ORDER : 1. The present petition has been preferred by the petitioner challenging the order dated 19.02.2011 (Annexure-P/1) passed by the respondent No.3, whereby the petitioner, who was appointed as Officer Marketing and Recovery (Rural), has been discharged from services, and the order dated 13.09.2011 (Annexure-P/2) passed by the respondent No.2, whereby the appeal of the petitioner has also been dismissed. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was appointed as Officer Marketing and Recovery (Rural) in the State Bank of India, Bhopal vide order dated 15.11.2007 on contractual basis for a period of 2 years with a condition that if his services would be found satisfactory, the same would be renewed. Subsequently, the respondent No.1 issued a circular dated 20.07.2010 to the CGMs of Banks regarding supervision for permanent absorption of officers working on contract basis and post of OMR (Rural) was designated as Rural Marketing and Recovery Officer as well, but all of sudden vide order dated 19.02.2011 passed by the respondent No.3, the services of the petitioner were terminated, thereafter the petitioner preferred an appeal before the respondent No.2, but the same also stood dismissed, against which the present petition has been filed. 3. The reliefs sought by the petitioner are as under:- “10.1. It is prayed that this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the entire records pertaining to case of the petitioner for its kind perusal. 10.2. That, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to issue an appropriate writ quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 19/2/2011 (Annexure P/1) and order dated 13/9/2011 (Annexure P/2) being illegal and inoperative in law. 10.3. This Hon’ble Court may further kindly be pleased to issue an appropriate writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to absorb the petitioner on the post of OMR (Rural) now designated as RMRO on permanent basis in pursuance of circular dated 20/7/2010. 10.4. Any other relief/reliefs, which this Hon’ble Court may think fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, with cost of the petition, may also please be granted to the petitioner.” 4. 10.4. Any other relief/reliefs, which this Hon’ble Court may think fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, with cost of the petition, may also please be granted to the petitioner.” 4. Learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the impugned orders passed by the respondent authorities are not only bad, illegal and arbitrary but also contrary to the provisions of Rules, 20, 22 & 23 of the Conduct Rules, 2004 and no opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioner while passing the impugned orders and the orders have been passing in complete violation of Article 14, 16 & 21 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner was required to be absorbed in the services as per the circular dated 20.07.2010, but all of sudden he has been terminated on the ground that he committed irregularities in the fund, as a result of which crime was registered and after enquiry he was arrested, but no disciplinary action was initiated nor any show cause notice was ever issued to the petitioner in this regard. Therefore, the petition may kindly be allowed and the impugned orders be set aside and the petitioner be directed to be absorbed in the service in light of the circular dated 20.07.2010. Learned counsel has placed his reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rajasthan High Court vs Ved Priya and another, reported in 2020 SCC Online SC 337, Sunil Kumar Verma vs The High Court of Judicature at Jabalpur and another rendered by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Writ Appeal No.413/2006, order dated 02.05.2022, G. Yuvaraja vs State Bank of India and others rendered by the High Court of Madras in WP No.12160/2011, order dated 22.02.2017 and in the matter of Yogeshbhai Rupabhai Vatukiya vs State of Gujarat and others rendered by the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Special Civil Application No.13245/2020, order dated 26.11.2020. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the petitioner was initially appointed as Officer Marketing and Recovery (Rural) on 15.11.2007 purely on contract basis for the period of 2 years i.e. upo to 14.11.2009, although his contract period expired on 14.11.2009, he continued in service till 08.09.2010. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the petitioner was initially appointed as Officer Marketing and Recovery (Rural) on 15.11.2007 purely on contract basis for the period of 2 years i.e. upo to 14.11.2009, although his contract period expired on 14.11.2009, he continued in service till 08.09.2010. The petitioner was terminated from service for the reason that he was arrested by the Police and was kept in jail for his involvement in a fraud case at Kurud Branch. Copy of letter dated 14.09.2010 written by the Police Station Kurud to the Branch Manager, SBI Dhamtari is already annexed as Annexure-R/1. He further submits that the petitioner while working at Kurud Branch during the period 01.08.2008 to 29.07.2010, he committed serious irregularities, upon which criminal case was registered against him and he was arrested, as such the services of the petitioner were terminated, as he was not found fit and suitable to be absorbed as per Clause 4 of the State Bank of India Officers Marketing and Recovery (Rural) Service and Conduct Rules, as such the impugned orders have rightly been passed. Therefore, the petition may kindly be dismissed. Learned counsel has placed his reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Gridco Ltd. and another vs Sadananda Doloi and others, reported in 2012 AIR SCW 484, Sushil Kumar Singhal vs Regional Manager, Punjab National Bank, reported in 2010 AIR SCW 5119, in the matter of Dena Bank vs Indrajeet Singh Solanki rendered by this Court, reported in LAWS (CHH) 2017 457 and in the matter of Prashant Shrivastava vs State Bank of India and others, passed by this Court in WPS No.4858/2012, order dated 27.08.2021. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 7. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was appointed on the post of OMR (Rural), subsequently designated as RMRO, vide order dated 15.11.2007 (Annexure-P/3) on contractual basis for a period of two years. The petitioner was terminated from service on the allegation of misappropriation of funds. 7. It is not in dispute that the petitioner was appointed on the post of OMR (Rural), subsequently designated as RMRO, vide order dated 15.11.2007 (Annexure-P/3) on contractual basis for a period of two years. The petitioner was terminated from service on the allegation of misappropriation of funds. The respondents in order to substantiate their stand have filed copy of letter dated 14.09.2010 (Annexure-R/1), which is a letter written by the Police Station Kurud to the Branch Manager, SBI, Dhamtari informing arrest of the petitioner, which is as under:- ^^'kk[kk dq:n ftyk /kerjh ds vi0 dza0 245@10 /kkjk 420] 467] 468] 471] 201] 120ch] 34 Hkk0na0fo0 ds izjd.k esa Hkkjrh; LVsV cSad dq:n 'kk[kk ds vf/kdkjh Jh izeksn dqekj pansy vkSj Jh vkf'k"k 'kekZ ds fo:} i;kZIr lk{; ik;s tkus ij mDr izdj.k o /kkjk ds varxZr fnukad 8-9-10 dks le; 15-00 cts ,ao 15@25 cts fxjrkj dj ekuuh; ts,e,Qlh egks0 dq:n ds vkns'k ij ftyk /kerjh esa fu:} fd;k x;k gSA^^ 8. This Court in the matter of Prashant Shrivastava (supra) held in paras 19, 20 & 21 as under:- “19. Moral turpitude” has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary (8th Edn.,2004) as under: - "Conduct that is contrary to justice, honesty, or morality. In the area of legal ethics, offenses involving moral turpitude—such as fraud or breach of trust. Also termed moral depravity.......... ‘Moral turpitude means, in general, shameful wickedness—so extreme a departure from ordinary standards of honest, good morals, justice, or ethics as to be shocking to the moral sense of the community. It has also been defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which one person owes to another, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between people.’" 20. In the matter of Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana, the Supreme Court has observed as under:- "12. `Moral turpitude' is an expression which is used in legal as also societal parlance to describe conduct which is inherently base, vile, depraved or having any connection showing depravity." 21. In the matter of Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana, the Supreme Court has observed as under:- "12. `Moral turpitude' is an expression which is used in legal as also societal parlance to describe conduct which is inherently base, vile, depraved or having any connection showing depravity." 21. The aforesaid decision in Pawan Kumar (supra) has been considered by the Supreme Court again in the matter of Allahabad Bank and another v. Deepak Kumar Bhola5 and reliance has been placed upon the matter of Baleshwar Singh v. District Magistrate and Collector in which it has been held by the Allahabad High Court as under:- "The expression `moral turpitude' is not defined anywhere. But it means anything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. It implies depravity and wickedness of character or disposition of the person charged with the particular conduct. Every false statement made by a person may not be moral turpitude, but it would be so if it discloses vileness or depravity in the doing of any private and social duty which a person owes to his fellow men or to the society in general. If therefore the individual charged with a certain conduct owes a duty, either to another individual or to the society in general, to act in a specific manner or not to so act and he still acts contrary to it and does so knowingly, his conduct must be held to be due to vileness and depravity. It will be contrary to accepted customary rule and duty between man and man." 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Wainganga Bahuuddeshiya Vikas Sanstha and others vs Jaya and others, reported in (2019) 20 SCC 288 held in paras 10 & 11 as under:- “10. In Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences wherein, the inquiry conducted to assess the fitness of an employee for continuing on probation was not found to be punitive, the Court held as under: 21. One of the judicially evolved tests to determine whether in substance an order of termination is punitive is to see whether prior to the termination there was (a) a full-scale formal enquiry (b) into allegations involving moral turpitude or misconduct which (c) culminated in a finding of guilt. If all three factors are present the termination has been held to be punitive irrespective of the form of the termination order. If all three factors are present the termination has been held to be punitive irrespective of the form of the termination order. Conversely if any one of the three factors is missing, the termination has been upheld. 21. One of the judicially evolved tests to determine whether in substance an order of termination is punitive is to see whether prior to the termination there was (a) a full scale formal enquiry (b) into allegations involving moral turpitude or misconduct which (c) culminated in a finding of guilt. If all three factors are present the termination has been held to be punitive irrespective of the form of the termination order. Conversely, if any one of three factors is missing, the termination has been upheld. 31. Returning now to the facts of the case before us. The language used in the order of termination is that the appellant’s “work and conduct has not been found to be satisfactory” These words are almost exactly those which have been quoted in Dipti prakash Banerjee case as clearly falling within the class of non-stigmatic orders of termination. It is, therefore safe to conclude that the impugned order is not ex facie stigmatic. 32. We are also no prepared to hold that the enquiry held prior to the order of termination turned this otherwise innocuous order into one of punishment. An employer is entitled to satisfy itself as to the competence of a probationer to be confirmed in service and for this purpose satisfy itself fairly as to the truth of any allegation that may have been made about the employee. A charge-sheet merely details the allegations so that the employee may dealt hem effectively. The enquiry report in this case found nothing more against the appellant than an inability to meet the requirements for the post. None of the three factors catalogued above for holding that the termination was in substance punitive exists here.” 11. In Rajesh Kohli v. High Court of J&K again this Court held that order of termination is a fallout of unsatisfactory service adjudged on the basis of overall performance. The Court held as under: “28. In the present case, the order of termination is a fallout of his unsatisfactory service adjudged on the basis of his overall performance and the manner in which he conducted himself. The Court held as under: “28. In the present case, the order of termination is a fallout of his unsatisfactory service adjudged on the basis of his overall performance and the manner in which he conducted himself. Such satisfaction even if recorded that his service is unsatisfactory would not make the order stigmatic or punitive as sought to be submitted by the petitioner. On the basis of the aforesaid resolution, the matter was referred to the State Government for issuing necessary orders.” 10. Adverting to the facts of the present case in light of the aforesaid legal propositions, it is quite vivid from Annexure-P/1 that the petitioner was appointed for a period of 2 years on contractual basis i.e. from 15.11.2007 to 14.11.2009 and even after expiry of this period, he was allowed to continue for one more year i.e. upto 14.11.2010. The stand taken by the petitioner in his defence that before termination of his services, neither any opportunity of hearing was afforded to him nor any show cause notice was issued to him is not favourable to him, as he was not the permanent employee and was only appointed on contractual basis. Suffice it would be to take note of the fact that the petitioner was found involved in misappropriation of funds, as a result of which a criminal case was registered against him and he was also arrested, but the petitioner himself did not inform about this to his Department and the same came into knowledge of the respondent authorities after the communication was done by the concerned police station in this regard. Even otherwise, the petitioner has failed to produce any renewal order or letter which could show that his service period was extended, as such the impugned order of termination has rightly been passed. The impugned order is not stigmatic and it is purely a simple termination of contract from service and the same has not been passed in violation of any principle of natural justice. 11. The petition has no substance. It fails and is hereby dismissed accordingly. No order as to cost (s).