JUDGMENT : M.S. JAWALKAR, J. 1. Heard finally learned Counsel for both the parties at the stage of admission. 2. Present appeal is filed by the appellant, being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed in First Appeal No. 260/2014 by learned Ad-Hoc District Judge-7, Nagpur, on 21/04/2016 and thereby dismissed the appeal with cost. 3. This Court while issuing the notice has framed the following substantial question of law vide order dated 12/09/2018: “In the light of the evidence on record, whether the discretion to grant the relief of specific performance has been rightly exercised by the Courts?” 4. The case of the plaintiff in brief is as under: Defendant is owner of agricultural land bearing S. No. 72/1, P.H. No. 4 situated at Mahuli, Tah-Parsheoni, Dist.- Nagpur. Defendant agreed to sell the suit property to the plaintiff for valuable consideration of Rs. 5,51,000/- as per agreement to sell dated 09/10/2005. The sum of Rs. 5000/- was paid by the plaintiff through cheque dated 10/10/2005. Balance consideration amount was to be paid in installment Rs. 1,75,000/- in total was paid to the defendant from time to time against which defendant acknowledged the receipt. Defendant agreed to get the land measured and obtained all the certificates necessary for the purpose of sell transaction, but he failed to do so and therefore lastly plaintiff issued registered notice on 16/12/2006. It was received by the defendant on 20/12/2006. Defendant failed to reply it and further to execute the sale deed by accepting the remaining amount of consideration which constrained plaintiff to file the suit for specific performance of the contract and damages valued of Rs. 5,36,000/-. 5. Defendant appeared in the said matter and filed its Written Statement and submitted that there was no such agreement to sell the suit property for consideration of Rs. 5,51,000/-. He also denied the receipt of Rs. 1,75,000/- from time to time from plaintiff. According to the defendant, amount of Rs. 70,000/- was only paid on 09/10/2005 and thereafter no amount was paid at any point of time. It was a transaction of hand loan of Rs. 70,000/- only and against this amount, agreement to sell was reduced on stamp paper for the purpose of security with assurance that plaintiff will not act upon it. 6. It is further submitted that signatures of the defendant were obtained on blank stamp paper and used as money receipt. It was a transaction of hand loan of Rs. 70,000/- only and against this amount, agreement to sell was reduced on stamp paper for the purpose of security with assurance that plaintiff will not act upon it. 6. It is further submitted that signatures of the defendant were obtained on blank stamp paper and used as money receipt. The amount of consideration shown is less than market value. The defendant tried to refund the amount but plaintiff refused to accept it. On this defence, defendant prayed for dismissal of the suit. 7. After considering the matter before it the learned Lower Court observed that plaintiff has discharged the initial burden of execution of the agreement as defendant has not denied signing of the document of agreement scribed. Burden is on the defendant to show that it was a loan transaction which defendant has failed to discharge. Therefore, learned lower court decreed the suit with cost and directed to the plaintiff to deposit the remaining balance consideration of Rs. 3,76,000/- and also directed the defendant to execute the registered sale deed in favor of plaintiff. 8. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the aforesaid judgment of learned lower court the defendant preferred an appeal before the learned ad-hoc district judge-7, Nagpur. The learned appellate court gave the concurrent finding as that of the learned lower court and dismissed the appeal with cost. The aforesaid finding is the subject matter of challenged in the present appeal. 9. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the learned courts below erred in admitting the agreement dated 09/10/2005 in evidence without getting it proved by witnesses and scriber. Specifically under the situation when the defendant has categorically denied the same in his written statement at Exh.17. It is further contended that the Courts below have not properly and lawfully exercised the discretion as required under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and balanced the equities under the law. The admission of mere signature on a paper ipse dixit does not prove the execution of document under Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act and grants immunity to the beneficiary to discharge the burden of proof under Section 101 and 102 of the Indian Evidence Act. The admission of mere signature on a paper ipse dixit does not prove the execution of document under Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act and grants immunity to the beneficiary to discharge the burden of proof under Section 101 and 102 of the Indian Evidence Act. The Trial Court and Lower Appellate Court decreed the suit for specific performance of contract merely on its own surmises conjectures and calculations which needs interference by this court. 10. The learned Counsel for the appellants relied on following citations: (i) C.S. Venkatesh vs. A.S.C. Murthy (D) by LRs. and Others, AIR 2020 SC 930 (ii) Vijay Kumar and Others vs. Om Parkash, AIR 2018 SC 5098 (iii) Sukhwinder Singh vs. Jagroop Singh and Another, AIR 2020 SC 4865 (iv) Desh Raj and Others vs. Rohtash Singh, (2023) 3 SCC 714 (v) Shenbagam and Others vs. K.K. Rathinavel, AIR 2022 SC 1275 11. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that after considering the matter before it the courts have passed an appropriate order and supported the judgment and order passed by the learned courts below and also prayed for the dismissal of the present appeal. 12. The learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 relied on following citations: (i) Vidur Impex and Traders Private Limited and Others vs. Tosh Apartments Private Limited and Others, (2012) 8 SCC 384 (ii) Keshrimal Jivji Shah and Another vs. Bank of Maharashtra and Others, 2004 (3) Mh. L.J. 893 (iii) Surjit Singh and Others vs. Harbans Singh and Others, (1995) 6 SCC 50 (iv) Saraswati Devi Gupta vs. Har Narain Johari and Others, (2006) 1 SCC 729 13. The learned Counsel for respondent No. 2 newly added party in Second Appeal, claimed that he is a bona-fide purchaser. He purchase the property during the pendency of the suit without knowledge of pendency of suit. He purchase the property by the registered sale deed dated 18/06/2008 and by the said sale deed, he is in the possession of the property. The name of respondent No. 2 is also mutated in revenue records. He further stated that he has also mortgaged the suit property with State Bank of Maharashtra, Mansar in 2017 and therefore, claimed remand to get an opportunity to lead evidence by setting aside both the judgments. 14. The name of respondent No. 2 is also mutated in revenue records. He further stated that he has also mortgaged the suit property with State Bank of Maharashtra, Mansar in 2017 and therefore, claimed remand to get an opportunity to lead evidence by setting aside both the judgments. 14. The learned Counsel for the respondent No. 2 relied on following citations: (i) Azhar Sultana vs. B. Rajamani and Others, (2009) 17 SCC 27 (ii) Savitri Devi vs. District Judge, Gorakhapur and Others, (1999) 2 SCC 577 (iii) V. Ravimenon vs. R. Ebinessar, 2009 SCC Online Mad. 41 (iv) Thomson Press (India) Limited vs. Nanak Builders and Investors Private Limited and Others, (2013) 5 SCC 397 (v) Madhukar Nivrutti Jagtap and Others vs. Pramilabai Chandulal Parandekar (Dead) through LRs. and Others, (2020) 15 SCC 731 (vi) Shrikrushna Narayan Tupkari vs. Mahadeo S/o Bansilal Dahale and Others, 2014 SCC Online Bom. 2845 15. I have heard all the parties at length. Perused the judgments of both the Courts below and considered the citations relied on. 16. It is necessary to take note of some dates before I proceed further. That the Special Civil Suit No. 180/2007 came to be filed for specific performance of agreement to sell dated 09/10/2005 by the plaintiff Shri Saurabh Rajendra Agrawal against Shri Ashok Daulatrao Kusumbe on 06/02/2007. On 05/01/2008, the injunction order came to be passed and the defendant was restrained from creating third party interest in the suit property. The defendant no. 1 Ashok Daulatrao Kusumbe sold out the suit property to newly added respondent no. 2 in the Second Appeal vide Registered Sale Deed dated 18/06/2008. On the basis of said sale deed, the name of respondent no. 2 was mutated in 7/12 extract vide Mutation Entry No. 456. Accordingly, he is paying regular taxes. The suit property was converted for non-agricultural use on 18/05/2009. Further in the year, 2017, respondent no. 2 has obtained financial assistance from the Bank of Maharashtra, Mansar Branch and has mortgaged the suit property with the said bank. It can also be seen from 7/12 extract. 17. It is the contention of respondent no. 2 that the original defendant appeared before the learned Trial Court but did not disclose the fact that he has already sold the suit property to respondent no. 2. It can also be seen from 7/12 extract. 17. It is the contention of respondent no. 2 that the original defendant appeared before the learned Trial Court but did not disclose the fact that he has already sold the suit property to respondent no. 2. The judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court dated 26/04/2014 is not binding on respondent no. 2. It is contended that the respondent no. 2 has already purchased the suit property without having any knowledge about pendency of litigation. The rights were created in favour of respondent no. 2. It was incumbent on the respondent no. 1 or the appellant to add the respondent no. 2 as a party to the suit as the right of respondent would be affected by the outcome of the same. There was no opportunity to defend the claim by respondent no. 1/plaintiff. 18. The learned counsel for respondent no. 2 relied on Azhar Sultana (supra) wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held that, it is also a well-settled principle of law that not only the original vendor but also a subsequent purchaser would be entitled to raise a contention that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of contract. However, the fact involved in the matter of Azhar Sultana (supra) are different than the facts involved in the matter at hand. In the said matter, the plaintiff purchaser entered into an agreement dated 04/12/1978 and filed a suit for specific performance on 07/12/1981 after property sold on 31/10/1981 in favour of defendant nos. 5 and 6. Although the subsequent purchasers were in possession of property and deed of sale was registered one, the plaintiff did not challenge bona fides of sale transaction in their favour, in her notice or plaint. No explanation given by her as to why she waited for more than 3 years for impleading the said purchasers as parties, specifically after disclosure of factum of subsequent sale in his written statement by vendor. In the present matter, the subsequent purchaser purchased property during the pendency of suit specifically when an injunction order was in effect. As such, the reliance is misplaced. 19. The learned counsel for respondent no. In the present matter, the subsequent purchaser purchased property during the pendency of suit specifically when an injunction order was in effect. As such, the reliance is misplaced. 19. The learned counsel for respondent no. 2 also relied on Savitri Devi (supra) wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held that, “Order I Rule 10 of CPC enables the Court to add any person as a party at any stage of the proceedings if the person whose presence before the Court is necessary in order to enable the Court to effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. Avoidance of a multiplicity of proceedings is also one of the objects of the said provision in the Code. It is also held that, the plea raised by respondents 3 to 5 that they were bona fide transferees for value in good faith may have to be decided before it can be held that the sales in their favour created no interest in the property. The aforesaid questions have to be decided by the Court either in the suit or in the application filed by respondents 3 to 5 for impleadment in the suit. If the application for impleadment is thrown out without a decision on the aforesaid questions, Respondents 3 to 5 will certainly come up with a separate suit to enforce their alleged rights which means multiplicity of proceedings. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that Respondents 3 to 5 are neither necessary nor proper parties to the suit.” There is no dispute over the said preposition of law. However, it has to be seen in the facts and circumstances of the case whether impleadment is necessary in the suit. The learned counsel for respondent no. 2 also relied on V. Ravimenon (supra) wherein relying on the ratio laid down in Savitri Devi’s case, held that the impleadment of subsequent purchaser essential for complete adjudication of rights of parties. 20. The learned counsel for respondent no. 2 also relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Thomson Press (India) Limited (supra). In the instant matter before the Hon’ble Apex Court, despite having notice and knowledge of injunction by court passed in such pending suit, prohibiting transactions or alienation of suit property, suit property was purchased by appellant. 20. The learned counsel for respondent no. 2 also relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Thomson Press (India) Limited (supra). In the instant matter before the Hon’ble Apex Court, despite having notice and knowledge of injunction by court passed in such pending suit, prohibiting transactions or alienation of suit property, suit property was purchased by appellant. Thereafter, in the said suit filed by the plaintiff buyer under prior Contract for Sale (CFS) against original owner/vendor, for specific performance of said prior Contract for Sale. The appellant filed application for impleadment. The High Court rejected the said application on the ground that the appellant purchased the suit property from original owner/vendor knowing fully well that there was injunction by the Court prohibiting any transaction of said property till disposal of suit. It is held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that, transfer pendente lite is neither illegal nor void ab initio but remains subservient to rights eventually determined by Court in pending litigation. Hence, the transfer in favour of purchaser pendente lite is effective in transferring title subject to certain obligations as decision of Court in a suit is binding not only on litigating parties but also on those who derive title pendente lite. Similar is the view taken in the judgment of Madhukar Nivrutti Jagtap (supra) relied on by the learned counsel for respondent no. 2. 21. The learned counsel for respondent no. 2 also placed reliance on Shrikrushna Narayan Tupkari (supra) wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held that, there is no straight jacket formula in respect of such cases whether to allow or disallow a subsequent purchaser on record of suit or appeal as necessary or proper party to the suit. The sale deed in favour of petitioner does not automatically become void or illegal. But decree passed in dispute may be binding on petitioner. But then right of person like petitioner who stood deceived can certainly be worked out by Court ultimately by passing decree instead of asking such party to go and file another suit. However, in the said matter, the Honble Apex Court came to the conclusion that there is prima facie case made out by the subsequent purchaser that he was bona-fide purchaser. However, in the present matter, there is no material placed on record to show that the appellant was bona-fide purchaser. However, in the said matter, the Honble Apex Court came to the conclusion that there is prima facie case made out by the subsequent purchaser that he was bona-fide purchaser. However, in the present matter, there is no material placed on record to show that the appellant was bona-fide purchaser. There was no public notice calling objection placed on record. 22. As against this, the learned counsel for the respondent no. 1/original plaintiff relied on Vidur Impex and Traders Private Limited and ors (supra), wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held that, the agreement for sale and sale deeds were executed by respondent no. 2 in favour of appellants in a clandestine manner and in violation of injunction granted by the Delhi High Court. It is further held that, no valid title or interest was acquired by appellants in suit property. The Hon’ble Apex Court relied on the ratio of Surjit Singh vs. Harbans Singh, (1995) 6 SCC 50 , held that, the appellant are claiming right on the basis of transactions made in defiance of the restraint order passed by the High Court. 23. The learned counsel for respondent no. 1 relied on Surjit Singh and Others (supra) wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held that, the alienation/assignment was made in defiance of Court’s order irrespective of whether it was of the property per se or of the decree pertaining to the property. In the circumstances, Court obliged to treat the alienation/assignment as non est. Hence, the assignees not entitled to be impleaded. The principle of lis pendens not applicable on facts. 24. The learned counsel for respondent no. 1 also relied on Keshrimal Jivji Shah and Another (supra) wherein it is held that, during the pendency of injunction order passed by the Court, respondent no. 2 transferred and assigned its leasehold rights in the suit property in favour of petitioner no. 2. Once the issue is placed on the pedestal of public policy and the very faith of litigants in Rule of law and administration of justice, then it is not possible to make the distinction or bifurcation that the ratio in Surjit Singh (supra) cannot be extended to defiance of injunction order and it is restricted only proceedings under Order 22, Rule 10 of C.P.C. Para 26 of the said citation [i.e. Keshrimal Jivji Shah and Another (supra)] is reproduced as under: “26. Once the issue is placed on the pedestal of public policy and the very faith of litigants in Rule of law and administration of justice, then it is not possible to make the distinction or bifurcation suggested by Shri Naphade. It would mean that consequences of nullifying such transaction not being provided by the Statute, it would not lose its legal efficacy even if it is in utter disregard to or in violation of or breach of prohibitory order or order of injunction issued by a Court of law. It would mean that parties can breach and violate Court orders openly and with impunity and neither they nor the beneficiaries suffer any consequences. It is time that we recognise the principle that transfer of immovable property in violation of an order of injunction or prohibition issued by Court of law, confers no right, title or interest in the transferee, as it is no transfer at all. The transferee cannot be allowed to reap advantage or benefit from such transfer merely because he is not party to the proceedings in which order of injunction or other prohibitory direction or restraint came to be issued. It is enough that the transferor is a party and the order was in force. These two conditions being satisfied, the transfer must not be upheld. If this course is not adopted then the tendency to flout orders of Courts which is increasing day by day can never be curbed. The Court exercises its powers on the foundation of respect and regard for its authority by litigating public. People would loose faith and respect completely if the Court does not curb and prevent this tendency. The note of caution of the Supreme Court must be consistently at the back of everybody's mind. Therefore, Shri Naphade is not right in the distinction which he is trying to make.” 25. In view of the legal position, in my considered opinion, respondent no. 2 has not made out any case for impleadment in the suit or for remand of the matter. Even on perusal of application for impleadment in the suit, there is no document showing that the public notice was issued prior to entering into the contract. Only verification of mutation entries would not suffice. The absence of mutation entries in the name of the plaintiff cannot further the case of respondent no. Even on perusal of application for impleadment in the suit, there is no document showing that the public notice was issued prior to entering into the contract. Only verification of mutation entries would not suffice. The absence of mutation entries in the name of the plaintiff cannot further the case of respondent no. 2 inasmuch as the mutation entries are taken for fiscal purposes and cannot be treated as document of title. The necessary enquiries are required to be made by the purchaser who believes in good faith that he is absolutely entitled to the same. The publishing notice is one of the act that determines whether the purchaser acted bona fide and took reasonable care and caution in making usual enquiry into the title. 26. If the dates are perused, the injunction order was passed on 05/01/2008 and in spite of injunction order was in force, the appellant executed the sale deed on 18/06/2008. As such, the appellant was well aware about injunction order and while injunction order was in effect, he executed a sale deed to defeat the claim of respondent no. 1. 27. So far as readiness and willingness is concerned, the concurrent finding is recorded by both the Courts below that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of contract. The plaintiff has proved the payment which he has made and it was agreed that the amount of Rs. 3,76,000/- was to be paid at the time of execution of sale deed. As per the agreement, the defendant was required to supply the documents by 15/10/2006. However, the defendant neither supplied the required document and denied the very agreement itself. Even the legal notice issued by the plaintiff was neither complied nor replied. 28. The learned counsel for the appellants relied on C.S. Venkatesh (supra) in support of his contention, that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of contract. The plaintiff has failed to prove his readiness and willingness and as such, he is not entitled for decree of specific performance. However, in my considered opinion, this citation is not applicable in the present set of facts. There is no averment or pleading in the written statement or in the evidence that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of contract. However, in my considered opinion, this citation is not applicable in the present set of facts. There is no averment or pleading in the written statement or in the evidence that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of contract. On the contrary, the notice was given by the plaintiff to the defendant to intimate the date on which the sale deed was to be executed and he will be ready with the amount. However, the notice is neither complied nor replied. In view thereof, the judgment relied on is not applicable. 29. The learned counsel for the appellants also relied on Vijay Kumar and Others (supra) in support of his contention, that the readiness and willingness has to be shown throughout and established by the plaintiff. In the present case, the plaintiff has satisfied the requirement of the pleading in the plaint and the evidence has been placed on record in the form of aforesaid notice dated 16/12/2006 sent to the defendant wherein it is specifically stated that, he is ready and willing to perform his part of contract and the defendant should inform the date and time for execution of sale within 7 days. However, neither date was informed nor reply was filed by the defendant. It is settled position of law that it is not necessary that the plaintiff in a case of specific performance of contract has to produce money or vouch a concluded scheme for financing the transaction to prove his readiness and willingness in order to successful claim of decree of specific performance. The finding of readiness and willingness of the plaintiff is necessarily a finding of the fact which has to be rendered by the Court on the basis of nature of agreement and the evidence and the material on record in the context of readiness of the parties. 30. The learned counsel for respondent no. 1 relied on Saraswati Devi Gupta (supra) wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under: “4. Both the trial court and the lower appellate court after dealing with the facts and circumstances of the case, came to the conclusion regarding the various facts leading to the readiness and willingness to perform the contract. The lower appellate court decreed the suit. 1 relied on Saraswati Devi Gupta (supra) wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under: “4. Both the trial court and the lower appellate court after dealing with the facts and circumstances of the case, came to the conclusion regarding the various facts leading to the readiness and willingness to perform the contract. The lower appellate court decreed the suit. The High Court did not consider the finding of fact and placed reliance on the decision where it has been held that the plaintiff must allege and prove the readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract. The High Court interfered with the decree of the lower appellate court and dismissed the suit for specific performance filed by the plaintiff. The learned Judge of the High Court did not consider any other question apparently because no other question was raised as is also clear from the judgment of the High Court itself as it is stated that this was the only question raised by the present respondent before the High Court. In view of the facts discussed above, the High Court was wrong in coming to the conclusion that the readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract was not pleaded and proved.” 31. In the written statement, the defendant totally denied the execution of any agreement itself, however, the plaintiff has duly proved the agreement to sell. It is the contention of the defendant that it was loan transaction, however, the defendant failed to establish the same. There is neither averment in the written statement that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of contract nor there was any suggestion to that effect in the cross-examination of the plaintiff. The plaintiff even deposited the entire amount after passing of decree as per direction of the Court. As such, there is nothing on record to show that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of contract. On the contrary, the defendant during an injunction order was in effect, sold the property and suppressed this fact from the Court. As such, he is not entitled for any equitable relief. 32. The other citations relied on by the appellants i.e. Sukhwinder Singh (supra), Desh Raj and Others (supra) and Shenbagam and Others (supra) are also not applicable in the present set of facts in view of above discussions. 33. As such, he is not entitled for any equitable relief. 32. The other citations relied on by the appellants i.e. Sukhwinder Singh (supra), Desh Raj and Others (supra) and Shenbagam and Others (supra) are also not applicable in the present set of facts in view of above discussions. 33. On perusal of deposition of the plaintiff, it appears that there is no suggestion with regard to readiness of the amount. In fact as notice was issued for execution of the sale deed, it presupposes readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform his part of contract. He specifically averred in the evidence on affidavit that he was ready to pay the balance sale consideration of Rs. 3,76,000/- to the defendant at the time of execution of sale deed, thereafter, or during the pendency of instant suit or even the date on which he filed his evidence on affidavit. There is no question in cross-examination put by the defendant that he is not ready with the amount as alleged. The willingness can be gathered from the conduct of the party and readiness can be gathered from his capacity to pay the amount. Moreover, it was never ground/defence of the defendant that respondent/plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of contract. As such, I do not see any reason to interfere in the finding about readiness and willingness by both the Courts below. As such, there is no substance in the appeal and the substantial question of law is answered in affirmative. Both the Courts rightly exercised discretion to grant specific performance of contract in favour of the plaintiff. As such, I proceed to pass the following order: ORDER: (1) The Second Appeal stands dismissed. (2) Decree be drawn up accordingly.