Udaya Sahkari Grih Nirman Sahkari Sanstha Maryadit Tatibandh Raipur, Chhattisgarh, Registration No. Upa. P. /r P R/75/81-82 Through President/Vice-President/Authorized Director v. Hathiyarin Bai, W/o. Late Vishwambhar Sahu
2023-04-27
GOUTAM BHADURI, SACHIN SINGH RAJPUT
body2023
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : (Goutam Bhaduri, J.) 1. The instant appeal is against the judgment and decree dated 28.07.2016 passed in Civil Suit No.13-A/2015 by the learned 9th Additional District Judge, Raipur, whereby the civil suit for specific performance of agreement was dismissed. 2. The plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance that initially on 07.01.1982 and 01.07.1982 two agreements were executed for sale of land bearing Kh.No. 189/1 admeasuring 0.162 acres, Kh.No.189/2 area 0.081 acres, Kh.No.201 area 0.299 acres and Kh.No.202 area 0.259 acres and Kh.No.203/2 area 0.405 acres situated in Tatibandh, Raipur and pursuant to such agreement with Kejau Ram and Bismal and also acting through the minor Khubi Ram, the amount was paid to the predecessor of the defendants. Subsequently, on 14.01.1987, Rs. 1 lakh (one lakh) was given to Kejau Ram whereby the consent was also given to include the part and parcel of the further land bearing Kh.No.189/1 so as to amalgamate into one agreement. Kejau Ram died on 16.09.2011 and subsequently Bishambar (since deceased) on behalf of himself and as a Power of Attorney Holder of other land owners executed another agreement on 21.09.2007 whereby the earlier execution of agreement dated 07.01.1982 was acknowledged. As per the agreed terms, on the date of agreement, since the land was comprised within the ceiling limit, as such, it was agreed that the saledeed would be executed as and when the land would be released from Ceiling Act. The plaintiff asserted that at that time, another part of sale consideration Rs.2 lakhs was paid and remaining Rs.16 lakhs was agreed to be paid at the time of execution of the sale deed. It is stated that subsequently the subject land in question was released from ceiling limit but the same was not informed to the plaintiff. The names of defendants 1 to 11 were recorded in revenue records. Subsequently, when a publication was made in a daily Newspaper on 25.12.2013, they came to know that defendants 1 to 11 have sold the lands to defendants 12, 13 & 14 by sale deed dated 13.11.2013. Consequently, the application was filed in the mutation proceeding to object the sale on the ground that prior agreement dated 21.09.2007 was in existence, therefore, the subsequent sale to defendants 12 to 14 would be illegal.
Consequently, the application was filed in the mutation proceeding to object the sale on the ground that prior agreement dated 21.09.2007 was in existence, therefore, the subsequent sale to defendants 12 to 14 would be illegal. The plaintiffs further state that they were not in possession of the said land and they are ready and willing to purchase the same but despite all their efforts, the defendants have not executed the sale deed. 3. During pendency of such mutation proceeding , the present suit was filed for specific performance and declaratory relief. Few of the defendants filed their written statements wherein they stated that when the agreement was executed, the land was enveloped within the Urban Land Ceiling Act, therefore, any agreement would not be specifically enforced while the land was comprised in the process of Ceiling Act. The defendants would submit that after the death of Karta, they are in possession of the said land and their names were also recorded in the revenue records to hold that they are in possession. Pursuant thereto, when the lands were declared to be released from ceiling limit, defendants 1 to 11 have executed the sale deed in favour of defendants 12 to 14 and had handed over the possession to the purchasers. 4. On the basis of these pleadings, the learned trial Court framed as many as 11 issues and held that the agreement on which the plaintiff placed its reliance was not proved and also held that the plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform its part of contract and dismissed the suit. Hence this appeal. 5. The subsequent agreement on which the suit was primarily based is Ex.P-19. In the said agreement, the sale consideration of Rs.29,56,000/- was fixed and by way of earnest money, Rs.10 lakhs was paid by Cheque. The agreement further reflects the fact that earlier Rs.1,56,000/- was already paid in cash, thereby a total sum of Rs.11,56,000/- was paid. It was further agreed that after the lands were released from the Land Ceiling Act, Rs.2 lakhs would be paid, thereafter the sale deed would be executed and remaining Rs.16 lakhs would be paid in future. According to the agreement, the sale deed was agreed to be executed within one year from the date of agreement i.e., 21st September, 2007.
It was further agreed that after the lands were released from the Land Ceiling Act, Rs.2 lakhs would be paid, thereafter the sale deed would be executed and remaining Rs.16 lakhs would be paid in future. According to the agreement, the sale deed was agreed to be executed within one year from the date of agreement i.e., 21st September, 2007. According to the plaintiff, when the lands got released from Urban Land Ceiling Act, they were not informed of the fact of issue, therefore, having known the fact, a notice was served for specific performance of sale on 22.11.2011 by Ex.D-1. According to the plaint averments, the sale deed was already executed in respect of the suit land on 13.11.2013. The plaintiff averred that in the meanwhile, certified copies of sale deed were applied but they were received late. Be that as it may, the sale deeds Ex.D-2, D-3 & D-4 would show that the entire property in question was sold in favour of defendants 12 to 14. Therefore, the inference would be while the notice for specific performance was served initially the ownership of the land was already transferred on 22.11.2011 vide Ex.D-1. A perusal of the sale deed would also show that defendants 12 to 14 were put into possession of the suit land. 6. The agreement based on which the suit was filed i.e., Ex.P-19 dated 21.09.2007 purports that a specific time limit was agreed in between the parties to get the sale deed executed within a year. The conduct of the plaintiff would show that they became dormant and came out of their long slumber in the year 2011 after a period of 4 years by sending a notice Ex.D-1 and by the time the ownership of the suit land was already transferred. The submission of the appellants is that 2nd notice of the appellant was issued on 19th March 2013 by Ex.P-15. It is silent about the subsequent sale-deed and only speaks for specific performance of the contract whereas the the plaintiff averred at Plaint Para 18 that they came to know the fact specifically on 27.08.2014 when the certified copy of the sale deed was received that the sale deed was already executed.
It is silent about the subsequent sale-deed and only speaks for specific performance of the contract whereas the the plaintiff averred at Plaint Para 18 that they came to know the fact specifically on 27.08.2014 when the certified copy of the sale deed was received that the sale deed was already executed. The said fact having come to the notice of plaintiff, it was bye-passed in the notice Ex.P-15 and prima facie, it appears that in order to bring the suit within the Limitation Act 1963 under Article 54, a subsequent notice was issued. The conduct of the plaintiff would show that certain notice was issued for specific performance in the year 2011 and sale-deed having not been executed, for all probabilities, they were in know of the fact that the performance of contract is refused. So Article 54 of the Limitation Act which speaks of the period for filing of suit for specific performance would be applicable in the facts of this case, which provides that within 3 years’ period, a suit has to be filed for specific performance of sale. Therefore, 3 years would be the limitation for applying the suit when the refusal to execute the sale deed is made. Hence, the finding of the trial Court that the suit was barred under Article 54 of the Limitation Act does not call for any interference. 7. According to the plaint averments, the plaintiff came to know about the subsequent sale-deed when the certified copy of the sale deed was received in the month of August 2014. A perusal of the certified copy of the subsequent sale deed in favour of the defendants 12 to 14 would show that they were put into possession of the suit land. The plaintiff though filed a suit for specific performance of suit and for cancellation of the sale deed but specific finding has been arrived at by the learned court below which on facts, we do not find to be perverse that defendants 12 to 14 were put into possession. It is further obvious that if the sale deed for the value was executed, the purchaser would be put into possession and in such a case when the possession is not claimed for, a declaratory relief simplicitor will not lie without claiming the decree of possession. 8.
It is further obvious that if the sale deed for the value was executed, the purchaser would be put into possession and in such a case when the possession is not claimed for, a declaratory relief simplicitor will not lie without claiming the decree of possession. 8. The Supreme Court in case of Ram Saran v. Ganga Devi { AIR 1972 SC 2685 } AIR 1972 SC 2685 and further followed by Executive Officer, Arulmigu Chokkanatha Swamy Koil Trust, Virudhunagar Vs. Chandra (2017) 3 SCC 702 has held that when the plaintiff is not in possession and having only sought for declaratory reliefs, the suit was not be maintainable. 9. Further the Supreme Court in Venkataraja Vs. Vidyane Doureradiaperumal (dead) through LRs reported in (2014) 14 SCC 502 has reiterated the law laid down in Muni Lal Vs. Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd., (1996) 1 SCC 90 and Shakuntala Devi Vs. Kamla (2005) 5 SCC 390 and has held in paras 24, 25 & 26 thus : “24. A mere declaratory decree remains non-executable in most cases generally. However, there is no prohibition upon a party from seeking an amendment in the plaint to include the unsought relief, provided that it is saved by limitation. However, it is obligatory on the part of the defendants to raise the issue at the earliest. (Vide Parakash Chand Khurana v. Harnam Singh [ (1973) 2 SCC 484 ] and State of M.P. v. Mangilal Sharma [ (1998) 2 SCC 510 ). 25. In Muni Lal v. Oriental Fire & General Insurance Co. Ltd. [ (1996) 1 SCC 90 ] this Court dealt with declaratory decree, and observed that : (SCC p. 93, para 4) “4….. mere declaration without consequential relief does not provide the needed relief in the suit; it would be for the plaintiff to seek both the reliefs. The omission thereof mandates the court to refuse the grant of declaratory relief.” 26. In Shakuntala Devi v. Kamla [ (2005) 5 SCC 390 ], this Court while dealing with the issue held : (SCC p. 399 Para 21) “21….. a declaratory decree simpliciter does not attain finality if it has to be used for obtaining any future decree like possession.
In Shakuntala Devi v. Kamla [ (2005) 5 SCC 390 ], this Court while dealing with the issue held : (SCC p. 399 Para 21) “21….. a declaratory decree simpliciter does not attain finality if it has to be used for obtaining any future decree like possession. In such cases, if suit for possession based on an earlier declaratory decree is filed, it is open to the defendant to establish that the declaratory decree on which the suit is based is not a lawful decree.” 10. Likewise, in Executive Officer, Arulmigu Chokkanatha Swami Koil Trust, Virudhunagar (Supra), the Supreme Court relying on a case of Ram Saran Vs. Ganga Devi (1973) 2 SCC 60 , has held in para 34 as under: “34. In the present case, the plaintiff having been found not to be in possession and having only sought for declaratory reliefs, the suit was clearly not maintainable and has rightly been dismissed by the trial Court. In this context, the reference is made to the judgment of this Court in Ram Saran v. Ganga Devi [Ram Saran v. Ganga Devi, (1973) 2 SCC 60 ], where at paragraphs 1 and 4 following was stated: (SCC pp. 6–61). “1. This is a plaintiffs appeal by special leave. Ram Saran and Raghubir Saran, the plaintiffs are brothers. They jointly owned suit property with Chhabili Kuer, widow of Lalita Prasad. After the death of Chhabili Kuer on 08.02.1971, Ganga Devi, the defendant in the suit came forward as the legal representative of Chhabili Kuer and got the mutation effected in her name in the place of deceased Chhabili Kuer. In 1958, the plaintiffs brought this suit for a declaration that they are the sole owners of the suit properties. They did not claim possession of either the entire or even any portion of the suit properties. 4. We are in agreement with the High Court that the suit is hit by Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. As found by the fact-finding courts, Ganga Devi is in possession of some of the suit properties. The plaintiffs have not sought possession of those properties. They merely claimed a declaration that they are the owners of the suit properties. Hence the suit is not maintainable. 11.
As found by the fact-finding courts, Ganga Devi is in possession of some of the suit properties. The plaintiffs have not sought possession of those properties. They merely claimed a declaration that they are the owners of the suit properties. Hence the suit is not maintainable. 11. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we do not find any merit in the appeal warranting interference in judgment and decree passed by the learned court below. Consequently, the appeal fails and dismissed. 12. A decree be drawn accordingly. No order as to costs.