JUDGMENT : Jyotsna Rewal Dua, J. Suit for declaration and injunction filed by the appellants, husband and wife respectively, has been dismissed by both the learned Courts below giving cause of action to them to institute the present Regular Second Appeal. 2. Facts 2 (i) Parties are related to each other in the following manner : Jai Mal Solia Mahantu Bansi Lal (Defendant) Bhagat Ram Saraswati Devi (Plaintiff No.2) Jagdish Chand (Plaintiff No.1) 2 (ii) The appellants instituted Civil Suit averring therein that S/Shri Mahantu and Sh. Solia (predecessor of the parties) were owners in possession of the land situated in 04 ‘Tikkas’. On 03.02.1958, these two persons entered into a family partition(agreement) Ex.PW2/A. In the said agreement, land comprised in one ‘Tikka’ (“Tikka Khangru”) was allotted to Shri Mahantu, whereas the land comprised in other three ‘Tikkas’ came to the share of Sh. Solia. The partition was given effect to and Shri Mahantu took possession of the land comprised in ‘Tikka Khangru’, whereas Sh. Solia took possession of the land comprised in other three ‘Tikkas’. Ever since the parties are enjoying their separate possession over the above ‘Tikkas’. With the grievance that the defendants had started interfering with the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs in the suit land, situated in ‘Tikka Khangru’, Civil Suit for declaration and injunction was filed by the grand daughter of Sh. Mahantu and her husband. 2 (iii) The defendants denied the existence of family partition (agreement) dated 03.02.1958. They pleaded that the aforesaid document put forth by the plaintiffs was fraudulent and not binding upon the defendants rights. That as per the revenue record the parties are joint owners in possession of the suit land. The suit land had never been partitioned between the parties. 2 (iv) On going through the pleadings and evidence, the learned Trial Court returned the findings that the revenue record depicted joint ownership and possession of the parties over the suit land. The plaintiffs had themselves admitted these entries to be correct. Even Khasra Girdawari (Ex.D8) showed that the disputed land was jointly owned and possessed by the parties. In respect of alleged family partition (agreement), learned Trial Court concluded that the same was not a registered document and also the signatures of Shri Mahantu did not appear on this document. Hence, no reliance whatsoever could be placed on this document by the plaintiff. In respect of alleged family partition (agreement), learned Trial Court concluded that the same was not a registered document and also the signatures of Shri Mahantu did not appear on this document. Hence, no reliance whatsoever could be placed on this document by the plaintiff. For the aforesaid reasons, the suit instituted by the plaintiffs (appellants herein) was dismissed on 27.11.1999. 2 (v) The first appeal preferred by the plaintiffs against the aforesaid judgment and decree also met the same fate. It was dismissed on 21.11.2007. 3. This Regular Second Appeal was admitted on 29.4.2009, on the following substantial question of law : “Whether the Ex.PX, order of the learned Divisional Commissioner, Mandi, Ex.PW1/A, order of Tehsildar, Ex.PW1/B, order of the Consolidation Officer andEx.XPW1/D, order of the Settlement Officer, whereby the suit land has been held to be in the separate possession of the appellants by virtue of agreement of partition between the parties, have wrongly been ignored by the learned Courts below, resulting into erroneous decisions”? 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties on the above substantial question of law and also considered the relevant record of the case carefully. 4 (i) The main plank of the suit instituted by the plaintiffs was the family partition deed (agreement) Ex.PW2/A allegedly executed between their predecessor Sh. Mahantu (plaintiff’s predecessor) and Sh. Solia (defendant’s predecessor) whereby the suit land was statedly partitioned between them. According to the plaintiffs, pursuant to this agreement, Sh. Mahantu came in possession of the suit land comprised in ‘Tikka Khangru’ and Sh. Solia came in possession of the land comprised in other three ‘Tikkas’. However, perusal of Ex.PW2/A reflects that the said agreement has not been signed by Sh. Mahantu. This agreement put forth by the plaintiffs is the real foundation of their case, once it turns out to be unsigned by their predecessor, the entire edifice of the suit goes. 4 (ii) Learned counsel for the appellants would argue that Ex.PW2/A was only a family settlement (agreement), therefore, it need not necessarily bear the signatures of Sh. Mahantu. This submission cannot be accepted. The entire case of the plaintiff is based upon this agreement. In case the same was not signed by Sh. Mahantu, the same could not be relied upon. The defendants have denied the existence of this settlement deed (agreement) Ex.PW2/A. According to them, this is a suspicious document. Mahantu. This submission cannot be accepted. The entire case of the plaintiff is based upon this agreement. In case the same was not signed by Sh. Mahantu, the same could not be relied upon. The defendants have denied the existence of this settlement deed (agreement) Ex.PW2/A. According to them, this is a suspicious document. Both the learned Courts below have returned concurrent findings of the fact that the settlement deed (agreement) was not signed by Sh. Mahantu. The effect of this is that the plaintiffs had nothing to project in support of their plea that the suit land was partitioned between the parties. Law regarding interference with concurrent findings of facts returned by both the learned Courts below, is very well settled. In Ramanuja Naidu vs. V. Kanniah Naidu and another, (1996) 3 SCC 392 , it has been held as under : “11. We are of the view, that in interfering with the concurrent findings of facts of the lower courts, the learned single Judge of the High Court acted in excess of the jurisdiction vested in him under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code. The learned Judge totally erred in his approach to the entire question, and in reappraising and reappreciating the entire evidence, and in considering the probabilities of the case, to hold that the judgments of the courts below are "perverse and that the plaintiff is entitled to the declaration of title to suit property and recovery of possession. It is evident that the courts below found, on the basis of oral and documentary evidence, that Ex.B-2 sale deed obtained by the first defendant on 5.5.1967 is genuine and valid, and that first defendant discharged the mortgage, Ex. B-1, on 10.5.1967, took possession of the suit property and thereafter cultivated the same. The courts below were of opinion that Ex.A-1 cannot be accepted in view of the contradictions in the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 regarding the payment of consideration, and none of the attestors to Ex. A-1 were examined. Laying stress on Ex.A-4, suit notice, sent by the plaintiff to the first defendant and other circumstances, the courts also found that there is collusion between the plaintiff and the second defendant and so, Ex.A-1 purported to have been executed by the second defendant in favour of the plaintiff is not valid in law. A-1 were examined. Laying stress on Ex.A-4, suit notice, sent by the plaintiff to the first defendant and other circumstances, the courts also found that there is collusion between the plaintiff and the second defendant and so, Ex.A-1 purported to have been executed by the second defendant in favour of the plaintiff is not valid in law. These concurrent findings of facts of the courts below, were based on oral and documentary evidence. The learned Single Judge on reappreciating the evidence took the view that it was "not probable" that the document Ex.B-1-, "would have’ been executed on 5.6.1967 in view of the delay in the registration of the document. In second appeal, the learned single Judge of the High Court totally erred in making such an approach. Besides, the learned single Judge totally ignored the concurrent findings of the courts below that the first defendant discharged the mortgage, Ex.B-1 on 10.5.1967, took possession of the property and cultivated the same and the said finding was based on the oral evidence of DW-3, the mortgagee and independent witnesses, DW-4 and DW-5 scribe, besides the defendant, DW-6. There was no evidence contra. The concurrent findings of the court/courts below that Ex.B-2, sale deed in favour of the first defendant is earlier in point of time and was genuine and valid is a finding of fact. Such a finding was not open to any challenge in Second Appeal. The learned single Judge of the High Court totally misconceived his jurisdiction in deciding the second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the way he did. No question of law arose for consideration before the learned single Judge. The sole question that arose for consideration was, whether Ex.B2, sale deed, in favour of the first defendant dated 5.5.1967, which is admittedly earlier in point of time to Ex.A-1 dated 5.6.1967, in favour of the plaintiff is genuine and valid. Both the trial court as well as the appellate Court, rightly, in our opinion, started with dated 5.5.1967, was made on that day which is earlier to Ex.A1 dated 5.6.1967, and that there was no evidence to off set or rebut the said presumption, to hold that Ex.B-2 was not executed on 5.5.1967 as pleaded by the plaintiff. Both the trial court as well as the appellate Court, rightly, in our opinion, started with dated 5.5.1967, was made on that day which is earlier to Ex.A1 dated 5.6.1967, and that there was no evidence to off set or rebut the said presumption, to hold that Ex.B-2 was not executed on 5.5.1967 as pleaded by the plaintiff. On the other hand, according to the courts below, the evidence available in the case reinforced the aforesaid presumption and positively pointed out that Ex.B-2 was, in fact, executed, long before Ex.A-1. The High Court ignored such crucial aspects and surmised that it was "not probable" that Ex.B-2 dated 5.5.1967 would have been executed on that day in view of "the delay" in registration. The approach so made and the resultant conclusion, are totally unjustified and unsustainable in law.” In Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited vs. Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission and others, (2022) 4 SCC 657 , it has been held as under : “158. In Navaneethammal vs. Arjuna Chetty, this Court held that interference with concurrent findings of the courts below must be avoided under Section 100 CPC unless warranted by compelling reasons. In any case, this Court is not expected to reappreciate the evidence. 159. The questions of law raised by Mr. Vikas Singh, which have been set forth hereinabove in para 14, would not have a material bearing on the decision in this appeal, for the reasons discussed hereinafter.” In the instant case, apart from above, even the revenue record reflects joint ownership and possession of the parties over the suit land. These revenue entries have been admitted to be correct by the plaintiffs. There has been no challenge to the revenue entries on behalf of the plaintiffs. 5. In view of above, there is no occasion whatsoever to interfere with the concurrent findings recorded by learned Courts below in dismissing the suit filed by the appellants. Hence, I find no merit in the instant appeal and the same is dismissed, so also the pending application(s), if any.