JUDGMENT (Prayer: Original Side Appeal filed under Order XXXVI Rule 1 of Original Side Rules r/w. Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment and decree dated 03.10.2007 in C.S.No.985 of 1993 on the Original Side of this Court.) S.S. Sundar. 1. The plaintiffs in the suit in C.S.No.985 of 1993 on the Original Sideof this Court, are the appellants in the above Original Side Appeal. 2. The suit in C.S.No.985 of 1993 was originally filed bySmt.Chebrolu Thayaramma, the mother of 1st appellant and also the wife of6th appellant, for permitting her to institute the suit in forma pauperis andfor recovery of possession of plaint A-Schedule properties, after removingthe superstructure built by defendants, and to direct the 1st defendant to paya sum of Rs.14,55,000/-, the 2nd defendant to pay a sum of Rs.3,60,000/-,and the 3rd defendant to pay a sum of Rs.60,000/- as mesne profits and forfuture mesne profits. 3. During the pendency of the suit, the original plaintiff Smt.ChebroluThayaramma died and therefore, the appellants were impleaded as legalheirs of the deceased 1st plaintiff and they became plaintiffs 2 to 7 in the suitin C.S.No.985 of 1993. 4. The suit property consists of A and B Schedules. Item 1 of suit AScheduleis an extent of 2 Cawnies and 12 Grounds in R.S.No.3799 inTeynampet, within Mylapore Sub-Registration District, Chennai. Item 2 ofsuit A-Schedule is an extent of 1 Ground in R.S.No.3798/B (now inR.S.No.3798/2) in Mylapore, Chennai. 5. The case as pleaded by the original plaintiff Smt.ChebroluThayaramma, as per the plaint averments, is as follows : 5.1. The suit property described as Items 1 and 2 in A-Scheduleoriginally belonged to plaintiff''s grandfather Sri Narayanasamy Chetty. 5.2. By a deed of family settlement dated 01.02.1937 executed by SriNarayanasamy Chetty, life interest in respect of Items 1 and 2 of plaint AScheduleproperty was created in favour of father of plaintiff, namely, SriLakshmiah Chetty and vested remainder was given in favour of plaintiff.The elder brother of plaintiff''s father, by name Sri Achanna Chetty, wasnominated as Trustee of the properties for the benefit of life estate holder inthe said deed. 5.3. Plaintiff came to know that the said Sri Achanna Chetty wasremoved from the Trusteeship for alleged acts of malfeasance, misfeasanceand non-feasance. 5.3. Plaintiff came to know that the said Sri Achanna Chetty wasremoved from the Trusteeship for alleged acts of malfeasance, misfeasanceand non-feasance. Plaintiff also learnt that her father Sri Lakshmiah Chettyeffected some alienations in respect of the properties described in A-Schedule to third parties without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff.The plaintiff''s father, who is only a life estate holder, did not have any rightto alienate the properties and the rights of plaintiff had neither accrued forher to take necessary action nor the plaintiff had knowledge of suchtransactions. 5.4. The life estate holder, namely the father of plaintiff, died on14.12.1975 and from the said date, the plaintiff became the absolute ownerof the properties in terms of the family settlement deed dated 01.02.1937. 5.5. The 1st defendant is in possession of 2 Cawnies of land inR.S.No.3799 and the 2nd item of A-Schedule. From the RegistrationRecords, plaintiff learnt that the 3rd defendant is in occupation of an extentof 2 Grounds and 192 sq.ft. Another extent of 12 Grounds is in the name ofSmt.Dhanalakshmi Ammal, who purchased the said property from plaintiff''sfather Sri Lakshmiah Chetty in a Court auction. The 2nd defendant is theonly known surviving heir of Smt.Dhanalakshmi Ammal, who purchasedthe property in Court auction. 5.6. Defendants are in occupation of plaint A-Schedule properties onthe basis of a few registered documents which did not convey any right, titleor interest to the defendants, as all those alienations were made by plaintiff''sfather Sri Lakshmiah Chetty and the transactions are void and collusive innature. Since the plaintiff was not a party to the transactions, the allegedsales in favour of defendants and any other transactions are not binding onthe plaintiff. Sri Lakshmiah Chetty, the father of plaintiff, who was only alife estate holder, is not competent to alienate the property and suchalienations do not affect the title of plaintiff who is the vested remainder andthe transactions are non est in the eye of law and hence, liable to be ignored. 5.7. Under the void transactions, the defendants have madeconstructions over the plaint A-Schedule properties without the consent andknowledge of the plaintiff. Therefore, defendants are bound to deliverpossession of plaint A-Schedule properties to the plaintiff, after removingthe superstructure put up by them over the land. 5.8. 5.7. Under the void transactions, the defendants have madeconstructions over the plaint A-Schedule properties without the consent andknowledge of the plaintiff. Therefore, defendants are bound to deliverpossession of plaint A-Schedule properties to the plaintiff, after removingthe superstructure put up by them over the land. 5.8. The plaintiff addressed a letter to the 1st defendant on 10.03.1983,to which, the Secretary of 1st defendant sent a reply, dated 19.04.1993,making untenable allegations and denying the rights of plaintiff over thesuit property. 5.9. The plaintiff is therefore entitled to recovery of vacant possessionof plaint A-Schedule properties from the defendants and an order forremoval of superstructures erected by defendants in the plaint A-Scheduleproperty. The plaintiff is also entitled to mesne profits for three years beforesuit for the wrongful use and occupation of the land by the defendants. 6. Though the plaintiff filed the suit as an indigent person, it isadmitted that the application seeking permission to file the suit as anindigent person was dismissed and the plaintiff paid the Court Fee,thereafter. 7. The suit was mainly contested by the 1st defendant. Though the 1stdefendant, in the original written statement, only denied every averment inthe plaint and did not raise all the legal grounds which are germane todefend the suit regarding suit ''A'' Schedule, the additional written statementsfiled by the 1st defendant are more relevant and the allegations in the firstand second Additional written statements are specific. 8. It is the case of 1st defendant that the father of plaintiff SriLakshmiah Chetty, along with 1st plaintiff Chebrolu Thayaramma who wasthen a minor represented by her father, filed a suit in C.S.No.480 of 1948before the Original Side of this Court against the brother of plaintiff''s fatherSri Achanna Chetty for several reliefs in relation to the private Trust. Theprayer in the said suit was to remove Sri Achanna Chetty from theTrusteeship over the properties described in suit schedule and to appoint SriLakshmiah Chetty as Trustee and for the delivery of the land comprised inS.No.3999. It is further stated that the suit ended in a compromise decreebased on a compromise memo dated 22.09.1948 filed in C.S.No.480 of1948. Based on the compromise recorded, a decree was passed by orderdated 05.10.1948 in A.No.3005 of 1948. It is the case of 1st defendant that,as per the decree, an Advocate Commissioner was appointed to effectdivision by metes and bounds and demarcation of the properties includingthe suit A-Schedule. Based on the compromise recorded, a decree was passed by orderdated 05.10.1948 in A.No.3005 of 1948. It is the case of 1st defendant that,as per the decree, an Advocate Commissioner was appointed to effectdivision by metes and bounds and demarcation of the properties includingthe suit A-Schedule. Sri Lakshmiah Chetty, the father of plaintiff, filed anapplication in A.No.1745 of 1949 in C.S.No.480 of 1948 for appointment ofCommissioner for demarcation of lands and for the sale of 1st item of suit A-Schedule located in Teynampet, Chennai. It is the case of 1st defendant thatthis Court was pleased to appoint a Commissioner to sell the property inpublic auction, as there was no income from the property. 9. It is then contended by the 1st defendant that, pursuant to the orderpassed by this Court in the application for sale of lands by auction, a publicauction was held on 11.07.1949 in respect of the property described in Item1 of plaint A-Schedule and the Sale Certificate was issued to the auctionpurchaser Smt.Dhanalakshmi Ammal. It is stated that the Sale Certificatewas also registered on 05.03.1954 on the file of Sub-Registrar''s Office,T.Nagar. It is stated that the property in suit Item 1 of A-Schedule was soldin Court auction for a substantial consideration of more than Rs.30,000/-and the Court also permitted the plaintiff''s father to invest the sale proceedsby obtaining a mortgage for a sum of Rs.25,000/-. Therefore, it iscontended that the property was sold only for the benefit of minor, as thesuit A-Schedule property was not capable of giving any income. Statingthat this Court has granted permission by its order dated 14.12.1949 and thatthe sale proceeds of the land comprised in R.S.No.3799 was reinvested bythe plaintiff''s father for their benefit, it is contended that the plaintiff cannotquestion the Court auction sale after several decades. 10. It is the further case of 1st defendant that Smt. DhanalakshmiAmmal, who purchased an extent of 46 ½ Grounds by virtue of the SaleCertificate issued by this Court dated 03.01.1950, sold the entire property infavour of one Sri P.S.Swaminatha Iyer and his son for a substantial saleconsideration under a registered sale deed dated 25.02.1953. It is alsostated that the sale was confirmed by the release deed executed by husbandof Smt.Dhanalakshmi Ammal in favour of Sri P.S.Swaminatha Iyer and hisson by another registered document dated 25.02.1953. It is further stated inthe written statement that Sri P.S.Swaminatha Iyer and others havemortgaged the property on 05.03.1953. It is alsostated that the sale was confirmed by the release deed executed by husbandof Smt.Dhanalakshmi Ammal in favour of Sri P.S.Swaminatha Iyer and hisson by another registered document dated 25.02.1953. It is further stated inthe written statement that Sri P.S.Swaminatha Iyer and others havemortgaged the property on 05.03.1953. The 1st defendant claimed to havepurchased the property from the said Sri P.S.Swaminatha Iyer by way ofexchange deed dated 11.02.1954 registered as Doc.No.170 of 1954 on thefile of Sub-Registrar''s Office, T.Nagar. Thus, the 1st defendant took adefinite stand that they became the absolute owner of the suit A-Scheduleland by virtue of the exchange deed and further stated that its title isperfected. 11. It is the further case of 1st defendant that the 1st defendant aftertaking possession put up constructions immediately after the exchange deedand that the 1st defendant is running a Women''s College for more than 50years without any interference or claims from anybody. Therefore, the 1stdefendant specifically raised a plea of limitation on multiple counts. Statingthat the 1st defendant is in possession and enjoyment of suit A-Scheduleproperty for more than 50 years without any interference from anybody, the1st defendant specifically denied all the plaint averments and reiterated thatall the transactions are valid and binding on the plaintiff and that theplaintiff cannot question the transfers after a lapse of several decades. It isalso contended that the defendants are bona fide purchasers and that the saledeeds are binding on plaintiff, as the plaintiff has not sought for any prayerto set aside the alienations within the prescribed period of limitation. 1stdefendant pleaded adverse possession and contended that the suit is barredby res judicata. 12. In the second Additional written statement, the 1st defendantfurther contended that the plaintiff cannot seek delivery of vacantpossession of plaint A-Schedule properties and mesne profits without aprayer to set aside the alienations. Referring to the fact that the plaintiff waseo nominee party to the Court proceedings in C.S.No.480 of 1948, it iscontended that the plaintiff is bound by the transactions/alienations made byher father. It was pointed out by the 1st defendant that the plaintiff has noteven come forward with specific plea to set aside any of the alienations,which are not void but only voidable as per plaint allegations. It is furthercontended that the present prayer for delivery of possession without evenpaying proper Court Fee, is not maintainable. It was pointed out by the 1st defendant that the plaintiff has noteven come forward with specific plea to set aside any of the alienations,which are not void but only voidable as per plaint allegations. It is furthercontended that the present prayer for delivery of possession without evenpaying proper Court Fee, is not maintainable. Since the sale transactionswere in 1953, it is contended by the 1st defendant that the suit for recoveryof possession without a prayer to declare the alienations as void, cannot beentertained. The 1st defendant raised a plea that the plaintiff is not entitledto relief by applying the Doctrine of Acquiescence pointing out that theplaintiff and her husband had full knowledge of the transactions and atleastthe factum of huge constructions being put up by 1st defendant. It is alsocontended that the 1st defendant has invested a huge money for constructionof buildings for starting and running a Women''s College and School. 13. In the suit, a preliminary issue was raised questioning themaintainability of the suit in the absence of a prayer to set aside the saledeeds dated 22.08.1949 and 30.11.1956. The following issues were alsoframed in the suit : i. “Whether the father of the deceased first plaintiff, Lakshmiahhad the right to alienate the property described in A scheduleof the plaint and whether the alienation and subsequentalienation made by him and his successors-in-title are valid inthe eye of law ? ii. Whether the suit claim is barred by limitation ? iii.Whether the plaintiff is entitled to mesne profits as prayedfor ? iv. Whether the defendants have prescribed title by adversepossession ? v. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to delivery of vacantpossession of the property described in A schedule of the plaintafter removal of the superstructure built by the defendants ? vi. To what relief, are the plaintiffs entitled ?” 14. On the side of plaintiffs, 7th plaintiff was examined as P.W.1 andExs.P1 to P4 were marked. On the side of defendants, a Member of theExecutive Council of the 1st defendant Trust was examined as D.W.1 andExs.D1 to D19 were marked. 15. vi. To what relief, are the plaintiffs entitled ?” 14. On the side of plaintiffs, 7th plaintiff was examined as P.W.1 andExs.P1 to P4 were marked. On the side of defendants, a Member of theExecutive Council of the 1st defendant Trust was examined as D.W.1 andExs.D1 to D19 were marked. 15. Learned Single Judge of this Court, while deciding the preliminaryissue, found that the father of 1st plaintiff, for himself and on behalf of 1stplaintiff who was then a minor, filed the suit in C.S.No.480 of 1948 and thatthe suit was decreed in terms of the compromise memo, granting an ordernot only for removal of Sri Achanna Chetty from the Trusteeship, but alsofor demarcation and delivery of Items 1 and 2 of A-Schedule. LearnedSingle Judge, referring to the fact that the compromise was effected in theinterest of the plaintiff who was then a minor, upheld the consent decreeunder Ex.D4, dated 05.10.1948, passed by this Court in C.S.No.480 of 1948in terms of memo of compromise filed by both parties under Ex.D2.Learned Single Judge found that the application in A.No.1745 of 1949 inC.S.No.480 of 1948, filed by the father of plaintiff for himself and on behalfof 1st plaintiff for a direction to the Advocate Commissioner, to sell Item 1of suit A-Schedule property, is allowed on merits. Referring to the fact thatthis Court had granted permission for Court auction sale and thechronological events relating to Court auction sale, the confirmation of salein favour of Smt.Tharani Singh Gramani (Smt.Dhanalakshmi Ammal) for aconsideration of Rs.33,100/- on 19.08.1949, the Sale Certificate and thedelivery of property through Court, the learned Single Judge held that theCourt auction sale, which was held in the interest of minor in a proceedingwhere minor was eo nominee a party, cannot be questioned by the minorwithout a prayer to set aside the compromise decree or subsequentalienations. Referring to the facts that the Court auction purchaser hadalienated the property in favour of Sri P.S.Swaminatha Iyer and thesubsequent exchange deed by which the 1st defendant got title to theproperty, the learned Single Judge found that the 1st defendant became theowner of 1st item of A-Schedule by virtue of the Court auction sale. Referring to the facts that the Court auction purchaser hadalienated the property in favour of Sri P.S.Swaminatha Iyer and thesubsequent exchange deed by which the 1st defendant got title to theproperty, the learned Single Judge found that the 1st defendant became theowner of 1st item of A-Schedule by virtue of the Court auction sale. Asregards 2nd item, it is admitted that plaintiff''s father, for himself and onbehalf of plaintiff who was then a minor, sold the property to one Kesavanunder a sale deed dated 22.08.1949 marked as Ex.D15 and that the 1stdefendant has purchased the said property under subsequent sale deed dated30.11.1956 from the said Kesavan under Ex.D16. 16. Since the suit Items 1 and 2 of A-Schedule are found to be sold bythe father of plaintiff for the benefit of both the father of plaintiff and theplaintiff, who was then a minor, and the minor plaintiff was eo nomineeparty in all the proceedings and transactions, the learned Single Judge, afterreferring to several judgments, held that the plaintiff who had not chosen tochallenge the public Court auction sale as well as the private sale, lost herright by virtue of Section 27 of Limitation Act, as no suit was filed beforethe expiry of three years from the date, the plaintiff attained majority. It isalso to be noted that the plaintiff''s father, though was given life interest, thelearned Single Judge held that the plaintiff acquired vested right as on thedate of settlement deed executed by her grandfather and that therefore, theplaintiff cannot slumber over the alienations made already by her fatherignoring the vested remainder conferred on her under Ex.P1 settlementdeed. In other words, the contention of plaintiff that her right to questionthe alienations arise only after the lifetime of her father, was rejected. Sincethe 1st plaintiff was eo nominee party not only to the suit proceedings inC.S.No.480 of 1948 which culminated in the Court auction sale at theinstance of her father, but also the private sale effected by her father forhimself and on behalf of his minor daughter under Ex.D15 dated22.08.1949, the learned Single Judge held that the plaintiff cannot simplyseek for recovery of possession ignoring the transactions which are onlyvoidable and not void in nature. 17. 17. Examining the case whether the Court auction sale or private salewas for legal necessity or in the interest of minor, the learned Single Judgefound that there is no plea as to want of legal necessity in the plaint and thattherefore, it is held that the plaintiff cannot contend that the alienations arenot for legal necessity. The learned Single Judge also held that thealienations by the father, even without a legal necessity, is only voidable andnot void and therefore, the suit without a prayer to set aside the alienations,is not maintainable. It is true that the learned Single Judge held that thealienations are only voidable by referring to the provisions of HinduMinority and Guardianship Act, 1956, ignoring the fact that the said Actwas not in the Statute when the alienations were effected. 18. Further, learned Single Judge, relying upon several precedents,made a distinction between the alienations which are totally void and thealienations in the present case which are voidable which can be questionedby reversioner or minor within three years on attaining majority or on thedeath of limited estate holder. The learned Single Judge has further madedistinction between a case where the transaction can be held to be void onaccount of lack of jurisdiction or competency and a transaction which canbe characterised as irregular on the admitted facts. Though the learnedSingle Judge agreed that a judgment or decree obtained by playing fraudupon the Court is null and non-est in law and such a fraudulent decree canbe simply ignored, the learned Single Judge found that the well settledposition of law reiterated by Hon''ble Supreme Court cannot be applied inthe present case where the plaintiff has not even pleaded fraud or collusionto challenge the alienations that had taken place in 1950s. 19. After deciding the preliminary issue against the plaintiff, thelearned Single Judge did not go into the other issues and dismissed the suitholding that the suit itself is not maintainable in the absence of a prayer toset aside the sale deeds dated 22.08.1949 and 30.11.1956. 20. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the learned Single Judge,the above appeal is preferred. 21. Mr.P.J.George, learned counsel appearing for the appellants,submitted that the learned Single Judge failed to consider the fact that thesuit in the present case was filed by the life estate holder as an ordinary suitagainst the Trustee appointed by the settlor for his removal fromTrusteeship. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the learned Single Judge,the above appeal is preferred. 21. Mr.P.J.George, learned counsel appearing for the appellants,submitted that the learned Single Judge failed to consider the fact that thesuit in the present case was filed by the life estate holder as an ordinary suitagainst the Trustee appointed by the settlor for his removal fromTrusteeship. Stating that the previous suit, which was only for removal ofTrustee on the ground of misfeasance and malfeasance and for substitutionof himself as Trustee, filed by the life estate holder, was decreed on thememo of compromise filed by the plaintiff''s father, the life estate holder andhis brother, learned counsel for appellant submitted that the sale in Courtauction, is a collusive one. Learned counsel submitted that the wholeproceedings starting from the suit till the order passed in the applicationfiled by the plaintiff''s father seeking permission for the sale of property, arefraudulent and therefore, contended that fraud vitiates every solemntransaction including Court auction sale or any alienation by the life estateholder which were only to defeat the vested right of the plaintiff under thesettlement deed. 22. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants then submitted thatthe application in A.No.1745 of 1949 filed under Order XXXII Rule 12 readwith Order 13 Rule 14 of Original Side Rules on originating summons isonly used to obtain directions and therefore, the prayer for sale of propertyunder originating summons is outside the jurisdiction of Court which passedthe order. Learned counsel then submitted that the application in A.No.1745of 1949 was filed without making the plaintiff as a party, as seen fromEx.D5. Learned counsel submitted that the suit ought not to have beendismissed on the ground that it is not maintainable without a prayer to setaside the decree and orders in A.No.1745 of 1949, especially when thedirection for sale of property of the vested remainder is without jurisdictionand void. 23. Learned counsel then submitted that the learned Single Judge haserroneously held that the alienations are voidable without an application ofmind as to the irregularities pointed out by the plaintiff. Learned counselfurther submitted that the learned Single Judge has confused himself bypassing orders relying upon the provisions of Hindu Minority andGuardianship Act, 1956, which was not even in existence in 1948, whenCourt orders were passed based on a collusive compromise memo filed todefeat the right of vested remainder. Learned counselfurther submitted that the learned Single Judge has confused himself bypassing orders relying upon the provisions of Hindu Minority andGuardianship Act, 1956, which was not even in existence in 1948, whenCourt orders were passed based on a collusive compromise memo filed todefeat the right of vested remainder. Learned counsel also submitted thatthis is not a case where sale of property of minor by guardian is challenged,but about the right of a vested remainder to redeem the property which wasalienated by the Trustee by a fraudulent and collusive act without the powerof alienation. 24. Referring to Section 44 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and a fewprecedents, learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted thatfraud and collusion in obtaining a judgment vitiates not only the judgmentof Court, but also all the subsequent transactions and that therefore, the saleordered by Court in an application filed by the plaintiff''s father in a suitfiled for removal of Trustee, is without jurisdiction and that therefore, thejudgment or order in the suit and in the compromise memo and in theapplications are vitiated by fraud and collusion. Learned counsel submittedthat the Court, as a matter of policy, should set aside such fraudulenttransactions unmindful of any technicalities. In other words, learnedcounsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the order passed inA.No.1745 of 1949 granting permission for sale of property is a nullity, asthe order for sale of property is outside the purview of the suit and therefore,it is without jurisdiction. 25. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants reiterated the factthat the family settlement deed executed in 1937 creates only a life estate infavour of father of plaintiff and that the plaintiff, being the vestedremainder, gets right only after the death of plaintiff''s father. Learnedcounsel submitted that the finding of learned Single Judge that the suit isbarred by limitation is erroneous and unsustainable in law. Learned counselthen submitted that, none of the other parties in the suit appeared nor wererepresented in the previous suit and he further submitted that the memo ofcompromise marked as Ex.D3 in the suit was nothing but a diabolicalmisuse of the power of Court and abuse of process to achieve the father''sselfish needs. Learned counsel then submitted that no third party affidavit,which is mandatory for sale of property of a minor, was filed, but only bythe interested Advocate of the father. Learned counsel then submitted that no third party affidavit,which is mandatory for sale of property of a minor, was filed, but only bythe interested Advocate of the father. Learned counsel then submitted thatthe decision of the learned Single Judge dismissing the suit on thepreliminary issue is fundamentally wrong, as the Court failed to advert tothe main issues regarding collusion and fraud which vitiates the transactionas void and not voidable. 26. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants then pointed out thatthe learned Single Judge erred in applying Article 60 of Schedule toLimitation Act, instead of Article 65 which is applicable in the factualcontext. Learned counsel relied upon a few judgments of Hon''ble SupremeCourt and other High Courts to buttress his arguments that it is notnecessary to set aside a void sale and that in appropriate cases, the plaintiff,who has established fraud and collusion, need not file an independent suit toset aside the void sale. 27. However, on the other hand, Mr.S.Parthasarathy, learned SeniorCounsel appearing for the 1st respondent, submitted that Article 60 ofLimitation Act, 1963 will apply to the facts of the case and that the suit inC.S.No.985 of 1993 is clearly barred by limitation. Learned Senior Counselreferred to the chronology of events and submitted that the application inA.No.1745 of 1949 was filed by father of 1st plaintiff to sell Item 1 of suitA-Schedule property in C.S.No.985 of 1993. Since the property in Item 1 ofplaint A-Schedule was sold on public auction on 11.07.1949 pursuant to thepermission that was granted by this Court in A.No.1745 of 1949, learnedSenior Counsel submitted that, without a plea of fraud or collusion, theplaintiff cannot set at naught the alienations made several decades ago.Referring to the terms of compromise decree and several facts, learnedSenior Counsel submitted that the sale proceeds created out of sale by Courtauction was deposited to the credit of C.S.No.480 of 1948 and that out ofthe amount of deposit, all the statutory liabilities and the remuneration toAdvocate Commissioner were met. 28. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the 1st respondent alsorelied upon several precedents to substantiate that the findings of thelearned Single Judge on the preliminary issue are perfectly in order and thatthe suit as such is barred by limitation. 28. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the 1st respondent alsorelied upon several precedents to substantiate that the findings of thelearned Single Judge on the preliminary issue are perfectly in order and thatthe suit as such is barred by limitation. Though the broad proposition thatfraud vitiates every solemn transaction, is accepted by learned SeniorCounsel, referring to Order 6 Rule 4 CPC and the plaint in the present case,learned Senior Counsel submitted that the plaintiff has not even comeforward with a plea to satisfy the requirements of Order 6 Rule 4 CPC.Though the learned Senior Counsel admitted that the suit is filed within 12years from the date of cause of action, he submitted that Article 65(a) ofLimitation Act, 1963, is not applicable to the facts of the case and that theCourt auction sale and the private sales by way of registered sale deedswhich culminated in the transfer of title in favour of 1st defendant, haveextinguished the title of plaintiff. Learned Senior Counsel then submittedthat, by virtue of Articles 59 and 60 of Limitation Act, 1963, the suit whichis filed in 1983 by 1st plaintiff who attained majority in 1960 is barred bylimitation and the right to the suit property insofar as the 1st plaintiff isextinguished under Section 27 of the Limitation Act. 29. Sum and substance, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the salein favour of a stranger, who is the subsequent purchaser pursuant to a Courtauction sale, is protected and that the innocent purchaser of suit propertypursuant to the Court auction cannot be set at naught at the instance of 1stplaintiff who was eo nominee party to all the proceedings and who neverraised her little finger during the lifetime of her father. Referring to theDoctrine of Acquiescence, learned Senior Counsel further submitted that theplaintiff is not entitled to any relief by applying the equitable principles ofacquiescence. He also relied upon several judgments. 30. Having regard to the substantial arguments of learned counselappearing for the appellants and the learned Senior Counsel appearing forthe 1st respondent, this Court is required to frame the following points fordetermination : i. Whether the suit for recovery of possession is maintainable inthe absence of a prayer to set aside the Court auction sale andprivate sales pursuant to order of Court in proceedings whereminor is eo nominee party, namely on the ground of fraudwithout specific pleadings as required under Order VI Rule 4CPC ? ii. ii. Whether the father of 1st plaintiff had right to alienate theproperty in suit A-Schedule as a guardian of plaintiff ? iii. Whether the suit is barred by limitation ? iv. Whether the defendants have prescribed title by adversepossession ? v. Whether the learned Single Judge is right in dismissing the suiton the preliminary issue ? 31. Before going into the merits of the submissions, this Court has tosummarise briefly the admitted facts and events which are not incontroversy: 31.1. The suit A-Schedule properties and several other propertiesoriginally belonged to one Sri Narayanasamy Chetty. 31.2. From the plaint filed in C.S.No.480 of 1948, it is seen that the 1stplaintiff Smt.Chebrolu Thayaramma is the daughter of Sri LakshmiahChetty. Father of Sri Lakshmiah Chetty is one Sri Ramanna Chetty. Thesaid Sri Ramanna Chetty is the son of Sri Veerasamy Chetty. Therefore,grandfather of Sri Lakshmiah Chetty is Sri Veerasamy Chetty. One SriNarayanasamy Chetty is the father''s brother''s son of the said Sri VeerasamyChetty who is the grandfather of Sri Lakshmiah Chetty (the father of 1stplaintiff Smt.Chebrolu Thayaramma). Therefore, Sri Narayanasamy Chettyis not the grandfather of 1st plaintiff Smt.Chebrolu Thayaramma as projectedin the plaint, but the plaintiff''s grandfather is Sri Veerasamy Chetty. 31.3. It is admitted that, by a deed of family settlement executed on01.02.1937, Sri Narayanasamy Chetty conveyed several movable andimmovable properties belonging to him. The properties that are the subjectmatter of C.S.No.480 of 1948 belonging to Sri Narayanasamy Chetty wereconveyed in favour of the male and female heirs of Sri Lakshmiah Chetty,the father of 1st plaintiff. However, the said Sri Narayanasamy Chettyretained his absolute right over the properties set out in A-Schedule to thesaid settlement deed. 31.4. As regards the properties mentioned in Schedules B, C and D tothe said family settlement deed, Sri Lakshmiah Chetty, the father of 1stplaintiff Smt.Chebrolu Thayaramma, was given life interest and it is statedthat the properties would vest absolutely with the male and female issues ofSri Lakshmiah Chetty upon his death. It is to be noted that the property wasentrusted to the brother of Sri Lakshmiah Chetty, by name Sri AchannaChetty, in trust for the benefit of Sri Lakshmiah Chetty, to manage and paythe income of the properties in the C-Schedule to the settlement, to SriLakshmiah Chetty. 31.5. It is stated that Sri Narayanasamy Chetty died in November,1939. 31.6. It is to be noted that the property wasentrusted to the brother of Sri Lakshmiah Chetty, by name Sri AchannaChetty, in trust for the benefit of Sri Lakshmiah Chetty, to manage and paythe income of the properties in the C-Schedule to the settlement, to SriLakshmiah Chetty. 31.5. It is stated that Sri Narayanasamy Chetty died in November,1939. 31.6. As per the settlement deed executed by Sri NarayanasamyChetty, suit properties and other properties which are enumerated in CScheduleto the said family settlement deed were to be enjoyed by the saidSri Narayanasamy Chetty during his life and the properties would vest infavour of Sri Lakshmiah Chetty who is entitled to derive income from theproperties during his lifetime. After the lifetime of Sri Lakshmiah Chetty,the properties as per the settlement deed should vest absolutely in all themale or female issues of Sri Lakshmiah Chetty. It is also provided thatpossession of all the properties referred to in C-Schedule to the familysettlement deed should vest in Sri Achanna Chetty, the brother of SriLakshmiah Chetty, who should hold them in trust for the benefit of SriLakshmiah Chetty to manage and pay the income of the propertiesmentioned in C-Schedule to the settlement deed, to Sri Lakshmiah Chetty. 31.7. After the death of Sri Narayanasamy Chetty and after themarriage of Sri Lakshmiah Chetty, there appears some dispute in the familyand Sri Achanna Chetty, the brother of Sri Lakshmiah Chetty, who wasappointed as Trustee to manage the properties and supposed to pay incometo Sri Lakshmiah Chetty, neglected to pay the income nor to render theaccounts to Sri Lakshmiah Chetty. Therefore, Sri Lakshmiah Chetty and theplaintiff who was then a minor represented by Sri Lakshmiah Chetty filed asuit in C.S.No.480 of 1948 for various reliefs including the relief forremoval of Sri Achanna Chetty from the Trusteeship of the propertiesdescribed in A-Schedule. 31.8. From the Schedule of properties in C.S.No.480 of 1948, it isseen that several properties in heart of Madras City were given to SriLakshmiah Chetty and Smt.Chebrolu Thayarammal, apart from valuablejewels and properties in Alaganipadu Village in Vellore District. 31.9. The family settlement deed dated 01.02.1937 is produced asEx.P1. 31.10. Ex.P4 dated 11.08.1948 is the plaint in C.S.No.480 of 1948.The 1st plaintiff in C.S.No.480 of 1948 is Sri Lakshmiah Chetty, the fatherof Smt.Chebrolu Thayammaral, the original plaintiff in the present suit inC.S.No.985 of 1993. 31.9. The family settlement deed dated 01.02.1937 is produced asEx.P1. 31.10. Ex.P4 dated 11.08.1948 is the plaint in C.S.No.480 of 1948.The 1st plaintiff in C.S.No.480 of 1948 is Sri Lakshmiah Chetty, the fatherof Smt.Chebrolu Thayammaral, the original plaintiff in the present suit inC.S.No.985 of 1993. The 2nd plaintiff in C.S.No.480 of 1948 is none otherthan the plaintiff in the present suit. Since the plaintiff was then a minor,she was represented by her father, Sri Lakshmiah Chetty. The 1st defendantin the said suit is the brother of Sri Lakshmiah Chetty, namely Sri AchannaChetty. The 2nd defendant in the said suit is the daughter of SriNarayanasamy Chetty, the settlor who executed the settlement deed underEx.P1. The 3rd defendant in the suit is the wife of Sri Narayanasamy Chetty. 31.11. Under Ex.D2 dated 22.09.1948, a consent memo was executedby the 1st plaintiff and the 1st defendant in C.S.No.480 of 1948. The suitagainst other defendants were dismissed as withdrawn. As per thecompromise memo (memo of consent), the 1st defendant in the suit namelySri Achanna Chetty was discharged from Trusteeship without any liability toaccount. Father Sri Lakshmiah Chetty was appointed as Trustee of theproperties settled by Sri Narayanasamy Chetty in favour of Sri LakshmiahChetty and his children. Sri Achanna Chetty agreed to deliver to SriLakshmiah Chetty all the properties that were given in favour of SriLakshmiah Chetty and his children under the settlement deed and hand overall the title deeds mentioned in the Schedule to the compromise memo. Theparties also agreed for appointment of Mr.P.C.Sarangapani, Advocate, asCommissioner for the purpose of effecting division by metes and boundsand demarcation of all the items of Schedule mentioned properties whichhave to be divided and demarcated. Sri Achanna Chetty agreed to pay asum of Rs.1,100/- to Sri Lakshmiah Chetty within a month from the date ofcompromise memo in full satisfaction of all other claims against the 1stdefendant as per the suit prayers. 31.12. On 24.09.1948 under Ex.D3, the counsel for the plaintiffs inC.S.No.480 of 1948 certified that the compromise as per the terms found inthe consent memo is in the interest of minor Chebrolu Thayaramma and thatthe terms are not in any way adverse to the interest of ChebroluThayaramma who is the 2nd plaintiff in C.S.No.480 of 1948. 31.13. During the pendency of the suit in C.S.No.480 of 1948, anorder was passed in A.No.3005 of 1948 dated 05.10.1948 (marked asEx.D4) by Hon''ble Mr. 31.13. During the pendency of the suit in C.S.No.480 of 1948, anorder was passed in A.No.3005 of 1948 dated 05.10.1948 (marked asEx.D4) by Hon''ble Mr. Justice Yahya Ali, granting leave to the 1st plaintiffin C.S.No.480 of 1948 to enter into a compromise on behalf of 2nd plaintiffand a consent decree was passed based on the compromise memo. Whilerecording the compromise, the order passed in A.No.3005 of 1948 dated29.09.1948 is referred to. It is seen that the Court, while passing the order,has observed that the compromise is beneficial to the interest of minor. 31.14. Thereafter, Judges Summons in A.No.1745 of 1949 was filedunder Order XXXII Rule 12 r/w. Order XIII Rule 4 of Original Side Rulesby Sri Lakshmiah Chetty, the father of plaintiff and plaintiff represented byher father for permission to sell the lands in Teynampet, that is the landwhich is shown as Item 1 in Schedule-A, measuring 2 Cawnies and 12Grounds in R.S.No.3799 and the extent of 1 Ground in R.S.No.3798/B. Theprayer in A.No.1745 of 1949 is to direct the Advocate Commissionerappointed earlier to sell the land in Teynampet in plots or in one lot at aprice of not less than Rs.650/- a Ground and to direct the Commissioner topay the applicant therein from and out of the sale proceeds a sum ofRs.7,500/- for discharge of debts and for improving the properties premisesNos.19 and 23-A, Bheemanna Mudali Street, Mylapore, Madras.A.No.1745 of 1949 was allowed by directing the Commissioner to sell theproperty by public auction at the price already mentioned in the Schedule.The order passed in A.No.1745 of 1949 is not available and it is reportedthat the order is not traceable. However, the subsequent order passed inA.No.1745 of 1949 under Ex.D6 dated 19.08.1949 would show that the salethat was effected by public auction by the Commissioner on 11.07.1949 fora sum of Rs.33,100/- to Smt.Tharani Singh Gramani (Smt.DhanalakshmiAmmal) is confirmed and that the Commissioner was directed to collect themoney and deposit the same into the Court to the credit of the suit. 31.15. Under Ex.D7, an application was filed in A.No.3239 of 1949 bySri Lakshmiah Chetty and the plaintiff for permission to invest a sum ofRs.25,000/- out of the sale proceeds by advancing a mortgage loan to a thirdparty on the security of the Bungalow and garden to the said third party at6.25% interest after examination of title by the Advocate. 31.15. Under Ex.D7, an application was filed in A.No.3239 of 1949 bySri Lakshmiah Chetty and the plaintiff for permission to invest a sum ofRs.25,000/- out of the sale proceeds by advancing a mortgage loan to a thirdparty on the security of the Bungalow and garden to the said third party at6.25% interest after examination of title by the Advocate. Under Ex.D8dated 20.10.1949, order was passed in A.No.3239 of 1949, issuing certaindirections to the Advocate Commissioner to examine the title in respect ofthe properties owned by the proposed mortgager. The application inA.No.3239 of 1949 was allowed by order dated 14.12.1949 marked asEx.D9, by according sanction for the investment of Rs.25,000/- out of theamount deposited in Court by the Commissioner on the security ofBungalow and Garden of Door No.12, Brindavan Street, Mylapore, Madras. 31.16. On 03.01.1950 under Ex.D10, Sale Certificate in favour ofSmt.Dhanalakshmi Ammal was issued by the II Assistant Registrar on03.01.1950. 31.17. Under Ex.D11, dated 25.02.1953, a sale deed was executed bySmt.Dhanalakshmi Ammal in favour of one Sri P.S.Swaminatha Iyer inrespect of the property purchased by her in Court auction, i.e., substantialportion of Item 1 in suit A-Schedule. A release deed was also executed bythe husband of Smt.Dhanalakshmi Ammal in favour of Sri P.S.SwaminathaIyer dated 25.02.1953, which is marked as Ex.D12. 31.18. Under Ex.D13 dated 05.03.1953, Sri P.S.Swaminatha Iyer andothers who have purchased the portion of suit property, executed a mortgagedeed in favour of Vanguard Insurance Company. 31.19. Under Ex.D14 dated 11.02.1954, by a deed of exchangebetween Sri P.S.Swaminatha Iyer and three others with the 1st defendant, amajor portion of Item 1 of suit A-Schedule was transferred in favour of 1stdefendant. 31.20. Under Ex.D15 dated 22.08.1949, the father of plaintiff namelySri Lakshmiah Chetty executed a sale deed in respect of suit 2nd Item of ASchedulein favour of one Sri S.Kesavan. 31.21. Under Ex.D16 dated 30.11.1956, the 2nd Item of suit ASchedulewas sold by Sri S.Kesavan in favour of 1st defendant. 31.22. Sri Lakshmiah Chetty, the father of 1st plaintiff in C.S.No.985of 1993 died on 14.12.1975. 31.23. On 11.12.1987, the plaint in C.S.No.985 of 1993 was presentedbefore the Original Side of this Court. 32. From the facts narrated and the compromise decree based on theconsent memo as evident from Ex.D2 and Ex.D4, this Court is unable tofind any procedural irregularity. 31.22. Sri Lakshmiah Chetty, the father of 1st plaintiff in C.S.No.985of 1993 died on 14.12.1975. 31.23. On 11.12.1987, the plaint in C.S.No.985 of 1993 was presentedbefore the Original Side of this Court. 32. From the facts narrated and the compromise decree based on theconsent memo as evident from Ex.D2 and Ex.D4, this Court is unable tofind any procedural irregularity. It is by virtue of the compromise decree,the 1st plaintiff and her father have redeemed the property from the brotherof plaintiff''s father who was in enjoyment of entire property conveyed toplaintiff without paying income or rendering account. 33. The Rules of High Court of Judicature at Madras which were inforce in 1927 is brought to the notice of this Court. Rules relating to theprocedures on the Original Side of this Court includes Original Side Rules,High Court Fees Rules, Insolvency Rules, Company Rules, Madras, etc.Order XXXII of the then Original Side Rules relates to ''Guardians andWards''. Rule 1 of Order XXXII of the then Rules is relating to theproceedings under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. Rules 12 and 13 ofOrder XXXII of the then Original Side Rules read as follows : “12.An application for leave to deal with immovableproperty of a minor by way of sale, mortgage, lease orotherwise, shall state, concisely the substance of the orderprayed for; and shall be supported by the affidavit of some disinterestedand independent person, stating what, in hisopinion, is the value of the property proposed to be dealt with,and the best manner of disposing thereof in the interests of theminor, and also by the affidavit of some person, acquaintedwith the circumstances of the minor showing the necessity oradvantage of the said disposition. 13.If leave to sell is granted, the sale shall, unless theCourt otherwise orders, be made by public auction with thesanction of the Court; and the sale shall be conducted inmanner prescribed by Order XVIII of these rules.” 34. 13.If leave to sell is granted, the sale shall, unless theCourt otherwise orders, be made by public auction with thesanction of the Court; and the sale shall be conducted inmanner prescribed by Order XVIII of these rules.” 34. Learned Senior Counsel for 1st respondent relied upon Clause 17of Letters Patent conferring Jurisdiction of High Court with respect to thepersons and estate of infants, and lunatics within the Presidency of Madras.Though it is stated that the application for leave to deal with the immovableproperty of minor should be supported by the affidavit of disinterested orindependent person to the effect that the value of the property proposed tobe dealt with is in the best interest of minor, this Court cannot ignore thefact that a third party affidavit was available at the time when Court grantedpermission to sell the property of minor by public auction. Unfortunately,the order granting permission to sell the property and the connected recordsare not available and this Court is convinced that a bona fide attempt wasmade by the respondent to search all records relating to the procedure thatwas followed or the order granting leave. 35. This Court finds that a substantial consideration received by Courtauction sale has been invested to earn interest for a sum of Rs.25,000/-.Having regard to the nature of dispute as seen from the plaint in C.S.No.480of 1948 and the compromise memo, absolutely, there is no reason for thisCourt to suspect any foul play or the bona fides of the father in filing thesuit on his behalf and also on behalf of 1st plaintiff for removal of Trusteeand for taking possession of the property in the best interest of both.Absolutely, there is no connection, whatsoever, between the father and thethird party Court auction purchaser to justify an allegation of collusion. 36. The provisions under Section 44 of the Indian Evidence Act that aparty to the suit or any other proceeding may show that a judgment or anorder or a decree which is relevant under Sections 40, 41 or 42 of EvidenceAct was delivered by a Court not competent to deliver it or it was obtainedby fraud or collusion, would only show that a party to the proceeding who isadversely affected by the judgment or order can still contest that suchadverse order or decree against him has been delivered by a Court notcompetent to deliver it or on the ground that it was obtained by fraud orcollusion. Want of jurisdiction to entertain a suit or proceeding vitiates alljudicial acts of the Court. However, a decree passed by a competent courtcan only be set aside on the ground of want of jurisdiction or collusion orfraud and otherwise, the judgment will stand. 37. “Fraud” or “collusion” has been explained in several judgments ofHon''ble Supreme Court and this Court. In Bhaurao Dagdu Paralkar v.State of Maharashtra and others reported in (2005) 7 SCC 605 , the words“fraud” and “collusion” have been explained and the legal implications insetting aside an order of Court on the ground of fraud or collusion havebeen considered. Section 17 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, defines“fraud” as follows : “17.“Fraud” defined.—“Fraud” means and includesany of the following acts committed by a party to a contract,or with his connivance, or by his agent , with intent to deceiveanother party thereto of his agent, or to induce him to enterinto the contract:— (1) the suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true,by one who does not believe it to be true; (2) the active concealment of a fact by one havingknowledge or belief of the fact; (3) a promise made without any intention of performingit; (4) any other act fitted to deceive; (5) any such act or omission as the law speciallydeclares to be fraudulent. Explanation.—Mere silence as to facts likely to affect thewillingness of a person to enter into a contract is not fraud,unless the circumstances of the case are such that, regardbeing had to them, it is the duty of the person keeping silenceto speak, or unless his silence is, in itself, equivalent tospeech. Illustrations (a) A sells, by auction, to B, a horse which A knows tobe unsound. A says nothing to B about the horse’sunsoundness. This is not fraud in A. (b) B is A’s daughter and has just come of age. Here,the relation between the parties would make it A’s duty to tellB if the horse is unsound. (c) B says to A—“If you do not deny it, I shall assumethat the horse is sound.” A says nothing. Here, A’s silence isequivalent to speech. (d) A and B, being traders, enter upon a contract. A hasprivate information of a change in prices which would affectB’s willingness to proceed with the contract. A is not bound toinform B.” Therefore, fraud should always involve two elements, i.e., deceit and injuryto the person deceived. Here, A’s silence isequivalent to speech. (d) A and B, being traders, enter upon a contract. A hasprivate information of a change in prices which would affectB’s willingness to proceed with the contract. A is not bound toinform B.” Therefore, fraud should always involve two elements, i.e., deceit and injuryto the person deceived. Fraud has been defined as an act of deliberatedeception with a design of securing something by taking unfair advantage ofanother. It has been further stated in the above judgment that fraud is adeception in order to gain by another''s loss. In other words, it is a cheatingintended to get an advantage. Fraud is a conduct either by letters or wordsor by an act inducing the other to take a definite determinative stand as aresponse to the conduct of the former with an intention to deceive. Afraudulent misrepresentation is called deceit and an act of fraud or collusionor conspiracy with a view to deprive the right of other in relation to aproperty would render a transaction void ab initio. It is established thatfraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been madeknowingly, recklessly, without any belief in its truth just to deceive theperson deceived. Suppression of material documents or any other seriousfact to get an order from Court may be construed as an act of fraud onCourt. It is only in those cases where a judgment or order of Court isobtained by playing fraud, Courts have held that fraud unravels everythingby holding that no judgment or order of Court can be allowed to stand if ithas been obtained by fraud. 38. In the present case, this Court has no reason to doubt the bonafides of father Sri Lakshmiah Chetty in approaching the Court for the reliefsprayed for in C.S.No.480 of 1948. It is only by virtue of the compromisedecree, the father could retrieve the properties from his brother Sri AchannaChetty. The object behind the litigation in C.S.No.480 of 1948 is only toprotect the interest of both father and minor Chebrolu Thayaramma, the 1stplaintiff in the present suit. It is true that it is not known whether theapplication in A.No.1745 of 1949 is an application intended for the benefitof minor. Since the order in A.No.1745 of 1949 and the files relating toA.No.1745 of 1949 are not traceable, this Court cannot jump intoconclusions on the basis of mere statements without specific pleading. 39. It is true that it is not known whether theapplication in A.No.1745 of 1949 is an application intended for the benefitof minor. Since the order in A.No.1745 of 1949 and the files relating toA.No.1745 of 1949 are not traceable, this Court cannot jump intoconclusions on the basis of mere statements without specific pleading. 39. It is surprising to note that the 1st plaintiff has not even comeforward with a specific plea of fraud or collusion, satisfying the requirementof Order VI Rule 4 CPC. Order VI Rule 4 CPC requires that, whereverfraud, misrepresentation or willful default or undue influence is pleaded, theplaint should contain the particulars that are necessary to constitute such aserious allegation. Allegations of fraud must be clear, definite and specificand it has been held in several cases that general allegations of fraud,however strong the language in which they are referred to, are insufficientto constitute fraud if unaccompanied by particulars. 40. As regards fraud, there is no averment in the pleading as to howthe fraud was accomplished. In the present case, if we have to consider theplea of fraud to give rise to a cause of action, absolutely, there is no materialaverment. Not even a story has been spun to consider the probability offraud while getting an order for the sale of the 1st Item of suit A-Scheduleproperty by public auction. When there is clear evidence to show that theconsideration received by the public auction was utilised for earning interest@ 6.5% on the value of property, this Court, having regard to the moneyvalue and other factors, is unable to find any foul play or fraud ormisrepresentation. It is true that a reversioner can file a suit for recovery ofproperty alienated by a limited owner. The present suit is filed by areversioner for recovery of property alienated by her father who had limitedright, after the lifetime of father. However, the fact remains that the plaintiffhas questioned the Court proceedings and the public auction, four decadesafter the confirmation of sale. There is a presumption under Section 114 ofIndian Evidence Act that Court may presume the existence of any facthaving regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct andpublic and private business. Illustration (e) to Section 114 of Evidence Actgoes to show that every official act, if proved to have been done, can bepresumed to have been regularly done. There is a presumption under Section 114 ofIndian Evidence Act that Court may presume the existence of any facthaving regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct andpublic and private business. Illustration (e) to Section 114 of Evidence Actgoes to show that every official act, if proved to have been done, can bepresumed to have been regularly done. Though the presumption isrebuttable, it is intended to uphold every official, judicial acts rather than torender them inoperative. In the present case, the absence of any specificallegation of fraud with material particulars, this Court is unable tocountenance the submissions of learned counsel appearing for the appellantson the plea of fraud without basic material particulars being pleaded. 41. As regards collusion, a general allegation of collusion withoutinvolving parties on either side of the proceedings can be termed asincomplete. In the present case, the plaintiff can allege collusion only byshowing that her father has brought the property for Court auction for hispersonal gains in collusion with any stranger. In this case, the purchaser ofCourt auction sale is a third party and against her, there is no allegation. Insuch circumstances, the allegation of collusion does not convey anymeaning in the absence of particulars involving a third party apart fromplaintiff''s father. 42. In Embassy Hotels Private Limited v. Gajaraj and Company andothers reported in (2015) 14 SCC 316 , it has been held that judgment of acompetent Court cannot be ignored by another Court in collateralproceedings on mere suspicion of fraud or collusion. It has beenspecifically held that there must be direct challenge to alleged proceedingsof competent Court on the ground of fraud or collusion by instituting a suitor other appropriate legal proceedings and that fraud or collusion must beproved by the party alleging them. This Court is of the view that thefollowing passage of the judgment is relevant in this context : “17.No doubt, if a fraud is alleged and proved, it can besufficient to get rid of most solemn of proceedings includingcourt proceedings. But in case of order of a court of competentjurisdiction, this must be done only by throwing a directchallenge to the proceedings by instituting a suit for thatpurpose or through any appropriate legal proceeding whichmay permit such direct challenge. Judgments of courts cannotbe ignored by another court in a collateral proceeding and thatalso on mere suspicion of fraud or collusion, as has been donein this case. Judgments of courts cannotbe ignored by another court in a collateral proceeding and thatalso on mere suspicion of fraud or collusion, as has been donein this case. 18.Learned counsel for the appellant has rightly placedreliance for this purpose on paragraph 76 of a recent judgmentof this Court in the case of Union of India vs. Major S.P.Sharma, 2014 (6) SCC 351 . Paragraph 76 of the judgmentreads as follows: “76. A decision rendered by a competent courtcannot be challenged in collateral proceedings forthe reason that if it is permitted to do so therewould be ''confusion and chaos and the finality ofproceedings would cease to have any meaning''.”” 43. In the case of R.Rathnasabapathi Chettiar v. Ammakannammaland others reported in LW (1929) Vol XXX Pg.914, a Division Bench ofthis Court has held that a pleading containing charges involving anything inthe nature of fraud should be established specifically with particularsnecessary. 44. The Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case ofBishundeo Narain and another v. Seogeni Rai and others reported in AIR1951 SC 280 has made a distinction between a case where minor can neverbe able to consent and case where minor is properly represented before theCourt. It is held that in the latter case, the decree is binding on minor,unless the minor establishes fraud or collusion on the part of guardian. Inthe same judgment, the Constitution Bench has expressed the followingview on the requirement of pleadings under Order VI Rule 4 CPC in thefollowing lines : “25. It is also to be observed that no proper particularshave been furnished. Now if there is one rule which is betterestablished than any other, it is that in cases of fraud, undueinfluence and coercion, the parties pleading it must set forthfull particulars and the case can only be decided on theparticulars as laid. There can be no departure from them inevidence. General allegations are insufficient even to amountto an averment of fraud of which any court ought to take noticehowever strong the language in which they are couched maybe, and the same applies to undue influence and coercion. SeeOrder 6, rule 4, Civil Procedure Code.” 45. There can be no departure from them inevidence. General allegations are insufficient even to amountto an averment of fraud of which any court ought to take noticehowever strong the language in which they are couched maybe, and the same applies to undue influence and coercion. SeeOrder 6, rule 4, Civil Procedure Code.” 45. Again, a Three Member Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in thecase of Varanasaya Sanskrit Vishwavidyalaya and another v. RajkishoreTripathi and another reported in AIR 1977 SC 615 stresses the requirementof specific allegation of collusion implying some kind of fraud, when aCourt procedure is challenged, in the following lines : “9.We do not think it is enough to state in general termsthat there was "collusion" without more particulars. ThisCourt said in Bishundeo Narain & Anr. v. Seogeni Rai & Ors., 1951 SCR 548 (at p.556) = ( AIR 1951 SC 280 at page 283) asunder: "General allegations are insufficient even to amountto an averment of fraud of which any Ct. ought totake notice, however strong the language in whichthey are couched may be, and the same applies toundue influence and coercion". We have already set out the general allegations of allegedcollusion by which the plaintiff-respondent seemed to implysome kind of fraud. He indicated no reason for this and madeno specific allegation against any particular person.” 46. Recently, in Biraji alias Briraji and another v. Surya Pratap andothers reported in (2020) 10 SCC 729 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court hasreiterated the requirement of specific pleading and has reiterated theprinciple that no amount of evidence will help a party in the absence ofspecific pleading. It is to be pointed out that the principle that was settledby the Privy Council in Siddik Mahomed Shah v. Mt. Saran reported in AIR 1930 PC 57 (1), that no amount of evidence can be looked into upon aplea which was never put forward, has been followed and reiterated inseveral judgments of this Court and Hon'ble Supreme Court. 47. The object of pleadings and purpose of pleadings with reference tothe procedure is reiterated by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case ofBachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal and another reported in (2008) 17 SCC491 in the following lines : “12.The object and purpose of pleadings and issues is toensure that the litigants come to trial with all issues clearlydefined and to prevent cases being expanded or grounds beingshifted during trial. Its object is also to ensure that each side isfully alive to the questions that are likely to be raised orconsidered so that they may have an opportunity of placing therelevant evidence appropriate to the issues before the court forits consideration. This Court has repeatedly held that thepleadings are meant to give to each side intimation of the caseof the other so that it may be met, to enable courts to determinewhat is really at issue between the parties, and to prevent anydeviation from the course which litigation on particular causesmust take. 13.The object of issues is to identify from the pleadingsthe questions or points required to be decided by the courts soas to enable parties to let in evidence thereon. When the factsnecessary to make out a particular claim, or to seek aparticular relief, are not found in the plaint, the court cannotfocus the attention of the parties, or its own attention on thatclaim or relief, by framing an appropriate issue. As a result thedefendant does not get an opportunity to place the facts andcontentions necessary to repudiate or challenge such a claimor relief. Therefore, the court cannot, on finding that theplaintiff has not made out the case put forth by him, grantsome other relief. The question before a court is not whetherthere is some material on the basis of which some relief can begranted. The question is whether any relief can be granted,when the defendant had no opportunity to show that the reliefproposed by the court could not be granted. When there is noprayer for a particular relief and no pleadings to support sucha relief, and when defendant has no opportunity to resist oroppose such a relief, if the court considers and grants such arelief, it will lead to miscarriage of justice. Thus it is said thatno amount of evidence, on a plea that is not put forward in thepleadings, can be looked into to grant any relief.” 48. The 1st plaintiff's father, who is a limited owner, is also theguardian of 1st plaintiff and therefore, he is competent to represent the 1stplaintiff in the suit and the proceedings which culminated in the sale ofproperty. In all fairness, the 1st plaintiff has to admit that her father wasacting as her guardian to protect her and her property. Therefore, the plaintcannot be simply treated as one where a reversioner challenges the sale bythe limited owner. In all fairness, the 1st plaintiff has to admit that her father wasacting as her guardian to protect her and her property. Therefore, the plaintcannot be simply treated as one where a reversioner challenges the sale bythe limited owner. The father of 1st plaintiff, being the guardian, is entitledto represent the minor and the 1st plaintiff, who is eo nominee party to theproceedings, cannot file a suit for recovery of property merely on theallegations that her father, as a limited owner, has no right to sell theproperty. When plaintiff is eo nominee party and father Sri LakshmiahChetty has acted as a guardian to sell the property with the permission ofCourt, the 1st plaintiff cannot question the sale or alienation by her father asguardian, who acted with the permission of the Court, without even a prayerto set aside the order of Court and then to set aside both the alienations. 49. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the 1st respondent referredto Clause 17 of Letters Patent, which reads as follows : “And we do further ordain that the said High Court ofJudicature at Madras shall have the like power and authoritywith respect to the persons and estates of infants, idiots andlunatics within the Presidency of Madras, as that which is nowvested in the said High Court immediately before thepublication of these presents.” Learned Senior Counsel submitted that, by virtue of above clause, theMadras High Court is vested with parens patria jurisdiction to deal withestate of the minor. Learned Senior Counsel relied upon the judgment ofthe Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Central Potteries Ltd.,Nagpur v. State of Maharashtra and others reported in (1963) 1 SCR 166 : AIR 1966 SC 932 , wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed asfollows : “7.In this connection it should be remembered that thereis a fundamental distinction between want of jurisdiction andirregular assumption of jurisdiction, and that whereas anorder passed by an authority with respect to a matter overwhich it has no jurisdiction is a nullity and is open tocollateral attack, an order passed by an authority which hasjurisdiction over the matter, but has assumed it otherwise thanin the mode prescribed by law, is not a nullity. It may be liableto be questioned in those very proceedings, but subject to thatit is good, and not open to collateral attack. It may be liableto be questioned in those very proceedings, but subject to thatit is good, and not open to collateral attack. Therefore even ifthe proceedings for assessment were taken against a nonregistereddealer without the issue of a notice under Section10 (1) that would be a mere irregularity in the assumption ofjurisdiction and the order of assessment passed in thoseproceedings cannot be held to be Without jurisdiction and nosuit will lie for impeaching them on the ground that Section 10(1) had not been followed. This must a fortiori be so when theappellant has itself submitted to jurisdiction and made areturn. We accordingly agree with the learned Judges thateven if the registration of the appellant as a dealer underSection 8 is bad that has no effect on the validity of theproceedings taken against it under the Act and the assessmentof tax made thereunder.” Therefore, this Court is convinced that High Court had competentjurisdiction to permit sale of minor's property and the sale pursuant to theorder of Court of competent jurisdiction cannot be ignored as null and voidwithout specific averments to render the sale as null and void either on theground of fraud or collusion. The sanctity attached to a Court auction saleis stressed on a different perspective in Janak Raj v. Gurdial Singh andanother reported in AIR 1967 SC 608 , wherein, it is held as follows : “27. For the reasons already given and the decisionsnoticed, it must be held that the appellant-auction purchaserwas entitled to a confirmation of the sale notwithstanding thefact that after the holding of the sale the decree had been setaside. The policy of the Legislature seems to be that unless astranger auction-purchaser is protected against thevicissitudes of the fortunes of the suit, sales in execution wouldnot attract customers and it would be to the detriment of theinterest of the borrower and the creditor alike if sales wereallowed to be impugned merely because the decree wasultimately set aside or modified. The Code of Civil Procedureof 1908 makes ample provision for the protection of theinterest of the judgment-debtor who feels that the decree oughtnot to have been passed against him. On the facts of this case,it is difficult to see why the judgment-debtor did not take resortto the provisions of Order 21 Rule 89. The Code of Civil Procedureof 1908 makes ample provision for the protection of theinterest of the judgment-debtor who feels that the decree oughtnot to have been passed against him. On the facts of this case,it is difficult to see why the judgment-debtor did not take resortto the provisions of Order 21 Rule 89. The decree was for asmall amount and he could have easily deposited the decretalamount besides 5 per cent of the purchase money and thushave the sale set aside. For reasons which are not known to ushe did not do so.” 50.The next question is about the private sale in respect of Item 2 ofA-Schedule. We have already seen that the sale in favour of Kesavan wasby the father Sri Lakshmiah Chetty along with the 1st plaintiff, who was thena minor, represented by her father as guardian. Document Ex.D15 dated22.08.1949 is the sale deed executed by Sri Lakshmiah Chetty and ChebroluThayaramma, the 1st plaintiff represented by her father and guardian. Thesale deed honestly discloses the source of title for the vendors and refers tothe Court proceedings. It is categorically stated in the document that thevendors were in need of funds for family expenses and that absolutely thereis no income from the land described in the Schedule. It is therefore statedthat the vendors have decided to sell the land for a sum of Rs.300/- for legalnecessity. This Court cannot dwell into the issue whether the sale was forthe benefit of minor. Law is well settled that the private alienation of aguardian on behalf of minor where minor is eo nominee party cannot beignored. The suit to recover property thus alienated by guardian on behalfof minor, has to be filed within three years from the date of minor attainingmajority, with a specific prayer to set aside the sale. In the present case,under Ex.D15 dated 22.08.1949, Sri Lakshmiah Chetty and 1st plaintiffrepresented by her guardian sold the property to one Kesavan. The saidKesavan executed a sale deed under Ex.D16 dated 30.11.1956 in favour of1st defendant. It has been reiterated by Hon'ble Supreme Court that thealienations which are voidable at the instance of minor or on his behalf arerequired to be set aside before relief for possession can be obtained. Thesuit filed by 1st plaintiff without seeking prayer to set aside the sale isimproper and cannot be decreed. 51. It has been reiterated by Hon'ble Supreme Court that thealienations which are voidable at the instance of minor or on his behalf arerequired to be set aside before relief for possession can be obtained. Thesuit filed by 1st plaintiff without seeking prayer to set aside the sale isimproper and cannot be decreed. 51. In the case of Palaniappa Gounden v. Nallappa Goundan andothers reported in AIR 1951 Madras 817, this Court has held as follows : “12.An alienation by a 'de jure' or lawful guardian of theproperty of the ward in excess of his powers as a guardian istreated differently from an improper alienation by a Hinduwidow or the manager of a joint Hindu family for purposes ofthe Limitation Act. The transfer by the guardian is not void asagainst the minor, but only voidable at his instance & theminor must sue to set aside the unauthorised transfer withinthe three years limited by Article 44 or lose his title to theproperty. As I have already stated, the law regards the minor asbeing a party to the alienation through his guardian, & Article44 allows only a period of three years for setting aside thetransfer, the same period being allowed under Article 91 for aman who seeks to set aside his own deed. But, if a 'de facto'manager of a minor's estate improperly alienates his property,the alienation is one to which the minor is not a party throughhis legally authorised representative & does not require to beset aside within the period limited by Article 44. The minor cansue for recovery of possession within the period 12 yearsallowed by Article 142 or Article 144. The word 'guardian' inArticle 44 must be interpreted as meaning only a lawful or 'dejure' guardian & not as including a 'de facto' manager of theproperty of a Hindu minor, whatever be the effect of analienation by a 'de facto' guardian or manager under theHindu law.”The words “void” and “voidable” are loosely used in different contexts byseveral Courts. However, in all the judgments, it is held that a transfer by aguardian is only voidable. When a minor who also eo nominee party to thetransaction challenges a voidable transaction, there must be a specific prayerto set aside the same. 52. However, in all the judgments, it is held that a transfer by aguardian is only voidable. When a minor who also eo nominee party to thetransaction challenges a voidable transaction, there must be a specific prayerto set aside the same. 52. The Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in the case ofRameshwar Prasad v. Ram Chandra Sharma and others reported in ILR1952 Vol I Allahabad Pg.420, has ruled that a decree obtained against aminor is not void but voidable, even if the guardian appointed by the Courthas been guilty of gross negligence. 53. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants, during the course ofarguments, pointed out that the learned Single Judge relied upon theprovisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, particularlySection 8 of the Act and the judgments on the interpretation of Section 8 ofthe said Act. Stating that the alienations in the present case and the Courtauction sale was much prior to the commencement of Hindu Minority andGuardianship Act, 1956, the learned counsel submitted that the findings ofthe learned Single Judge are vitiated. This Court has reiterated the sameprinciple followed by this Court in several judgments prior to thecommencement of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. UnderSection 7 of Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, the power of Court to make anorder as to guardianship is absolute. In the present case, there is no disputethat father was appointed as a guardian of 1st plaintiff as per compromisedecree. Sections 29 and 30 of Guardians and Wards Act are relevant andtherefore, extracted hereunder: “29.Limitation of powers of guardian of property appointedor declared by the Court. Where a person other than a Collector, or than aguardian appointed by will or other instrument, has beenappointed or declared by the Court to be guardian of theproperty of a ward, he shall not, without the previouspermission of the Court,-- (a) mortgage or charge, or transfer by sale, gift,exchange or otherwise, any part of the immovable propertyof his ward, or (b) lease any part of that property for a term exceedingfive years or for any term extending more than one yearbeyond the date on which the ward will cease to be a minor. 30.Voidability of transfers made in contravention of section28 or section 29. 30.Voidability of transfers made in contravention of section28 or section 29. A disposal of immovable property by a guardian incontravention of either of the two last foregoing sections isvoidable at the instance of any other person affectedthereby.” In the present case, the transfer by sale was with the permission of Courtand the sale was by Court auction insofar as substantial portion of Item 1 ofplaint A-Schedule. Therefore, the sale is well within the power of guardianand saved. Even the private sale is only voidable and therefore, all thejudgments which are relied upon by the learned Single Judge and citedbefore this Court by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the 1strespondent hold good. 54. As regards limitation, provisions under Article 44 of LimitationAct, 1908, corresponding to Article 60 of Limitation Act, 1963, areapplicable to the facts of present case and the suit to set aside the alienationshould be filed within three years from the date of minor attaining majority. 55. In the case of Koya Ankamma v. Konaganchi Kameswarammaand others reported in ILR Vol. LIX Madras Pg.549, a Division Bench ofthis Court has applied Article 44 of Indian Limitation Act and in the saidcase similar to the present case, the Division Bench of this Court held thatthe suit which was instituted three years after the plaintiff attaining majority,though within twelve years of the alienation, is barred by limitation. 56. Same position is reiterated even earlier by a Division Bench of thisCourt in Raja Ramaswami (dead) and others v. Govindammal and othersreported in LW (1929) Vol XXIX Pg.169. It is held that a suit by transfereefrom a minor to set aside the sale made by the minor's guardian must bebrought within three years from the date of attainment of majority by theminor. 57. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants relied upon ajudgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd.v. Rajendra Singh and others reported in AIR 2000 SC 1165 , wherein, theHon'ble Supreme Court, following the maxim that “fraud and justice neverdwell together” and the observation of Lord Denning that “no judgment ofa Court, no order of a Minister can be allowed to stand if it has beenobtained by fraud, for, fraud unravels everything”, has reiterated theprinciple that Courts have inherent powers to set aside the order obtained byfraud practiced upon Court. However, this judgment has no application tothe facts of the present case, where there is no specific pleading or materialparticulars to satisfy the requirement of fraud as defined under Section 17 ofContract Act. 58. Learned counsel relied upon a judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Courtin the case of Asharfi Lal v. Smt.Koili (dead) by LRs reported in AIR 1995SC 1440 for the proposition that Section 44 of Indian Evidence Act wouldbe attracted if fraud or collusion against the decree obtained against theminor is proved. However, on a careful reading of the said judgment,Section 44 will be attracted only if inference of fraud or collusion could bedrawn from gross negligence. Though it is permissible for a minor to avoida judgment or decree by invoking Section 44 without taking resort to aseparate suit for setting aside the decree or judgment if a judgment isvitiated by fraud, only when an inference can be drawn from the grossnegligence on the part of guardian of the minor in conducting the earliersuit, it may be possible in a collateral proceeding to avoid a decree of aCourt alleged to have been obtained by fraud or collusion. In the presentcase, absolutely there is no plea or material particulars so as to infer that thedecree or order or transfer was obtained by fraud as defined under Section17 of the Indian Contract Act. 59. Learned counsel relied upon another judgment of Hon'ble SupremeCourt in Gram Panchayat of Village Naulakha v. Ujagar Singh and othersreported in AIR 2000 SC 3272 for the proposition that a decree obtained bycollusion would not operate as res judicata and that filing of separate suitfor declaration that the decree was collusive is not a condition precedent forraising such a plea. The said judgment cannot be applied in the factualmatrix of this case, where there is neither particulars to constitute a plea offraud nor an allegation against a person to accomplish collusion. 60. Similarly, the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court relied upon bythe learned counsel appearing for the appellants in S.P.ChengalvararayaNaidu (dead) by LRs v. Jagannath (dead) by LRs and others reported in AIR 1994 SC 853 cannot be applied in the present case. It is true that theHon'ble Supreme Court, in the said case, has considered the act of fraud bya litigant withholding vital document relevant to the litigation. It is true that theHon'ble Supreme Court, in the said case, has considered the act of fraud bya litigant withholding vital document relevant to the litigation. Finding thatthe conduct amounts to fraud on Court, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that alitigant obtaining preliminary decree for partition of property withoutmentioning as to his having executed a release deed before filing of suit infavour of his employer should be thrown out as the decree is vitiated byfraud. However, the said judgment is not applicable to the facts of the caseon hand. 61. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants relied upon ajudgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Official Trustee, WestBengal and others v. Sachindra Nath Chatterjee and others reported in AIR 1969 SC 823 for the proposition that an order which is outside thejurisdiction of Court is not merely a wrong order or illegal order but it is anorder which the Court had no competence to make. The Hon'ble SupremeCourt, in the said case, has held that an order without jurisdiction orcompetence is a void order. This Court is unable to understand how the saidjudgment is relevant to the present case, where the order was obtained on anapplication in exercise of the power conferred on the Original Side of thisCourt in terms of Original Side Rules. 62. Learned counsel then relied upon a judgment of Hon'ble SupremeCourt in the case of Ashok Kumar Kapur and others v. Ashok Khanna andothers reported in 2007 All SCR 1300, wherein, it is held as follows : “22.The provisions of Section 34 of the Act must begiven its literal meaning. The court cannot exercise ajurisdiction which is not vested in it. A court can exercisejurisdiction, provided it is vested therewith. An order withoutjurisdiction over the subject-matter would render the decisiona nullity.” Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the said case where the learned Single Judge andDivision Bench of High Court refused to exercise their discretionaryjurisdiction under Section 34 of Indian Trusts Act, 1882 on the ground thatit had no jurisdiction to entertain application under Section 34 of IndianTrusts Act, confirmed the order of High Court holding that the jurisdictionof Court in relation to the subject matter is limited and that the decisionrendered by it would be nullity if it does not fall within the limitedjurisdiction. The general dictum that principle of res judicata will have noapplication to such order without jurisdiction, cannot be applied in thepresent case where the facts are entirely different. 63. Similarly, the judgment relied upon by the learned counselappearing for the appellants in the case of Chief Justice of A.P. andanother v. L.V.A.Dikshitulu and others reported in 1979 AIR SC 193 hasno application to the facts of this case. 64. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants also relied upon ajudgment of this Court in the case of A.Venkatesan v. Padmavathi andothers [S.A.No.1396 of 2001, dated 12.01.2018], where, this Court hasobserved as follows : “26.In the light of the above discussions, it is found thatthe suit laid by the plaintiff is not barred by limitation and it isfurther found that the claim of the defendants that they hadperfected title to the suit property by adverse possession, assuch, cannot be accepted and also found to be not establishedas the suit had been laid by the plaintiff within the periodallowed by law, from the date on which she is entitled to makeclaim to the suit property. It is further found that the executionof Exs.A2/B12 would not in any manner revoke or cancel thesettlement deed Exs.A1/B10 and Exs.A2/B12 having beenexecuted by the person having no right in the suit property andis invalid and the settlee under the said document could notacquire any valid title to the suit property so as to defeat theright of the plaintiff. It is further seen that Ex.A2 cannot betermed as a family arrangement, as rightly determined by thefirst appellate Court and it is further seen that Ex.B26,settlement Will, claimed to have been executed by GovindarajIyengar, being only a life estate holder, would not in anymanner affect the plaintiff's vested remainder right over thesuit property and therefore, it is seen that the same is also notvalid and binding upon the plaintiff. Accordingly, thesubstantial questions of law formulated in this second appealare answered in favour of the plaintiff and against thedefendants.” It has been specifically held by this Court that the plaintiff is not a party toEx.A2 nor even eo nominee party to the same. Therefore, it is held that it isnot necessary for the plaintiff to seek cancellation of the document. Accordingly, thesubstantial questions of law formulated in this second appealare answered in favour of the plaintiff and against thedefendants.” It has been specifically held by this Court that the plaintiff is not a party toEx.A2 nor even eo nominee party to the same. Therefore, it is held that it isnot necessary for the plaintiff to seek cancellation of the document. Thesame is not the position here, where the plaintiff is eo nominee party notonly to the Court proceedings, but also to the private sale that was effectedby the 1st plaintiff's father as guardian of 1st plaintiff. 65. In view of the conclusions which we have reached on the analysisof overall facts and issues, precedents relied upon by both the sides, thisCourt finds that the suit in C.S.No.985 of 1993 for recovery of possession isnot maintainable in the absence of a prayer to set aside the Court auctionsale and private sales, in favour of defendants, on the ground of fraud, andthe suit is also barred by limitation. Under Section 27 of Limitation Act, theright of plaintiff is extinguished. Therefore, the learned Single Judge isright in deciding the preliminary issue as against the plaintiff and dismissingthe suit. This Court also finds that the father of 1st plaintiff had every rightto alienate the property in suit A-Schedule as a guardian of 1st plaintiff, andtherefore, the alienations made by the father of plaintiff are saved.Accordingly, all the points raised in this Appeal are answered againstthe appellants/plaintiffs. 66. As a result, this Court finds no merit in this appeal and hence, thisOriginal Side Appeal is dismissed with costs.