies except on the ground of error apparent on the face of the record in criminal cases. Order XL Rule 5 of the Supreme Court Rules provides that after an application for review has been disposed of no further application shall be entertained in the same matter. xxx xxx xxx 56. It follows, therefore, that the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review. Once a review petition is dismissed no further petition of review can be entertained. The rule of law of following the practice of the binding nature of the larger Benches and not taking different views by the Benches of coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to be followed and practised. Once a review petition is dismissed no further petition of review can be entertained. The rule of law of following the practice of the binding nature of the larger Benches and not taking different views by the Benches of coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to be followed and practised. However, this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 136 or Article 32 of the Constitution and upon satisfaction that the earlier judgments have resulted in deprivation of fundamental rights of a citizen or rights created under any other statute, can take a different view notwithstanding the earlier judgment. xxx xxx xxx 58. Otherwise also no ground as envisaged under Order XL of the Supreme Court Rules read with Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been pleaded in the review petition or canvassed before us during the arguments for the purposes of reviewing the judgment in Sarla Mudgal Case. It is not the case of the petitioners that they have discovered any new and important matter which after the exercise of due diligence was not within their knowledge or could not be brought to the notice of the Court at the time of passing of the judgment. All pleas raised before us were in fact addressed for and on behalf of the petitioners before the Bench which, after considering those pleas, passed the judgment in Sarla Mudgal16 case. We have also not found any mistake or error apparent on the face of the record requiring a review. Error contemplated under the rule must be such which is apparent on the face of the record and not an error which has to be fished out and searched. It must be an error of inadvertence. No such error has been pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the parties seeking review of the judgment. The only arguments advanced were that the judgment interpreting Section 494 amounted to violation of some of the fundamental rights. No other sufficient cause has been shown for reviewing the judgment. The words “any other sufficient reason appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC” must mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule” as was held in Chajju Ram vs. Neki Ram and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius. The words “any other sufficient reason appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC” must mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule” as was held in Chajju Ram vs. Neki Ram and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius. Error apparent on the face of the proceedings is an error which is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law in T.C. Basappa vs. T. Nagappa this Court held that such error is an error which is a patent error and not a mere wrong decision. In Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad, it was held: “It is essential that it should be something more than a mere error; it must be one which must be manifest on the face of the record. The real difficulty with reference to this matter, however, is not so much in the statement of the principle as in its application to the facts of a particular case. When does an error, cease to be mere error and become an error apparent on the face of the record? Learned Counsel on either side were unable to suggest any clear-cut rule by which the boundary between the two classes of errors could be demarcated. Mr. Pathak for the first respondent contended on the strength of certain observations of Chagla, C.J. in Batuk K. Vyas vs. Surat Borough Municipality, that no error could be said to be apparent on the face of the record if it was not self-evident and if it required an examination or argument to establish it. This test might afford a satisfactory basis for decision in the majority of cases. But there must be cases in which even this test might break down, because judicial opinions also differ, and an error that might be considered by one Judge as self-evident might not be so considered by another. The fact is that what is an error apparent on the face of the record cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively, there being an element of indefiniteness inherent in its very nature, and it must be left to be determined judicially on the facts of each case. The fact is that what is an error apparent on the face of the record cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively, there being an element of indefiniteness inherent in its very nature, and it must be left to be determined judicially on the facts of each case. Therefore, it can safely be held that the petitioners have not made out any case within the meaning of Article 137 read with Order XL of the Supreme Court Rules and Order 47 Rule 1 CPC for reviewing the judgment in Sarla Mudgal Case. The petition is misconceived and bereft of any substance.” (Emphasis added) 12. It is also settled law that in exercise of review jurisdiction, the Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence to arrive at a different conclusion even if two views are possible in a matter. In Kerala State Electricity Board vs. Hitech Electrothermics and Hydropower Ltd. and Others, 2005 (6) SCC 651 , the Apex Court observed as follows: “10........In a review petition it is not open to this Court to re-appreciate the evidence and reach a different conclusion, even if that is possible. Learned counsel for the Board at best sought to impress us that the correspondence exchanged between the parties did not support the conclusion reached by this Court. We are afraid such a submission cannot be permitted to be advanced in a review petition. The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court. If on appreciation of the evidence produced, the court records a finding of fact and reaches a conclusion, that conclusion cannot be assailed in a review petition unless it is shown that there is an error apparent on the face of the record or for some reason akin thereto. It has not been contended before us that there is any error apparent on the face of the record. To permit the review petitioner to argue on a question of appreciation of evidence would amount to converting a review petition into an appeal in disguise.” (Emphasis added) 13. Under the garb of filing a review petition, a party cannot be permitted to repeat old and overruled arguments for reopening the conclusions arrived at in a judgment. The power of review is not to be confused with the appellate power which enables the Superior Court to correct errors committed by a subordinate Court. Under the garb of filing a review petition, a party cannot be permitted to repeat old and overruled arguments for reopening the conclusions arrived at in a judgment. The power of review is not to be confused with the appellate power which enables the Superior Court to correct errors committed by a subordinate Court. This point has been elucidated in Jain Studios Ltd. vs. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd. 2006 (5) SCC 501 where it was held thus: “11. So far as the grievance of the applicant on merits is concerned, the learned counsel for the opponent is right in submitting that virtually the applicant seeks the same relief which had been sought at the time of arguing the main matter and had been negatived. Once such a prayer had been refused, no review petition would lie which would convert rehearing of the original matter. It is settled law that the power of review cannot be confused with appellate power which enables a superior court to correct all errors committed by a subordinate court. It is not rehearing of an original matter. A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. The power of review can be exercised with extreme care, caution and circumspection and only in exceptional cases. 12. When a prayer to appoint an arbitrator by the applicant herein had been made at the time when the arbitration petition was heard and was rejected, the same relief cannot be sought by an indirect method by filing a review petition. Such petition, in my opinion, is in the nature of ‘second innings’ which is impermissible and unwarranted and cannot be granted.” (Emphasis added) 14. After discussing a series of decisions on review jurisdiction in Kamlesh Verma vs. Mayawati and Others, 2013 (8) SCC 320 the Apex Court observed that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC. As long as the point sought to be raised in the review application has already been dealt with and answered, parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment only because an alternative view is possible. The principles for exercising review jurisdiction were succinctly summarized in the captioned case as below: “20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute: 20.1. The principles for exercising review jurisdiction were succinctly summarized in the captioned case as below: “20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute: 20.1. When the review will be maintainable: (i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him. (ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. (iii) Any other sufficient reason. The words “any other sufficient reason” has been interpreted in Chajju Ram vs. Neki Ram and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule.” The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India vs. Sandur Manganese and Iron Ores Ltd. and Others. 20.2. When the review will not be maintainable: (i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. (ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import. (iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case. (iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. (v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for patent error. (vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review. (vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched. (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition. (ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.” 15. (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition. (ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.” 15. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma vs. Aribam Pishak Sharma, 2013 (8) SCC 337 , the Apex Court was examining an order passed by the Judicial Commissioner who was reviewing an earlier judgment that went in favour of the appellant, while deciding a review application filed by the respondents therein who took a ground that the predecessor Court had overlooked two important documents that showed that the respondents were in possession of the sites through which the appellant had sought easementary rights to access his homestead. The said appeal was allowed by Apex Court with the following observations: “3.......It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh and Others vs. State of Punjab there is nothing in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and pulpable errors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.” (Emphasis added) 16. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be confused with appellate power which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.” (Emphasis added) 16. In State of West Bengal and Others vs. Kamal Sengupta and Another, 2008 (8) SCC 612 , the Apex Court emphasized the requirement of the review petitioner who approaches a Court on the ground of discovery of a new matter or evidence, to demonstrate that the same was not within his knowledge and held thus: “21. At this stage it is apposite to observe that where a review is sought on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence, such matter or evidence must be relevant and must be of such a character that if the same had been produced, it might have altered the judgment. In other words, mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review ex debito justitiae. Not only this, the party seeking review has also to show that such additional matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the court earlier.” (Emphasis added) 17. In the captioned judgment, the term ‘mistake or error apparent’ has been discussed in the following words: “22. The term ‘mistake or error apparent’ by its very connotation signifies an error which is evident per se from the record of the case and does not require detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts or the legal position. If an error is not self-evident and detection thereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC or Section 22(3) (f) of the Act. To put it differently an order or decision or judgment cannot be corrected merely because it is erroneous in law or on the ground that a different view could have been taken by the court/tribunal on a point of fact or law. In any case, while exercising the power of review, the court/tribunal concerned cannot sit in appeal over its judgment/decision.” (Emphasis added) 18. In any case, while exercising the power of review, the court/tribunal concerned cannot sit in appeal over its judgment/decision.” (Emphasis added) 18. In S. Nagaraj and Others vs. State of Karnataka and Another, 1993 Supp. (4) SCC 595, the Apex Court explained as to when a review jurisdiction could be treated as statutory or inherent and held thus: “18. Justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers. Neither the rules of procedure nor technicalities of law can stand in its way. The order of the court should not be prejudicial to anyone. Rule of stare decisis is adhered for consistency but it is not as inflexible in Administrative Law as in Public Law. Even the law bends before justice. Entire concept of writ jurisdiction exercised by the higher courts is founded on equity and fairness. If the court finds that the order was passed under a mistake and it would not have exercised the jurisdiction but for the erroneous assumption which in fact did not exist and its perpetration shall result in miscarriage of justice then it cannot on any principle be precluded from rectifying the error. Mistake is accepted as valid reason to recall an order. Difference lies in the nature of mistake and scope of rectification, depending on if it is of fact or law. But the root from which the power flows is the anxiety to avoid injustice. It is either statutory or inherent. The latter is available where the mistake is of the Court.” (Emphasis added) 19. In Patel Narshi Thakershi and Others vs. Shri Pradyuman Singhji Arjunsinghji, 1971 (3) SCC 844 , the Apex Court held as follows: “4.......It is well settled that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. No provision in the Act was brought to notice from which it could be gathered that the Government had power to review its own order. If the Government had no power to review its own order, it is obvious that its delegate could not have reviewed its order......” (Emphasis added) 20. In Ram Sahu (Dead) through LRs. No provision in the Act was brought to notice from which it could be gathered that the Government had power to review its own order. If the Government had no power to review its own order, it is obvious that its delegate could not have reviewed its order......” (Emphasis added) 20. In Ram Sahu (Dead) through LRs. and Others vs. Vinod Kumar Rawat and Others, 2020 SCC Online SC 896, citing previous decisions and expounding on the scope and ambit of Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1, the Apex Court has observed that Section 114 CPC does not lay any conditions precedent for exercising the power of review; and nor does the Section prohibit the Court from exercising its power to review a decision. However, an order can be reviewed by the Court only on the grounds prescribed in Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. The said power cannot be exercised as an inherent power and nor can appellate power be exercised in the guise of exercising the power of review. 21. As can be seen from the above exposition of law, it has been consistently held by the Apex Court in several judicial pronouncements that the Court’s jurisdiction of review, is not the same as that of an appeal. A judgment can be open to review if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record, but an error that has to be detected by a process of reasoning, cannot be described as an error apparent on the face of the record for the Court to exercise its powers of review under Order XLVII Rule1 CPC. In the guise of exercising powers of review, the Court can correct a mistake but not substitute the view taken earlier merely because there is a possibility of taking two views in a matter. A judgment may also be open to review when any new or important matter of evidence has emerged after passing of the judgment, subject to the condition that such evidence was not within the knowledge of the party seeking review or could not be produced by it when the order was made despite undertaking an exercise of due diligence. There is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision as against an error apparent on the face of the record. There is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision as against an error apparent on the face of the record. An erroneous decision can be corrected by the Superior Court, however an error apparent on the face of the record can only be corrected by exercising review jurisdiction. Yet another circumstance referred to in Order XLVII Rule 1 for reviewing a judgment has been described as “for any other sufficient reason.” The said phrase has been explained to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule.” 22. In the light of the legal position crystalized above, we now proceed to examine the grievance raised by the applicant. While dealing with the submissions of the Development Authority vis-a-vis possession, this Court while allowing the writ petition has clearly held that the petitioner is in actual physical possession of the land in question. The Moradabad Development Authority aggrieved by the order passed by this court preferred Special Leave Petition No. 12283 of 2012. The Apex Court called for the report on the point of possession from the District Judge, Moradabad, who submitted the report. The Apex Court after considering the said report dismissed the SPL filed by the Development Authority and recorded a specific finding that actual physical possession is with the petitioner. 23. So far as the contention of the learned Counsel for the Development Authority to the effect that it is the case of peaceful delivery of possession, this court has recorded a specific finding that it is also not the case of the respondents that after publication of the notice u/s 10 (5) of the principal Act in the official gazette, the petitioner had delivered the physical possession of his surplus land to the respondent nos. 1 to 3. Thus this argument can also not be sustained as the respondent/applicant can not be permitted to carve out a new case in review proceedings. 24. Thus this court in the guise of exercising powers of review, though can correct a mistake but not substitute the view taken earlier merely because there is a possibility of taking two views in a matter. 24. Thus this court in the guise of exercising powers of review, though can correct a mistake but not substitute the view taken earlier merely because there is a possibility of taking two views in a matter. A judgment can be open to review if there is a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record, but an error that has to be detected by a process of reasoning, cannot be described as an error apparent on the face of the record for the Court to exercise its powers of review. As long as the point sought to be raised in the review application has already been dealt with and answered, parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment only because an alternative view is possible. 25. For the reasons stated above the present review application lacks merit and is hereby dismissed.