JUDGMENT : Rekha Borana, J. 1. The present second appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree dated 04.03.2022 passed by the Additional District Judge No. 7, Jodhpur Metro in Civil Appeal Decree No. 04/2022 (NCV No. 06/2022) vide which the judgment and decree dated 31.01.2022 passed by the Additional Civil Judge No. 2, Jodhpur Metro in Civil Original Suit No. 17/2022 (NCV No. 36/2022) has been reversed. The learned trial Court, vide judgment and decree dated 31.01.2022, proceeded on to allow the application under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure as preferred by defendant no. 1-appellant and consequently, dismissed the suit as preferred by plaintiff-respondent No. 1 for specific performance and permanent injunction. However, the first appellate Court proceeded on to reverse the said order and rejected the application under Order 7, Rule 11, CPC as preferred by the defendant. 2. The plaintiff preferred the suit for specific performance of contract and permanent injunction with the following averments: Defendant No. 1 had entered into an agreement with plaintiff's grandmother - Triveni Devi for sale of plot no. 113-118 admeasuring 1230.66 sq. yards situated at Khasra no. 447/306, Maruti Nagar, Kudi Bhagtasani, Jodhpur for a sale consideration of Rs.1,17,000/-. On 05.05.1997, defendant No. 1 received the total consideration amount and an agreement to sell was executed in the favour of plaintiff's grandmother. Thereafter, the said plots were acquired by defendant No. 2 - Jodhpur Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as 'JDA' for short) and on 26.10.2004, the Land Acquisition Officer passed an award no. 243/2015 in favour of defendant No. 1. In lieu of the earlier plots, defendant No. 2 allotted four equivalent plots nos. A-133, A- 52, A-571 and A-528 under Vivek Vihar Scheme. Plaintiff's grandmother - Triveni Devi before her demise on 17.09.2014, had executed a Will in favour of plaintiff on 15.06.2011 regarding the plots allotted in lieu of plot nos.113-118. 3. On 05.11.2019, defendant No. 2 issued allotment letter in the favour of defendant no. 1 regarding plot Nos. A-52, A-571 and A-528 however, allotment letter regarding plot no. A-133 could not be issued as it was in possession of some other person. On 16.01.2020, defendant No. 1 executed three sale deeds in the favour of plaintiff regarding plot nos. A-52, A-571 and A-528. On 11.01.2022, defendant No. 2 passed an order for allotment of plot no. A-52, A-571 and A-528 however, allotment letter regarding plot no. A-133 could not be issued as it was in possession of some other person. On 16.01.2020, defendant No. 1 executed three sale deeds in the favour of plaintiff regarding plot nos. A-52, A-571 and A-528. On 11.01.2022, defendant No. 2 passed an order for allotment of plot no. A-158 in the favour of plaintiff in lieu of plot no. A-133. When the sale deed of the same was not executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of plaintiff, the present suit for specific performance of agreement was filed. 4. In the said suit, an application under Order 7, Rule 11, CPC was preferred on behalf of defendant No. 1 with the submission that in the present suit for specific performance and permanent injunction, a challenge to land acquisition proceedings as undertaken by defendant No. 2-JDA has been laid and as per Section 63 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 2013' for short), no civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any dispute relating to land acquisition and further, no injunction can be granted by any court in respect of any such matter. Hence, the land acquisition proceedings being under challenge and further the injunction being prayed for in the present suit, the same is clearly barred in terms of Section 63 of the Act of 2013. It was hence prayed that the plaint be rejected being barred by law. 5. A reply to the said application was preferred on behalf of the plaintiff with the specific submissions that, firstly, the award in question had been passed on 26.10.2004 and hence, the proceedings in question cannot be said to be governed by the Act of 2013. Even if the land acquisition act is to be applied, the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 would apply and not that of 2013. Secondly, the land acquisition proceedings or the award in question have not been challenged in the present suit and further, no relief qua the same has been prayed for. The present is a suit primarily against defendant No. 1 for specific performance of the contract in terms of the award itself. Secondly, the land acquisition proceedings or the award in question have not been challenged in the present suit and further, no relief qua the same has been prayed for. The present is a suit primarily against defendant No. 1 for specific performance of the contract in terms of the award itself. Further, the relief of specific performance of contract cannot be granted by the Collector or any empowered authority in terms of Section 63 of the Act of 2013 and hence, the bar of Section 63 would not even apply to the present matter. Further, no injunction to stay the acquisition proceedings has been prayed for in the present suit. Therefore also, Section 63 of the Act of 2013 would not apply. 6. The application under Order 7, Rule 11, CPC as preferred by defendant No. 1 was allowed by the learned trial Court vide order dated 31.01.2022 while relying upon the Apex Court judgment in the case of The Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority and Ors. v. Brijesh Reddy and Ors.; (2013) 3 SCC 66 . Learned trial Court although held that the Act of 1894 would apply and not that of Act of 2013 but, proceeded on to further hold that even if the acquisition proceedings are not under challenge, the suit for injunction also would not be maintainable before a civil court. Consequently, the suit as preferred by the plaintiff was also dismissed. 7. Learned first appellate Court reversed the order/judgment passed by the learned trial Court with a finding that the primary relief as sought for in the present suit is against defendant No. 1 and no provision of the Act of 1894 prohibits any suit between two private parties. Aggrieved against the order/judgment and decree dated 04.03.2022, the present second appeal has been preferred. 8. It is relevant to note at this stage that during the pendency of the appeal, the patta of plot No. A-158 was issued by JDA in favour of defendant No. 1 vide which the acquisition proceedings stood complete. In the said circumstances, an application under Order 23, Rule 1, CPC was preferred by the appellant to withdraw the suit against defendant No. 2 which was allowed and the plaintiff was permitted to withdraw the suit against defendant No. 2-JDA. 9. In the said circumstances, an application under Order 23, Rule 1, CPC was preferred by the appellant to withdraw the suit against defendant No. 2 which was allowed and the plaintiff was permitted to withdraw the suit against defendant No. 2-JDA. 9. Three specific grounds have been raised by learned counsel for the appellant before this Court: first, the learned first appellate Court erred in granting permission to the plaintiff to withdraw the suit against defendant No. 2-JDA. It has been submitted that no permission to withdraw a suit which had already been dismissed could have been granted by the Court. Second, Order 23, Rule 1, CPC does not entitle a party to withdraw a suit against one of the defendants at the appellate stage. The impact of such order is that the suit which was otherwise not maintainable before a civil court, has been held to be maintainable. Third, in the specific terms of the bar as provided under the law, no acquisition proceedings could have been challenged before a civil court and hence, the same was rightly dismissed by the learned trial Court. Further, the first appellate Court erred in passing an interim order to maintain status quo which could not have been passed without adjudicating the matter on merits. 10. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 11. For adjudication of the issue whether the acquisition proceedings were under challenge in the present suit or not and whether any relief qua the same has been prayed for in the present suit, a perusal of the reliefs as prayed for in the suit is essential. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 11. For adjudication of the issue whether the acquisition proceedings were under challenge in the present suit or not and whether any relief qua the same has been prayed for in the present suit, a perusal of the reliefs as prayed for in the suit is essential. The prayers as made in the plaint are as under: ^^28 & oknh dh izkFkZuk gS fd %& ,&bdjkj dh fof'k"V ikyuk dh fMdzh cgd oknh fo:) izfroknh la[;k 1 bl vk'k; dh lkfnj QjekbZ tkos fd oknh ds Hkw[kaM la[;k ,&158 dh vkoaVu dh ns; jkf'k izfroknh la[;k 2 tks Hkh ns; gSa oknh] izfroknh la[;k 2 ds dk;kZy; esa tek djokus dk vf/kdkjh gksus ls izfroknh la[;k 2] oknh ls vkoaVu dh tks Hkh ns'k jkf'k gSa] oknh ls izkIr dj izfroknh la[;k 1 ds i{k esa iV~Vk Hkw[kaM la[;k ,&158 dk tkjh dj iathc) djokos vkSj izfroknh la[;k 1] oknh ds i{k esa cspku ukek fu"ikfnr dj jftLVMZ djok;s] iV~Vk iathc) djokus ds fy;s ou VkbZe yht jkf'k] lkbZV Iyku bR;kfn dh tks Hkh jkf'k izfroknh la[;k 2 dh ns; gSa] og izfroknh la[;k 2 dh ns; gSa] og izfroknh la[;k 2 oknh ls izkIr djs vFkok izfroknh la[;k 1 pqdrh bl ckcr tks Hkh jkf'k ns; gS og mlds }kjk tek djokus ij oknh ls izkIr dj oknh ds i{k esa cspku ukek fu"ikfnr dj iathc) djokosA ch& fodYi esa izfroknh la[;k 1 iwoZ ekfQd oknh ds i{k esa [kkl eq[R;kj ukek Hkw[kaM la[;k ,&158 dk iV~Vk izkIr djus dh leLr dk;Zokgh djus ckcr~ fu"ikfnr dj jftLVMZ djokosa rkfd oknh izfroknh la[;k 2 ds dk;kZy; esa okafNr bl ckcr reke dk;Zokgh dj iV~Vk izkIr dj iathc) djokdj iV~Vk izkIr djsa vkSj izfroknh la[;k 1] oknh ds i{k esa Hkw[kaM la[;k ,&158 foosd fcgkj ;kstuk cuki 500 oxZ xt ds Hkw[kaM dk cspku ukek fu"ikfnr dj jftLVMZ dkjokosA lh& LFkkbZ fu"ks/kkKk dh fMdzh cgd oknh fo:) izfroknh la[;k 1 ,&133 ds ,ot esa vkoafVr Hkw[kaM izfroknh la[;k 2 }kjk foosd fogkj ;kstuk esa vkoafVr fd;s tkus okyk izfroknh la[;k 1] oknh ds vykok vU; fdlh dks cspku] gLrkarj.k] eqarfdy ugha djsa vkSj u gh fdlh cU; dks dCtk lqiqnZ djs vkSj u gh bl Hkw[kaM ckcr~ fdlh vU; ds i{k esa fdlh Hkh izdkj dk dk;Z djus gsrq [kkl eq[R;kj] vke eq[R;kjukek fu"ikfnr djsa] cspku bdjkjukek vFkok eqarfdyh dk vU; dksbZ Hkh nLrkost fu"ikfnr ugha djsa vkSj vkoafVr Hkw[kaM dh fLFkfr ;Fkkor cuk;s j[ksaA Mh& LFkkbZ fu"ks/kkKk dh fMdzh cgd oknh fo:) izfroknh la[;k 2 bl vk'k; dh lkfnj QjekbZ tkosa fd izfroknh la[;k 2] Hkw[kaM la[;k ,&158 ds vkoaVu dh tks Hkh ns; jkf'k vFkkZr ,&158 ds ekax i= vuqlkj ns; jkf'k pawfd mDr Hkw[kaM oknh gh izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gS vkSj oknh ;g jkf'k tek djokus dk vf/kdkjh gksus ,oa oknh mijksDr jkf'k tek djokus gsrq rS;kj ,oa rRij gksus ls IyksV la[;k ,&158 dh jkf'k oknh ls izfroknh la[;k 2 izkIr djsa vkSj oknh ds vykok vkSj fdlh ls mDr jkf'k izkIr ugha djsa rFkk oknh ls IyksV la[;k ,&158 ds vkoaVu dh ns; jkf'k mudh ekax vuqlkj tek djokus ij izfroknh la[;k 1 ds i{k esa iV~Vk fu;ekuqlkj tkjh dj iathc) djokosaA bZ& [kpkZ eqdnek fnyok;k tkosaA ,Q& fnxj nknjlh eqQhn oknh gks vrk QjekbZ tkosaA** 12. A bare perusal of the above prayers makes it clear that no relief for injunction qua the acquisition proceedings has been made, rather the reliefs are for performance of the contract in terms of the award as passed in the acquisition proceedings. The relief as prayed for is for a direction to defendant No. 1 to execute the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff as a consequence of the allotment of the plot by JDA to him in terms of the award. Therefore, no relief which can be termed to be barred in terms of Section 63 of the Act of 2013 can be concluded to have been prayed for in the present suit. Further, as rightly held by both the Courts, the Act of 2013 could not even apply to the present matter and therefore too, the bar of Section 63 would not apply. 13. So far as the ground of the first appellate Court having wrongly permitted the plaintiff to withdraw the suit against defendant No. 2 is concerned, in the opinion of this Court, the same would even otherwise be not of much relevance in view of the subsequent developments. It is not in dispute that during the pendency of the appeal, patta of the disputed plot qua which relief No. D was prayed for against defendant No. 2, had been issued in favour of defendant No. 1. Therefore, relief No. D as prayed for had even rendered infructuous. It is not the case wherein, after passing of a decree in favour of one of the defendants, the plaintiff has been permitted to withdraw the suit against the said defendant and hence, the same could not be said to be permissible. It is the case wherein the relief as prayed for against one of the defendants having rendered infructuous that the suit against the said defendant has been prayed to be withdrawn. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the permission as granted by learned first appellate Court, in terms of Order 23, Rule 1, CPC, cannot be faulted with. 14. Further, even if the suit had not been withdrawn against defendant No. 2, the Court would not have been required to go into the same, it having rendered infructuous. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the permission as granted by learned first appellate Court, in terms of Order 23, Rule 1, CPC, cannot be faulted with. 14. Further, even if the suit had not been withdrawn against defendant No. 2, the Court would not have been required to go into the same, it having rendered infructuous. Even if no prayer for withdrawal of the suit had been made by the plaintiff, the Court could have suo moto directed for deletion of name of defendant No. 2, no relief as prayed for against it, being surviving. 15. Further, for the sake of arguments, even if it is assumed that prayer-D had not been rendered infructuous and the same had survived against defendant No. 2, in the opinion of this Court, the same was not for seeking a relief of injunction against any acquisition proceedings. Further, the same was an ancillary relief and as is the settled position of law, a plaint cannot be rejected in part. 16. Therefore, even if it is assumed that the plaintiff could not have been permitted to withdraw the suit against defendant No. 2, the same could not have affected the ultimate conclusion of rejection of the application under Order 7, Rule 11, CPC. By all means, the plaint could not have been rejected in terms of Order 7, Rule 11, CPC. 17. In view of the above observations, no substantial question of law arises in the present appeal and the same is therefore, dismissed. 18. The stay petition and the pending applications, if any, also stands dismissed.