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2023 DIGILAW 227 (JK)

Nazir Ahmed v. Union Territory of J&K

2023-06-05

MOHD.AKRAM CHOWDHARY

body2023
JUDGMENT : MOHD. AKRAM CHOWDHARY, J. 1. The two petitions, invoking inherent jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, have been filed by petitioners/accused in two counter FIRs first filed on the complaint of one Tariq Iqbal and the second by Razia Begum seeking quashing of both the FIRs. 2. The respondent No. 3 in CRM(M) No. 299/2021 had got registered a case against the petitioners Nazir Ahmed and others vide FIR No. 130/2021 on 15.05.2021 at Police Station Domana for the commission of offences punishable under sections 452/323/147/148 IPC, whereas respondent No. 2 Razia Begum in CRM(M) No. 311/2021 had filed a case which was registered vide FIR No. 141/2021 at the same police station on 25.05.2021 for commission of offences punishable under sections 452/323/504/506/34 IPC against Nazir Hussain and others. The second FIR registered on the complaint of Razia Begum seems to be counterblast to the earlier FIR registered on the complaint of Tariq Iqbal, however, both the cases arise out of same incident and cause of action. 3. The official respondents filed the status report in both the cases. However, during pendency of these petitions, the private parties entered into a compromise which was executed between the complainants in both the cases i.e. Tariq Iqbal and Razia Begum. Their statements in support of the compromise were also recorded by the learned Registrar Judicial as per directions of the Court. 4. The facts which lead to the filing of CRM(M) No. 299/2021 are that on 14.05.2021, the respondent No. 3 parked his Scorpio car in front of the house of the petitioners 3 and 6; and when petitioner No. 6, Razia Begum objected to parking of the car in front of her house, respondent No. 3 along with two/three persons hurled filthy abuses and assaulted her. As a result whereof, she sustained injuries; and that as she was getting her treatment, respondent No. 3 in the meantime lodged a false and frivolous FIR against the petitioners which is impugned in the petition. Whereas, the facts as stated in CRM(M) No. 311/2021, are that petitioner No. 1 is the resident of Mendhar Poonch and have purchased a plot of land at Gurha Brahmana Bantalab, Jammu over which he has constructed a residential house; that the respondent no. Whereas, the facts as stated in CRM(M) No. 311/2021, are that petitioner No. 1 is the resident of Mendhar Poonch and have purchased a plot of land at Gurha Brahmana Bantalab, Jammu over which he has constructed a residential house; that the respondent no. 2-Razia Begum lodged the impugned FIR in order to scuttle the proceedings in the FIR No. 130/2021 lodged by the son of the petitioner No. 1, who has been mercilessly beaten by the family members of the respondent No. 2. 5. This Court while issuing notice to the respondents on 02.06.2021 in CRM(M) No. 299/2021 and on 04.06.2021 in CRM(M) No. 311/2021 allowed the investigation in the FIR to go ahead, however, presentation of challan was made subject to the permission of this Court. It is stated that the complainants in both the cases i.e. Tariq Iqbal and Razia Begum have entered into a compromise, wherein, inter alia, it has been resolved and agreed by them that after lodging FIRs against each others, they have executed a compromise deed and have amicably settled their grievance between them and are not interested in pursuing the impugned FIRs lodged by them against each others. A copy of the compromise deed dated 29th February, 2022 has also been placed on record. 6. On 09.02.2023, the parties were directed to record their statements in support of their compromise, in compliance whereof, Tariq Iqbal as well as Razia Begum got their statements recorded before the learned Registrar Judicial on 23.05.2023. Both the parties were identified by their respective counsels. In their statements, complainants in both the cases have stated that they have amicably resolved all disputes and issues with each other. It has also been stated by the complainants in their statements that they do not want to pursue the impugned FIRs filed by them against each other. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record. 8. So far as the facts alleged in petition pertaining to the compromise arrived at between the parties in terms of compromise deed executed on 29.02.2021, are concerned, the same are not disputed. However, according to the parties, most of the offences of which accused/petitioners have been charged are non-compoundable. 8. So far as the facts alleged in petition pertaining to the compromise arrived at between the parties in terms of compromise deed executed on 29.02.2021, are concerned, the same are not disputed. However, according to the parties, most of the offences of which accused/petitioners have been charged are non-compoundable. In the backdrop of this position, the question arises as to whether this Court has power to quash the proceedings, particularly when some of the offences alleged to have been committed are non-compoundable in nature. The Supreme Court in the case of Gian Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr. (2012) 10 SCC 303 , while considering this aspect, has observed as under: “57. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz. (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R. may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above questions is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.” 9. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the case titled Narinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr. (2014) 6 SCC 466 , has laid down guidelines for quashing of criminal proceedings. The guidelines are reproduced as under: “31. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the case titled Narinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr. (2014) 6 SCC 466 , has laid down guidelines for quashing of criminal proceedings. The guidelines are reproduced as under: “31. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between c/w the parties and exercising its power under section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings: (I) Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. (II) When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure: (i) ends of justice. (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. (III) Such a power is not be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by Public Servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender. (IV) On the other, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. (IV) On the other, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves. (V) While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases. (VI) Offences under section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore is to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the later case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship. (VII) While deciding whether to exercise its power under section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship. (VII) While deciding whether to exercise its power under section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence under section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.” 10. Here charge is proved under section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.” 10. From a perusal of the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court, it is clear that in the cases or disputes which have predominantly civil flavour and where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute, the High Court is well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceedings if it is known that because of the compromise arrived at between the parties, there is remote possibility of securing conviction of the accused. In fact, in such cases, the Supreme Court has clearly observed that it would amount to extreme injustice if despite settlement having been arrived at by the parties, the criminal proceedings are allowed to continue. 11. Adverting to the facts of the instant case, it is clear that the parties to the dispute, Tariq Iqbal and Razia Begum have entered into a compromise, whereby complainants/victims have decided not to pursue prosecution in the impugned FIRs against each other. Therefore, once the rival parties have arrived at a settlement, allowing the prosecutions to continue merely because the offences alleged against the accused are non-compoundable in nature, would amount to great injustice to both the parties and, in fact, it will amount to frittering away the fruits of compromise that has been arrived at between the parties. The continuance of criminal proceedings against the petitioner, in these circumstances, will be nothing but an abuse of process of law. 12. In view of the aforesaid discussion, both the petitions are allowed. Accordingly, FIR No. 0130/2021 registered at Police Station, Domana for offences punishable under sections 452, 323, 147, 148 IPC and FIR No. 0141/2021 registered at the same police station for offences punishable under Sections 452, 323, 504, 506 and 34 IPC as well as further proceedings taken thereon are quashed. 13. Both the petitions, alongwith interim applications are disposed of. 14. Copy of this Judgment shall be placed on the connected file as well.