JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. The instant petition has been filed for grant of the following reliefs: “That this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue appropriate writ by directing the statutory authorities to take strict action and restrain the respondent No. 5 permanently from extracting the raw material and mineral against the terms and conditions of lease deed with regard to the joint property and the Annexure P­3 lease deed and P­4 i.e. permanent registration certificate of the respondent No. 5 is liable to be quashed and set aside. (b) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or directions, directing the concerned respondents to restrain and not to allow mining of sand within the joint land comprised in khata No. 39, khatauni No. 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, khasra No. 346,346/1,355,426,427, 342, 425 plots 7 land measuring 13­07­37 HM situated in Mohal Lodhwan Pratham, Sub­Tehsil Gangath, Distt. Kangra, H.P. (c) That this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to direct the respondents No. 1 & 4 to take coercive action with regard to illegal mining and stop the same with immediate effect, as the same is in violation of the policy and act itself. 2. The petitioner has not only approached the Civil Court, but has also obtained interim order of status quo in his favour, as would be evident from the order passed by learned Senior Civil Judge, Nurpur, District Kangra, on 25.3.2022, which reads as under : “Put up for filing of reply on 19.4.2022. Till then, both the parties are directed to maintain status quo qua nature, construction and possession over the suit land and also qua illegal mining by engaging JCB machine.” 3. In these circumstances, there cannot be plurality of proceedings as no person can be vexed twice for the same cause of action. 4. It is more than settled that avoiding the multiplicity of legal proceedings should be the aim of all courts and, therefore, a litigant cannot be allowed to split up his claim and file writ petition in piecemeal fashion. If the litigant could have, but did not without any legal justification claim a relief, which was available to him at the time of filing earlier suit, the same claim cannot be allowed to be subsequently agitated by filing the instant writ petition. 5. If the litigant could have, but did not without any legal justification claim a relief, which was available to him at the time of filing earlier suit, the same claim cannot be allowed to be subsequently agitated by filing the instant writ petition. 5. In this context, it shall be apt to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s. D. Cawasji and Co., etc vs. State of Mysore and another, AIR 1975 SC 813 wherein it was held as under: “[18] But, that however, is not the end of the matter. In the earlier writ petitions which culminated m the decision in (1968) 2 Mys LJ 78 : (AIR 1969 Mys 23) the appellants did pray for refund of the amounts paid by them under the Act and the High Court considered the prayer for refund in each of the writ petitions and allowed the prayer in some petitions and rejected it in the others on the ground of delay. The Court observed that those writ petitioners whose prayers had been rejected would be at liberty to institute suits or other proceedings. We are not sure that, in the 4 context, the High Court, meant by 'other proceedings', applications in the nature of proceedings under Article 226, when it is seen that the Court refused to entertain the relief for refund on the ground of delay in the proceedings under Article 226 and that in some cases the Court directed the parties to file representations before Government. Be that as it may, in the earlier writ petitions, the appellants did not pray for refund of the amounts paid by way of cess for the years 1951­52 to 1965­66 and they gave no reasons before the High Court in these writ petitions why they did not make the prayer for refund of the amounts paid during the years in question. Avoiding multiplicity of unnecessary legal proceedings should be an aim of all courts. Therefore, the appellants could not be allowed to split up their claim for refund and file writ petitions on this piecemeal fashion. If the appellants could have, but did not, without any legal justification, claim refund of the amounts paid during the years in question, in the earlier writ petitions, we see no reason why the appellants should be allowed to claim the amounts by filing writ petitions again. If the appellants could have, but did not, without any legal justification, claim refund of the amounts paid during the years in question, in the earlier writ petitions, we see no reason why the appellants should be allowed to claim the amounts by filing writ petitions again. In the circumstances of this case, having regard to the conduct of the appellants in not claiming these amounts in the earlier writ petitions without any justification, we do not think we would be justified in interfering with the discretion exercised by the High Court in dismissing the writ petitions which were filed only for the purpose of obtaining the refund and directing them to resort to the remedy of suits.” 6. In Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay vs. T.P. Kumaran, (1996) 10 SCC 561 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under: “[4] The tribunal has committed a gross error of law in directing the payment. The claim is barred by constructive 5 res judicata under Section 11, Explanation IV, Civil Procedure Code which envisages that any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in a former suit, shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in a subsequent suit. Hence when the claim was made on earlier occasion, he should have or might have sought and secured decree for interest. He did not seek so and, therefore, it operates as res judicata. Even otherwise, when he filed a suit and specifically did not claim the same, Order 2 Rule 2 Civil Procedure Code prohibits the petitioner to seek the remedy separately. In either event, the OA is not sustainable.” 7. Apart from above, the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable in writ jurisdiction by virtue of the provision of section 141 but the principles enshrined therein are applicable. (Ref. Gulabchand Chhotalal Parikh vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1965 SC 1153 , Babubhai Muljibhai Patel vs. Nandlal Khodidas Barot, AIR 1974 SC 2105 and Sarguja Transport Service vs. STAT, AIR 1987 SC 88 ) 8. The question posed before this Court otherwise stands directly answered by this Court in Kundlu Devi and another vs. State of H.P. and others, Latest HLJ 2011 (HP) 579 wherein it was held as under: “4. The question posed before this Court otherwise stands directly answered by this Court in Kundlu Devi and another vs. State of H.P. and others, Latest HLJ 2011 (HP) 579 wherein it was held as under: “4. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that though the grievance with regard to quantum was dealt with, the grievance with regard to the claim for rent and occupation charges during the period the property was in possession of the Government has not been dealt with. According to the petitioners, they are entitled to the same in view of the decision of the Apex Court in R.L. Jain Versus DDA, (2004) 4 SCC 79 . We do not think that it will be proper for this Court at this stage in proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to go into the question as to whether the petitioners are entitled to that component of compensation. That grievance the petitioners have pursued in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 initially before the Collector, thereafter before the Civil Court and finally in appeal before the High Court. According to the petitioners, though this grievance was raised, the same has not been adverted to. If that be so, a civil writ petition or for that matter any other collateral proceeding is not the remedy. All contentions, which a party might and ought to have taken, should be taken in the original proceedings and not thereafter. That is the well settled principle under Order II Rule 2 CPC. Order II Rule 2 reads as follows: “2.Suit to include the whole claim. – (1) Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action; but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court. (2) Relinquishment of part of claim. – Where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. (3) Omission to sue for one of several reliefs. (2) Relinquishment of part of claim. – Where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. (3) Omission to sue for one of several reliefs. – A person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of such reliefs; but if he omits, except with the leave of the Court, to sue for all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted.” 5. This Rule is based on the principle that the defendant shall not be vexed twice for one and the same cause. The Rule also seeks to prevent two evils, one the splitting of claims and the other splitting of remedies. If a plaintiff omits any portion of the claim or omits any of the remedies in respect of the cause, he shall not be permitted to pursue the omitted claim or the omitted remedy. The requirement of the Rule is that every suit should include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of a cause of action. Cause of action is a cause which gives occasion for and forms foundation of the suit. If that cause of action enables a person to ask for a larger and broader relief than to which he had limited his 8 claim, he cannot thereafter seek the recovery of the balance of the cause of action by independent proceedings. This principle has been also settled by the Apex Court in Sidramappa versus Rajashetty, AIR 1970 SC 1059 . 6. Order II Rule 2 applies also to writ proceedings. The left out portion of a cause of action cannot be pursued in a subsequent writ proceedings. All claims which a petitioner might and ought to have taken, should be taken in one proceedings and only in one proceedings. {See the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income tax vs. T.P. Kumaran, 1996 (1) SCC 561}. 7. Equally, a person who has filed the suit seeking certain relief in respect of a cause of action is precluded from instituting another suit for seeking other reliefs in respect of the same cause of action. {See the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income tax vs. T.P. Kumaran, 1996 (1) SCC 561}. 7. Equally, a person who has filed the suit seeking certain relief in respect of a cause of action is precluded from instituting another suit for seeking other reliefs in respect of the same cause of action. He shall not be entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court for obtaining the very same relief. In other words, if a second suit is barred, a writ petition would also be barred. What is directly prohibited cannot be indirectly permitted. That is the principle underlying under Order II Rule 2 CPC.” 9. Apart from above, it is more than settled that an order of injunction is binding not only upon the parties, but even upon the 3rd party, in case they refuse to execute the orders of injunction. 10. Additionally, we find that even though the petitioner has made a reference regarding the proceedings pending before the Civil Court, but the only ground on which the petition has been filed is that despite the injunction order, respondent No. 5 has not desisted or stopped the illegal mining. 11. Even if the allegations, so made, are taken to correct, even then the writ petition would not be maintainable and it would be for the petitioner to resort to such remedies, as available to him, under the law, to enforce the order of injunction. 12. Consequently, we find the instant petition to be not only mis­conceived but also not maintainable and the same is accordingly dismissed. The pending application(s), if any, are also disposed of.