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2023 DIGILAW 2268 (ALL)

Mohit Soni v. State of U. P.

2023-10-05

ANISH KUMAR GUPTA

body2023
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Aakash Kishan, Advocate holding brief of Sri Ashok Gupta, learned counsel for the applicant, Sri C.P. Awasthi, Advocate holding brief of Sri Shashi Kumar Verma, learned counsel for the opposite party no.2 and Sri Prem Prakash Tripathi, learned A.G.A. for the State. 2. The instant application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed seeking quashing of the Charge Sheet No. 114/17 dated 20.06.2017 in Case No. 3056/IX of 2017 (State vs. Mohit Soni), arising out of Case Crime No. 201 of 2017 u/S 493, 376, 504, 506 I.P.C., P.S.-Rajapur, District-Chitrakoot, pending in the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chitrakoot. 3. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that in the instant case, after the pleadings were exchanged, the opposite party no.2 has filed a joint affidavit in the form of compromise before the learned Trial Court, which has been taken on record by the learned Trial Court and learned counsel for the opposite party no.2 does not dispute the said fact. In the said compromise, the opposite party no.2 has stated that she does not wish to prosecute her case against the applicant herein as she has already married to someone else and is settled in her life and the instant prosecution would cause further harassment to her. In addition to the same, learned counsel for the applicant further submits from the plain allegations made in the F.I.R., the applicant and opposite party no.2 were in physical relationship or rather were in live-in relationship with each other for more than six years and due to some dispute later on between the parties, when the applicant herein could not marry the opposite party no.2, the instant prosecution has been lodged by the opposite party no.2 herein against the applicant herein. 4. Learned counsel for the applicant has further relied upon the judgment of this Court dated 15.09.2023 in Application u/S 482 No. 5419 of 2021 (Jiyaullah vs. State of U.P. and Another), wherein it has been held that where the consensual physical relationship between the parties was a longstanding relationship with the consent of their parents, then, no offence u/S 376 of I.P.C. shall be made out. 5. Learned counsel for the applicant has further relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1217 of 2022 (Kapil Gupta vs. State of NCT of Delhi & Anr.) dated 10.08.2022. 5. Learned counsel for the applicant has further relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1217 of 2022 (Kapil Gupta vs. State of NCT of Delhi & Anr.) dated 10.08.2022. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that when the complainant herself is not supporting the prosecution case and has applied for withdrawing the prosecution of the accused persons, then, it will end nothing else but an acquittal, therefore, it will be futile to keep the prosecution pending in the courts, which are already humongously overburdened. 6. Learned counsel for the opposite party no.2 do not dispute the fact of compromise between the parties. It is further stated by learned counsel for opposite party no.2 that the opposite party no.2 has already married to someone else and is living happily, therefore, the pendency of the criminal case will be further harassment to the new matrimonial life of the opposite party no.2. In view thereof, she wants the instant proceedings to be quashed. 7. In view of the compromise between the parties and the nature of relationship between the parties, learned counsel for the State do not object to quashing of the instant proceedings on the basis of the compromise between the parties. 8. Having heard the learned counsels for the parties, this Court has carefully perused the records of the case and on perusal of the records, the following questions arises for determination of this Court: I) Whether while exercising the power u/S 482 Cr.P.C., this Court can quash the proceedings in non-compoundable cases involving heinous crimes like rape etc., on the basis of compromise between the parties? II) Whether if all the allegations as alleged by the opposite party no.2 in the F.I.R. and in her statements u/S 161 and 164 of Cr.P.C., and believed to be true on its face value, whether the offence u/S 376 & 493 I.P.C. and other offences against the applicant are constituted? III) whether in view of the developments and the present status of the parties and in view of the compromise between the applicant and the opposite party no.2, what are the chances of conviction of the applicant and whether the pendency of the prosecution against the applicant could cause oppression and harassment of the applicant as well as that of the opposite party no2? and IV) Whether in a case where an offence of heinous crime like rape is alleged and on given facts, prima facie the offences is not constituted and the parties in view of the further developments in the status of the parties and the victim has already moved ahead in life and in view of such developments, the prosecutrix has entered into a compromise with the applicant and did not wish to prosecute the case any further against the applicant/accused, it will not be a duty of the courts while exercising u/S 482 Cr.P.C., to quash such proceedings to secure ends of justice? 9. Question No. 'I'-To find the necessary answers of these questions, it will be relevant to note the few decisions of the Apex Court. In Shiji vs. Radhika : (2011) 10 SCC 705 , the Apex Court held as under: "17. It is manifest that simply because an offence is not compoundable under Section 320 CrPC is by itself no reason for the High Court to refuse exercise of its power under Section 482 CrPC. That power can in our opinion be exercised in cases where there is no chance of recording a conviction against the accused and the entire exercise of a trial is destined to be an exercise in futility. There is a subtle distinction between compounding of offences by the parties before the trial court or in appeal on the one hand and the exercise of power by the High Court to quash the prosecution under Section 482 CrPC on the other. While a court trying an accused or hearing an appeal against conviction, may not be competent to permit compounding of an offence based on a settlement arrived at between the parties in cases where the offences are not compoundable under Section 320, the High Court may quash the prosecution even in cases where the offences with which the accused stand charged are non-compoundable. The inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC are not for that purpose controlled by Section 320 CrPC. 18. Having said so, we must hasten to add that the plenitude of the power under Section 482 CrPC by itself, makes it obligatory for the High Court to exercise the same with utmost care and caution. The inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC are not for that purpose controlled by Section 320 CrPC. 18. Having said so, we must hasten to add that the plenitude of the power under Section 482 CrPC by itself, makes it obligatory for the High Court to exercise the same with utmost care and caution. The width and the nature of the power itself demands that its exercise is sparing and only in cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that continuance of the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to enumerate the situations in which the exercise of power under Section 482 may be justified. All that we need to say is that the exercise of power must be for securing the ends of justice and only in cases where refusal to exercise that power may result in the abuse of the process of law. The High Court may be justified in declining interference if it is called upon to apaslipreciate evidence for it cannot assume the role of an appellate court while dealing with a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Subject to the above, the High Court will have to consider the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether it is a fit case in which the inherent powers may be invoked. 19. Coming to the case at hand, we are of the view that the incident in question had its genesis in a dispute relating to the access to the two plots which are adjacent to each other. It was not a case of broad daylight robbery for gain. It was a case which has its origin in the civil dispute between the parties, which dispute has, it appears, been resolved by them. That being so, continuance of the prosecution where the complainant is not ready to support the allegations which are now described by her as arising out of some “misunderstanding and misconception” will be a futile exercise that will serve no purpose. It is noteworthy that the two alleged eyewitnesses, who are closely related to the complainant, are also no longer supportive of the prosecution version. The continuance of the proceedings is thus nothing but an empty formality. It is noteworthy that the two alleged eyewitnesses, who are closely related to the complainant, are also no longer supportive of the prosecution version. The continuance of the proceedings is thus nothing but an empty formality. Section 482 CrPC could, in such circumstances, be justifiably invoked by the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of law and thereby preventing a wasteful exercise by the courts below." 10. Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure saves the inherent power of the High Court and it reads as under: "482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.-Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice." 11. In Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and Another : (2012) 10 SCC 303 , the Full Bench of the High Court has observed as under: "52. The question is with regard to the inherent power of the High Court in quashing the criminal proceedings against an offender who has settled his dispute with the victim of the crime but the crime in which he is allegedly involved is not compoundable under Section 320 of the Code. 53. Section 482 of the Code, as its very language suggests, saves the inherent power of the High Court which it has by virtue of it being a superior court to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It begins with the words, “nothing in this Code” which means that the provision is an overriding provision. These words leave no manner of doubt that none of the provisions of the Code limits or restricts the inherent power. The guideline for exercise of such power is provided in Section 482 itself i.e. to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. As has been repeatedly stated that Section 482 confers no new powers on the High Court; it merely safeguards existing inherent powers possessed by the High Court necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. As has been repeatedly stated that Section 482 confers no new powers on the High Court; it merely safeguards existing inherent powers possessed by the High Court necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. It is equally well settled that the power is not to be resorted to if there is specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of an aggrieved party. It should be exercised very sparingly and it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code. 54. In different situations, the inherent power may be exercised in different ways to achieve its ultimate objective. Formation of opinion by the High Court before it exercises inherent power under Section 482 on either of the twin objectives, (i) to prevent abuse of the process of any court, or (ii) to secure the ends of justice, is a sine qua non. 55. In the very nature of its constitution, it is the judicial obligation of the High Court to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice or to prevent continuation of unnecessary judicial process. This is founded on the legal maxim quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, conceditur et id sine qua res ipsa esse non potest. The full import of which is whenever anything is authorised, and especially if, as a matter of duty, required to be done by law, it is found impossible to do that thing unless something else not authorised in express terms be also done, may also be done, then that something else will be supplied by necessary intendment. Ex debito justitiae is inbuilt in such exercise; the whole idea is to do real, complete and substantial justice for which it exists. The power possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code is of wide amplitude but requires exercise with great caution and circumspection. 56. It needs no emphasis that exercise of inherent power by the High Court would entirely depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. It is neither permissible nor proper for the court to provide a straitjacket formula regulating the exercise of inherent powers under Section 482. No precise and inflexible guidelines can also be provided. 57. 56. It needs no emphasis that exercise of inherent power by the High Court would entirely depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. It is neither permissible nor proper for the court to provide a straitjacket formula regulating the exercise of inherent powers under Section 482. No precise and inflexible guidelines can also be provided. 57. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of offence. They are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of offences given to a court under Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment. 58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of the society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without the permission of the court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed. 61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus : the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz. : (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding." 12. In Narinder Singh & Ors. In Narinder Singh & Ors. vs. State of Punjab : (2014) 6 SCC 466 , this Court has laid down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties in exercising its power u/S 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement at its discretion with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings: "29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. 29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure: (i) ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. 29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender. 29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. 29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases. 29.6. 29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases. 29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship. 29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. 29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime." 13. In Prabatbhai Aahir Alias Prabatbhai Bhimsinghbhai Karmur and others vs. State of Gujarat and Another : (2017) 9 SCC 641 , the Apex Court has summarized the broad principles with regard to quashing of the criminal proceedings on the basis of compromise between the parties: "16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions: 16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions: 16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court. 16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable. 16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power. 16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court. 16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first information report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated. 16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences. 16.7. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences. 16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned. 16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute. 16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and 16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8. and 16.9. above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the State have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance." 14. In the light of the aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court, following propositions emerges which are relevant to the instant case. Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code preserves the inherent power of the High Court to prevent the abuse of process of any Court or to secure the hands of justice: a) the power to quash the criminal proceedings u/S 482 Cr.P.C., is attracted even when the offences is non-compoundable; b) though in the case involving heinous and serious offences, normally the inherent powers ought not to have been exercised on the basis of compromise between the parties. However, there is no absolute bar that each and every case where heinous crimes are alleged can never be quashed. However, there is no absolute bar that each and every case where heinous crimes are alleged can never be quashed. It will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and while exercising such powers, the ultimate object is to see whether by exercising such powers and quashing the criminal proceedings, whether the ends of justice will be secured; and c) If on the facts of the case, the Court is satisfied that prima facie the offence alleged which is of heinous and serious in nature is not constituted on the facts of the case and parties have settle their disputes through compromise and further in view of such compromise, there are remote and bleak possibilities of conviction of the accused persons and the continuation of such criminal proceedings would cause oppression and prejudice, not only to the accused but the victim as well such proceedings can be quashed in exercise of power u/S 482 of Cr.P.C., on the basis of settlement between the parties. 15. Question No. 'II'-To determine the questions whether on the given facts of the case, the offence u/S 376 I.P.C., is made out against the applicant herein. It will be relevant to note few decisions of the Apex Court, which are as under. 16. In Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra : (2019) 18 SCC 191 , the Apex Court has held as under: "8. It is well settled that exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC is the exception and not the rule. Under this section, the High Court has inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. But the expressions "abuse of process of law" or "to secure the ends of justice" do not confer unlimited jurisdiction on the High Court and the alleged abuse of process of law or the ends of justice could only be secured in accordance with law, including procedural law and not otherwise. 13. It is clear that for quashing the proceedings, meticulous analysis of factum of taking cognizance of an offence by the Magistrate is not called for. Appreciation of evidence is also not permissible in exercise of inherent powers. 13. It is clear that for quashing the proceedings, meticulous analysis of factum of taking cognizance of an offence by the Magistrate is not called for. Appreciation of evidence is also not permissible in exercise of inherent powers. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers. 24. In the instant case, it is an admitted position that the appellant was serving as a Medical Officer in the Primary Health Centre and the complainant was working as an Assistant Nurse in the same health centre and that she is a widow. It was alleged by her that the appellant informed her that he is a married man and that he has differences with his wife. Admittedly, they belong to different communities. It is also alleged that the accused/appellant needed a month's time to get their marriage registered. The complainant further states that she had fallen in love with the appellant and that she needed a companion as she was a widow. She has specifically stated that "as I was also a widow and I was also in need of a companion, I agreed to his proposal and since then we were having love affair and accordingly we started residing together. We used to reside sometimes at my home whereas sometimes at his home". Thus, they were living together, sometimes at her house and sometimes at the residence of the appellant. They were in a relationship with each other for quite some time and enjoyed each other's company. It is also clear that they had been living as such for quite some time together. When she came to know that the appellant had married some other woman, she lodged the complaint. It is not her case that the complainant has forcibly raped her. She had taken a conscious decision after active application of mind to the things that had happened. It is not a case of a passive submission in the face of any psychological pressure exerted and there was a tacit consent and the tacit consent given by her was not the result of a misconception created in her mind. She had taken a conscious decision after active application of mind to the things that had happened. It is not a case of a passive submission in the face of any psychological pressure exerted and there was a tacit consent and the tacit consent given by her was not the result of a misconception created in her mind. We are of the view that, even if the allegations made in the complaint are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, they do not make out a case against the appellant. We are also of the view that since the complainant has failed to prima facie show the commission of rape, the complaint registered under Section 376(2)(b) cannot be sustained." 17. In State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa, (2002) 3 SCC 89 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 539, it was held by the Apex Court that while exercising powers under Section 482 CrPC, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It was further held as under : "6. … It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto." 18. Recently, in Vineet Kumar v. State of U.P., (2017) 13 SCC 369 : (2017) 4 SCC (Cri) 633, the Apex Court has observed as under : "41. Inherent power given to the High Court under Section 482 CrPC is with the purpose and object of advancement of justice. Recently, in Vineet Kumar v. State of U.P., (2017) 13 SCC 369 : (2017) 4 SCC (Cri) 633, the Apex Court has observed as under : "41. Inherent power given to the High Court under Section 482 CrPC is with the purpose and object of advancement of justice. In case solemn process of Court is sought to be abused by a person with some oblique motive, the Court has to thwart the attempt at the very threshold. … Judicial process is a solemn proceeding which cannot be allowed to be converted into an instrument of oppression or harassment. When there are materials to indicate that a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive, the High Court will not hesitate in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the proceeding. … the present is a fit case where the High Court ought to have exercised its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC and quashed the criminal proceedings." 19. Similarly, in Shambhu Kharwar vs. State of U.P. : 2022 SCC Online SC 1032, the Apex Court has held as under: "8. In Bhajan Lal (supra) this Court formulated the parameters in terms of which the powers in Section 482 of CrPC may be exercised. While it is not necessary to revisit all these parameters again, a few that are relevant to the present case may be set out. The Court held that quashing may be appropriate: "102.(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2). […](7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 9. […](7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." 9. In Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra, a two Judge Bench of this Court while dealing with similar facts as the present case reiterated the parameters laid down in Bhajan Lal (supra) held that: "13. It is clear that for quashing the proceedings, meticulous analysis of factum of taking cognizance of an offence by the Magistrate is not called for. Appreciation of evidence is also not permissible in exercise of inherent powers. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of its inherent powers." (emphasis supplied) 10. An offence is punishable under Section 376 of the IPC if the offence of rape is established in terms of Section 375 which sets out the ingredients of the offence. In the present case, the second description of Section 375 along with Section 90 of the IPC is relevant which is set out below. "375. Rape - A man is said to commit "rape" if he -[…] under the circumstances falling under any of the following seven descriptions Firstly …Secondly. -Without her consent. […]Explanation 2. -Consent means an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the woman by words, gestures or any form of verbal or non-verbal communication, communicates willingness to participate in the specific sexual act: Provided that a woman who does not physically resist to the act of penetration shall not by the reason only of that fact, be regarded as consenting to the sexual activity. xxx 90. Consent known to be given under fear or misconception - A consent is not such a consent as is intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception; or…" 20. In Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, a two Judge Bench of this Court of which one of us was a part (D.Y. Chandrachud J.), held in Sonu @ Subhash Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, observed that: "12. This Court has repeatedly held that consent with respect to Section 375 of the IPC involves an active understanding of the circumstances, actions and consequences of the proposed act. An individual who makes a reasoned choice to act after evaluating various alternative actions (or inaction) as well as the various possible consequences flowing from such action or inaction, consents to such action…[…] 14. […] Specifically in the context of a promise to marry, this Court has observed that there is a distinction between a false promise given on the understanding by the maker that it will be broken, and the breach of a promise which is made in good faith but subsequently not fulfilled…[…] 16. Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in sexual relations, there is a "misconception of fact" that vitiates the woman's "consent". On the other hand, a breach of a promise cannot be said to be a false promise. To establish a false promise, the maker of the promise should have had no intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it. The "consent" of a woman under Section 375 is vitiated on the ground of a "misconception of fact" where such misconception was the basis for her choosing to engage in the said act…[…] 18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above cases, the "consent" of a woman with respect to Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish whether the "consent" was vitiated by a "misconception of fact" arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act. (emphasis supplied) 12. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act. (emphasis supplied) 12. In the present case, the issue which had to be addressed by the High Court was whether, assuming all the allegations in the charge-sheet are correct as they stand, an offence punishable under Section 376 IPC was made out. Admittedly, the appellant and the second respondent were in a consensual relationship from 2013 until December 2017. They are both educated adults. The second respondent, during the course of this period, got married on 12 June 2014 to someone else. The marriage ended in a decree of divorce by mutual consent on 17 September 2017. The allegations of the second respondent indicate that her relationship with the appellant continued prior to her marriage, during the subsistence of the marriage and after the grant of divorce by mutual consent." 21. In State of HP vs. Mango Ram : (2000) 7 SCC 224 , a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that consent for the purpose of Section 375 I.P.C. requires voluntary participation not only after the exercise of intelligence based on the knowledge of significance and moral quality of the act but after having fully exercised the choice between resistance and assent whether there was consent or not is to be ascertained only careful perusal of relevant circumstances. 22. In the Application u/S 482 No. 5419 of 2021 (Jiyaullah vs. State of U.P. and Another), on similar facts this Court has held that where there was long-standing consensual relationship between the parties with the approval of the family members, no offence u/S 376 I.P.C. will be made out. In Jiyaullah (Supra), this Court has held as under : 14. From the aforequoted judgments, it is apparent that the powers u/S 482 Cr.P.C. vested in the High Court is with the purpose and objective of advancement of justice. In Jiyaullah (Supra), this Court has held as under : 14. From the aforequoted judgments, it is apparent that the powers u/S 482 Cr.P.C. vested in the High Court is with the purpose and objective of advancement of justice. In case, the High Court is of an opinion that the process of the Court is being abused by persons with some oblique motive, the Court has to thwart such an attempt at the very threshold and the judicial process cannot be allowed to be converted into an instrument of oppression and harassment. It is also a settled position of law that if there are materials to indicate that the criminal proceedings is initiated with mala fide intentions and with an ulterior motive, it is the duty of the High Court to quash such proceedings in exercise of powers u/S 482 Cr.P.C. 15. In Section 375 I.P.C., where the offence of rape is constituted when the sexual intercourse is committed against the will of women and without her consent. A women is said to consent only when she freely agrees to submit herself while in free and unconstrained possession of physical and moral power to act in a manner she wanted. Consent implies the exercise of free and untrammelled right to forbid or withhold what is being consented to. 17. Thus, from the cumulative reading of the judgments passed by the Apex Court in Shivashankar (supra), Pramod Suryabhan Pawar (Supra), Sonu alias Subhash Kumar (supra), Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar (supra) and Mango Ram (supra), it is apparent that when there is a longstanding relationship between the parties under the promise of marriage. It is to be seen that whether such promise of marriage was false at the inception or it is a subsequent breakdown of relationship and refusal to marry amounts to breach of such promise, which was genuinely made at the inception of such relationship. 18. The expression "against her will" would ordinarily mean that the intercourse was done by man with a women despite her resistance and opposition. On the other hand, the expression "without her consent" would comprehend an act of reason accompanied by deliberation." 23. 18. The expression "against her will" would ordinarily mean that the intercourse was done by man with a women despite her resistance and opposition. On the other hand, the expression "without her consent" would comprehend an act of reason accompanied by deliberation." 23. In the instant case, it is an admitted fact that the opposite party no.2 was having consensual physical relationship due to love and affection between them since last six years and many times, the opposite party no.2 became pregnant and as per the F.I.R. itself the opposite party no.2 and this relationship was well known to both the families since last six years from the lodging of the report. From the F.I.R. and statements u/S 161 & 164 Cr.P.C., of the prosecutors, it is clear that from its inception, there was no cheating on behalf of the applicant and the relationship between them was with the approval of the families. Subsequently, after some developments, the applicant has broken his promise to marry the opposite party no.2 which has resulted in registration of the F.I.R. From the allegations made, it is apparent that the promise to marry by the applicant herein was not false from its inception, however, due to later developments, the applicants has denied to marry the opposite party no.2. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid judgments, prima facie no offence u/S 376 I.P.C., is established as the relationship between the parties was of consensual nature which had the approval of both the families and the initial promise by the applicant to marry the opposite party no.2 was not false. It is only after subsequent developments between the parties, the applicant herein had refused to marry her. It was indeed a live-in relationship between the parties, which has ultimately failed, for which the instant F.I.R. has been lodged by the opposite party no.2. Therefore, in the considered view of this Court, prima facie no offence u/S 376 I.P.C. is made out against the applicant herein. So far as the offence u/S 493 I.P.C., is concerned in the instant case, the opposite party no.2 was an adult female and she very well knew that the applicant has not married to her. Therefore, in the considered view of this Court, prima facie no offence u/S 376 I.P.C. is made out against the applicant herein. So far as the offence u/S 493 I.P.C., is concerned in the instant case, the opposite party no.2 was an adult female and she very well knew that the applicant has not married to her. However, out of love and affection, she was having the physical relationship with the applicant and the fact that relationship did not end in the marriage, it is evident enough from the allegations made in the F.I.R. Therefore, it can't be said that there was any inducement by the applicant to have co-habitation with him under a belief of lawful marriage. Since, the applicant herein was an adult partner in the relationship and was well aware of the consequences of such relationship and which had the approval of the families as well and they had the continuous physical relationship out of their free will. It is not the case of the opposite party no.2 that the applicant had the relationship either against her will or without her consent. Therefore, the offence against the applicant are also not be made out prima facie on the facts of the case u/S 493 I.P.C. 24. Question No. 'III' :-It has been submitted by the counsels for the applicant as well as for the opposite party no.2, due to lapse of time the opposite party no.2 has already moved ahead in life and has married someone else and pendency of the instant prosecution against the applicant at the behest of the opposite party no.2 will be a continuous harassment to the opposite party no.2 in her new matrimonial life. In view thereof, the opposite party no.2 had accepted the situation and has entered into a compromise with the applicant and do not want to prosecute the case against the applicant herein. In view of the aforesaid compromise between the parties, there are very remote and bleak chances of conviction of the applicant herein and the pendency of this prosecution will be a futile exercise and in view of the settled matrimonial life of the opposite party no.2 and further developments in her life, pendency of the instant prosecution against the applicant will cause oppression and harassment not only of the applicant but that of the opposite party no.2 as well. In the case of Kapil Gupta vs. State of NCT of Delhi & Another : Criminal Appeal No. 1217 of 2022 (@ SLP (CRL.) No. 5806 of 2022) dated 10.08.2022, the Apex Court in para 16' & 17' has held as under: "16. In both the cases, though the charge sheets have been filed, the charges are yet to be framed and as such, the trial has not yet commenced. It is further to be noted that since the respondent No.2 herself is not supporting the prosecution case, even if the criminal trial is permitted to go ahead, it will end in nothing else than an acquittal. If the request of the parties is denied, it will be amounting to only adding one more criminal case to the already overburdened criminal courts. 17. In that view of the matter, we find that though in a heinous or serious crime like rape, the Court should not normally exercise the powers of quashing the proceedings, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case and in order to give succour to Respondent No. 2 so that she is saved from further agony of facing two criminal trials, one as a victim and one as an accused, we find that this is a fit case wherein the extraordinary powers of this Court be exercised to quash the criminal proceedings." Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, in the light of the aforesaid judgement of the Apex Court, the instant case is a fit case to be quashed as there are very remote and bleak chances of conviction of the applicant. Looking at the facts and circumstances of the case, specifically in view of the compromise between the parties and the pendency of the instant prosecution would cause oppression and harassment not only to the applicant but also to the opposite party no.2. 25. Question No. 'IV':-Since, in the instant case, this Court has already held prima facie no offence u/S 376 or 493 I.P.C., is made out against the applicant. 25. Question No. 'IV':-Since, in the instant case, this Court has already held prima facie no offence u/S 376 or 493 I.P.C., is made out against the applicant. The victim/opposite party no.2 has already married to someone else and has moved ahead in life and the pendency of the instant case will cause further harassment to her and she has already entered into a compromise with the applicant and had given statement on oath before the learned Trial Court that she don't want to prosecute this case against the applicant which has also been reiterated by the opposite party no.2 before this Court. Therefore, in the considered view of this Court, it will be duty of this Court to exercise the powers u/S 482 Cr.P.C., to quash the instant proceedings to secure the ends of justice not only to the applicant but also to save the opposite party no.2 from further harassment. 26. In view of the aforesaid discussions, since there was no prima facie case u/S 376 or 493 against the applicant herein and further the parties have entered into a compromise as the opposite party no.2 has already moved ahead in life and as settled in a new matrimonial life with someone else, the pendency of the instant case will be a further harassment to her and in view of the aforesaid discussions, there are very bleak and remote chances of conviction to the applicant on the given facts of the case, therefore, the Charge Sheet No. 114/17 dated 20.06.2017 and entire proceedings in Case No. 3056/IX of 2017 (State vs. Mohit Soni), arising out of Case Crime No. 201 of 2017 u/S 493, 376, 504, 506 I.P.C., P.S.-Rajapur, District-Chitrakoot, pending in the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chitrakoot, are hereby quashed. 27. The instant application is disposed of accordingly.