JUDGMENT : This appeal under Section 30 of the Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923[‘the Act of 1923’ for short] is directed against the judgment and award of the Employees’ Compensation Commissioner, Moradabad (then called the ‘Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner’) dated 02.02.2008, awarding compensation to the claimants for the death of their son, in the sum of 4,33,820/- and Rs.4,33,820/- and other incidental reliefs. 2. This appeal was entertained by a Division Bench of this Court on 21.04.2008, though not formally admitted to hearing. The question that would tentatively be involved was also indicated in the order of the day, though not formulated as such. The appeal was later on admitted to hearing vide order dated 09.12.2019, albeit without framing the question/ questions involved. 3. On 24.02.2022, when the appeal came up, the following substantial question of law was framed : Whether a Commissioner, seized of a claim in relation to an accident that has taken place in an area other than one over which he has jurisdiction, is entitled to try and determine the claim, without issuing notice to the Commissioner having jurisdiction and the State Government concerned in terms of the proviso to Section 21(1) of the Employee's Compensation Act, 1923? 4. The appeal has been heard on the aforesaid substantial question of law. Learned Counsel for the parties have addressed the Court on the issue, of course, in the background of the facts and evidence giving rise to the claim, very elaborately. 5. The claimants, Mohd. Aslam and Smt. Husn Ara, Aslam’s wife, are the parents of Mohd. Salim alias Raja, said to be the victim of a fatal motor accident, that happened on 07.06.2005 at Begusarai, Bihar. The claimants are residents of Moradabad. They instituted Claim Petition No. 31 of 2007 before the Employees’ Compensation Commissioner, Moradabad on 07.06.2007, with allegations that their son, Mohd. Salim alias Raja, was employed as a Cleaner by the owner of Vehicle No. HR 38 J/3735. Sarfaraz Khan was the owner of the vehicle and impleaded as opposite party No. 1 to the claim petition. He shall hereinafter be called ‘the owner’. 6. According to the claimants, their son, Mohd. Salim alias Raja, who shall hereinafter be called ‘the victim’ was carrying a consignment of goods on board Vehicle No. HR 38 J/3735, with Rais Ahmad operating the vehicle as its driver. He shall hereinafter be called ‘the owner’. 6. According to the claimants, their son, Mohd. Salim alias Raja, who shall hereinafter be called ‘the victim’ was carrying a consignment of goods on board Vehicle No. HR 38 J/3735, with Rais Ahmad operating the vehicle as its driver. The victim was carrying the consignment according to the instructions of the owner on board the ill-fated vehicle. The vehicle had to deliver the consignment at a destination in the State of Bihar. The victim mounted the vehicle’s tool box to recover some tools, perhaps, to fix some fault that had occured on way, when he slipped and fell down onto the road, leading to injury to the head and other parts of his body. The driver immediately conveyed the victim the same day i.e. 07.06.2005 to a certain Shivam Nursing Home, managed by Dr. Ram Yatan Singh, situate at Begusarai, Bihar for necessary medical aid and reported the matter to the local police station at Begusarai, Bihar. During the course of treatment by Dr. Ram Yatan Singh, the claimants’ son succumbed to his injuries on the following day i.e. 08.06.2005. 7. The owner would pay the victim salary in the sum of 4,200/- per Rs.4,33,820/- and month, besides a diet allowance. At the time of his demise, the victim was aged 25 years. The victim suffered injuries during the course of employment, in consequence of which, he died. The claimants have been rendered without financial support, inasmuch the victim was the sole breadwinner of the family, whose life has extinguished in consequence of the accident. The claimants find it difficult to sustain themselves and both of them are suffering of diseases. They do not have any other person as their support. 8. The claimants asked the owner to pay compensation, which he did not. They served the owner with a notice under Section 10 of the Act of 1923, but they received nothing towards compensation for the victim’s untimely demise in the accident. 9. The ill-fated vehicle was insured with the New India Assurance Company Limited, represented by its Regional Manager, Regional Office, Civil Lines, Moradabad on the date and time of the accident. The insurance cover, bearing number 396248 was valid from 02.10.2004 to 01.10.2005. The Insurance Company aforesaid, who shall hereinafter be called ‘the insurers’ have been impleaded as opposite party No. 2 to the claim petition. The insurance cover, bearing number 396248 was valid from 02.10.2004 to 01.10.2005. The Insurance Company aforesaid, who shall hereinafter be called ‘the insurers’ have been impleaded as opposite party No. 2 to the claim petition. The insurers are the appellants here. The claimants and the owner are both residents of Tehsil Sambal, Moradabad, and for the said reason, the Employees’ Compensation Commissioner, Moradabad has jurisdiction to try the claim. The claimants have prayed that they be given compensation according to the provisions of the Act of 1923, which ought to be ordered from the date of the accident till realisation, with simple interest at the rate of 18% per annum. 10. The insurers contested the claim before the Employees’ Compensation Commissioner and put in a written statement dated 23.07.2007. The insurers, in their written statement, generally denied the allegations in the claim petition, and pleaded their case, raising additional pleas. The case pleaded by the insurers is that the victim was not a Cleaner on board the ill-fated vehicle, nor the owner had ever issued any letter of appointment in his favour. It is said in the written statement that the claimants did not mention the date, month or year of the victim’s appointment in the claim petition, nor have they produced a copy of any salary certificate. The victim was not performing his duty on board the illfated vehicle. He never mounted the toolkit chamber to recover tools; also he did not sustain injuries to his head or other parts of the body in the claimed accident. It is said that if the victim was on duty, the claimants would have mentioned the date and time of the accident, also mentioning if it happened by night. It is emphasized that the time of accident is not mentioned at all in the claim petition. It is averred that for the claimants’ failure to get a First Information Report relevant to the accident registered, the claim petition is fit to be rejected. 11. By way of an amendment incorporated on 03.10.2007, it was pleaded vide paragraph No. 18(a) of the insurers' written statement that upon arrival of the deceased’s cadaver, an inquiry was undertaken by the insurers' surveyor, D. Kumar, who found that the victim’s death certificate dated 08.06.2005 that the claimants had presented, was not issued by Shivam Nursing Home or Dr. Ram Jatan Yadav. Ram Jatan Yadav. It was a fabricated document, got up and presented by the claimants. After inquiry, it was also found that on 07.06.2005, no crime was registered at Police Station Begusarai relating to the accident. The written information that was presented, too was a got up document. It is the further case of the insurers that the claim petition is barred by Section 10 of the Act of 1923, inasmuch as it is provided there that the Employees' Compensation Commissioner shall not entertain any claim under the Act of 1923, unless notice of the accident has been given in the manner provided, as soon as practicable, after the event. It is averred that from a perusal of the assertions made in the claim petition, the claimants never served a notice upon the insurers. The insurers have also raised a plea that the driver of the ill-fated vehicle did not possess a valid driving license, in accordance with the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The driver and the victim are not entitled to any compensation, for the reason that the driver did not hold a valid driving license on the date and time of the accident. In the circumstances, the insurers have no liability to indemnify. The claim petition was urged to be rejected on the basis of the aforesaid pleas. 12. The owner of the ill-fated vehicle filed his written statement on 31.07.2007. The contents of paragraph Nos. 1 to 5 to the claim petition were admitted. In answer to paragraph No. 6 of the claim, it is averred that the victim was employed on a salary of Rs. 3500/- per month. It is accepted in paragraph No. 8 of the written statement that the victim died during the course of employment. It is pleaded in paragraph No. 13 that the claimants are not entitled to compensation. However, in case the Court is of opinion that the claimants are entitled, burden has to be shouldered by the insurers, because the owner's vehicle was insured on the date and time of the accident with the insurers, the policy being valid from 02.10.2004 to 01.10.2005. The insurance cover note is numbered as 396248, according to the owner. 13. However, in case the Court is of opinion that the claimants are entitled, burden has to be shouldered by the insurers, because the owner's vehicle was insured on the date and time of the accident with the insurers, the policy being valid from 02.10.2004 to 01.10.2005. The insurance cover note is numbered as 396248, according to the owner. 13. In the additional pleas set out in the written statement on behalf of the owner, it is averred in paragraph No. 14 that the owner helped the claimants in every manner possible, but the claimants have not provided him with all the necessary documents, such as the ration card and others, on account of which, he could not manage compensation to be paid by the insurers. 14. On the pleadings of parties, the Tribunal framed the following issues (translated into English from Hindi) : (i) Whether the claimants' son died during the course of employment on account of grievous injuries sustained in a motor accident? (ii) Whether on the date of the accident i.e. 07.06.2005, vehicle No. HR 38J/3735 was insured with opposite party No. 2? (iii) What was the salary received by the claimants' son at the time of the accident? (iv) Whether the driver had a valid driving license at the time of the accident? (v) Whether the claimants are entitled to any compensation? If yes, how much and from which opposite party? 15. Parties led evidence, both oral and documentary, of which there is eloquent mention in the impugned judgment passed by the Employees' Compensation Commissioner. There is no necessity to refer to that evidence, considering the substantial question of law, the answer to which would govern the fate of this appeal before this Court. Nevertheless, for the sake of record, it must be held that the issues were answered in favour of the claimants and the claim petition allowed, awarding compensation in the sum of 4,33,820/-, ordering the insurers to make it good. It was Rs.4,33,820/- and ordered that the compensation be paid within 30 days, favouring the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Moradabad Region, Moradabad. It was also directed that in the event of non-compliance within the time allowed, recovery proceedings would be initiated without further notice. In addition, notice was issued to the owner on the issue of penalty. 16. It was Rs.4,33,820/- and ordered that the compensation be paid within 30 days, favouring the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Moradabad Region, Moradabad. It was also directed that in the event of non-compliance within the time allowed, recovery proceedings would be initiated without further notice. In addition, notice was issued to the owner on the issue of penalty. 16. This Court, at the time when the appeal was entertained on 21.04.2008, directed that no part of the compensation awarded shall be released in favour of the respondents. It is, thus, apparent that the sum of 4,33,820/- deposited with the Employees' Compensation Commissioner Rs.4,33,820/- and by the insurers vide cheque dated 26.03.2008 is lying in deposit with the said Commissioner. 17. Heard Mr. S.C. Srivastava, learned Counsel for the insurers and Mr. Mohd. Asim Zulfiquar, learned Counsel on behalf of the respondents. 18. Learned Counsel for the insurers submits that in the absence of a notice issued by the Compensation Commissioner at Moradabad to the Compensation Commissioner at Begusarai, within whose territorial jurisdiction the accident happened, the award cannot be sustained. He further submits that a notice was also required to be issued by the Employees' Compensation Commissioner, Moradabad to the State Government of the State where the accident occurred. In this connection, he has placed reliance upon the first proviso to Section 21(1)(b) of the Act of 1923. Mr. Srivastava impresses upon the Court that where a Compensation Commissioner, other than the one within whose jurisdiction the accident occurred, entertains and decides a claim, he can do so after compliance with the first proviso; else, he would have no jurisdiction. He submits that but for compliance with the proviso to Section 21(1)(b), or for that matter, Section 21(1)(c) of the Act of 1923, the non-jurisdictional Commissioner does not possess jurisdiction to process and decide an employees' compensation claim. The failure, therefore, on the part of the Employees' Compensation Commissioner who is not the jurisdictional Commissioner to comply with the proviso to Section 21(1)(b) would vitiate the award. In support of the aforesaid contention of his, Mr. Srivastava has placed reliance upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company Limited v. Rakesh and another, 2010 (2) T.A.C. 237 (All.). 19. Mr. Mohd. In support of the aforesaid contention of his, Mr. Srivastava has placed reliance upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company Limited v. Rakesh and another, 2010 (2) T.A.C. 237 (All.). 19. Mr. Mohd. Asim Zulfiquar, learned Counsel for the claimants, on the other hand, submits that there is no plea raised before the Employees' Compensation Commissioner, Moradabad on behalf of the insurers or the owner that the Compensation Commissioner was mandated by law to issue notice to the jurisdictional Commissioner and the State Government concerned before processing the claim. Mr. Zulfiquar says that in the absence of this plea being canvassed before the Compensation Commissioner at Moradabad, it is not open to the insurers to urge for the first time in appeal before this Court that there was no adherence to the mandatory provisions of Section 21(1)(b) of the Act of 1923. He submits, in the alternative, that the Act of 1923 is a social welfare legislation that has, for its object, welfare of employees who are poor persons. He points out that the provision for a non-jurisdictional Commissioner to entertain and process the claim was brought in through Workmen's Compensation (Amendment) Act, 1995 (amending Act No. 30 of 1995)[ ‘the Act of 1995’ for short] vide Section 10 thereof, with effect from 01.10.1996. The object of this amendment was to ameliorate the hardships of poor workmen and employees that would be there if they were compelled to suit their claim before the Compensation Commissioner, where the accident happened. 20. Dilating on his submissions, Mr. Zulfiquar has submitted that given the socio-economic conditions of the labour class, to which the employees and workmen belong, they go away from home across large distances in search of work, particularly, in factories and other establishments. They have no cause to stay in that place, but their gainful engagement in the factory or other establishment. Once they meet with an accident, even if they survive it, and are not fit to work, they would have to go back home. If they die, their heirs and legal representatives are, of course, not at the place where an employee or workman might have toiled to secure his livelihood. Once they meet with an accident, even if they survive it, and are not fit to work, they would have to go back home. If they die, their heirs and legal representatives are, of course, not at the place where an employee or workman might have toiled to secure his livelihood. Therefore, to insist, in these circumstances, that the claim would have to be instituted before the jurisdictional Commissioner, would virtually be depriving poor employees and workmen of their right to seek redress, the forum being venued at a station far away from where the claimant is domiciled. He submits that this would defeat the object of the Act of 192 . He submits, therefore, that once the plea of non issue of notice by the Commissioner at Moradabad to the jurisdictional Commissioner at Begusarai and the Government of Bihar was not raised before the Employees’ Compensation Commissioner, it ought not to be permitted to be raised here, after claim has been determined on merits by the Moradabad Commissioner. 21. In support of his contention, Mr. Zulfiquar has placed reliance upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Mayan v. Mustafa and another, 2022 (3) TAC 375, Bharat Singh v. Management of New Delhi Tublerclosis Centre, New Delhi and others, (1986) 2 SCC 614 and Morgina Begum v. MD, Hanuman Plantation Limited, (2007) 11 SCC 616 , the decision of this Court in New India Assurance Company Limited v. Smt. Shadab and others, 2018 (3) ADJ 833 and the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Company Limited v. Suman Devi and others, 2021 ILR 1 P&H 333. 22. This Court has keenly considered the submissions advanced by learned Counsel for the parties. 23. There is not much issue on facts and this appeal after all, though a first appeal, is not an open appeal on both facts and law. It has to be determined solely upon the substantial question involved, of course, with reference to facts, in the context of which, it has been formulated. The substantial question of law involved here has been formulated in the background of facts that the Employees' Compensation Commissioner who has tried, or so to speak, employing the language of the Statute, processed the claim, has admittedly not issued a notice to the Employees' Compensation Commissioner at Begusarai, Bihar, where the accident happened on 07.06.2005. The substantial question of law involved here has been formulated in the background of facts that the Employees' Compensation Commissioner who has tried, or so to speak, employing the language of the Statute, processed the claim, has admittedly not issued a notice to the Employees' Compensation Commissioner at Begusarai, Bihar, where the accident happened on 07.06.2005. He has also not issued notice to the State Government concerned, that is to say, the Government of Bihar, the twin conditions to be mandatorily fulfilled in terms of the proviso to Section 21(1)(b) of the Act of 1923 by a non-jurisdictional Compensation Commissioner trying or processing, as the Statute says, a claim by an employee or his heirs for compensation under the Act of 1923. Therefore, the substantial question, in the terms that it has been framed, has arisen. The general rule about venue or jurisdiction of a Court trying a civil cause or proceedings akin to it is that the Court competent to try the action or undertake the proceedings is the one within the territorial jurisdiction of which the cause of action has arisen. Different Statutes, including the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, extend the venue to other Courts, upon principles spelt out by the law. Here, the Statue, prior to its amendment by the Act of 1995, did not invest any other Compensation Commissioner, except for the one in whose area the accident took place and resulted in the injury. There was, of course, some modification of the rule if the workman was employed on a seagoing vessel or a seaman. Section 21 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, as the Act was called prior to the alteration of its name by Act No. 45 of 2009, reads : 21. Venue of proceedings and transfer.-(1) Where any matter is under this Act to be done by or before a Commissioner, the same shall, subject to the provisions of this Act and to any rules made hereunder, be done by or before a Commissioner for the area in which the accident took place which resulted in the injury : Provided that, where the workman is the master of a ship or a seaman any such matter may be done by or before a Commissioner for the area in which the owner or agent of the ship resides or carries on business. 24. 24. Section 21(1), as amended by the Act No. 30 of 1995, reads: : 21. Venue of proceedings and transfer.— (1) Where any matter is under this Act to be done by or before a Commissioner, the same shall, subject to the provisions of this Act and to any rules made hereunder, be done by or before the Commissioner for the area in which— (a) the accident took place which resulted in the injury; or (b) the [employee] or in case of his death, the dependant claiming the compensation ordinarily resides; or (c) the employer has his registered office: Provided that no matter shall be processed before or by a Commissioner, other than the Commissioner having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident took place, without his giving notice in the manner prescribed by the Central Government to the Commissioner having jurisdiction over the area and the State Government concerned: Provided further that, where the employee, being the master of a ship or a seaman or the captain or a member of the crew of an aircraft or a employee in a motor vehicle or a company, meets with the accident outside India any such matter may be done by or before a Commissioner for the area in which the owner or agent of the ship, aircraft or motor vehicle resides or carries on business or the registered office of the company is situate, as the case may be. 25. In order to give effect to the provisions of the amended Section 21(1), the Employees’ Compensation (Venue of Proceedings) Rules, 1996['the Rules of 1996' for short] have been framed by the Central Government in exercise of power under Section 21(1) of the Act. Rule 3 of the Rules of 1996 reads : 3. 25. In order to give effect to the provisions of the amended Section 21(1), the Employees’ Compensation (Venue of Proceedings) Rules, 1996['the Rules of 1996' for short] have been framed by the Central Government in exercise of power under Section 21(1) of the Act. Rule 3 of the Rules of 1996 reads : 3. Processing of an application - (1) An application under section 19 or section 22 shall be processed before or by a Commissioner for the area in which- (a) the accident took place which resulted in the injury; or (b) the employees or in case of his death the dependants claiming the compensation ordinarily reside; or (c) the employer has his registered office: Provided that no matter shall be processed before or by a Commissioner other than the Commissioner having the jurisdiction over the area in which the accident took place without his giving notice in Form A to the Commissioner having jurisdiction over the area and the State Government concerned. (2) The Commissioner under section 21(1)(b) or (c) may initiate proceedings afresh or he may continue the previous proceedings initialed under section 21(1)(a) as if the same or any of its part had been taken before him if he is satisfied that the interest of the parties shall not thereby be prejudiced. 26. A reading of the scheme of the Statute, as it originally stood prior to its amendment by Act No. 30 of 1995, spares not a shadow of doubt that the territorial jurisdiction to try or process, as the Statute calls it, a claim for compensation under the Act, lay exclusively with the Compensation Commissioner for the area in which the accident took place. However, by amendment, in order to further the benevolent object of the social welfare legislation, the Statute has introduced enabling provisions that facilitate the employee to institute a claim petition before a Compensation Commissioner for another area, different from one where the accident happened. 27. A fortiori the amended provisions confer jurisdiction on other Compensation Commissioners as well, if an employee moves such Commissioner, invoking his jurisdiction in terms of Section 21(1)(b) or Section 21(1)(c) of the Act of 1923. The object behind introduction of this change in the Act, as it originally stood, is obvious. We have mentioned it hereinbefore and need not recapitulate in all its details. The object behind introduction of this change in the Act, as it originally stood, is obvious. We have mentioned it hereinbefore and need not recapitulate in all its details. It is to facilitate a poor workman or employee suiting his claim at a venue of his convenience. But, the provision that enables the workman to approach a Compensation Commissioner, other than the one for the area where the accident happened, mandates that before the jurisdiction of a Commissioner other than the jurisdictional Commissioner is invoked, the Commissioner, who is approached under Section 21(1)(b) or 21(1)(c) of the Act, must adhere to the mandatory conditions for assuming jurisdiction in the matter spelt out by the proviso to Section 21(1)(b), or for that matter, 21(1)(c). The conditions are that the Commissioner, who has been approached to process a claim other than the one in whose area the accident has taken place, must give notice to the Commissioner having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident took place and also to the State Government concerned. Both these notices are to be given in the manner prescribed by the Central Government. 28. It has to be noted here that the first proviso to Section 21(1) (b) and 21(1)(c) is cast in prohibitive words. It says that “No matter shall be processed before or by the Commissioner other than the Commissioner having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident took place, without giving notice….” to quote the words employed by the Statute. The words clearly show that so far as the Commissioner within whose area the accident has taken place is concerned, the right of the claimant is as untrammelled as the jurisdiction of the Commissioner to process the claim. The jurisdiction of any other Commissioner, that is to say, other than the one within whose area the accident took place, is forbidden by law, unless notice in the manner prescribed is served upon the jurisdictional Commissioner and the State Government concerned. The service of notice in accordance with the first proviso to Section 21(1)(b), or for that matter, 21(1)(c) of the Act of 1923 then becomes a jurisdictional fact. The service of notice in accordance with the first proviso to Section 21(1)(b), or for that matter, 21(1)(c) of the Act of 1923 then becomes a jurisdictional fact. A non-jurisdictional Commissioner is invested with jurisdiction not just upon receiving a claim with regard to an accident that took place beyond his area, but, upon service of notice, as mandated by the first proviso to Section 21(1) (b) or 21(1) (c) of the Act. The presentation of a claim to a non-jurisdictional Commissioner is a state of things where he may proceed to assume jurisdiction, after he issues notice in the manner prescribed by the Central Government to the jurisdictional Commissioner for the area where the accident occurred, as well as the State Government concerned; if he does not do that, a non-jurisdictional Commissioner has no jurisdiction to proceed, notwithstanding the state of things on which he may act. 29. Rule 3 of the Rules of 1996, in particular, Rule 3(1), reinforces the aforesaid construction of the proviso to Section 21(1)(b) and 21(1)(c) of the Act of 1923. It prescribes a form, to wit, Form A to the Rules, in which notice has to be given by the non-jurisdictional Commissioner to the one who has jurisdiction over the area where the accident took place and the State Government concerned. 30. In ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company Limited v. Rakesh and another (supra) relied upon by the learned Counsel for the insurers, it was held by their Lordships of the Division Bench of this Court : 4. We have considered the pros and cons. We are of the view that there are two situations, i.e., judicial authority inherently lacks the jurisdiction and having jurisdiction not complied with legal formalities. If the Commissioner completely lacks jurisdiction then the entire exercise subsequent thereto will render futile and no proceeding can be proceeded without such notice but when the Court having jurisdiction did not discharge obligation/s required to be done procedurally then an appropriate order at an appropriate stage can be passed but depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In this particular case no such point has been raised by the appellant preliminary or substantially before the court of Commissioner. The Commissioner has proceeded on merit, delivered a judgment and passed an order giving compensation to the claimant on account of injury. In this particular case no such point has been raised by the appellant preliminary or substantially before the court of Commissioner. The Commissioner has proceeded on merit, delivered a judgment and passed an order giving compensation to the claimant on account of injury. It is for the first time before the appellate court, the appellant has taken the point. Although the point can be taken at the appellate stage but one should be diligent before the court of first instance at the time of framing issues and leading evidences. The objects and reasons of Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 is to provide compensation to certain classes of workmen or their dependants on account of injury caused by the accident. Therefore, it is a beneficial piece of legislation. In the case of beneficial piece of legislation, law is little tilted in favour of the beneficiaries. Hence, the requirement for the Court is to determine the course of payment as natural and refusal, if any, as unnatural. One of such reason of refusal is extortion of money by practising fraud upon the Court. To plug the loophole, law has provided the parameter to avoid double benefit. The requirement of law is that the Commissioner who is going to pass an order having jurisdiction over the residence of the claimant has to have knowledge or information about proceeding, if any, before the Commissioner in whose jurisdiction accident took place. Therefore, non-discharge of such duty by the Commissioner is definitely an acute procedural irregularity but the same cannot be construed as inherent lack of jurisdiction. On the basis of the ratio of Ramchandra Keshav (supra), it is expected that the judiciary must be much more careful since judicial accuracy gives correct message to the society. 31. The Division Bench in Rakesh has taken note of the other object of providing for notice to be given to the jurisdictional Commissioner. It is to avoid fraud being practised by the claimant, simultaneously presenting, prosecuting and realising for the same accident compensation before two fora. This is certainly one of the objects behind the requirement to serve a notice upon the jurisdictional Commissioner. But, to the understanding of this Court, that is not relevant to the validity of the exercise of jurisdiction by the non-jurisdictional Commissioner. This is certainly one of the objects behind the requirement to serve a notice upon the jurisdictional Commissioner. But, to the understanding of this Court, that is not relevant to the validity of the exercise of jurisdiction by the non-jurisdictional Commissioner. As already stated, the non jurisdictional Commissioner acquires jurisdiction only upon the fulfilment of the conditions mentioned in the proviso to Section 21(1)(b) or 21(1)(c) of the Act of 1923. Else, he does not have it. 32. For the same reason, the failure to raise this plea before the Compensation Commissioner may be blameworthy conduct on the insurers’ part, that may entitle the claimant to be compensated in costs, but being a jurisdictional plea, pure and simple, and one not involving any mixed question of fact and law, it can be permitted to be raised at the appellate stage, without doubt. It is, after all, a plea of jurisdiction that goes to the root of the matter. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision of the Karnataka High Court in National Insurance Company v. B. Ramaswamy and another, 2005 Lab IC 3632 where it was observed : 6. From the records, it is seen that the accident had occurred in Andhra Pradesh, the injured was treated at Andhra Pradesh and that the police complaint was lodged there. The single circumstance that claimants have shown their address at Bellary in lodging the claim petition would certainly raise a clear doubt as to the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation who would have jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim. This is an aspect, which goes to the very jurisdiction of the Commissioner for the Workmen's Compensation for entertaining the claim petition. The legislature in its wisdom has prescribed under Section 21 of the Act, that the first requirement of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation is to ascertain that the claim would not lie before any other Commissioner and if it is possible that claim would be within the jurisdiction of some other Commissioner, that a notice should be issued to such other Commissioner, before processing the claim. This exercise is necessary obviously in order to avoid dual claims. It is apparent from the record that no such notice has been issued and this procedure is a mandatory requirement, which has been apparently overlooked. This exercise is necessary obviously in order to avoid dual claims. It is apparent from the record that no such notice has been issued and this procedure is a mandatory requirement, which has been apparently overlooked. Therefore, in the absence of a notice, in the first instance, by the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Bellary to the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Kurnool, the same was not capable of being processed in the first instance. 7. The second circumstance, that the claimants claimed as labourers in spite of their advanced age and that the vehicle involved was moving inter-State and the improbability of loaders being carried from Madhya Pradesh to Karnataka, being a glaring circumstance, it is difficult to envisage the manner in which the Commissioner has proceeded to entertain and allow the claims. Hence, the very jurisdiction of the Commissioner having been questioned, the embargo placed on the defence that may be set up by the insurance company and the grounds on which an appeal can be filed, could not come in the way of the insurance company raising a substantial question of law touching upon the jurisdiction of the Commissioner to entertain the claim petition. In this light of the matter, I hold that appeals deserve to be allowed. 33. This position of law was adumbrated by a learned Single Judge of this Court in M/s. Chawla Techno Construction Ltd. and another v. State of U.P. and others, (2006) 108 FLR 35. In Chawla Techno Construction (supra) it was observed : 9. A bare perusal of provisions quoted above would go to show that under Section 21 sub Rule (1) has been in corporated in respect of Venue of the proceedings and transfer of the proceedings. Section 21 started that where any matter under the Act is to be done by or before a Commissioner the same shall, subject to the provisions of this Act and to any rules made hereunder be done by or before the Commissioner for the area in which (a) accident took place which resulted in the injury or (b) the workman or in case of his death the dependent claiming the compensation ordinarily resides or (c ) the employer has his registered office. This particular section proviso has been provided that no matter shall be processed before or by a Commissioner other than the Commissioner having jurisdiction over the area which is the accident took place, without his giving notice in the manner prescribed by the Central Government to the Commissioner having jurisdiction over the area and the State Government concerned. Workmen's Compensation (Venue of Proceedings) Rules 1996 Form and in exercise of power provided under sub section (1) of Section 21 Central Government provides that an application under Section 19 or Section 21 shall be processed before or by a Commissioner for the area in which accident to take which resulted in injury, the workman or in case of his death the dependent claiming the compensation ordinarily resides or (c ) the employer has his registered office. This particular proviso by providing that no matter shall be possessed before the Commissioner then Commissioner having jurisdiction over the area in which accident took place without his giving notice in Form-A to the Commissioner having jurisdiction over the area and the State Government concerned. Sub-section 3 of Section 21 further provided that Commissioner under sub Section (1) (b) and (c) may initiate proceedings afresh or he may continue the previous proceedings initiated under Section 21 (1) (a) as if the same or any of its part had been taken before him if he satisfied that the interest of the parties shall not be prejudiced. Thus as per this Rule orderly it is the Commissioner having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident has take place has the authority to proceed however after giving notice in Form A to the Commissioner having jurisdiction in whose area workmen or the dependent in case death claiming the compensation ordinarily resides or the employer has his registered. 10. 10. Now touch stone of the provisions quoted above fact of the case is to be seen that undisputed position is that accident has taken place at Delhi and petitioner has no permanent abroad at Delhi and after accident petitioner has shifted his native place at Allahabad and thus, petitioner by all means can be treated as permanent to ordinarily resides in the district Allahabad and has authority to move an application at Allahabad in that even moving of application at Allahabad it self enjoined upon the Commissioner Workmen to send information to the Commissioner of the State having jurisdiction over the area State government concerned namely at Delhi. 11. In the present case original record has been produced before Workmen Compensation Commissioner and Sri Shaliesh Kumar, Assistant Labour Commissioner was present in the Court and made statement that at no point of time any notice or information on Form A was given to the Commissioner having jurisdiction having over the area and the State Government whereas factual position is clear then net effect of the same is that workmen had no authority or jurisdiction to process the application without giving notice in Form A, Commissioner of the State concerned. Thus process of application itself was fertile exercise and has no consequence and no action taken pursuant thereto consequences would not be consequent and as Commissioner would lacking territorial jurisdiction to deal with the matter in term of the provision as contained under proviso of Section 21 of the aforementioned Act and provisions of the Rule 3 of the Rules. 34. The same view has been endorsed in National Insurance Company Limited v. Smt. Nirmala Devi and others, 2008 (7) ADJ 450 (DB), a Bench decision of this Court, where it is remarked : 5. According to us, enabling provision does not disassociate itself from the mandatory part of the Act to avoid possibility of double benefit. Under normal circumstances place of accident got basic jurisdiction to attract because immediately after accident lodging F.I.R. in the local police station and medical treatment etc. from the local hospital are associated with the incident. Therefore, there should be a process of scrutiny about filing of application at the place of accident before proceeding with the application on merit by the Court of Commissioner having jurisdiction over the place of the residence of the claimant/s. Although Mr. from the local hospital are associated with the incident. Therefore, there should be a process of scrutiny about filing of application at the place of accident before proceeding with the application on merit by the Court of Commissioner having jurisdiction over the place of the residence of the claimant/s. Although Mr. Tandon contended that there is a difference between inherent lack of jurisdiction and irregular application of jurisdiction which is otherwise curable, we are of view that there are three distinct parts available for the Court to adjudicate a matter. Firstly the Court will entertain, then the Court will try and ultimately the Court will determine. There is no dispute that the Court of Commissioner has jurisdiction to entertain and determine but before determination at the time of trying the same, the statutorily adopted process has to be followed strictly. 35. In view of this consistent authority, there is little doubt about the view that this Court has taken that the Compensation Commissioner, other than the jurisdictional Commissioner within whose area the accident took place, cannot determine a claim without complying with the first proviso to Section 21(1)(b) of the Act of 1923. In the decision of the Supreme Court relied upon by Mr. Mohd. Asim Zulfiquar in Mustafa (supra), the point was never raised if the Compensation Commissioner, other than the one having jurisdiction over the area where the accident took place, could assume jurisdiction and decide without adhering to the mandatory procedure of giving notice envisaged by the first proviso to Section 21(1) (b) of the Act of 1923. All that was decided was that by virtue of Section 21(1)(b) of the Act, a Compensation Commissioner, other than the jurisdictional Commissioner, could also entertain and decide a claim. Therefore, the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Mustafa is of little assistance to the claimants. 36. The other decision relied upon by Mr. Zulfiquar is the one in Bharat Singh (supra) where the issue was about restrospective operation of Section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947['the Act of 1947' for short]. In Bharat Singh it was observed : 11. In interpretation of statutes, courts have steered clear of the rigid stand of looking into the words of the section alone but have attempted to make the object of the enactment effective and to render its benefits into the person in whose favour it is made. In Bharat Singh it was observed : 11. In interpretation of statutes, courts have steered clear of the rigid stand of looking into the words of the section alone but have attempted to make the object of the enactment effective and to render its benefits into the person in whose favour it is made. The legislators are entrusted with the task of only making laws. Interpretation has to come from the courts. Section 17-B on its terms does not say that it would bind awards passed before the date when it came into force. The respondents' contention is that a section which imposes an obligation for the first time, cannot be made retrospective. Such sections should always be considered prospective. In our view, if this submission is accepted, we will be defeating the very purpose for which this section has been enacted. It is here that the court has to evolve the concept of purposive interpretation which has found acceptance whenever a progressive social beneficial legislation is under review. We share the view that where the words of a statute are plain and unambiguous effect must be given to them. Plain words have to be accepted as such but where the intention of the legislature is not clear from the words or where two constructions are possible, it is the court's duty to discern the intention in the context of the background in which a particular section is enacted. Once such an intention is ascertained the courts have necessarily to give the statute a purposeful or a functional interpretation. Now, it is trite to say that acts aimed at social amelioration giving benefits for the have-nots should receive liberal construction. It is always the duty of the court to give such a construction to a statute as would promote the purpose or object of the Act. A construction that promotes the purpose of the legislation should be preferred to a literal construction. A construction which would defeat the rights of the have-nots and the underdog and which would leave to injustice should always be avoided. This section was intended to benefit the workmen in certain cases. It would be doing injustice to the section if we were to say that it would not apply to awards passed a day or two before it came into force. 16. This section was intended to benefit the workmen in certain cases. It would be doing injustice to the section if we were to say that it would not apply to awards passed a day or two before it came into force. 16. According to the respondents' counsel, these two decisions clearly cover the question involved in this appeal also. We feel that this submission cannot be accepted for more than one reason. Section 11-A, confers a jurisdiction on the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal to act in a particular manner which jurisdiction it did not have prior to the coming into force of Section 11-A. This is the reason why this Court held that Section 11-A cannot apply to proceedings before it came into force. The conferment of a new jurisdiction can take effect only prospectively except when a contrary intention appears on the face of the statute. Section 11-A plainly indicates its prospective operation. This is made clear in the proviso to the section when it says “provided that in any proceeding under this section”. This can only mean something relatable to a stage after the section came into being. That is not the case with Section 17-B. Here it is not the conferment of a new jurisdiction but the codification in statutory form of a right available to the workmen to get back wages when certain given conditions are satisfied. There are no words in the section to compel the court to hold that it cannot operate retrospectively. Before Section 17-B was introduced there was no bar for courts for awarding wages. Of course the workmen had no right to claim it. This section recognizes such a right. To construe it in a manner detrimental to workmen would be to defeat its object. 37. The principle spoken of in Bharat Singh, to the understanding of this Court, would work just the other way. Their Lordships have not at all suggested placing a construction upon the terms of a welfare statute contrary to its plain meaning. Of course, if the intendment of the legislature is different from the literal meaning or the object of legislation defeated by a literal construction, effect has to be given to the intendment in case of such statutes. Their Lordships have not at all suggested placing a construction upon the terms of a welfare statute contrary to its plain meaning. Of course, if the intendment of the legislature is different from the literal meaning or the object of legislation defeated by a literal construction, effect has to be given to the intendment in case of such statutes. What is important to note in Bharat Singh is the distinction between the acceptance of some retrospective operation for Section 17B of the Act of 1947, but not so for Section 11A which was held to be prospective in Gujarat Mineral Development Corporation v. Shri Brahmbhatt, (1974) 3 SCC 601 and Workmen of M/s. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (P.) Ltd. v. Management and others, (1973) 1 SCC 813 . A reading of paragraph No. 16 of the report in Bharat Singh makes it evident that Section 17B was given retrospective operation because the provision did not confer a new jurisdiction on the Court, but the codification of a jurisdiction that the Court already exercised by directing payment of backwages etc. By contrast, the jurisdiction under Section 11A was absolutely a new jurisdiction conferred upon a Labour Court or Tribunal, which never existed before. Therefore, Section 11A, according to the plain words of the Statute, was held to apply prospectively, though both provisions were introduced through amendment in the same statute, which was a welfare legislation meant for the benefit of workmen or employees. 38. To this Court’s understanding, the principle in Bharat Singh works against what is contended on behalf of the claimants here. What is in question here is not at all the codification of an existing right that an employee or workman had before Act 30 of 1995 introduced the right by amendment to Section 21(1) of the Act of 1923. It is the investiture of jurisdiction in the Compensation Commissioner of another area and beyond his jurisdiction, no doubt, to facilitate the employee, but for the first time, by virtue of the amended statute. It is difficult, therefore, to interpret a provision of this kind in a manner different from what the plain words of the Statute say. Here, there is no question of a retrospective pitted against the prospective operation of the amended statute. It is difficult, therefore, to interpret a provision of this kind in a manner different from what the plain words of the Statute say. Here, there is no question of a retrospective pitted against the prospective operation of the amended statute. It is about, if at all, the extra territorial jurisdiction conferred upon a non-jurisdictional Commissioner appointed under the Act of 1923, that can be exercised in adherence to the provisions of the Statute, under which it is conferred. 39. This Court has opined that it is only subject to adherence with the conditions of the proviso to Section 21(1)(b) of the Act that extra territorial jurisdiction can be exercised by a Compensation Commissioner, and that appears to be the position of the law not at all to be doubted, considering the principles in Bharat Singh. 40. The other Authority, wherein Mr. Zulfiquar has reposed faith, is Morgina Begum (supra). In the said decision, their Lordships of the Supreme Court, after consideration of the provisions of Section 21(1)(b) of the Act of 1923, held that the Compensation Commissioner at Tejpur had jurisdiction in the matter, though the accident took place within the area of the Compensation Commissioner, Nagaon. The following words in paragraph No. 11 of the report in Morgina Begum are very relevant : 11. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that simply by saying that they are residing at Tezpur is not enough to prove their statement but they should produce documents to show that in fact they are residing at Tezpur. We see no reason to agree with the learned counsel for the respondent when there is a clear statement by both the claimants that they started residing at Tezpur after the death of their son. If the respondent wanted to prove that they were deposing falsely, he should have cross-examined these witnesses and challenged their testimony in the witness box on this point, which has not been done. In the present case, we are satisfied that the statement of the deceased's father and mother is trustworthy that they are ordinarily residing at Tezpur, and hence the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation, Tezpur has jurisdiction to entertain the claim petition. The Commissioner, Tezpur has also given notice to the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation, Nagaon as well as the State Government in compliance with the proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act. (emphasis by Court) 41. The Commissioner, Tezpur has also given notice to the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation, Nagaon as well as the State Government in compliance with the proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act. (emphasis by Court) 41. The facts in Morgina Begum show that the proviso to Section 21(1) (b) of the Act of 1923 was duly complied with by the Compensation Commissioner at Tejpur, giving notice to the jurisdictional Compensation Commissioner, Nagaon and also to the State Government. Therefore, the principle in Morgina Begum is not at all the one that would be applicable here. 42. Learned Counsel for the claimants has relied upon the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in New India Assurance Company Limited v. Smt. Shadab and others (supra). He has drawn attention of this Court to the following remarks in Smt. Shadab : 12. Similarly, in respect of objection raised during the course of argument in the present appeal based on reading of Section 21 of the Act, it is seen, no pleading had been made by the insurer, either that the Commissioner, Ghaziabad did not have territorial jurisdiction because the accident did not occur within his territorial area or that the Commissioner, Ghaziabad could not proceed with the claim petition because he had not issued any prior notice to other Commissioner. Therefore, neither there the stage nor the occasion arose to frame an issue in respect of the territorial jurisdiction of the Commissioner, Ghaziabad. 13. For the insurer appellant to raise such an objection, it ought to have specifically pleaded facts necessary for such issue to arise. The insurer ought to have then pleaded the facts stating what the territorial limits of jurisdiction of the Commissioner at Ghaziabad were and where the accident site was. No pleading in that regard was made. 43. The learned Judge has repelled the contention based on non-adherence to the proviso to Section 21(1)(b) of the Act of 1923, because the plea, like the present case, was never raised before the Compensation Commissioner. We are afraid that we cannot agree with the said principle, and for good reason. It appears that the remarks of the Division Bench in Rakesh were not brought to the notice of his Lordship, where it is said that although the point can be taken at the appellate stage, one should be diligent before the Court of first instance. We are afraid that we cannot agree with the said principle, and for good reason. It appears that the remarks of the Division Bench in Rakesh were not brought to the notice of his Lordship, where it is said that although the point can be taken at the appellate stage, one should be diligent before the Court of first instance. The decision of the learned Single Judge, therefore, rendered in Smt. Shadab, to that extent, appears to be per incuriam. 44. In the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Smt. Suman Devi (supra), the remarks of the Court certainly seem to favour what Mr. Zulfiquar urges. It is observed in Smt. Suman Devi : 5. Sub-clauses (b) & (c) of Section 21(1) of the Act further provides that the Commissioner shall have the jurisdiction for the area in which the employee or in case of his death, the dependent claiming the compensation ordinarily resides; or the employer has his registered office. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Commissioner at Nuh had no jurisdiction as such, if the claimants-dependents are ordinarily residing in the area of Nuh. The only argument available with the appellant is that since the proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act provides that if the Commissioner, other than the Commissioner having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident took place, has to give a notice in the manner prescribed by the Central Government to the Commissioner having jurisdiction over the area and to the State Government concerned. It is pleaded that no notice was given by the Commissioner at Nuh to the Commissioner having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident took place. The said proviso is only procedural to ensure that the Commissioner of the concerned jurisdiction has also notice that the another Commissioner has taken cognizance of the issue and if the Commissioner at Nuh has not followed the aforesaid procedure, the claimants cannot be prejudiced for any such irregularity, which has taken place. (emphasis by Court) 45. We are in respectful disagreement with the view expressed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Smt. Suman Devi, for reason that requirement of law introduced by the proviso to Section 21(1)(b) of the Act of 1923 is not a matter of procedural irregularity, which can be ignored. (emphasis by Court) 45. We are in respectful disagreement with the view expressed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Smt. Suman Devi, for reason that requirement of law introduced by the proviso to Section 21(1)(b) of the Act of 1923 is not a matter of procedural irregularity, which can be ignored. It is an issue of jurisdiction, which goes to the root of the Commissioner’s jurisdiction. 46. In view of what this Court has said hereinabove, the substantial question of law involved in this appeal has to be answered in the negative. 47. The result is that this appeal shall stand allowed and the impugned judgment and award passed by the Employees’ Compensation Commissioner set aside with a remand of the matter to the Compensation Commissioner for a decision de novo. Before processing the claim de novo the Compensation Commissioner shall strictly adhere to the requirements of the first proviso to Section 21(1)(b) of the Act of 1923. 48. It is also clarified that it shall be open to all parties, which includes the claimants, the owner and the insurers to lead evidence afresh before the Compensation Commissioner in the manner indicated. It is also ordered that the Employees’ Compensation Commissioner, Moradabad shall ensure compliance with the provisions of Section 21(1)(b) of the Act of 1923 within a month of receipt of this judgment and endeavour to process the claim within three months thereafter, in accordance with law after hearing all parties. The deposit made before the Employees’ Compensation Commissioner under Section 30 of the Act by the insurers shall be refunded forthwith. 49. Costs easy.