JUDGMENT : Ramesh Sinha, J. 1. This criminal appeal preferred under Section 374(2) of the CrPC is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 22.12.2014 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Pratappur, District Surajpur in Sessions Case No.13/2013 by which the appellant has been convicted for offence under Sections 302 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.500/-, in default, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for fifteen days. 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that one Bhrigunath (PW-3) (father of the accused-appellant) lodged merg intimation (Ex.P-7) on 16.7.2013 at about 11 a.m. in Police Station Pratappur that his younger son Shambhu Prajapati was married with Sharmila Devi (since deceased). After marriage, deceased Sharmila Devi stayed for two days at village Tukudand (Bhandarpara) and later on, she went to village Kon, Distt.Sonbhadra (UP) for examination and returned back after two months to village Tukudand in her matrimonial house. Thereafter again she went to her parental house and after residing there for 22 days, again she came to village Tukudand (Bhandarpara). 3. Later on, she again went to village Kon, Sonbhadra District (UP) and after sometime, she returned back to village Tukudand during the festival of Dashera. In the meanwhile, Jhulan (PW-17), father of deceased Sharmila, came to Tukudand in order to take Sharmila for receiving scholarship, which was granted to her. In the meanwhile, the family members of accused Shambhu Prajapati went to village Kon for several times, but she refused to come back along with them. 4. Lastly, on 10.07.2013, the Panchayat members of village Tukudand along with the accused and his father approached to village Kon in order to bring deceased Sharmila at Tukudand. After amicable settlement between both the parties, the Panchayat members returned back to village Tukudand and the accused stayed there for few days and came to village Tukudand on 15.07.2013 along with Sharmila. The allegation against the appellant herein is that on the date of incident, accused / appellant Shambhu Prajapati locked his room from outside leaving his wife Sharmila Devi in room and went away. On 16.07.2013 when the accused did not return back to his house, the villagers and neighbors broke the lock and found Sharmila dead in the room. 5. The allegation against the appellant herein is that on the date of incident, accused / appellant Shambhu Prajapati locked his room from outside leaving his wife Sharmila Devi in room and went away. On 16.07.2013 when the accused did not return back to his house, the villagers and neighbors broke the lock and found Sharmila dead in the room. 5. On the basis of merg intimation (Ex.P-7), FIR (Ex.P-8) has been registered against the appellant for offence under Section 302 of the IPC. Inquest was conducted over dead body of deceased Sharmila vide Ex.P-2. Nazari naksha was prepared vide Ex.P-6. Spot map was prepared by the investigating officer vide Ex.P-9. Bloodstains & plain soil, bamboo stick and axe were seized from the spot vide Ex.P-3 in presence of Rajkumar Soni and Devpratap. Bloodstains sari and blouse were also seized vide Ex.P-12. Dead body of deceased Sharmila Devi was sent for postmortem to Primary Health Center, Pratappur vide Ex.P-20, where Dr.A.K. Vishwakarma (PW-15) conducted postmortem over the body of the deceased vide Ex.P-13 and found following injuries:- “The dead body was found supine in position. Head & neck smeared with blood. Neck cut down with bone just attached with post skin. Ornaments in ear, neck, leg, hand was present. She was put down Redsari, Red petticoat, Redblouse, white braw. Neck is severed down by sharp cutting & hard obj. whole body pale, both eye close. 10 cm x 5 cm H x V length of post skin whatever left behind. Rigor mortis present, lividity fixed on post aspect, a paper something written was found in right braw handed over to police, 3cmx0.5cmxskin deep 3 injury on frontal bone, whole teeth break down, Triangular injury 4 parietal (Ant) bone.” After having careful postmortem examination, the doctor came to the conclusion that the cause of death was due to heamorrhagic shock and death was homicidal in nature. The appellant was arrested on 17.8.2013 vide Ex.P-17. 6. Statements of the witnesses were recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC. After usual investigation, the accused / appellant was charge-sheeted for offence under Section 302 of the IPC and charge-sheet was filed before the jurisdictional criminal court and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions from where the Additional Sessions Judge, Pratappur, received the case on transfer for hearing and disposal in accordance with law. 7. After usual investigation, the accused / appellant was charge-sheeted for offence under Section 302 of the IPC and charge-sheet was filed before the jurisdictional criminal court and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions from where the Additional Sessions Judge, Pratappur, received the case on transfer for hearing and disposal in accordance with law. 7. The accused / appellant abjured the guilt and entered into witness. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as many as 22 witnesses and exhibited 20 documents. The defence has examined none and no document has been exhibited. 8. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence on record and considering that it is the appellant who has caused the murder of his wife, proceeded to convict and sentence him under Section 302 of the IPC in the manner mentioned in the opening paragraph of this judgment against which the instant appeal under Section 374(2) of the CrPC has been preferred. 9. Mr.V.K.Pandey, learned counsel for the appellant submits that axe has not been recovered from possession of the present appellant and axe seized from the place of incident was sent to FSL for examination, but FSL report has not been brought on record and it has not been proved and as such, it cannot be held that blood was found in axe and therefore, the appellant could not be connected in offence in question. He further submits that it is the case of the prosecution that the appellant locked the door from outside and went away, but no such lock was seized from the place of incident. Memorandum statement of the appellant has been recorded in presence of two witnesses Rajkumar Soni (PW-1) and Pradeep Kumar (PW-22), but both the witnesses have turned hostile and they have not supported the case of the prosecution. He also submits that panch witnesses Shivnarayan (PW-6), Satish (PW-7) and Bhuneshwar Prasad (PW-8) have also not supported the case of the prosecution. Therefore, it is the case where the appellant deserves to be acquitted. He relied upon the judgment of this Court passed in Criminal Appeal No.533 of 2014 (Karan Prasad v. State of Chhattisgarh, para-16), decided on 4.5.2022. 10. Therefore, it is the case where the appellant deserves to be acquitted. He relied upon the judgment of this Court passed in Criminal Appeal No.533 of 2014 (Karan Prasad v. State of Chhattisgarh, para-16), decided on 4.5.2022. 10. On the other hand, Mr.Sudeep Verma, learned Deputy Government Advocate, appearing for the respondent/State, supports the impugned judgment and submits that Jhulan (PW-17) (father of deceased Sharmila Devi) has stated in his evidence that soon before death of his daughter, she was subjected to cruelty on account of demand of dowry. He submitted that the deceased was brought by the appellant on the date of incident and done to death by the appellant in the room of his house. The appellant has failed to explain the death of his wife. The FIR of incident was lodged by father of the appellant. He contended that the prosecution has been able to bring home the offence beyond reasonable doubt and the trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for offence under Section 302 of the IPC and therefore, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 11.We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the original records of the trial Court with utmost circumspection and carefully as well. 12. The first question for consideration would be, whether the trial Court was justified in holding that death of deceased Sharmila Devi was homicidal in nature ? 13. The trial Court relying upon the statement of Dr.A.K.Vishwakarma (PW-15), who has conducted postmortem on the body of deceased Sharmila vide Ex.P-13, has clearly come to the conclusion that death of deceased Sharmila was homicidal in nature. The said finding recorded by the trial Court is a finding of fact based on evidence available on record, which is neither perverse nor contrary to record. Even otherwise, it has not been seriously disputed by the learned counsel for the appellant. We hereby affirm the said finding. 14. The next question for consideration would be, whether the trial Court has rightly held that the appellant is author of the crime by relying upon the following circumstances:- (i) Homicidal death was proved by the prosecution as per postmortem report (Ex.P-13) of Dr.A.K. Vishwakarma (PW-15) who conducted autopsy. We hereby affirm the said finding. 14. The next question for consideration would be, whether the trial Court has rightly held that the appellant is author of the crime by relying upon the following circumstances:- (i) Homicidal death was proved by the prosecution as per postmortem report (Ex.P-13) of Dr.A.K. Vishwakarma (PW-15) who conducted autopsy. (ii) Motive has been proved as per the statement of Jhulan (PW-17) (father of the deceased) who has stated in his evidence that soon before death of his daughter, she was subjected to cruelty on account of demand of dowry and that is the reason, on previous occasion meeting of panchayat was conducted to mediate and settle the dispute. (iii) As per the case of the prosecution, the fact of death of deceased Sharmila was within the knowledge of the appellant, however, there was no any explanation given by the appellant in his statement under Section 313 of the CrPC. Thus, burden of proof was on the appellant to explain such circumstance, which he failed to explain. 15. Now, the question would be, whether Section 106 of the Evidence Act would be applicable or not? 16. Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, states as under: - “106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.—When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.” 17. This provision states that when any fact is specially within the knowledge of any person the burden of proving that fact is upon him. This is an exception to the general rule contained in Section 101, namely, that the burden is on the person who asserts a fact. The principle underlying Section 106 which is an exception to the general rule governing burden of proof applies only to such matters of defence which are supposed to be especially within the knowledge of the other side. To invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the main point to be established by prosecution is that the accused persons were in such a position that they could have special knowledge of the fact concerned. 18. To invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the main point to be established by prosecution is that the accused persons were in such a position that they could have special knowledge of the fact concerned. 18. In the matter of Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer, AIR 1956 SC 404 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 of the Evidence Act is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution, to establish facts which are “especially” within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The Supreme Court while considering the word “especially” employed in Section 106 of the Evidence Act, speaking through Vivian Bose, J., observed as under: - “11. … The word "especially" stresses that it means facts that are preeminently or exceptionally within his knowledge. If the section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who could know better than he whether he did or did not. It is evident that that cannot be the intention and the Privy Council has twice refused to construe this section, as reproduced in certain other Acts outside India, to mean that the burden lies on an accused person to show that he did not commit the crime for which he is tried. These cases are Attygalle v. The King, 1936 PC 169 (AIR V 23) (A) and Seneviratne v. R. 1936-3 ER 36 AT P. 49 (B).” Their Lordships further held that Section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot be used to undermine the well established rule of law that save in a very exceptional class of case, the burden is on the prosecution and never shifts. 19. The decision of the Supreme Court in Shambhu Nath Mehra (supra) was followed with approval recently in the matter of Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar, (2021) 10 SCC 725 in which it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as under: - “22. 19. The decision of the Supreme Court in Shambhu Nath Mehra (supra) was followed with approval recently in the matter of Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar, (2021) 10 SCC 725 in which it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as under: - “22. Thus, Section 106 of the Evidence Act will apply to those cases where the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts which are within the special knowledge of the accused. When the accused fails to offer proper explanation about the existence of said other facts, the court can always draw an appropriate inference. 23. When a case is resting on circumstantial evidence, if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of burden placed on him by virtue of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, such a failure may provide an additional link to the chain of circumstances. In a case governed by circumstantial evidence, if the chain of circumstances which is required to be established by the prosecution is not established, the failure of the accused to discharge the burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act is not relevant at all. When the chain is not complete, falsity of the defence is no ground to convict the accused.” 20. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the matter of Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 460 , while considering the provisions contained in Sections 103 & 106 of the Evidence Act, held that the burden of proving a plea specially set up by an accused which may absolve him from criminal liability, certainly lies upon him, but neither the application of Section 103 nor that of 106 could, however, absolve the prosecution from the duty of discharging its general or primary burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt. It was further held by their Lordships that it is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or which makes out a prima facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof may lie upon the accused. Their Lordships also held that the burden of proving a plea specifically set up by an accused, which may absolve him from criminal liability, certain lies upon him. 21. Their Lordships also held that the burden of proving a plea specifically set up by an accused, which may absolve him from criminal liability, certain lies upon him. 21. The principle of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Gurcharan Singh (supra) has been followed with approval by their Lordships in the matter of Sawal Das v. State of Bihar, AIR 1974 SC 778 and it has been held that burden of proving the case against the accused was on the prosecution irrespective of whether or not the accused has made out a specific defence. 22. Bhrigunath (PW-3) in para-2 of his evidence has stated that on the date of incident the appellant came along with deceased Sharmila in his house at 3 p.m. and thereafter at about 3.30 p.m. the appellant proceeded to visit Village Khunshi and this witness, Sharmila and his wife were present in the house. Deceased Sharmila prepared the meal and served to them and also eat. After taking meal, he and his wife went inside their room for sleeping and deceased Sharmila also went in her room for sleeping. When he and his wife woke up at 6-6.30 a.m. they saw that deceased Sharmila was lying on the floor soaked with blood, blood was also lying on the floor and at that time, Sharmila has died. Then, they proceeded to the Sarpanch of village and gathered 2-4 persons and informed the incident to them. They told him that go and lodge the report at police station, thereafter he went to the police station and lodged the report. In para-10 of his cross-examination, he has stated that deceased Sharmila was brought in his house after convening panchayat meeting in her parental house. He does not know about Bandhpatra, but in plain paper, signature has obtained. In para-11 of his cross-examination, he has stated that it is incorrect to say that at about 6.30 p.m. when he came to his house at that time his son Shambhu Prajapati locked the room. He has stated that at that night his son Shambhu did not come back. 23. Batmaniya Bai (PW-4) is mother of the appellant. In para-11 of his cross-examination, he has stated that it is incorrect to say that at about 6.30 p.m. when he came to his house at that time his son Shambhu Prajapati locked the room. He has stated that at that night his son Shambhu did not come back. 23. Batmaniya Bai (PW-4) is mother of the appellant. On the date of incident, her daughter-in-law and son came to her house and at 5 p.m. her son proceeded to village Khunshi for Satsang by cycle and after taking meal at night, she and her husband went for sleeping in their room and her daughter-in-law also went for sleeping in her room. On second day at about 5 a.m. when her husband woke up and after sometime went inside the room of his daughter-in-law, he saw dead body of his daughter-in-law. 24. Jhulan (PW-17) in para-2 of his evidence has stated that the appellant and his father used to assault Sharmila on account of demand of dowry. In para-3 of his evidence, he has stated that meeting of panchayat was convened between him, the appellant, his father and others and decision was taken by Panchayat and told him to send Sharmila along with the appellant on the promise that no quarrel would would took place hereinafter. After 4-5 days of Panchayat, deceased Sharmila sent with the appellant in village Tukudand. At about 6 p.m. the appellant informed him that they reached to village Tukudand. In para-5 of his evidence, he has stated that on second day at about 6 a.m. brother-in-law (bahnoi) of the appellant informed him that after locking the room, the appellant fled away somewhere. After receiving information, he, his son, his brother and others reached to village Tukudand at 2.30 p.m. and saw that the appellant’s room was locked. The police opened the lock and entered into the room and saw that Sharmila was lying dead and her neck was cut. In para-7 of his cross-examination, he has stated that before the incident, no report was lodged by him and his daughter against the appellant and his parents regarding demand of dowry. It is correct to say that no complaint was made by him before Police Station Pratappur regarding demand of dowry and assault made by the appellant and his parents. 25. It is correct to say that no complaint was made by him before Police Station Pratappur regarding demand of dowry and assault made by the appellant and his parents. 25. Dr.A.K.Vishwakarma (PW-15) has stated in para-1 of his evidence as under:- ^^ckg~; ijh{k.k%&'ko fpr voLFkk esa FkkA flj vkSj xys esa [kwu yxk gqvk Fkk A xyk dk gM~Mh rd dVk gqvk FkkA dsoy xnZu ds ihNs dh fLdu cph gqbZ FkhA dM+s ,oa /kkjnkj vkStkj ls dkVk x;k FkkA nksuksa vka[ks can FkhA jkbZxj ekfLVZ'k mifLFkr FkkA fofoMhVh fQDl FkhA ekFks dh gM~Mh ds mij rhu pksVsa Fkh] ftudk lkbZt 3x.5 c.m fLdu MsIFk A ck;s iSukbZVy cksu ij ,d Vªk;,xqyj pksV FkkA ftlesa Hkwtk dh yackbZ 07x5x8 c.m. FkkA vkarfjd ijh{k.k%& 01 diky%& ckg; iSjkbVu fttu esa cSzu iSjudkbZek Msest FkkA vU; Hkkx lkekU; FkkA 02 FkksjsDl%&’okl uyh MSest FkhA QsQMs+ nksuksa dkatsLVsM Fkk g`n; nksuksa [kkyh FkhA 03 mnj%& isV esa v)ipk Hkkstu ,oa [kwu FkkA vU; Hkkx lkekU; FkkA fiztoZ eVsfj;y%& lkM+h] Cykmt] nksuksa dks fiztoZ djds mlh vkj{kd dks ,Q0,l0,y Hkstus ds fy, lksi fn;k FkkA vfHker%& e`R;q dk dkj.k fgejsftd lkd ¼jDr rsth ls cguk½ e`R;q dk le; 18&30 ?kUVs ds chp dk FkkA e`R;q dk izd`fr gR;kRed FkhA esjs }kjk rS;kj dh xbZ 'ko ijh{k.k fjiksVZ iz0ih0&13 gS] ftlds v ls v Hkkx ij esjk gLrk{kj gSA After having careful postmortem examination, the doctor had come to the conclusion that cause of death was haemorrhagic shock and death was homicidal in nature. 26. Investigating Officer Filmon Toppo (PW-20) in para-9 of his evidence has stated that during investigation he found that the appellant and his father Bhrigunath both residing in the same house and also found that there is only one door to get out of the house. He has stated that during the statement of witness Jhulan Prajapati, it transpires that demand of dowry and assault was made by the accused and his parents to the deceased. He has stated that during investigation it also transpires that while giving statement witness Jhulan Prajapati has informed regarding demand of dowry and assault by the appellant and his parents. He has stated that only father of the deceased has stated about demand of dowry and other witnesses have not stated about demand of dowry. He has stated that during investigation it also transpires that while giving statement witness Jhulan Prajapati has informed regarding demand of dowry and assault by the appellant and his parents. He has stated that only father of the deceased has stated about demand of dowry and other witnesses have not stated about demand of dowry. It is correct to say that on the date of incident after convening panchayat meeting deceased Sharmila was brought by the appellant in his house. In para-10 of his evidence, he has stated that it is incorrect that in merg intimation Ex.P-7 it has not been mentioned that who has caused the incident. It is correct to say that in merg intimation it has not been mentioned that the informant has not seen the incident. In para-11, he has stated that it is correct that in merg intimation Ex.P-7 and first information report Ex.P-8, it has not been mentioned that in-laws of deceased Sharmila Prajapati were torturing her on account of demand of dowry. It is incorrect to say that he has not seized articles, stick and iron axe in presence of Rajkumar Soni and Devpratap. It is incorrect to say that during investigation, it has been informed that there was old enmity of the appellant and his father with neighbors and that is the reason on the date of incident some unknown person caused murder of Sharmila in absence of appellant Shabhu Prajapati. 27. Rajkumar Soni (PW-1) is memorandum and seizure witness. He has stated in para-2 of his evidence that at about 9 a.m. Bhrigunath (PW-3) came to his house and informed him that his son Sambhu Prajapati was not present in the house, he locked the house and told that he went for bringing Shivnarayan and Surjan and till his arrival he will not open the house. After informing the father of the appellant, he along with other persons informed the incident to Jageshwar, husband of Sarpanch by phone, when they opened the door, dead body of the appellant’s wife was lying soaked with blood. 28. Surjan Prajapati (PW-5), Shivnarayan (PW-6), Satish (PW-7) and Bhuneshwar Prasad (PW-8) are members of the Panchayat held in matrimonial house of the deceased. 28. Surjan Prajapati (PW-5), Shivnarayan (PW-6), Satish (PW-7) and Bhuneshwar Prasad (PW-8) are members of the Panchayat held in matrimonial house of the deceased. In para-2 of his evidence, Surjan Prajapati (PW-2) has stated that Bhrigunath Prajapati (PW-3) came to his house and informed that his daughter-in-law had gone to her parental house and we will go to bring her, then he said that bring another 2-4 persons and thereafter they will go. Then he along with Bhuneshwar Prajapati, Shivnarayan Jayaswal, Satish Prajapati, Bhrigunath Prajapati and Shambhu Prajapati (appellant herein) proceeded to maternal house of deceased Sharmila where meeting of panchayat was convened. In that meeting, Julan (father of the deceased) has stated that his daughter informed him that her husband, father-in-law and motherin- law tortured her on account of demand of dowry and also assaulted her. In para-3 of his evidence, this witness has stated that Bhrigunath (PW-3) and his son Shambhu Prajapati prayed pardon by saying that they would not torture the girl and would not demand the dowry. Panchayat has prepared panchnama wherein it has been written that if any of the party has committed mistake, then he will pay Rs. 3 lakhs. Statement of this witness has been supported by Shivnarayan (PW-6), Satish (PW-7) and Bhuneshwar Prasad (PW-8). 29. It is the case of no direct evidence, rather conviction is based on circumstantial evidence. Five golden principles which constitute Panchseel of proof of case based on circumstantial evidence have been laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 , which state as under :- “(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. Five golden principles which constitute Panchseel of proof of case based on circumstantial evidence have been laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116 , which state as under :- “(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned “must” or “should” and not “may be” established; (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.” 30. Now, the question is, whether the prosecution has discharged its initial or general burden or primary duty of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt? 31. Now, the question is, whether the prosecution has discharged its initial or general burden or primary duty of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt? 31. In this regard, the findings of the trial Court recorded in paragraph 58 of the judgment are as under: - ^^58@ vr% mijksDrkuqlkj vfHk;kstu dh vksj ls is'k v[kf.Mr o fLFkj lk{; ls ;g Li"V gks tkrk gS fd vfHk;qDr ?kVuk fnukad 15@07@13 ds ,d fnu iwoZ] 'kke dks vius iRuh e`rd 'kfeZyk nsoh dks iapk;r djk dj] mlds ek;ds xzke dksu ftyk&lksuHknz] ¼mRrj izns'k½ ls] viuk ?kj xzke&VqdqMkढ] Fkkuk&izrkiiqj] ftyk&lwjtiqj ¼N0x0½ ysdj vk;k Fkk vkSj mlds ckn jkf= esa e`rd 'kfeZyk nsoh dk gR;k vfHk;qDr o e`rd 'kfeZyk nsoh ds dejk esa fd;k x;k gS] ftldk 'ko dks lqcg ns[ks tkus ij vfHk;qDr ds fo:) fjiksVZ fd;k x;k gS] e`rd 'kfeZyk nsoh ds 'ko Ikk;k x;k ml dejk ds njoktk esa rkyk yxk fn;k x;k Fkk] ftls vfHk;qDr ds ekrk firk o fj'rsnkjksa ds }kjk [kksy dj e`rd 'kfeZyk nsoh ds 'ko dks ns[kk x;k vkSj ?kVuk dk fjiksVZ fd;k x;k gS] /kkjk 106 Hkkjrh; lk{; vf/kfu;e ds vuqlkj tc dksbZ rF; fo'ks"kr% fdlh O;fDr ds Kku esa gS] rc ml rF; dks lkfcr djus dk Hkkj ml ij gS A ,Slh fLFkfr esa tcfd vfHk;qDr e`rd 'kfeZyk nsoh dks ek;ds ls ysdj vk;k vkSj e`rd 'kfeZyk nsoh dk 'ko vfHk;qDr ds rkyk can dejk ik;k x;k gS vkSj vfHk;qDr Hkkx x;k rks vfHk;qDr ds }kjk e`rd 'kfeZyk nsoh dk 'ko mlds Lo;a ds rkyk can dejk esa dSls ik;k x;k vkSj og dgka x;k Fkk] ml laca/k esa vfHk;qDr dks Li"Vhdj.k is'k fd;kk tkuk Fkk] ysfdu mldh vkSj ls dksbZ izekf.kr Li"Vhdj.k is'k ugha fd;s tkus ds dkj.k /kkjk 106 Hkkjrh; lk{; vf/kfu;e ds rgr mlds foijhr ;g fu"d"kZ fudkyk tk;sxk fd vfHk;qDr ds }kjk gh e`rd 'kfeZyk nsoh ds gR;k fd;k x;k gSA 32. A careful perusal of the aforesaid findings recorded by the trial Court would show that the prosecution has established that, 1. death of deceased Sharmila Devi was homicidal in nature; 2. on the date of offence, the appellant & the deceased were staying in the same room ; and 3. it is the appellant who has murdered his wife by chopping neck and he came out of the room after locking it from outside and went somewhere. 33. death of deceased Sharmila Devi was homicidal in nature; 2. on the date of offence, the appellant & the deceased were staying in the same room ; and 3. it is the appellant who has murdered his wife by chopping neck and he came out of the room after locking it from outside and went somewhere. 33. The judgment cited by learned counsel for the appellant i.e. Karan Prasad (supra) is distinguishable to the facts of the present case and is not helpful to him. 34. Considering the statements of the prosecution witnesses, the finding recorded by the trial Court in para-58 of its judgment, the fact that the appellant has not offered any explanation under Section 313 of the CrPC and considering the statement of Jhulan (PW-17) (father of the deceased Sharmila), who has stated that the appellant used to commit torture and cruelty upon deceased Sharmila on account of demand of dowry, we are of the considered opinion that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and the trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for offence under Section 302 of the IPC. We do not find any illegality or irregularity in the findings recorded by the trial Court. 35. For the foregoing reasons, the criminal appeal being devoid of merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. 36. It is stated at the Bar that the the appellant is in jail, he shall serve out the sentence as ordered by the learned trial Court. 37. Let a copy of this judgment and the original record be transmitted to the trial court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance.