JUDGMENT : 1. This is an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay in preferring the instant appeal. 2. Heard Sri S.P. Tiwari, Additional Government Advocate-I for the applicant/State and also perused the record. 3. Office report reveals that there is a delay of fifteen days in preferring the instant appeal. 4. Having heard the learned Additional Government Advocate-I representing the State/applicant and upon perusal of averments made in the application seeking condonation of delay, this Court is satisfied that the delay has sufficiently been explained. 5. Accordingly, the application for condonation of delay is allowed and the delay in preferring the instant appeal is hereby condoned. Order on Memo of Appeal: 6. Heard Sri S.P. Tiwari, Additional Government Advocate-I for the applicant/State and also perused the record. 7. The instant appeal has been filed against the order dated 08.06.2023 passed by learned Special Judge (Gangster Act) / Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.4, Unnao in Sessions Trial No.133 of 2012, Case Crime No.163 of 2002, under Section 3 of The U.P. Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986, Police Station Ajgain, District Unnao, whereby the respondent has been acquitted of the charges levelled against him. 8. The prosecution case, in short conspectus, is that the first informant i.e. Station House Officer Ravindra Nath Singh had lodged the First Information Report No.163 of 2002, under Section 3(ii) of The U.P. Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 at Police Station Sohramau, District Unnao against the accused Ravishanker Kurmi, Deepu Gupta, Saleem, Nanhke @ Kaliya, Munna Shah, Shivmangal and Pappu @ Raju with the allegation that on 31.05.2002 at about 00:15 hours while the first informant alongwith S.I. Chandrabhan Singh, Constable Virendra Kumar Dwivedi, Constable Suresh Chandra, Constable Radhey Shyam and Constable Ramakant Mishra were searching the accused of another case i.e. Case Crime No.144 of 2002, under Sections 307, 323, 504, 427 I.P.C., they saw that the accused persons were cutting the electricity wires with intention to steal it. When the police surrounded them, the accused tried to fled away. Two accused succeeded in escaping while one was caught by the police. On being asked his name, he told Deepu Gupta. On being searched, a wooden danda and an iron axe was recovered from the possession of Deepu Gupta. The police also inquired him about co-accused. The accused Deepu Gupta informed the names of the accused. 9. Two accused succeeded in escaping while one was caught by the police. On being asked his name, he told Deepu Gupta. On being searched, a wooden danda and an iron axe was recovered from the possession of Deepu Gupta. The police also inquired him about co-accused. The accused Deepu Gupta informed the names of the accused. 9. On the basis of aforesaid incident, first information report as Case Crime No.163 of 2002, under Section 3(ii) of The U.P. Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986, Police Station Ajgain, District Unnao was lodged. 10. The Investigating Officer recorded the statements of witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C. He also visited the place of occurrence and prepared site plan. Upon conclusion of investigation, he submitted charge sheet against the accused/respondent under Section 3(ii) of The U.P. Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986. A gang chart was also prepared wherein the respondent was mentioned as gang leader. 11. In order to prove its case, the prosecution has examined Constable Harishchandra as P.W.-1, S.O. Ravindra Singh as P.W.-2 and Investigating Officer Parsuram Tripathi, C.O. as P.W.-3. 12. The accused respondent was charged under Section 3 of The U.P. Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986, who denied the charges and claimed to be tried. 13. No evidence in defence was adduced by the respondent. 14. After the conclusion of prosecution evidence, statement of accused-respondent was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein he had stated the prosecution story to be false and concocted and also stated himself to be innocent, who has been falsely implicated in this case. 15. The learned trial court vide impugned judgment and order dated 08.06.2023 has acquitted the respondent of all the charges. 16. Aggrieved by the aforesaid impugned judgment and order whereby the respondent was acquitted, the State has filed this appeal. 17. It is submitted by learned Additional Government Advocate-I that respondent was named in the first information report. Specific role of cutting, stealing and illegally selling the electricity wires has been assigned to the respondent. During investigation, sufficient evidences against the respondent was collected. The prosecution witnesses, through their testimonies, have proved the prosecution case. Therefore, the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial court is against the weight of evidence and the same is liable to be set aside and the appeal deserves to be allowed. 18. During investigation, sufficient evidences against the respondent was collected. The prosecution witnesses, through their testimonies, have proved the prosecution case. Therefore, the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial court is against the weight of evidence and the same is liable to be set aside and the appeal deserves to be allowed. 18. Having heard learned Additional Government Advocate-I for the State and upon perusal of records, this Court has been able to notice that the prosecution adduced three witnesses i.e. Constable Harishchandra as P.W.-1, S.O. Ravindra Singh as P.W.-2 and Investigating Officer Parsuram Tripathi, C.O. as P.W.-3. The learned trial court has found that all the witnesses are formal witnesses. There is no independent eye witness of the alleged offence. It also appears that alleged recovery of tool have been made from open fields which did not inspire confidence of learned trial court to believe the fact of recovery to be true. It also appears that no public at large is affected by the accused person even there is no terror of the accused on the general public. The prosecution also failed to prove the gang chart. 19. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid, the learned trial court appears to have rightly recorded the finding of acquittal of the respondent which is based on proper appreciation and analysis of evidence available on record. 20. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramesh And Others vs. State of Haryana reported in (2017) 1 SCC 529 in paragraphs 24 and 26 has held as under:- “24. We have duly appreciated the submissions advanced by the counsel for the parties on both sides. No doubt, the High Court was dealing with the appeal against the judgment of the trial court which had acquitted the appellants herein. The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is undoubtedly narrower than the scope of appeal against conviction. Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 confers upon the State a right to prefer an appeal to the High Court against the order of acquittal. At the same time, sub-section (3) thereof mandates that such an appeal is not to be entertained except with the leave of the High Court. Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 confers upon the State a right to prefer an appeal to the High Court against the order of acquittal. At the same time, sub-section (3) thereof mandates that such an appeal is not to be entertained except with the leave of the High Court. Thus, before an appeal is entertained on merits, leave of the High Court is to be obtained which means that normally judgment of acquittal of the trial court is attached a definite value which is not to be ignored by the High Court. In other words, presumption of innocence in favour of an accused gets further fortified or reinforced by an order of acquittal. At the same time, while exercising its appellate power, the High Court is empowered to reappreciate, review and reconsider the evidence before it. However, this exercise is to be undertaken in order to come to an independent conclusion and unless there are substantial and compelling reasons or very strong reasons to differ from the findings of acquittal recorded by the trial court, the High Court, as an appellate court in an appeal against the acquittal, is not supposed to substitute its findings in case the findings recorded by the trial court are equally plausible. 26. This legal position is reiterated in Govindaraju v. State, (2012) 4 SCC 722 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 533 and the following passage therefrom needs to be extracted: (SCC p. 732, paras 12-13) “12. The legislature in its wisdom, unlike an appeal by an accused in the case of conviction, introduced the concept of leave to appeal in terms of Section 378 CrPC. This is an indication that appeal from acquittal is placed on a somewhat different footing than a normal appeal. But once leave is granted, then there is hardly any difference between a normal appeal and an appeal against acquittal. The concept of leave to appeal under Section 378 CrPC has been introduced as an additional stage between the order of acquittal and consideration of the judgment by the appellate court on merits as in the case of a regular appeal. Sub-section (3) of Section 378 clearly provides that no appeal to the High Court under sub-section (1) or (2) shall be entertained except with the leave of the High Court. Sub-section (3) of Section 378 clearly provides that no appeal to the High Court under sub-section (1) or (2) shall be entertained except with the leave of the High Court. This legislative intent of attaching a definite value to the judgment of acquittal cannot be ignored by the courts. 13. Under the scheme of CrPC, acquittal confers rights on an accused that of a free citizen. A benefit that has accrued to an accused by the judgment of acquittal can be taken away and he can be convicted on appeal, only when the judgment of the trial court is perverse on facts or law. Upon examination of the evidence before it, the appellate court should be fully convinced that the findings returned by the trial court are really erroneous and contrary to the settled principles of criminal law.”” (Emphasis supplied) 21. Likewise in a recent judgment the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Guru Dutt Pathak Vs. State of U.P. reported in (2021) 6 SCC 116 in paragraphs 15, 16 and 17 has held as under:- “15. In Babu v. State of Kerala [Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1179], this Court has reiterated the principles to be followed in an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC. In paras 12 to 19, it is observed and held as under : (SCC pp. 196-199) “12. This Court time and again has laid down the guidelines for the High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court. The appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be the more probable one. While dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject-matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject-matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. (Vide Balak Ram v. State of U.P., (1975) 3 SCC 219 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 837], Shambhoo Missir v. State of Bihar, (1990) 4 SCC 17 : 1990 SCC (Cri) 518, Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P., (2003) 1 SCC 761 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 432, Narendra Singh v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1893, Budh Singh v. State of U.P., (2006) 9 SCC 731 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 377], State of U.P. v. Ram Veer Singh [State of U.P. v. Ram Veer Singh, (2007) 13 SCC 102 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 363], S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy [S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy, (2008) 5 SCC 535 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 645], Arulveluv. State [Arulvelu v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 288], Perla Somasekhara Reddy v. State of A.P. [Perla Somasekhara Reddy v. State of A.P., (2009) 16 SCC 98 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 176] and Ram Singh v. State of H.P. [Ram Singh v. State of H.P., (2010) 2 SCC 445 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1496] )” 13. In Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor [Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor, 1934 SCC OnLine PC 42 : (1933-34) 61 IA 398 : AIR 1934 PC 227 (2)], the Privy Council observed as under : (SCC Online PC : IA p. 404) ‘… the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.’ 14. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been followed by this Court. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been followed by this Court. (See Tulsiram Kanu v. State, 1951 SCC 92 : AIR 1954 SC 1 , Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 216 : 1957 Cri LJ 481, M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 200 : (1963) 1 Cri LJ 235, Khedu Mohton v. State of Bihar, (1970) 2 SCC 450 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 479, Sambasivan v. State of Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 412 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1320, Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P., (2002) 4 SCC 85 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 736 and State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran, (2007) 3 SCC 755 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 162) 15. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, this Court reiterated the legal position as under : (SCC p. 432, para 42) ‘(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.’ (Emphasis supplied) 16. In Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60, this Court reiterated the said view, observing that the appellate court in dealing with the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted the accused, should bear in mind that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. The appellate court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court as the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. 17. In State of Rajasthan v. Naresh, (2009) 9 SCC 368 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1069, the Court again examined the earlier judgments of this Court and laid down that : (SCC p. 374, para 20) ‘20. … An order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if the court believes that there is some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused.’ 18. In State of U.P. v. Banne, (2009) 4 SCC 271 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 260, this Court gave certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. In State of U.P. v. Banne, (2009) 4 SCC 271 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 260, this Court gave certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. The circumstances include : (SCC p. 286, para 28) ‘(i) The High Court's decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position; (ii) The High Court's conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record; (iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice; (iv) The High Court's judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case; (v) This Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court; (vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal.’ A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Dhanapal v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 401 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 336. 19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference.” (emphasis supplied)” 16. When the findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse has been dealt with and considered in para 20 of the aforesaid decision, which reads as under : (Babu case [Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1179], SCC p. 199) “20. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is “against the weight of evidence”, or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn., (1984) 4 SCC 635 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 131, Excise & Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312, Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 665], Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad, (2001) 1 SCC 501 , Arulvelu v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 288] and Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P., (2009) 10 SCC 636 :(2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 372])” It is further observed, after following the decision of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police, (1999) 2 SCC 10 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 429, that if a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. 17. In the decision of this Court in Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 5 SCC 436 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 586, this Court again had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 378 CrPC and the interference by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal. This Court considered a catena of decisions of this Court right from 1952 onwards. In para 31, it is observed and held as under : (Vijay Mohan Singh case [Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 5 SCC 436 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 586], SCC pp. 447-49) “31. An identical question came to be considered before this Court in Umedbhai Jadavbhai [Umedbhai Jadavbhai v. State of Gujarat, (1978) 1 SCC 228 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 108] . In the case before this Court, the High Court interfered with the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court on reappreciation of the entire evidence on record. 447-49) “31. An identical question came to be considered before this Court in Umedbhai Jadavbhai [Umedbhai Jadavbhai v. State of Gujarat, (1978) 1 SCC 228 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 108] . In the case before this Court, the High Court interfered with the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court on reappreciation of the entire evidence on record. However, the High Court, while reversing the acquittal, did not consider the reasons given by the learned trial court while acquitting the accused. Confirming the judgment of the High Court, this Court observed and held in para 10 as under : (SCC p. 233) ‘10. Once the appeal was rightly entertained against the order of acquittal, the High Court was entitled to reappreciate the entire evidence independently and come to its own conclusion. Ordinarily, the High Court would give due importance to the opinion of the Sessions Judge if the same were arrived at after proper appreciation of the evidence. This rule will not be applicable in the present case where the Sessions Judge has made an absolutely wrong assumption of a very material and clinching aspect in the peculiar circumstances of the case.’ 31.1. In Sambasivan v. State of Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 412 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1320, the High Court reversed the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court and held the accused guilty on reappreciation of the entire evidence on record, however, the High Court did not record its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. Confirming the order passed by the High Court convicting the accused on reversal of the acquittal passed by the learned trial court, after being satisfied that the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court was perverse and suffered from infirmities, this Court declined to interfere with the order of conviction passed by the High Court. While confirming the order of conviction passed by the High Court, this Court observed in para 8 as under : (SCC p. 416) ‘8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to ascertain whether the High Court has conformed to the aforementioned principles. While confirming the order of conviction passed by the High Court, this Court observed in para 8 as under : (SCC p. 416) ‘8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to ascertain whether the High Court has conformed to the aforementioned principles. We find that the High Court has not strictly proceeded in the manner laid down by this Court in Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 972 viz. first recording its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable, which alone will justify interference in an order of acquittal though the High Court has rendered a well- considered judgment duly meeting all the contentions raised before it. But then will this non compliance per se justify setting aside the judgment under appeal? We think, not. In our view, in such a case, the approach of the court which is considering the validity of the judgment of an appellate court which has reversed the order of acquittal passed by the trial court, should be to satisfy itself if the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusions arrived at by it are demonstrably unsustainable and whether the judgment of the appellate court is free from those infirmities; if so to hold that the trial court judgment warranted interference. In such a case, there is obviously no reason why the appellate court's judgment should be disturbed. But if on the other hand the court comes to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial court does not suffer from any infirmity, it cannot but be held that the interference by the appellate court in the order of acquittal was not justified; then in such a case the judgment of the appellate court has to be set aside as of the two reasonable views, the one in support of the acquittal alone has to stand. Having regard to the above discussion, we shall proceed to examine the judgment of the trial court in this case.’ 31.2. Having regard to the above discussion, we shall proceed to examine the judgment of the trial court in this case.’ 31.2. In K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Kerala, (1999) 3 SCC 309 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 410, after observing that though there is some substance in the grievance of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused that the High Court has not adverted to all the reasons given by the trial Judge for according an order of acquittal, this Court refused to set aside the order of conviction passed by the High Court after having found that the approach of the Sessions Judge in recording the order of acquittal was not proper and the conclusion arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge on several aspects was unsustainable. This Court further observed that as the Sessions Judge was not justified in discarding the relevant/material evidence while acquitting the accused, the High Court, therefore, was fully entitled to reappreciate the evidence and record its own conclusion. This Court scrutinised the evidence of the eyewitnesses and opined that reasons adduced by the trial court for discarding the testimony of the eyewitnesses were not at all sound. This Court also observed that as the evaluation of the evidence made by the trial court was manifestly erroneous and therefore it was the duty of the High Court to interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge. 31.3. In Atley v. State of U.P., AIR 1955 SC 807 : 1955 Cri LJ 1653, in para 5, this Court observed and held as under : (AIR pp. 809-10) ‘5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the judgment of the trial court being one of acquittal, the High Court should not have set it aside on mere appreciation of the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution unless it came to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial Judge was perverse. In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417 CrPC came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order. In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417 CrPC came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order. It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course, keeping in view the well- established rule that the presumption of innocence of the accused is not weakened but strengthened by the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses whose evidence has been recorded in its presence. It is also well-settled that the court of appeal has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of innocence with which the accused person starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal. If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated. (See in this connection the very cases cited at the Bar, namely, Surajpal Singh v. State, 1951 SCC 1207] ; Wilayat Khan v. State of U.P., 1951 SCC 898) In our opinion, there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the High Court was not justified in reviewing the entire evidence and coming to its own conclusions.’ 31.4. In K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P., (1979) 1 SCC 355 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 305, this Court has observed that where the trial court allows itself to be beset with fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for slender reasons and takes a view of the evidence which is but barely possible, it is the obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the interest of justice, lest the administration of justice be brought to ridicule.” (Emphasis supplied) 22. Further, this Court observed that an appeal against acquittal stands on a different footing from the appeal against conviction. Hon'ble the Apex Court in a very recent judgment in the case of Sadhu Saran Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others reported in (2016) 4 SCC 357 has considered this difference and has observed in paragraph nos.20 and 21 as under: "20. Generally, an appeal against acquittal has always been altogether on a different pedestal from that of an appeal against conviction. In an appeal against acquittal where the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused is reinforced, the appellate court would interfere with the order of acquittal only when there is perversity of fact and law. However, we believe that the paramount consideration of the Court is to do substantial justice and avoid miscarriage of justice which can raise by acquitting the accused who is guilty of an offence. A miscarriage of justice that may occur by the acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. This Court, while enunciating the principles with regard to the scope of powers of the appellate court in an appeal against acquittal, in Sambasiva V. State of Kerala 1998 SCC (Cri) 1320 has held: "7. The principles with regard to the scope of the powers of the appellate court in an appeal against acquittal, are well settled. The powers of the appellate court in an appeal against acquittal are no less than in an appeal against conviction. But where on the basis of evidence on record two views are reasonably possible the appellate court cannot substitute its view in the place of that of the trial court. It is only when the approach of the trial in acquitting an accused is found to be clearly erroneous in its consideration of evidence on record and in deducing conclusions therefrom that the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal." 21. The Court, in several cases, has taken the consistent view that the appellate court, while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, has no absolute restriction in law to review and relook the entire evidence on which the order of acquittal is founded. The Court, in several cases, has taken the consistent view that the appellate court, while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, has no absolute restriction in law to review and relook the entire evidence on which the order of acquittal is founded. If the appellate court, on scrutiny, finds that the decision of the court below is based on erroneous views and against settled position of law, then the interference of the appellate court with such an order is imperative." 23. In the light of the aforesaid guidelines, the impugned judgment has to be considered from the point of view whether the view taken by the court below was a probable view based on the material on record or it is an absolutely erroneous judgment devoid of merits. 24. A criminal trial proceeds with the presumption of innocence of the accused persons. With the acquittal of the accused persons this presumption of innocence stands fortified. So very strong and cogent reasons must exist in interfering the judgment of acquittal. 25. Thus, having considered the matter in its entirety and in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramesh’s case (supra), Guru Dutt Pathak’s case (supra) and Sadhu Saran Singh (supra), this Court finds that the learned trial court’s findings regarding acquittal of accused/respondent herein are based on proper appreciation and analysis of evidence available on record which do not, in any manner, appear to be improbable or perverse. 26. Keeping in view the aforesaid weakness of the prosecution case, as noted by the court below, I am of the view that the view taken by the court below was a probable and logical view, which is based on valid reasons. The judgment of the court below cannot be said to be illegal, illogical and improbable and not based on material on record or is based on erroneous views and is against the settled position of law. So, this Court is satisfied that there is absolutely no hope of success in this appeal and accordingly, no interference is called for. 27. Accordingly, the present appeal against acquittal is dismissed. 28. No order as to costs. 29. Copy of this judgment be sent to the court below for its compliance.