ORDER : 1. Heard Mr. Anil Jain, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Sandeep Singh Shekhawat and Mr. Sandeep Pathak, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 2. The third respondent-appellant herein has preferred this intra-court appeal against the judgment and order dated 03.09.2021 of the Writ Court disposing of S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7348/2021, M/s Disha Murlipura Indane through its partner Meenakshi Shekhawat vs. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and Others. 3. The petitioner-respondent No. 3 preferred the above writ petition for quashing of the order dated 03.06.2021 passed by the Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (IOCL) suspending the supply of gas to the petitioner-firm. The petitioner-firm had preferred the above writ petition through one of its partner Meenakshi Shekhawat. In the writ petition the third respondent, the appellant herein i.e. Devendra Singh Bhati is the husband of the aforesaid partner Meenakshi Shekhawat. The aforesaid firm-M/s Disha Murlipura Indane is a partnership firm, in which both the husband and wife are partners. 4. Admittedly, a Letter of Intent for running a retail distributorship of gas was issued in the name of Meenakshi Shekhawat. She along with her husband entered into an agreement with IOCL to allow to run the said distribution agency on 50% partnership basis. Accordingly, a partnership agreement was taken on record and was accepted by the IOCL. The partnership firm was allowed to run the agency in partnership. 5. It appears that the relations of the husband and wife got strained and as such, the husband started making complaints against the wife and the partnership agency. On the basis of the said complaints, an order of suspension of the gas agency was passed on 03.06.2021 suspending the supplies of gas to the agency for a period of three months. 6. The aforesaid order of suspension of gas supply to the partnership firm was challenged by the firm through its partner Meenakshi Shekhawat. In the writ petition the third respondent-appellant was also a party, to whom initially notices were directed to be issued but when the notices could not be served, the petitioner-firm moved an application for dispensing with the service of notice upon him and the same was duly allowed. In the writ petition the third respondent-appellant was also a party, to whom initially notices were directed to be issued but when the notices could not be served, the petitioner-firm moved an application for dispensing with the service of notice upon him and the same was duly allowed. Thus, the writ petition came to be decided in the absence of the third respondent-appellant herein by the impugned order, wherein directions have been issued allowing the petitioner i.e. Meenakshi Shekhawat alone to operate the gas agency as she was the original Letter of Intent holder, subject to her submitting an undertaking that she will abide by the conditions of the agreement and maintain the accounts relating to the agency. 7. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision of the Writ Court, the third respondent-appellant herein has preferred this appeal contending that the order impugned has been passed in utter violation of the principles of natural justice and that there was no occasion for issuing the directions, as contained therein, for the reason that the order suspending the gas supply to the partnership firm had outlived its utility rendering the writ petition as infructuous. 8. In defence to the above submissions, it has been submitted that the third respondent-appellant is bent upon harassing the petitioner Meenakshi Shekhawat and is unnecessarily intermeddling with the affairs of the gas agency. He is doing so on account of strained relationship. The petitioner-firm had not claimed any relief against him and therefore, service of notice upon him was rightly dispensed with and that the Writ Court is perfectly justified in allowing the petitioner-firm or Meenakshi Shekhawat to operate the gas agency alone as she was the original Letter of Intent holder. 9. The challenge in the writ petition was admittedly to the order dated 03.06.2021 only whereby the gas supply to the partnership-firm was suspended. In the said firm, both the husband and wife were partners and the husband was arrayed as respondent No. 3 in the writ petition. Therefore, the said writ petition, in all fairness, was not liable to be decided without affording an opportunity of hearing to the third respondent-appellant. 10. It is also an admitted fact that initially notices were directed to be issued and served upon the third respondent-appellant but the service could not be completed for one reason or the other. Therefore, the said writ petition, in all fairness, was not liable to be decided without affording an opportunity of hearing to the third respondent-appellant. 10. It is also an admitted fact that initially notices were directed to be issued and served upon the third respondent-appellant but the service could not be completed for one reason or the other. Thereafter, on the application of the petitioner-firm, service of the notice upon the third respondent-appellant was dispensed with by the Court as it was alleged that the partnership-firm is not claiming any relief against him. Thus, the third respondent-appellant remained unrepresented in the writ petition. Notwithstanding with the above, the writ petition has been disposed of by the impugned order affecting the rights of the third respondent-appellant, inasmuch as the petitioner-firm i.e. Meenakshi Shekhawat alone has been allowed to operate the gas agency to the detriment of the respondent-appellant. 11. The gas agency has been granted and allowed to be run by the partnership firm and as such, one partner alone could not have been permitted to carry on its business. Moreover, no such relief was claimed in the writ petition. Therefore, it is apparent that the Writ Court went beyond the scope of the writ petition or the reliefs claimed therein in issuing the above directions, that too behind the back of the third respondent-appellant. 12. The Writ Court has accepted that the suspension of the supplies of gas to the partnership firm was for a period of three months w.e.f. 03.06.2021, which had expired on the date of the order dated 03.09.2021, thus, rendering the writ petition as infructuous for the reason that the suspension order had come to an end. It had not been extended. In such circumstances, when the petition has been rendered infructuous or the order of suspension of the gas supply has expired, there was no occasion for the Writ Court to have proceeded any further so as to issue any direction on the merits of the dispute, if any between the husband and wife. 13. It had not been extended. In such circumstances, when the petition has been rendered infructuous or the order of suspension of the gas supply has expired, there was no occasion for the Writ Court to have proceeded any further so as to issue any direction on the merits of the dispute, if any between the husband and wife. 13. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the impugned order of the Writ Court is not only violative of the principles of natural justice which has been passed adversely affecting the rights of the third respondent-appellant, but is also without jurisdiction as the Writ Court had stepped outside its limits in granting the relief or directions, which were not even claimed in the writ petition. 14. It may be worth noting that the original Letter of Intent which was in the name of Meenakshi Shekhawat stood superseded as she herself entered into an agreement with the IOCL to include her husband and to allow her to run the gas agency on 50% partnership basis, which request was duly accepted as per the agreement signed between the partners and the IOCL. In the above scenario, it was not open for the Writ Court to have permitted Meenakshi Shekhawat alone to operate the gas agency for the reason that she was the original Letter of Intent holder. 15. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion that the impugned judgment and order dated 03.09.2021 and the directions contained therein cannot be sustained in law. Accordingly the same is set aside with liberty to the parties to pursue their remedy of arbitration, or to take recourse to any other remedy, that may be available to them in law, if any fresh order of suspension of supplies to the gas agency or for cancellation of the same is passed by the IOCL, or if there is any other dispute between the partners. 16. The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.