JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. By way of instant petition filed under S.482 CrPC read with Art. 227 of the Constitution of India, petitioners have prayed for quashing of FIR No.8, dated 28.11.2021 under Ss. 341, 147 and 149 IPC and S.174 of the Indian Railway Act, 1989 registered at Police Station Railway Police Station, Shimla alongwith consequential proceedings pending in the competent court of law. 2. Precisely, the facts of the case as emerge from the record tha the FIR sought to be quashed in the instant proceeding, came to be lodged at the behest of one Deepak, Station Master, Railway Station, Jutogh, who alleged that on 28.1.2021, at 10.55 am, around 250 persons alongwith present petitioners sat on railway track and obstructed the movement of trail No. 52456 DN H. Queen SML-KLK EXP, as a result of which, persons, travelling therein were put to undue harassment. Above named complainant alleged that on account of agitation, persons sat on railway track obstructed railway traffic for three and a half hours and as such, appropriate action in accordance with law be taken against them. In the aforesaid background, FIR sought to be quashed in the instant proceeding came to be lodged against the petitioners herein. After completion of investigation, police has presented Challan in the competent court of law but before same could be taken to its logical end, petitioners have approached this Court in the instant proceedings, for quashing of FIR as well as consequent proceedings pending in the competent court of law on the ground that no case, much less case under aforesaid provisions of law, is made out against the petitioners. 3. It has been averred in the petition that on the date of alleged incident, petitioners alongwith other persons, had gathered on railway track to lodge their protest against death of a person, who lost his life on account of negligence of the Railway administration. It has been averred in the petition that petitioner No.1, who was the then municipal councilor, had repeatedly requested the railway authorities to make provision of an overhead bridge enabling public to cross the railway track safely. Since no steps came to be taken at the behest of railway authorities, people of area alongwith petitioner No.1 were constrained to register their protest. Since no steps came to be taken at the behest of railway authorities, people of area alongwith petitioner No.1 were constrained to register their protest. It has been further stated in the petition that the petitioners alongwith other persons protested in a peaceful manner and no damage was caused to the public property. Petitioners categorically denied the factum with regard to theirs having stalled/obstructed railway traffic for three and a half hours. They claimed that they sat on the railway track and after being assured by railway authorities, that adequate steps shall be taken for construction of overhead bridge, they disbursed. 4. Mr. Naresh K. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners, while making this Court peruse the provisions contained under S.341 IPC, vehemently argued that no complaint, if any, ever came to be lodged at the behest of any person, who was allegedly, illegally and wrongfully confined by the petitioners, rather, complaint was made by Station Master, who simply stated that the petitioners alongwith other persons, obstructed railway track. He submitted that since there is no specific allegation, if any, of wrongful confinement of any of the individual or group of persons, case under S.341 IPC is not specifically made out. Similarly, while making this court peruse provisions contained under S.147 and 149 IPC, Mr. Sharma argued that though persons more than five were present on the spot, but there is nothing on record suggestive of the fact that after having formed an unlawful assembly, they created ruckus rather, they all peacefully lodged their protest and after being assured by the authorities, that steps would be taken to construct overhead bridge, they left the spot. 5. Mr. Vir Bahadur Verma, learned Central Government Counsel, while refuting aforesaid submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioners, argued that bare perusal of material available on record reveals that railway traffic was obstructed for three and a half hours, as a result of which, passengers travelling in the train were put to undue harassment. He further stated that since passengers travelling in the train were not allowed to move beyond one point, they can be safely said to have been wrongly confined by the persons agitating on the spot. He further stated that since passengers travelling in the train were not allowed to move beyond one point, they can be safely said to have been wrongly confined by the persons agitating on the spot. He further submitted that since the petitioner alongwith other persons had gathered on the spot and they had common object to stop vehicular traffic, as a result of which, persons travelling in the train were put to undue harassment, they have been rightly booked under Ss. 147 and 149 IPC. Lastly, Mr. Verma argued that there is ample evidence available on record suggestive of the fact that petitioners alongwith other persons, not only stopped vehicular traffic on the spot but also attempted to damage the public property as such, they need to be dealt in accordance with law. 6. Mr. Vishal Panwar, learned Additional Advocate General, representing respondent No.2/State, adopted the arguments made by learned Central Government Counsel and stated that keeping in view the gravity of the offence alleged to have been committed by the petitioners, they do not deserve any leniency. 7. Before adverting to the factual matrix of the case, this Court deems it necessary to elaborate upon the scope and competence of this Court to quash the criminal proceedings while exercising power under Section 482 of Cr.PC. Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment titled State of Haryana and others vs. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 has laid down several principles, which govern the exercise of jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Before pronouncement of aforesaid judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court, a three-Judge Bench of Hon’ble Court in State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy and others, 1977 (2) SCC 699 , held that the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. Relevant para is being reproduced herein below:- “7....In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. Relevant para is being reproduced herein below:- “7....In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court’s inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction.” 8. Hon’ble Apex Court in Bhajan Lal (supra), has elaborately considered the scope and ambit of Section 482 Cr.P.C. Subsequently, Hon’ble Apex Court in Vineet Kumar and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr., while considering the scope of interference under Sections 397 Cr.PC and 482 Cr.PC, by the High Courts, has held that High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to be quashed. The Hon’ble Apex Court has further held that the saving of the High Court’s inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose i.e. a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. The Hon’ble Apex Court has further held that the saving of the High Court’s inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose i.e. a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In the aforesaid case, the Hon’ble Apex Court taking note of seven categories, where power can be exercised under Section 482 Cr.PC, as enumerated in Bhajan Lal (supra), i.e. where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafides and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge, quashed the proceedings 9. Hon’ble Apex Court in Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293 , while drawing strength from its earlier judgment titled as Rajiv Thapar and Ors v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330 , has reiterated that High Court has inherent power under Section 482 Cr.PC., to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused, at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charge, but such power must always be used with caution, care and circumspection. While invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the High Court has to be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such, that would lead to the conclusion, that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts and the material adduced on record itself overrules the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. The material relied upon by the accused should be such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. In the aforesaid judgment titled Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:- “22. In the aforesaid judgment titled Prashant Bharti v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:- “22. The proposition of law, pertaining to quashing of criminal proceedings, initiated against an accused by a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as “the Cr.P.C.”) has been dealt with by this Court in Rajiv Thapar & Ors. vs. Madan Lal Kapoor wherein this Court inter alia held as under: (2013) 3 SCC 330 , paras 29-30) 29. The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused, at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far reaching consequences, inasmuch as, it would negate the prosecution’s/complainant’s case without allowing the prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. To invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. the High Court has to be fully satisfied, that the material produced by the accused is such, that would lead to the conclusion, that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; the material produced is such, as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused; and the material produced is such, as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without the necessity of recording any evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. 30. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.:- 30.1 Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the material is of sterling and impeccable quality? 30.2 Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false. 30.3 Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant? 30.4 Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice? 30.5 If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal - proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.” 10. Hon'ble Apex Court in Asmathunnisa v. State of A.P. (2011) 11 SCC 259 , has held as under: “12. Hon'ble Apex Court in Asmathunnisa v. State of A.P. (2011) 11 SCC 259 , has held as under: “12. This Court, in a number of cases, has laid down the scope and ambit of the High Court's power under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C. though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the Court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the Statute. 13. The law has been crystallized more than half a century ago in the case of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 wherein this Court has summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings. This Court summarized the following three broad categories where the High Court would be justified in exercise of its powers under section 482: (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the proceedings; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge." 14. In Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi and Others (1976) 3 SCC 736 , according to the court, the process against the accused can be quashed or set aside : "(1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused; (2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and (4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like". 15. This court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy & Others (1977) 2 SCC 699 , observed that the wholesome power under section 482 Cr.P.C. entitles the High Court to quash a proceeding when it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice requires that the proceedings ought to be quashed. The High Courts have been invested with inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, to achieve a salutary public purpose. A Court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In this case, the court observed that ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice must be administered according to laws made by the Legislature. This case has been followed in a large number of subsequent cases of this court and other courts.” 11. In this case, the court observed that ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice must be administered according to laws made by the Legislature. This case has been followed in a large number of subsequent cases of this court and other courts.” 11. Hon'ble Apex Court in Asmathunnisa (supra) has categorically held that where discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like, High Court would be justified in exercise of its powers under S. 482 CrPC. 12. Also, reliance is placed upon a judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judciial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749 , wherein, it has been observed that summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment (supra) has held as under: “28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. it is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused.” 13. Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused.” 13. From the bare perusal of aforesaid exposition of law, it is quite apparent that exercising its inherent power under Section 482 Cr.PC., High Court can proceed to quash the proceedings, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process of the law. 14. Careful perusal of aforesaid law taken note herein above, clearly reveals that power under S.482 for quashing of complaint and summoning order cannot be used mechanically in every case by High Court rather, such power is required to be used sparingly and in extraordinary circumstances, especially in those cases, where court, after having seen record, comes to a conclusion that if prosecution, on the basis of contents contained in the complaint, is allowed to continue, would result in sheer abuse of process of law and miscarriage of justice. Besides above, court, after having scanned material, if arrives at a conclusion that the material collected on record by prosecution is not of that kind that it would result in conviction of accused, it can quash proceedings, so that accused is not subjected to protracted trial. Most importantly, in all the judgments relied above, especially Pepsi Foods Ltd. (supra), Hon'ble Apex Court has categorically held that summoning of an accused in criminal case is a serious matter. Order of summoning must reflect that the court issuing such order has applied its mind to the facts of case and law applicable thereto. While deciding to issue summons, court is necessarily required to examine nature of allegations made in the complaint and evidence, both oral and documentary in support thereof. After having seen contents of the complaint as well as evidence led on record in support of allegations, court is required to satisfy itself that the material placed before it would be sufficient for the complainant to bring home charge to the accused. 15. After having seen contents of the complaint as well as evidence led on record in support of allegations, court is required to satisfy itself that the material placed before it would be sufficient for the complainant to bring home charge to the accused. 15. Now, in the light of the aforesaid exposition of law, this Court shall make an endeavor to examine the material available on record vis-à-vis prayer made in the petition for quashing of FIR, with a view to arrive at a conclusion that, whether facts of the case warrant exercise of power by this court under Section 482 Cr.PC for quashing of summoning process or not? 16. In the case at hand, it is not in dispute that on the date of alleged incident, petitioners alongwith other persons, had gathered on the railway track near Jutogh, as a result of which one train, detailed herein above, was unable to move for around three and a half hours. No doubt, on account of non-movement of the train for three and half hours persons travelling in the train were put to undue harassment but the question which needs to be decided in the instant proceedings is that whether on account of stoppage of train, if any, by the petitioners, provisions of S.341 would be attracted or not? At this stage, it would be apt to take note of S.341 IPC: “341. Punishment for wrongful restraint. —Whoever wrongfully restrains any person shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.” 17. Bare perusal of S.341 IPC reveals that Whoever wrongfully restrains any person shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both. “Wrongful restraint” has been defined under S.340 IPC, which reads as under: “Section 340 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 defines wrongful confinement as, "whoever wrongfully restrains any person in such a manner as to prevent that person from proceeding beyond certain circumscribing limits, is said "wrongfully to confine" that person."” 18. As per aforesaid provision, whoever wrongfully restrains any person in such a manner as to prevent that person from proceeding beyond certain circumscribing limits, is said "wrongful confinement" that person." 19. As per aforesaid provision, whoever wrongfully restrains any person in such a manner as to prevent that person from proceeding beyond certain circumscribing limits, is said "wrongful confinement" that person." 19. In the instant case, though, it has been vehemently argued by Mr. Verma, learned Central Government Counsel that on account of stoppage of train, persons, travelling in the train, were wrongfully confined but he was unable to point out, complaint, if any, made by any of the passengers travelling in the train in question on that day with respect to their wrongful confinement, rather, it is an admitted case that FIR sought to be quashed in the instant proceeding, came to be lodged at the behest of Station master of Railway Station Jutogh, who nowhere alleged wrongful confinement of the passengers travelling in train, rather, he simply stated that on account of obstruction caused on railway track, train going from Shimla to Kalka was detained for three and a half hours. Since no specific complaint ever came to be made on account of alleged wrongful confinement of the persons travelling in the train by any other person, there appears to be merit in the submission of Mr. Naresh K. Sharma, Advocate that no case much less case under S.341 IPC is made out against the petitioners. 20. Similarly, this Court finds that though the petitioners herein stand booked under S.147 and 149 IPC, but there is no allegation that the petitioners and other persons, ever formed an unlawful assembly and caused damage, to the public property or train. 21. Provisions of Ss. 147 and 149 IPC read as under: “147. Punishment for rioting.—Whoever is guilty of rioting, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. 148. Rioting, armed with deadly weapon.—Whoever is guilty of rioting, being armed with a deadly weapon or with anything which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. 149. 148. Rioting, armed with deadly weapon.—Whoever is guilty of rioting, being armed with a deadly weapon or with anything which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. 149. Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object.—If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence.” 22. Bare perusal of aforesaid provisions of law reveals that, under S.147, whoever is guilty of rioting, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. 23. Apart from aforesaid provision, S.148 reveals that, “Whoever is guilty of rioting, being armed with a deadly weapon or with anything which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both” 24. Perusal of S.149 IPC reveals that, “If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence.” 25. To attract Ss. 147 and 149 IPC, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that on the date of alleged incident, some force or violence was used by members of unlawful assembly and that at the relevant time, they had come on the spot with deadly weapon. 26. To attract Ss. 147 and 149 IPC, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that on the date of alleged incident, some force or violence was used by members of unlawful assembly and that at the relevant time, they had come on the spot with deadly weapon. 26. In the instant proceedings, bare perusal of contents of FIR as well as final report under S.173 CrPC, suggests that no member of ‘unlawful assembly’ was carrying any kind of deadly weapon with them, rather, as per own case of the prosecution, they had obstructed railway track with a view to lodge their protest on account of death of one person, who died after being hit by train. 27. To attract S.149, firstly, it is incumbent upon prosecution to prove that an unlawful act was committed by any member of the assembly and all members gathered on the spot had a common object. In the case at hand, common object, if any, of the persons on the spot was to protest against death of one person and they were compelled to obstruct traffic on account of apathy shown by railways to the repeated requests for construction of overhead bridge enabling locals to cross the traffic safely. 28. Since there is no specific complaint, if any, of rioting or any damage caused to the public property including train, provisions of Ss. 147 and 149 are also not attracted. 29. Mr. Vishal Panwar, learned Additional Advocate General invited attention of this Court to S.174 of the Indian Railways Act, 1989, which is reproduced herein below: “174. Obstructing running of train, etc.—If any railway servant (whether on duty or otherwise) or any other person obstructs or causes to be obstructed or attempts to obstruct any train or other rolling stock upon a railway,— (a) by squatting or picketing or during any Rail roko agitation or bandh; or (b) by keeping without authority any rolling stock on the railway; or (c) by tampering with, disconnecting or interfering in any other manner with its hose pipe or tampering with signal gear or otherwise, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both.” 30. No doubt, as per aforesaid provision of law, a person shall be punished with imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years on account of his having obstructed railway track, but if the averments contained in the FIR sought to be quashed in the instant proceeding, are perused in their entirety, there is no specific allegation that the persons named in the FIR obstructed passage of train rather, they came on the spot to lodge protest against death of a local person but thereafter, they disbursed after being assured by the authorities of Railways and the State i.e. Sub Divisional Magistrate that necessary provision of overhead bridge shall be made. 31. Leaving everything aside, this court having taken note of the material placed on record alongwith final report filed under S.173 CrPC, has no hesitation to conclude that the alleged incident of obstructing railway track happened on account of emotional outburst on account of death of a local person and none of the agitators including the petitioners had any kind of intention to obstruct the railway track or cause damage to public property but since their repeated requests were not paid any heed by the railway administration or district administration, after death of one person, petitioners gathered to agitate against railway administration. 32. Moreover, this Court finds from the list of witnesses enclosed with the final report under S.173 CrPC, that prosecution intends to prove its case with the help of witnesses, who are employees of railways. During proceedings of the case, Mr. Verma, learned Central Government Counsel was unable to point out any independent witness associated by railway authorities or the railway police to prove case of prosecution against the petitioners. No doubt, version put forth by interested witnesses cannot be brushed aside on account of their being interested or having relation with the complainant/injured, but certainly their statements cannot be taken as a gospel truth rather, same are required to be corroborated by independent witnesses, which in the present case is missing. 33. Leaving everything aside, this court after having scanned entire material placed on record by respective parties, finds that the prosecution launched by respondents, if permitted to continue would result in sheer abuse of process of law, because material collected on record in support of complaint by the Department, itself does not support the case of the prosecution. 33. Leaving everything aside, this court after having scanned entire material placed on record by respective parties, finds that the prosecution launched by respondents, if permitted to continue would result in sheer abuse of process of law, because material collected on record in support of complaint by the Department, itself does not support the case of the prosecution. Material collected on record by the Department in support of complaint, if perused in its entirety, nowhere suggests that the prosecution is likely to succeed. In case prosecution in the case at hand, is allowed to continue, it would unnecessarily expose the petitioners to protracted trial. 34. Leaving everything aside, this court after having perused material available on record has no hesitation to conclude that evidentiary material on record, if accepted would not reasonably connect the petitioners with the crime. Neither there is sufficient evidence to conclude that on the date of the alleged incident, petitioners had any intention to cause damage to public property or obstruct the railway traffic or they with the help and aid of each other committed alleged crime in furtherance of common intention. Otherwise also, in view of the material available on record by the Investigating Agency, case of the prosecution is bound to fail in as much as against present petitioners is concerned and hence, no fruitful purpose would be served by allowing such proceedings to continue. To the contrary, petitioners would suffer irreparable loss, harassment and mental agony, if criminal proceedings in the present case, are allowed to continue. Moreover, chances of conviction of the petitioners are very remote and bleak keeping in view the standard of evidence brought on record by the prosecution and in case, FIR sought to be quashed in the instant proceedings as well as consequent proceedings pending in the competent court of law are allowed to sustain, petitioners would unnecessarily be put to ordeals of protracted trial, which ultimately may lead to acquittal of the accused. 35. Consequently in view of detailed discussion made herein above as well as law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court, this court finds merit in the present petition, which is accordingly allowed. FIR No.8, dated 28.11.2021 under Ss. 341, 147 and 149 IPC and S.174 of the Indian Railway Act, 1989 registered at Police Station Railway Police Station, Shimla alongwith consequential proceedings pending in the competent court of law are quashed and set aside. FIR No.8, dated 28.11.2021 under Ss. 341, 147 and 149 IPC and S.174 of the Indian Railway Act, 1989 registered at Police Station Railway Police Station, Shimla alongwith consequential proceedings pending in the competent court of law are quashed and set aside. All the petitioners are acquitted. All pending applications also stand disposed of. Interim directions, if any, stand vacated.