JUDGMENT : (Piyush Agrawal, J.) : Heard Mr. Diptiman Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner. None appears on behalf of the respondent No. 3. Notice on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 & 2 has been accepted by office of learned A.S.G.I. 2. By means of this writ petition, the petitioner has assailed the order dated 8.2.2022 as published on 21.2.2022 passed by the respondent No. 2 in ID Case No. 19 of 2013 and the reference order dated 5.3.2013 made by respondent No. 1. 3. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner-Hindustan Aeronautics Limited is a Central Government undertaking, under the Ministry of Defence, company incorporated under the provisions of Indian Companies Act, engaged in manufacture, repair and overhauling of sophisticated Aircrafts and other defence equipments and services and caters to the Defence Services of India, which is controlled by and works under the Ministry of Defence. The President of India being the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, as declared under Article 53 of the Constitution of India, is having 75.15 shares of the company in its hand or under its control and rest 5 shares are being held by Director are Senior Officer of Ministry of Defence, Government of India, under direct control of the President of India. The petitioner company has several Divisions/Units all over the country. The present petition relates to the Transport Aircraft Division, HAL, Kanpur, which deals with the manufacturing/maintaining/overhauling/repairing of Transport Aircraft used by defence forces of the nation. 4. Further, the petitioner entered into an agreement for the work 'Repair & Maintenance of Telecom Lines and Telephone Equipments at Township' with one M/s. Mehrok Enterprises of Kanpur on 26.3.2007 and the contract was for 12 months which commenced on 7.4.2007 and completed on 6.4.2008, a copy of same has been annexed as Annexure-6, at page Nos. 61-64. Further the respondent No. 3 was an employee of contract; namely Neeraj Shukla whose services were terminated by the said contractor against which a reference was instituted by the workman, against which an award was passed and compensation has been directed to be paid by the petitioner company to the respondent No. 3, hence the present writ petition. 5.
61-64. Further the respondent No. 3 was an employee of contract; namely Neeraj Shukla whose services were terminated by the said contractor against which a reference was instituted by the workman, against which an award was passed and compensation has been directed to be paid by the petitioner company to the respondent No. 3, hence the present writ petition. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that on the one hand, the Tribunal has recorded the finding of fact in favour of the petitioner that the respondent No. 3 has set up a false claim and was engaged only through contractor namely; Mehrok Enterprises, on the other hand, has awarded compensation to the respondent No. 3 to be paid by petitioners, which is bad. 6. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgement of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Balwant Rai Saluja v. Air India Ltd., 2015 AIR (SC) 375. He submits that the Court below have travelled beyond the reference, which is not permissible. The reference was that whether the termination of the respondent No. 3 is correct and if just, fair and legal, what relief can be granted, but once the Tribunal has held that false claim was set up by the respondent No. 3, no compensation should have been granted. In support of his contention, he has further placed reliance upon the judgment of Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited v. State of Jharkhand and others, 2014 (1) SCC 536 . He prays for allowing the writ petition. 7. The Court has perused the records. 8. Admittedly, no material has been brought on record on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 & 3 that the award has been assailed by the respondent No. 3, thus the finding recorded in the impugned award at para 17 read as under : ''It is more or less clear that he was a casual worker engaged by a Contractor. He accepted his casual job on his volition. Since the claimant workman has come up with the false pleadings and assertions he should not be rewarded with huge compensation to be borne by HAL. At this distant point of time exact compensation with mathematical exactitude cannot be worked out.'' 9.
He accepted his casual job on his volition. Since the claimant workman has come up with the false pleadings and assertions he should not be rewarded with huge compensation to be borne by HAL. At this distant point of time exact compensation with mathematical exactitude cannot be worked out.'' 9. Once the finding of fact has been recorded that the respondent No. 3 was not engaged by the petitioner but by the contractor namely; Mehrok Enterprises, awarding compensation to be paid by petitioner is perverse. 10. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of of Balwant Raj Saluja (supra) in para 38 has held as under : ''38. We conclude that the question as regards the status of workmen hired by a contractor to work in a statutory canteen established under the provisions of the Act, 1948 has been well-settled by a catena of decisions of this Court. This Court is in agreement with the principle laid down in the Indian Petrochemicals case (supra) wherein it was held that the workmen of a statutory canteen would be the workmen of the establishment for the purpose of the Act, 1948 only and not for all other purposes. We add that the statutory obligation created under Section 46 of the Act, 1948, although establishes certain liability of the principal employer towards the workers employed in the given canteen facility, this must be restricted only to the Act, 1948 and it does not govern the rights of employees with reference to appointment, seniority, promotion, dismissal, disciplinary actions, retirement benefits, etc., which are the subject-matter of various other legislations, policies, etc. Therefore, we cannot accept the submission of Shri Jayant Bhushan, learned counsel that the employees of the statutory Canteen ipso-facto become the employees of the principal employer.'' 11. In view of the above quoted para, the impugned order cannot sustain. 12. Further, the reference was made, which is quoted in para 2 as under : ''Whether the action of the management of Hinudstan Aeronautics Ltd., in terminating the services of Shri Neeraj Shukla S/o Shri Krishan Dutt Shukla wokman w.ef. 10.3.2008 is just, fair and legal? If not, to what relief the workman concerned is entitled to?'' 13.
12. Further, the reference was made, which is quoted in para 2 as under : ''Whether the action of the management of Hinudstan Aeronautics Ltd., in terminating the services of Shri Neeraj Shukla S/o Shri Krishan Dutt Shukla wokman w.ef. 10.3.2008 is just, fair and legal? If not, to what relief the workman concerned is entitled to?'' 13. Once in para 17 of the award as quoted-above, it has been cleared that the respondent No. 3 has set up a false pleadings and assertion and further was engaged as a casual worker engaged, the Court below has erred in rewarding the compensation to be paid by the petitioner, which is beyond the reference. 14. The Hon'ble Apex Court in para 16 of the case Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited (supra) has been held as under : ''16. The Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act is a creature of that statute. It acquires jurisdiction on the basis of reference made to it. The Tribunal has to confine itself within one scope of the subject-matter of reference and cannot travel beyond the same. This is the view taken by this Court in number of cases including in National Engg. Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan. It is for this reason that it becomes the bounden duty of the appropriate Government to make the reference appropriately which is reflective of the real/exact nature of ''dispute'' between the parties.'' 15. In view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court as referred above and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case in hand, the impugned order dated 5.3.2013 and award dated 8.2.2022 so far as directing for payment of compensation cannot be justified in the eye of law and the same are hereby quashed. 16. The writ petition is allowed accordingly.