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2023 DIGILAW 235 (AP)

Rastriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. v. M. Ramachander Raju

2023-01-30

TARLADA RAJASEKHAR RAO

body2023
ORDER : The present Writ Petition is filed under Article 226 of Constitution of India for the following relief/s : “…to issue a writ, order or direction more particularly one in the nature of writ of Certiorari calling for the records of the 2nd respondent Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court at Hyderabad pertaining to its orders dt.08.03.2016 in LCID No.61 off 2010 and to quash the same holding that it is illegal, barred by Res-judicate, without application of mind and was made without adverting to all the earlier litigations before this Hon’ble Court in several repeated writ petitions filed by the applicant before it, which were dismissed on merits and to consequentially direct the 2nd respondent Tribunal to close all further proceedings in the said LCID No.61 of 2010 before it and to pass such other and further order or orders…..”. 2. The present Writ petition came to be filed assailing the order dated 08.03.2016 in L.C.I.D. No.61/2010 to quash the said order as it is illegal and barred by Res-judicata. 3. Facts of the case are like this: The 1st respondent in the Writ Petition is an employee under the petitioner company which is registered under the Companies Act as Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited, known as Visakhapatnam Steel Plant. The 1st respondent herein several times has been admonished and he was censured for several times and still his conduct of absenteeism is continued and due to his incorrigible absenteeism on medical grounds, he was referred to the Chief Medical Officer of the King George Hospital, Visakhapatnam on 03.10.1992. The Medical Officer gave a report that his claims of ill health are false. Accordingly, after constituting a committee and conducting a regular enquiry, a major punishment of removal from service was imposed on 24.12.1992. Against such removal order, the 1st respondent filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority, i.e. Deputy General Manager (Traffic and Raw Materials), who confirmed the punishment vide order dated 08.02.1993. Challenging the order of removal of the Appellate Authority, the 1st respondent herein filed W.P. No.8489 of 1995 before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad and the said Writ Petition was disposed of by an order dated 16.10.1997 inter alia with a direction to consider the case of the petitioner sympathetically. Pursuant to the said order, the management has once again examined the matter and confirmed the order of removal. Pursuant to the said order, the management has once again examined the matter and confirmed the order of removal. On the basis of the said Order in W.P. No.8489 of 1995, the petitioner herein made another representation dated 11.03.2002 and the said representation was considered and rejected. Aggrieved by the said rejection order, the 1st respondent herein filed W.P. No.25176 of 2002 before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad. The said Writ Petition was dismissed by an Order dated 20.12.2002, observing that the Writ Petitioner is not entitled for consideration of his representation for reemployment which request was already considered and rejected in 1997. The court observed that the writ petitioner does not found any merits. Accordingly, it was dismissed. After dismissal of the Writ Petition, the 1st respondent was kept quiet for a good length of time and again approached the 2nd respondent Tribunal challenging removal order dated 20.04.1992, which was confirmed by appellate authority on 08.02.1993. He challenged the said order after lapse of 8 years from the date of removal of the petitioner herein. The Tribunal after considering the evidence has allowed the dispute by an order dated 08.03.2016 in I.D.L.C. No.61 of 2010 and it was observed that the domestic enquiry conducted in this case is not valid. While disposing the dispute, the employee has been informed to take the help of a co-worker to assist before the enquiry committee and further he would also to be allowed to cross-examine the witnesses present in support of charges leveled against him at the time of concluding the domestic enquiry. 4. Aggrieved by the said order the present writ petition came to be filed on the grounds that the Tribunal has failed to advert the repeated orders of dismissal of Writ Petitions in WP 8489 OF 1995 dated 16.10.1997 and W.P. No.25176 of 2002 dismissal order dated 20.12.2002 has erroneously allowed the ID filed by the employee and there is a delay in approaching the Tribunal by the employee and the orders passed by the Court in the above said Writ Petition operates as res-judicata against employee and without considering the said aspects, the Tribunal has erroneously allowed the I.D. filed by the employee. Therefore, prayed to set aside the order in I.D. No.61 of 2010 dated 08.03.2016. 5. This Court by an order dated 19.09.2017, stayed the proceedings of the Industrial Tribunal. 6. Therefore, prayed to set aside the order in I.D. No.61 of 2010 dated 08.03.2016. 5. This Court by an order dated 19.09.2017, stayed the proceedings of the Industrial Tribunal. 6. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner/ employer is that the employee is irregular in attending his duties right from the inception and he himself abandoned the post and remained absent from 25.02.1991 to 13.06.1991 and his services were terminated on 24.12.1992 and he had approached the Industrial Tribunal belatedly. This aspect has not been gone into by the Industrial Tribunal. Hence, the substantial question of law has not been answered rightly. However, those two grounds were also urged by learned counsel for the petitioner before this court. 7. In Workmen of Cochin Port Trust v. Board of Trustees of the Cochin Port Trust and Anr., Smt. Pujari Bai v. Madan Gopal (dead) LRs. The "lesser relief" of reinstatement which was the subject-matter of the industrial dispute had already been claimed by the respondent in the writ petition. This was refused by the High Court. The correctness of the decision in the writ proceedings has not been challenged by the respondent. The decision was, therefore, final. Having got an adverse order in the writ petition, it was not open to the respondent to re-agitate the issue before the Labour Court and the Labour Court was incompetent to entertain the dispute raised by the respondent and re-decide the matter in the face of the earlier decision of the High Court in the writ proceedings." 8. Learned petitioner counsel submits that even if it is assumed that the employee has been illegally terminated or dismissed, he should have approached the Industrial Tribunal within reasonable time. 9. Thus, the unreasonable and unexplained delay has not been taken into account by the Industrial Tribunal. Accordingly, the learned counsel prays for allowing the present writ petition by setting aside the order passed by the Industrial tribunal. 10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Raghubir Singh v. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar, 2014 (4) SCT 263 . The Supreme Court has ruled out that Article 137 of the Limitation Act has no application to the I.D. Act when the expression used in Section 10(1) is that reference can be made 'at any time’. 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Limited, AIR 1999 SC 1351 . The Supreme Court has ruled out that Article 137 of the Limitation Act has no application to the I.D. Act when the expression used in Section 10(1) is that reference can be made 'at any time’. 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajaib Singh v. The Sirhind Co-Op. Marketing-cum-Processing Service Society Limited, AIR 1999 SC 1351 . This is also a case of delay in approaching the industrial adjudicator. The Court reiterated the principle that there is no limitation prescribed in raising a demand by the workman and seeking reference under the Act. In Ajaib Singh's case, the Supreme Court held that Article 137 of the Limitation Act applies to proceedings before the Labour Court and delay, laches and limitation are alone sufficient to constitute a valid hard and fast ground to decline relief. This legal principle continues to operate but several rational inroads have been made in various pronouncements of the Supreme Court largely starting from Shalimar Works Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1959 SC 1217 , wherein it held that merely because the ID Act does not provide for a limitation for raising the dispute, it does not mean that the dispute can be raised at any time and without regard to the delay and reasons therefor. In Nedungadi Bank Ltd v. K.P. Madhavan Kutty, (2000) 2 SCC 455 ; Indian Tea Association v. Ajit Kumar Barat and Others, (2000) 3 SCC 93 ; Executive Engineer v. Shivalinga, (2002) 10 SCC 167; Haryana State Coop. Land Development Bank v. Neelam, (2005) 5 SCC 91 [7 years delay], State of Karnataka v. Ravi Kumar, (2009) 13 SCC 746 , [14 years delay] and observed in the affirmative that inordinate delay can be fatal to the action. 12. In U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Babu Ram, (2006) 5 SCC 433 , the Supreme Court held that so far as delay in seeking reference is concerned, no formula of universal application can be laid down for determining the said question which would depend on the facts of each individual case. 12. In U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Babu Ram, (2006) 5 SCC 433 , the Supreme Court held that so far as delay in seeking reference is concerned, no formula of universal application can be laid down for determining the said question which would depend on the facts of each individual case. While on the question of delay it would be apposite to quote from Regional Provident Fund Commissioner v. K.T. Rolling Mills, (1995) 1 SCC 181 :- "When a power is conferred by statute without mentioning the period within which it could be invoked, the same has to be done within reasonable period, as all powers must be exercised reasonably, and exercise of the same within reasonable period would be a facet of reasonableness" 13. From the above, it is clear that the doctrine of res judicata is applicable to industrial adjudication also. When the dispute raised about termination of services of temporary workman by way of writ petition, was disposed of by reasoned order, on merits, and after contested hearing, and after that order becomes final, re-agitation of same issue before Labour Court is barred by res judicata. In the case on hand also, The 1st respondent herein filed W.P. No.8489 of 1995 before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad and the said Writ Petition was disposed of by an order dated 16.10.1997 inter alia with a direction to consider the case of the petitioner sympathetically. Pursuant to the said order, the management has once again examined the matter and confirmed the order of removal. the petitioner herein made another representation dated 11.03.2002 and the said representation was considered and rejected. Aggrieved by the said rejection order, the 1st respondent herein filed W.P. No.25176 of 2002 before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad. The said Writ Petition was dismissed by an Order dated 20.12.2002, observing that the Writ Petitioner is not entitled for consideration of his representation for reemployment which request was already considered and rejected in 1997. 14. On enunciating the law, the present Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches as well as applying principles of res-judicata. 15. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed and the I.D. No.61 of 2010 order dated 08.03.2016 is hereby set aside. However, no costs. 16. 14. On enunciating the law, the present Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches as well as applying principles of res-judicata. 15. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed and the I.D. No.61 of 2010 order dated 08.03.2016 is hereby set aside. However, no costs. 16. This court, with a sympathetic view and considering the poor condition of the employee /1st respondent, who is the land looser, is inclined to direct the writ petitioner herein to pay some amount not less than one lakh rupees to the 1st respondent herein within a period of two months from the date of the receipt of the order. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending shall stand closed.