JUDGMENT : 1. The short question that arises for our consideration in this appeal is whether an order of termination of service of a Principal of a College affiliated or associated to the University governed by the provisions of U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 (1973 Act), during or on expiry of the period of probation, could take effect without the approval of the Vice-Chancellor of the University concerned. 2. The factual matrix in the context of which the above issue arises is as follows: Kanohar Lal Post Graduate Girls College, Sharda Road, Brahampuri, Meerut (hereinafter referred to as ‘the College’) is affiliated to Chaudhary Charan Singh University, Meerut (hereinafter referred to as ‘the University’). As the post of Principal in the College was lying vacant, a requisition was sent to the Higher Education Services Commission (for short ‘the Commission’) to recommend a candidate for filling up the post. Pursuant thereto, the Director of Higher Education recommended fifth respondent for appointment on the post. In pursuance thereof, letter of appointment was issued on 22.10.2021 appointing fifth respondent as Principal of the College on probation of one year by stipulating that her service shall be subject to the service conditions prescribed by the University. On strength of the letter of appointment, the fifth respondent joined her duties as Principal of the College on 23.10.2021. On 16.10.2022, the Management of the College (the appellants herein) resolved that services of the fifth respondent would neither be confirmed nor the period of probation shall be extended on expiry of probation period of one year. Consequent to this resolution, by letter dated 21.10.2022, the appellant informed the fifth respondent that her services are not confirmed and they shall stand terminated on expiry of probation period. Against termination of her service, the fifth respondent represented to the University. The In-charge Vice-Chancellor of the University, through its letter / order dated 28.10.2022, directed that the effect and operation of the termination letter dated 21.10.2022 shall remain stayed as prior to issuance of the termination letter the matter was not reported to the University and no approval was sought as is required by section 35 (2) of the 1973 Act. Accordingly, by the said letter, the management of the College was invited to explain the circumstances in which the termination letter was issued. Accordingly, by the said letter, the management of the College was invited to explain the circumstances in which the termination letter was issued. It is this letter/order dated 28.10.2022 which was impugned in Writ A No. 19736 of 2022 filed by the appellants before the learned Single Judge. 3. Before the learned Single Judge, on behalf of the appellants, it was argued that the Vice-Chancellor is not vested with power to stay the effect and operation of the resolution, or the consequential order of termination, passed by the Committee of Management and, therefore, the order is void. Whereas, on behalf of fifth respondent it was argued that by virtue of Section 35 (2) of the 1973 Act, there could be no dispensation of service without the prior approval of the Vice-Chancellor therefore, the order terminating the services, without prior approval, was void. Thus, the order of the Vice-Chancellor impugned in the writ petition required no interference. 4. By impugned judgment and order dated 29.11.2022, the learned single Judge disposed off Writ A No. 19736 of 2022 by observing that there is no patent error in the order of the In-charge Vice-Chancellor. However, a direction was issued that if the writ petitioner files an objection to the proceedings pending before the Vice-Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor shall proceed to pass an appropriate reasoned order, in accordance with law, within a specified period, after hearing both sides. 5. Aggrieved by the order of the learned Single Judge dated 29.11.2022, the Management of the College (i.e. the writ petitioner) has filed this intra court appeal. 6. We have heard Sri Shailendra, learned senior counsel, assisted by Sri Subhanshu and Sri Abhiuday Mehrotra, for the appellants; Sri Avneesh Tripathi for the University; the learned Standing Counsel for the State of U.P.; and Sri R. K. Ojha, learned senior counsel, assisted by Sri Hemendra Kumar, for the respondent no.1. 7. Before we proceed to notice and appreciate the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties in support of their respective cases, it would be apposite for us to notice the relevant statutory provisions in the context of which those submissions have been made before us. Relevant Statutory Provisions 8. 7. Before we proceed to notice and appreciate the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties in support of their respective cases, it would be apposite for us to notice the relevant statutory provisions in the context of which those submissions have been made before us. Relevant Statutory Provisions 8. The U.P. Higher Education Services Commission Act, 1980 (for short 1980 Act) was enacted to establish a service commission for the selection of teacher for appointment to the Colleges affiliated to or recognised by a University and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Section 30 of the 1980 Act provides that the provisions of this Act, shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act, 1973 or the Statutes or Ordinances made thereunder. Section 12 of the 1980 Act provides that every appointment as a teacher of any college shall be made by the management in accordance with the provisions of this Act and every appointment made in contravention thereof shall be void. Sub-section (2) of section 12 provides that the management shall intimate the existing vacancies and the vacancies, likely to be caused during the course of the ensuing academic year, to the Director at such time and in such manner, as may be prescribed. Sub-section (3) of section 12 provides that the Director shall notify to the Commission at such time and in such manner as may be prescribed a subject wise consolidated list of vacancies intimated to him from all colleges. Sub-section (4) of section 12 provides that the manner of selection of persons for appointment to the posts of teachers of a college shall be such, as may be determined by regulations. Section 13 (1) provides that the Commission shall, as soon as possible, after the notification of vacancies to it under sub-section (3) of Section 12, hold interview of the candidates and send to the Director a list recommending such number of names of candidates found most suitable in each subject as may be, so far as practicable, twenty five per cent more than the number of vacancies in that subject. Sub-section (2) of section 13 provides that the list sent by the Commission shall be valid till the receipt of a new list from the Commission. Sub-section (2) of section 13 provides that the list sent by the Commission shall be valid till the receipt of a new list from the Commission. Sub-section (3) of section 13 provides that the Director shall having due regard in the prescribed manner, to the order of preference if any indicated by the candidates under the second proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 12, intimate to the management the name of a candidate from the list referred to in sub-section (1) for being appointed in the vacancy intimated under sub-section (2) of Section 12. Section 14 casts a duty on the management to issue appointment letter to the person whose name has been intimated within a period of one month from the date of receipt of intimation under sub-section (3) or sub-section (4) or sub-section (5) of Section 13. Sub-section (2) of section 14 provides that where the person referred to in sub-section (1) fails to join the post within the time allowed in the appointment letter or within such extended time as the management may allow in this behalf, or where such person is otherwise not available for appointment, the Director, shall on the request of the management intimate fresh name from the list sent by the Commission under sub-section (1) of Section 13 in the manner prescribed. 9. The provisions of the 1980 Act therefore deal with the selection of teachers for appointment to the Colleges affiliated to or recognised by the University, and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. They do not specifically provide for the terms and conditions of appointment of such teacher or the service conditions of the teachers. As a result thereof, the terms and conditions of appointment including termination of the services continue to be governed by the provisions of 1973 Act. Chapter VI of 1973 Act provides for appointment and condition of service of teachers and officers. The relevant provisions of section 31 of the 1973 Act with which we are concerned in this appeal read as under:- “31. Appointment of Teachers. Chapter VI of 1973 Act provides for appointment and condition of service of teachers and officers. The relevant provisions of section 31 of the 1973 Act with which we are concerned in this appeal read as under:- “31. Appointment of Teachers. -(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the teachers of the University and the teacher of an affiliated or associated college (other than a college maintained exclusively by the State Government) shall be appointed by the Executive Council or the management of the affiliated or associated college, as the case may be, on the recommendation of a Selection Committee in the manner hereinafter provided. (2) The appointment of every such teacher, Director and Principal not being an appointment under sub-section (3), shall in the first instance be on probation for one year which may be extended for a period not exceeding one year; Provided that no order of termination of service during or on the expiry of the period of probation shall be passed - (a) in the case of a teacher of the University, except by order of the Executive Council made after considering the report of the Vice-Chancellor and (unless the teacher is himself the Head of the Department), the Head of the Department concerned; (b) in the case of Principal of an affiliated or associated college, except by order of the Management; and (c) in the case of any other teacher of an affiliated or associated college, except by order of the Management made after considering the report of the Principal and (unless such teacher is the senior-most teacher of the subject), also of the senior most teacher of the subject : [Provided further that no such order of termination shall be passed except after notice to the teacher concerned giving him an opportunity of explanation in respect of the grounds on which his services are proposed to be terminated: Provided also that if a notice is given before the expiry of the period of probation or the extended period of probation, as the case may be, the period of probation shall stand extended until the final order of the Executive Council under clause (a) of the first proviso or, as the case may be, until the approval of the Vice-Chancellor under Section 35 is communicated to the teacher concerned.] ” 10. Section 35 of the 1973 Act of which reference is there in the third proviso to sub section (2) of section 31 is reproduced below:- “35. Conditions of service of teachers of affiliated or associated colleges other than those maintained by Government or local authority. -(1) Every teacher in an affiliated or associated college (other than a college maintained exclusively by the State Government) shall be appointed under a written contract which shall contain such terms and conditions as may be prescribed. The contract shall be lodged with the University and a copy thereof shall be given to the teacher concerned, and another copy thereof shall be retained by the college concerned. (2) Every decision of the Management of such college to dismiss or remove a teacher or to reduce him in rank or to punish him in any other manner shall before it is communicated to him, be reported to the Vice-Chancellor and shall not take effect unless it has been approved by the Vice-Chancellor: Provided that in the case of colleges established and administered by a minority referred to in clause (1) of Article 30 of the Constitution of India, the decision of the Management dismissing removing or reducing in rank or punishing in any other manner any teacher shall not require the approval of the Vice-Chancellor, but, shall be reported to him and unless he is satisfied that the procedure prescribed in this behalf has been followed, the decision shall not be given effect to. (3) The provisions of sub-section (2) shall also apply to any decision to terminate the services of a teacher, whether by way of punishment or otherwise but shall not apply to any termination of service on the expiry of the period for which the teacher was appointed: Provided that in the case of colleges established and administered by a minority referred to in clause (1) of Article 30 of the Constitution of India, the decision of the Management terminating the service of any teacher shall not require the approval of the Vice-Chancellor, but shall be reported to him and unless he is satisfied that the procedure prescribed in this behalf has been followed, the decision shall not be given effect to. (4) Nothing in sub-section (2) shall be deemed to apply to an order of suspension pending inquiry, but any such order may be stayed, revoked or modified by the Vice-Chancellor; Provided that in the case of colleges established and administered by a minority referred to in clause (1) of Article 30 of the Constitution of India, such order may be stayed, revoked or modified by the Vice- Chancellor only if the conditions prescribed for such suspension are not satisfied. (5) Other conditions of service of teachers of such colleges shall be such as may be prescribed.” Submissions on behalf of Appellants 11. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that sub-section (2) of Section 31 specifically provides that the appointment of a teacher, Director and Principal in the first instance shall be on probation for one year which may be extended for a period not exceeding one year. The first proviso to sub-section (2) has three clauses. Each clause deals with a separate class of teacher. Clause (a) deals with teacher of the University; clause (b) deals with the case of a Principal of an affiliated or associated College; and clause (c) deals with the case of any other teacher of an affiliated or associated College. As the three clauses of the first proviso deal with three separate class of persons, namely, (i) a teacher of the University; (ii) Principal of an affiliated or associated College; and (iii) any other teacher of an affiliated or associated College, the provisions of the second proviso that no such order of termination shall be passed except after notice to the teacher concerned giving him an opportunity of explanation in respect of the grounds on which his services are proposed to be terminated would relate to a teacher other than the Principal. Likewise, the provisions of the third proviso would apply to a teacher other than the Principal of an affiliated or an associated College. In respect of applicability of the provisions of subsection (2) read with sub section (3) of Section 35 of the 1973 Act it was argued that the same would apply only where the termination of service is by way of punishment and not termination simplicitor, because the words ‘or otherwise’ used after the word punishment would have to be interpreted ejusdem generis the word punishment. In addition to above, it was argued that the provisions of subsection (2) of Section 35 read with sub section (3) of section 35 of the 1973 Act would not in any case apply to the case of a Principal because sub-section (3) speaks of a teacher and not a Principal. 12. In light of the above submissions, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that there was no requirement of a prior approval before terminating the services of a Principal on probation, particularly, when the termination is simplicitor and not punitive. It was also argued that there being no specific provision in the 1973 Act empowering the Vice-Chancellor to stay the effect and operation of an order of termination, the order of Vice-Chancellor is void and was therefore liable to be set aside. It was argued that the learned Single Judge fell in error while holding that there was no patent error in the order of the Incharge Vice-Chancellor. 13. In addition to above, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that the Vice-Chancellor (In-charge) has stayed the effect and operation of the communication letter which was a consequence of a resolution therefore, as there is no stay on the resolution, the consequential order would remain effective. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on a Full Bench decision of this Court in P. C. Bagla (Post Graduate) College, Hathras vs. Vice-Chancellor, Agra University and another, (1980) 6 ALR 413 wherein it was held that the probationer has no right to hold a post and therefore the termination of his employment made in accordance with the terms of the contract or rules of his service does not per se amount to punishment unlike the case of a permanent and confirmed employee. Reliance has also been placed on a decision of the Apex Court in Edukanti Kistamma (dead) through Lrs. And others Vs. S. Venkatareddy (dead) through Lrs. And others, (2010) 1 SCC 756 so as to contend that where the basic order has not been questioned, the validity of consequential order is not to be examined. This decision was cited to contend that without putting a stay on the resolution, the Vice-Chancellor had no right to put in abeyance the termination letter. S. Venkatareddy (dead) through Lrs. And others, (2010) 1 SCC 756 so as to contend that where the basic order has not been questioned, the validity of consequential order is not to be examined. This decision was cited to contend that without putting a stay on the resolution, the Vice-Chancellor had no right to put in abeyance the termination letter. To buttress the submission that the words ‘or otherwise’ used in sub-section (3) of Section 35 of the 1973 Act were to be read ejusdem generis to the preceding word punishment, the learned counsel for the appellant cited a decision of the Apex Court in Kamlesh Kumar Sharma vs. Yogesh Kumar Gupta and others, 1998 (3) SCC 45 . Submissions on behalf of respondents 14. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents contended that section 2 (19) of the 1973 Act defines ‘teacher’ as follows:- “In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires ‘teacher’ in relation to the provisions of this Act except Chapter XI-A, means a person employed in a University or in an institute or in a constituent or affiliated or associated college of a University for imparting instructions or guiding or conducting research in any subject or course approved by that University and includes a Principal or Director.” 15. By relying on the above definition of the word ‘teacher’, the learned counsel for the respondents contended that section 35 falls in Chapter VI of the 1973 Act and therefore, the word ‘teacher’ used in sub-section (3) of section 35 including sub-section (2) of section 35 of the 1973 Act would include a Principal on probation hence the protection thereunder would be available to a Principal as well. It was contended on behalf of the respondents that there is no general principle that the phrase ‘or otherwise’ is to be read ejusdem generisto the preceding words. It is argued that interpretation of the words ‘or otherwise’ has to be accorded a wider meaning so as to cover all cases, whatever might be the reason, of termination. 16. It was contended on behalf of the respondents that there is no general principle that the phrase ‘or otherwise’ is to be read ejusdem generisto the preceding words. It is argued that interpretation of the words ‘or otherwise’ has to be accorded a wider meaning so as to cover all cases, whatever might be the reason, of termination. 16. In addition to above, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that under Section 13(1)(a) of the 1973 Act, the Vice-Chancellor being the Principal executive and academic officer of the University is empowered to exercise general supervision and control over the affairs of the University including the constituent colleges, the Institutes maintained by the University and colleges affiliated and associated to it. Sub-section (4) of section 13 casts a duty on the Vice-Chancellor to ensure the faithful observance of the provisions of the Act, the Statutes and Ordinance and provides that without prejudice to the powers of the Chancellor under Sections 10 and 68, he may exercise all such powers as may be necessary in that behalf. It was contended that by conferring general power of supervision and control on the Vice-Chancellor over the affairs of the University including constituent Colleges, the institutes maintained by the University and colleges affiliated or associated to it, the legislative intent is clear that the Vice-Chancellor shall ensure the faithful observance of the Act, the Statutes or the Ordinances. In light thereof, the provisions of section 35 of the 1973 Act have to be accorded wider interpretation so as to serve the purpose for which it is placed in the Act. Hence, the context in which the phrase ‘or otherwise’ is used in sub-section (3) of section 35, the same cannot be readejusdemgeneristo the word punishment. Learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on two Division Bench decisions of this Court, namely:- (a) Dr. A.P. Srivastava vs. The Committee of Management, Laxmi Narain Degree College, Sirsa, Allahabad and another, 1982 UPLBEC 25; and (b) Committee of Management Mahatama Gandhi Shanti Smarak Maha Vidyalaya, Gram Maqsoodpur, District Ghazipur Vs. Vice-Chancellor, Gorakhpur University, Gorakhpur and others, 1988 UPLBEC 526. 17. A.P. Srivastava vs. The Committee of Management, Laxmi Narain Degree College, Sirsa, Allahabad and another, 1982 UPLBEC 25; and (b) Committee of Management Mahatama Gandhi Shanti Smarak Maha Vidyalaya, Gram Maqsoodpur, District Ghazipur Vs. Vice-Chancellor, Gorakhpur University, Gorakhpur and others, 1988 UPLBEC 526. 17. In the aforesaid two decisions, the phrase ‘whether by way of punishment or otherwise’ used in sub-section (3) of Section 35 of the 1973 Act has been accorded wider interpretation as to include cases of termination of service of a teacher within the period of probation on the ground that service work and conduct was not satisfactory. The Court held that termination of services of teacher appointed on probation, without obtaining approval of the Vice-Chancellor, would be illegal. Submissions in Rejoinder 18. In his rejoinder arguments, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the above two division bench decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents are per incuriam as they fail to notice the true import of the provisions of section 31 of the 1973 Act. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 19. Before we proceed to weigh the rival submissions, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants that there is no specific power conferred on the Vice-Chancellor to stay the effect and operation of the order of termination need not detain us because, if we conclude that there can be no termination of the services of a Principal without the approval of the Vice-Chancellor, the order terminating the services would not operate till it is approved. Therefore, it would be immaterial whether the Vice-Chancellor had the power to stay its effect or not. We have, therefore, to examine, in light of the relevant provisions noticed above, whether the termination of service of a Principal of a College affiliated or associated to the University governed by the provisions of U.P. State Universities Act, 1973 (1973 Act) could take effect without the approval of the Vice-Chancellor of the University to which the College is affiliated or associated. 20. Section 2 (19) of the 1973 Act defines ‘teacher’ as follows:- “2. Definitions. 20. Section 2 (19) of the 1973 Act defines ‘teacher’ as follows:- “2. Definitions. -In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires: - (19) 'teacher' in relation to the provisions of this Act except Chapter XI-A, means a person employed in a University or in an institute or in a constituent or affiliated or associated college of a University for imparting instructions or guiding or conducting research in any subject or course approved by that University and includes a Principal or Director.” 21. From a plain reading of the definition of teacher in the 1973 Act it is clear that unless the context otherwise requires, wherever the word ‘teacher” is used in relation to the provisions of the 1973 Act, it shall, inter-alia, include a Principal of a constituent or affiliated or associated College of a University. 22. When we carefully read the provisions of section 31 of the 1973 Act, we notice that sub-section (1) of section 31 uses the word ‘teacher’ and refrains from using the word ‘principal’. It is a general provision which speaks of appointment of the teachers of the University and the teachers of an affiliated or associated college other than a college maintained exclusively by the State Government. Sub-section (2) of section 31 clarifies that the appointment of every such teacher, Director and Principal not being an appointment under sub-section (3) (note: we are not concerned with appointments under sub section (3) of section 31 as they deal with appointments on a leave or short term vacancy), shall in the first instance be on probation for one year which may be extended for a period not exceeding one year. The first proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 31 of the 1973 Act specifies the authority and the manner in which an order of termination of service, during or on the expiry of the period of probation, is to be passed. The proviso has three clauses (a) , (b) and (c). Clause (a) specifies the authority and the manner in which the services of a teacher of the University, during or on the expiry of the period of probation, could be terminated. The proviso has three clauses (a) , (b) and (c). Clause (a) specifies the authority and the manner in which the services of a teacher of the University, during or on the expiry of the period of probation, could be terminated. Clause (b) specifies the authority which could terminate the services of a Principal of an affiliated or associated College whereas Clause (c) not only specifies the authority which could terminate the services of a teacher other than the Principal of an affiliated or associated College but also suggests that no such order of termination is to be made by the management except after considering the report of the Principal and unless such teacher is the senior most teacher of the subject, also of the senior most teacher of the subject. 23. The second proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 31 provides a rider to the exercise of power of termination by stating that no such order of termination shall be passed except after notice to the teacher concerned giving him an opportunity of explanation in respect of the grounds on which his services are proposed to be terminated. 24. The third proviso clarifies that as and when a notice as contemplated by the second proviso is given before the expiry of the period of probation or the extended period of probation, the period of probation shall stand extended until the final order of the Executive Council as contemplated by Clause (a) of the first proviso or, as the case may be, until the approval of the Vice-Chancellor under Section 35 is communicated to the teacher concerned. 25. A plain construction of the aforesaid provisions would reveal that Clause (a) of the first proviso of sub-section (2) relates to a teacher of the University as per which no order of termination of service of such teacher can be passed during or on the expiry of the period except by order of the Executive Council made after considering the report of the Vice-Chancellor and, unless the teacher is himself the Head of the Department, the Head of the Department concerned. This implies that the service of a teacher of the University other than the Head of the Department, during or on the expiry of period of probation, can be terminated by an order of the Executive Council after considering the report of the Vice-Chancellor and the Head of the Department concerned. This implies that the service of a teacher of the University other than the Head of the Department, during or on the expiry of period of probation, can be terminated by an order of the Executive Council after considering the report of the Vice-Chancellor and the Head of the Department concerned. Whereas the services of such a teacher who is himself the Head of the Department, can be terminated by order of the Executive Council made after considering the report of the Vice-Chancellor. On a plain reading of clauses (b) and (c) of the first proviso we would notice that whether it is the case of a Principal or of any other teacher of an associated or affiliated College, the services can be terminated, during or on the expiry of the period of probation, by order of the management. The only distinction between the two clauses (i.e. (b) and (c)) is that when it relates to termination of a teacher other than the Principal of an affiliated or associated College, the order of the management must be after considering the report of the Principal and, if the teacher concerned is not the senior most teacher of the subject, also the report of the senior most teacher of the subject. The second proviso provides that no such order of termination shall be passed except after notice to the teacher concerned giving him an opportunity of explanation in respect of the grounds on which his services are proposed to be terminated. The third proviso clarifies that if a notice as contemplated by the second proviso is given before the expiry of the period of probation or the extended period of probation, as the case may be, the period of probation shall extend until the final order is passed by the Executive Council under clause (a) or, as the case may be, until the approval of the Vice-Chancellor under Section 35 is communicated to the teacher concerned. The use of phrase “as the case may be” in the third proviso is to indicate that where the notice as contemplated in the clause (b) of the second proviso is served on a teacher of an affiliated or associated College, the period of probation shall stand extended until the approval of the Vice-Chancellor under section 35 is communicated to the teacher concerned. Any other interpretation would render the phrase “until the approval of the Vice-Chancellor under Section 35” otiose as section 35 of the 1973 Act deals only with the conditions of service of teachers of affiliated or associated colleges other than those maintained by the Government or local authority. 26. At this stage we may note that the second and third proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 31 of the 1973 Act have been inserted by U.P. Act No. 5 of 1977. In the prefatory note – Statement of Objects and Reasons -it is stated as follows:- “With a view to removing certain difficulties experienced in the working of the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act, 1973, it has been considered expedient to make, inter alia, the following amendments in the aforesaid Act- (1)……….. (2) It has been provided that where the services of a teacher on probation are to be terminated, he should be given an opportunity of explanation in respect of the grounds on which such action is proposed to be taken (3)…… (4)……. (5) The Vice-Chancellor has been empowered to direct the management to reinstate and to pay the amount of salary to the teacher of a Degree College in case a decision of the management to dismiss or remove him or to terminate his services is not approved by the Vice-Chancellor. Such order shall be executable like a decree of the Civil Court and the amount of salary shall be recoverable as arrears of land revenue.” Thus, by insertion of the second and third proviso to sub-section (2) of the U.P. State Universities Act, 1973, the legislature has clearly exhibited its intent to control arbitrary termination of service of a teacher on probation. 27. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the second and third provisos will only relate to a teacher of an affiliated or associated College and not to the Principal thereof is not acceptable for the reason that a teacher as defined by section 2(19) of the 1973 Act includes a Principal of an affiliated or associated College. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the second and third provisos will only relate to a teacher of an affiliated or associated College and not to the Principal thereof is not acceptable for the reason that a teacher as defined by section 2(19) of the 1973 Act includes a Principal of an affiliated or associated College. According to the learned counsel for the appellant since the second and third provisos are placed below clause (c) therefore they would apply only with reference to a teacher other than a Principal is not acceptable because the first proviso deals with three separate situations as specified in clauses (a), (b) and (c). Clause (a) deals with the case of a teacher of the University; Clause (b) deals with the case of a Principal of an affiliated or associated College of the University; and Clause (c) deals with the case of any other teacher of an affiliated or associated College of the University. The requirement of placing Principal in Clause (b) and any other teacher in Clause (c) is apparent from the fact that in so far as a teacher is concerned before his termination there can be consideration of the report of the Principal and in case the teacher is not the senior most teacher of the subject, also of the senior most teacher of the subject. Such consideration cannot be there in the case of a Principal because in the hierarchy of teachers, the Principal is the highest. Therefore, by placing Principal in clause (b) and teacher in clause (c) of the first proviso, the use of the word ‘teacher’ in the second and third provisos does not express a legislative intent to deprive the Principal of the protection of the aforesaid two provisos. We, therefore, find no merit in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that second and third provisos of sub-section (2) would not apply to the case of a Principal of an affiliated or associated College, particularly, when, as per the provisions of section 2 (19) of the 1973 Act, ‘teacher’ includes a Principal. 28. We shall now deal with the issue as to whether the prior approval of the Vice-Chancellor is required for an order of termination of service to take effect even if the termination is simpliciter. 28. We shall now deal with the issue as to whether the prior approval of the Vice-Chancellor is required for an order of termination of service to take effect even if the termination is simpliciter. Sub-section (2) of section 35 provides that every decision of the management of an affiliated or associated College other than a College maintained exclusively by the State Government to dismiss or remove a teacher or to reduce him in rank or to punish him in any other manner shall before it is communicated to him, be reported to the Vice-Chancellor and shall not take effect unless it has been approved by the Vice-Chancellor. The requirement of prior approval is not there in the case of colleges established and administered by a minority referred to in clause (1) of Article 30 of the Constitution of India. Sub-section (3) of section 35 provides that the provisions of sub-section (2) shall also apply to any decision to terminate the services of a teacher, whether by way of punishment or otherwise but shall not apply to any termination of service on the expiry of the period for which the teacher was appointed. The proviso attached thereto states that the provisions of sub-section (3) shall not be applicable in the case of colleges established and administered by a minority referred to in clause (1) of Article 30 of the Constitution of India. 29. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that in the instant case the order of termination of services is non punitive and has been passed while the incumbent was on probation therefore, the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 35 would not get attracted and in so far as the provisions of sub-section (3) are concerned they would apply only to a case where the termination of the services is by way of punishment because the phrase ‘or otherwise’ should be read ‘ejusdem generis’ to the word punishment. According to him, section 31 of the 1973 Act envisages two types of termination of service during or on the expiry of the period of probation. The first is termination simpliciter where no ground need be specified and the second is termination on certain grounds wherein a notice is required to be served upon the teacher for giving him opportunity of submitting an explanation as contemplated by the second proviso to sub-section (2) of section 31. The first is termination simpliciter where no ground need be specified and the second is termination on certain grounds wherein a notice is required to be served upon the teacher for giving him opportunity of submitting an explanation as contemplated by the second proviso to sub-section (2) of section 31. To support the above submission, the learned counsel for the appellant has placed a number of decisions wherein the law has been settled that the services of a probationer can be terminated without specifying grounds of termination and without providing him an opportunity of hearing if he is not found suitable for the job and that an opportunity of hearing is to be offered only when the termination is punitive. 30. There can be no dispute to the legal proposition canvassed above but the general legal principles are always subject to statutory provisions and the rules applicable governing the service conditions. In the instant case, we have noticed the legislative intent in insertion of the second and third provisos to sub section (2) of section 31 of the 1973 Act which is to protect the teachers against arbitrary termination of their services by the management of an affiliated or associated colleges of the University. It is with that object in mind that the second and third provisos were inserted in section 31 of the 1973 Act so as to provide, vide the second proviso, that no order of termination could be passed except after notice to the teacher concerned giving him an opportunity of explanation in respect of the grounds on which his services are proposed to be terminated and, vide the third proviso, it is added that if a notice is given before the expiry of the period of probation or the extended period of probation, as the case may be, the period of probation shall stand extended until the approval of the Vice-Chancellor under Section 35 is communicated to the teacher concerned. This clearly implies that by using the phrase “by way of punishment or otherwise” section 35 (3) deals with termination simpliciter as well as punitive. 31. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the phrase ‘or otherwise’ used in sub-section (3) would have to read ejusdem generis to the word ‘punishment’ is not acceptable. The reasons are as follows: 32. 31. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the phrase ‘or otherwise’ used in sub-section (3) would have to read ejusdem generis to the word ‘punishment’ is not acceptable. The reasons are as follows: 32. The latin expression ejusdem generis is a principle of construction whereby when general words in a statutory context are flanked by restricted words, the meaning of the general words are taken to be restricted by implication with the meaning of the restricted words. This ejusdem generis principle is a facet of the principle of Noscitur a sociis. The Latin word `sociis' means `society'. Therefore, when general words are juxtaposed with specific words, general words cannot be read in isolation. Their colour and their contents are to be derived from their context. In Amar Chandra Chakraborty v. Collector of Excise, 1972 (2) SCC 442 , in paragraph 9, it was held as follows:- “The ejusdem generis rule strives to reconcile the incompatibility between specific and general words. This doctrine applies when (i) the statute contains an enumeration of specific words; (ii) the subjects, of the enumeration constitute-a class or category; (iii) that class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration; (iv) the general term follows the enumeration and (v) there is no indication of a different legislative intent.” 33. In Maharastra University of Health Sciences & others v. Satchikitsa Prasarak Mandal & others, 2010 (3) SCC 786 , the Apex Court had to decide whether in respect of unapproved teachers also the Grievances Committee constituted under Section 53 of the Maharashtra University of Health Sciences Act, 1998 would have jurisdiction to entertain complaint and undertake the statutory exercise conferred on it under Section 53 of the said Act. Section 53 of the said Act provided as follows: “53. (1) There shall be a Grievances Committee in the University to deal with the grievances of teachers and other employees of the University, Colleges, institutions and recognised institutions and to hear and settle grievances as far as may be practicable within six months, and the committee shall make a report to the Management Council. (2) It shall be lawful for the Grievances Committee to entertain and consider grievances or complaints and report to the Management Council for taking such action as it deems fit and the decisions of the Management Council on such report shall be final. (2) It shall be lawful for the Grievances Committee to entertain and consider grievances or complaints and report to the Management Council for taking such action as it deems fit and the decisions of the Management Council on such report shall be final. (3) The Grievances Committee shall consist of the following members, namely: (a) The Pro-Vice Chancellor, - Chairperson (b) Four members of the management council nominated by the Management Council from amongst themselves – Members (c) The Registrar - Member Secretary (4) The Registrar shall not have a right to vote." The provisions of section 53 was thus an enabling provision wherein the Grievances Committee in the University was empowered to deal with the grievance of the teachers and other employees of University, Colleges and recognized institutions. Interpretation of the definition clause of teacher as defined in Section 2 (35) of the above noted Act was subject matter of consideration before the Apex Court in the above case, where teachers were defined as follows:- “17.Section 2(35)of the said Act runs as under:- "2(35) "teachers" means full time approved Demonstrators, Tutors, Assistant Lecturers, Lecturers, Readers, Associate Professors, Professors and other persons teaching or giving instructions on full time basis in affiliated colleges or approved institutions in the university;” The High Court by construing the aforesaid two sections following the principle of ejusdem generis held that unapproved teachers would not be entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the Grievances Committee. Rejecting the above view, in paragraph 21, the Apex Court held as follows:- “19. If the definition of teachers, as quoted above, is properly perused it would appear that within the definition of teachers not only full time approved Demonstrators, Tutors, Assistant Lecturers, etc., are included but the definition is wide enough to include "and other persons teaching or giving instructions on full time basis in affiliated colleges or approved institutions in the university." Similarly, the Grievance Committee which is established under Section 53 of the said Act has also been given wide powers to deal with not only the grievances of teachers but also of other employees of the University, college, institution and to settle their grievances as far as may be practicable within a certain time-frame. Subsection (2) of Section 53 of the said Act provides for consequential steps which the Grievance Committee may take after entertaining the grievances of the category of persons named in Section 53(1). Subsection (2) of Section 53 of the said Act provides for consequential steps which the Grievance Committee may take after entertaining the grievances of the category of persons named in Section 53(1). Section 53(3) provides for the constitution of the Grievance Committee and Section 53(4) is procedural in nature.” 34. While holding as above, the Apex Court had the occasion to deal with the applicability of the principle of ejusdem generis. Following the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Amar Chandra Chakraborty’s case (supra), in paragraph 33 of the judgment, it was held as follows:- “…..where there is statutory indication to the contrary the definition of teacher under Section 2(35) cannot be read on the basis of ejusdem generis nor can the definition be confined to only approved teachers. If that is done, then a substantial part of the definition under Section 2(35) would become redundant. That is against the very essence of the doctrine of ejusdem generis. The purpose of this doctrine is to reconcile any incompatibility between specific and general words so that all words in a Statute can be given effect and no word becomes superfluous” 35. In Smt.Lila Vati Bai vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 521 , a Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court while rejecting the rule of ejusdem generis to interpret the words ‘orotherwise’ observed as follows:- “The rule of ejusdem generis is intended to be applied where general words have been used following particular and specific words of the same nature on the established rule of construction that the legislature presumed to use the general words in a restricted sense; that is to say, as belonging to the same genus as the particular and specific words. Such a restricted meaning has to be given to words of general import only where the context of the whole scheme of legislation requires it. But where the context and the object and mischief of the enactment do not require such restricted meaning to be attached to words of general import, it becomes the duty of the courts to give those words their plain and ordinary meaning” 36. But where the context and the object and mischief of the enactment do not require such restricted meaning to be attached to words of general import, it becomes the duty of the courts to give those words their plain and ordinary meaning” 36. Similarly, in Jage Ram & Ors vs State Of Haryana & Anr, 1971 (1) SCC 671 while interpreting the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the Apex Court, in paragraph 13 of its judgment, held:- “The ejusdem generis rule is not a rule of law but is merely a rule of construction to aid the courts to find out the true intention of the legislature. If a given provision is plain and unambiguous and the legislative intent is clear, there is no occasion to call into aid that rule.” 37. Applying the aforesaid legal principles we are of the considered view that the legislative intent for inserting second and third proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 31 of the 1973 Act was clear to accord protection to teachers against arbitrary termination of their services during or on the expiry of the period of probation. Bearing that in mind by using the phrase “by way of punishment or otherwise” the legislative intent is further strengthened as to indicate that sub-section (3) of Section 35 of the 1973 Act would apply to termination whether it is punitive or simplicier. In such circumstances the word “otherwise” would have to be given its ordinary meaning which is, in other manner; in other circumstances or in a different manner; in another way; differently in other respects(vide P. Ramanatha Aiyar Advanced Law Lexicon Edition 4,Vol.III ,Page 3443). 38. Once, we assign ordinary meaning to the words “or otherwise”, the position would be clear that, by virtue of sub section (3) to section 35, the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 35 of 1973 Act shall apply to any decision to terminate the service of a teacher whether by way of punishment or by way of termination simpliciter. We, therefore, find no good reason to take a different view than what was taken by this court in Dr. A.P. Srivastava’s case (supra) and Committee of Management Mahatama Gandhi Shanti Smarak Maha Vidyalaya’s case (supra). 39. We, therefore, find no good reason to take a different view than what was taken by this court in Dr. A.P. Srivastava’s case (supra) and Committee of Management Mahatama Gandhi Shanti Smarak Maha Vidyalaya’s case (supra). 39. In light of the discussion above, we come to the conclusion that the decision of the management of a College affiliated or associated to the University to terminate the service of a Principal or teacher of the College, during or on expiry of the period of probation, shall not take effect unless it has been approved by the Vice-Chancellor. Having held so, as we find that in the instant case the termination of the services of respondent no. 5 was communicated without approval of the Vice-Chancellor, the same could not have taken effect therefore, we do not find any good reason to interfere with the order of the Vice-Chancellor. The appeal is dismissed.