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2023 DIGILAW 236 (HP)

Lal Chand v. Dharam Chand

2023-04-27

SANDEEP SHARMA

body2023
JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. By way of instant petition, prayer has been made on behalf of the petitioners for initiation of the contempt proceedings against the respondents for their having willfully and intentionally disobeyed the mandate contained in order dated 17.2.2022, passed by this Court in CWP No. 719 of 2022, whereby this Court while directing the learned Additional Advocate General to have instructions ordered that till the next date of hearing, head Office building of respondent No.4 shall not be leased out/rented out. Since despite there being aforesaid order, respondent leased out the Head Office building on respondent No.4, to M/s Harsh Industries, petitioners have approached this Court in the instant proceedings for initiation of action against the respondent. 2. Pursuant to notice issued in the instant proceedings, respondent has filed reply, perusal whereof reveals that head office building of respondent No.4 was leased out/rented out to the M/s Harsh Industries on 1.3.2022, but since interim order was not extended on 28.2.2022, respondent remained under the impression that interim order dated 17.2.2022 has lost its efficacy. 3. Though learned counsel for the petitioner argued that since factum with respect to pendency of the case was very much in the knowledge of the respondent, there was no occasion for him to lease out the property in question, but there appears to be merit in the contention of the Mr. Rajiv Rai, learned counsel for the respondent that since interim order was operative till 28.2.2022 and same was not extended thereafter, there was no reason for the respondent to not to let out the premises to the third party as detailed herein above. He submits that since property in question came to be leased out to third party on 1.3.2022, no action of the respondent can be said to be contumacious. 4. This Court finds that though vide order dated 17.2.2022, court had directed the respondent to not to lease out/rent out the property in question as detailed herein above till the next date of hearing i.e. 28.2.2022, but once such order never came to be extended on 28.2.2022, respondent was not estopped from leasing out the property in question to the third party. Moreover, this court has been informed that main petition already stand disposed of, wherein directions have been issued to the Registrar Cooperative Societies to take adequate steps for winding up on its recommendations. Moreover, this court has been informed that main petition already stand disposed of, wherein directions have been issued to the Registrar Cooperative Societies to take adequate steps for winding up on its recommendations. The expression used in the impugned order “Till then” came to be dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ashok Kumar and Others v. State of Haryana and Another (2007) 3 SCC 470 , relevant paras whereof read as under : “11. The short question which arises for consideration in this appeal is as to whether the order of ad interim injunction granted by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Panipat, was operative till 09.09.1998 or 19.08.2000. We have noticed hereinbefore the nature of the orders passed by the learned Civil Judge. Although in its order dated 30.08.1997, the learned Civil Judge, used the term "In the meantime", which was repeated in its order dated 24.09.1997, but in the subsequent orders beginning from 29.11.1997, the expression used was "till then". 12. The term of the order of the learned Judge, in our opinion, does not leave any manner of doubt whatsoever that the interim order was only extended from time to time. The interim order having been extended till a particular date, the contention raised by the respondents herein that they were under a bona fide belief that the injunction order would continue till it was vacated cannot be accepted. 13. In our considered opinion, the purport of the order passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Panipat, in extending the order of injunction is absolutely clear and explicit. It may be true that the date was preponed to 28.07.1998, but from a bare perusal of the order passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, it is evident that the order of injunction was not extended. Even on the subsequent dates, the order of injunction was not extended. In fact, no order extending the period was passed nor any fresh order of injunction was passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, subsequent thereto. 14. Proviso (ii) appended to sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Act clearly debars making of any declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification issued under sub-section (1) of Section 4 after the expiry of one year from the date of publication thereof. 14. Proviso (ii) appended to sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Act clearly debars making of any declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification issued under sub-section (1) of Section 4 after the expiry of one year from the date of publication thereof. Explanation (1) appended to the said proviso, however, stipulates that in computing any of the periods referred to in the first proviso, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under Section, 4(1), is stayed by an order of a Court, shall be excluded. On a plain reading of the aforementioned provisions, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the period which is required to be excluded would be one, during which the action or proceeding taken was subjected to any order of stay passed by a competent court of law. 15. Provisions of the Act should be construed having regard to the purport and intent thereof. Section 6 of the Act is beneficent to the land owners. 16. In Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai and Others [(2005) 7 SCC 622], it was held : "29. The Act is an expropriatory legislation. This Court in State of M.P. v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma observed that in such a case the provisions of the statute should be strictly construed as it deprives a person of his land without consent. [See also Khub Chand v. State of Rajasthan and CCE v. Orient Fabrics (P) Ltd." 17. We have noticed hereinbefore that the proviso appended to subsection (1) of Section 6 is in the negative term. It is, therefore, mandatory in nature. Any declaration made after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the notification under subsection (1) of Section 4 would be void and of no effect. An enabling provision has been made by reason of the explanation appended thereto, but the same was done only for the purpose of extending the period of limitation and not for any other purpose. The purport and object of the provisions of the Act and in particular the proviso which had been inserted by act 68 of 1984 and which came into force w.e.f. 24.09.1984 must be given its full effect. The said provision was inserted for the benefit of the owners of land. The purport and object of the provisions of the Act and in particular the proviso which had been inserted by act 68 of 1984 and which came into force w.e.f. 24.09.1984 must be given its full effect. The said provision was inserted for the benefit of the owners of land. Such a statutory benefit, thus, cannot be taken away by a purported construction of an order of a court which, in our opinion, is absolutely clear and explicit.” 5. In the aforesaid judgment, Hon’ble Apex Court has held that expression used “till then” does not leave any doubt whatsoever that interim order was only extended from time to time. If impugned order is not extended beyond one particular date, it looses its efficacy. In the instant case, impugned order was passed uptill 28.2.2022 and thereafter, same was not extended. If it is so, no contempt can be said to have been committed by the respondents by leasing out the property to third party on 1.3.2022. 6. In view of the above, this Court finds no action of the respondents to be contumacious and accordingly, same is dismissed being devoid of any merits. Notice stands discharged.