JUDGMENT : 1. The record of the case would demonstrate how a low paid employee becomes victim of ego of higher officers which is nonetheless the Collector of the District. 2. The petitioner has filed this writ petition with prayer that he be paid salary for the period during suspension and 50% of back wages as awarded by this Court in WPS No. 4583/2013 while setting aside the termination order on 27.10.2014. The petitioner has also assailed order dated 05.2.2018 (Annexure P/7) by which the petitioner’s representation for grant of wages has been rejected by wrongly applying principle “no work no pay”. 3. The brief facts as reflected from the petition are that the petitioner was appointed as a Daily Wager in the office of Joint Director, Panchayat and Social Welfare Deipartment in the year 1980. Later on, his services were regularized by order dated 08.01.1997 and the petitioner completed probation period on 10.01.2004 as such he was confirmed employee. On 25.04.2008, petitioner was placed under suspension by the Collector, charge-sheet was also issued on 01.04.2008. Later on services of the petitioner were terminated by order dated 09.08.2010 by the Collector (Respondent No.3). The petitioner has challenged the said termination of service on the count that Collector is not competent to terminate the services of employees of Panchayat and Welafare Department in WPS No. 4583/2010. WPS No. 4583/2010 was allowed on 06.08.2013 by this Court and following order was passed:- 10. The approval of the order of the Collector is also of no consequence The Director, no doubt is an appellate authority but he cannot act as a disciplinary authority. The power conferred under the rules has to be exercised strictly in accordance with the provisions of the rules. An order passed by an incompetent authority can neither be validated nor approved By the appellate authority. In other words, an order, which is void at its inception, cannot be validated by subsequent approval. 11. I, however, find that by virtue of delegation as disciplinary authority competent to impose minor penalty, the Collector is one of the disciplinary authorities. Therefore, his order, appointing enquiry officer and presenting officer, cannot be said to be without jurisdiction and authority of law. This power could have been exercised by the Collector by virtue of being a disciplinary authority under Rule 13 of the Rules of 1966. Therefore, his order, appointing enquiry officer and presenting officer, cannot be said to be without jurisdiction and authority of law. This power could have been exercised by the Collector by virtue of being a disciplinary authority under Rule 13 of the Rules of 1966. However, major penalty could not be imposed by the Collector. 12. In the result, the impugned order is declared illegal and without competence and set aside. It would however be open for the competent authority to take action in accordance with law. The petitioner is directed to be reinstated in service in accordance with law. If the competent authority does not take any steps towards disciplinary action of petitioner within a period of three months from the date of receipt of copy of the order, the petitioner shall be entitled to 50% of the back wages. 4. The petitioner in view of order dated 06.08.2013 submitted his joining before the respondent No. 4. On 27.10.2014 an order was issued by respondent No. 3 posting the petitioner and reinstating him. Petitioner was posted on lowest scale of pay i.e. 4750-7440 with grade pay of 1300/-. In the same order ignoring the order of this Court the Collector (respondent No.3) has directed for non-payment of salary and allowances applying “no work no pay”. 5. The petitioner filed a contempt application for payment of 50% of back wages and other wages which was registered as contempt case (civil) No. 35/2014 and was decided on 15.04.2015 by following order:- “Be that as it may, the petitioner is directed to make suitable representation to the Collector, Koria stating that the order has been partly complied with. However, the respondents/contemnor would be free to pass order on the petitioner's representation in accordance with law. ” 6. The petitioner submitted representation on 08.07.2015 but the same was not considered and the petitioner was not paid any salary which compelled him again to knock the doors of this Court for his grievance by filing one more contempt application as Contempt Case No. 464/2015 which was decided on 11.12.2015 and the following order was passed:- “2. Learned counsel for respondents submits that there is no intention to flout the order of the Court. Learned counsel for respondents submits that there is no intention to flout the order of the Court. The respondents had decided to file writ appeal, which was also filed, then waited for decision and after writ appeal was dismissed by the Court on 31-07-2014, the petitioner has been reinstated on 27-10-2014. He also submits that the petitioner may raise this issue in pending writ petition. 3. Considering the submission of learned counsel for parties, particularly taking into consideration that claim for salary is for the period subsequent to passing of order by this Court, the petitioner would be at liberty to claim salary in the pending writ petition.” 7. The petitioner made various representations to the respondent No. 3 but his grievances were not resolved as no salary was paid to him. The respondent No. 3 finally passed an order on 05.02.2018 declaring that the petitioner is not entitled for salary and allowance for the period during suspension and even after termination ignoring the direction given by this Court. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that despite the suspension of the petitioner and the termination has been set aside by this Court vide order dated 27.10.2014, denial of salary to the petitioner by the respondents even after specific direction for grant of 50% back wages suffers from arbitrariness and malafide. 9. Learned counsel for the State would submit that vide circular dated 21.06.1999 the Collector is empowered to impose major penalty to Class-IV employees, therefore, the order has been passed in accordance with law. He would further submit that since the disciplinary proceeding was initiated by virtue of the order dated 06.08.2013 passed by this Court in Writ Petition (S) No. 4583/2010, therefore, the act of the respondents is in accordance with law and would pray for dismissal of the writ petition. 10. The service condition of the petitioner is governed by the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966. Rule 8 deals with Appointments to other service and posts and Rule 24 deals with Appellate authorities. Rule 8 and 24 are extracted below:- 8. Appointments to other service and posts which - All appointments to the State Civil Services Class III and Class IV, shall be made by the authorities specified in this behalf in the Schedule. 24. Appellate authorities. Rule 8 and 24 are extracted below:- 8. Appointments to other service and posts which - All appointments to the State Civil Services Class III and Class IV, shall be made by the authorities specified in this behalf in the Schedule. 24. Appellate authorities. - (1) A Government servant including a person who has ceased to be in Government service, may prefer an appeal against all or any of the orders specified in Rule 23 to the authority specified in his behalf either in Schedule or by a general or special order of the Governor or, where no such authority is specified ; (i) where such Government servant is or was a member of a State Civil Service Class I or Class II or holder of a State Civil Post, Class I or Class (a) to the appointing authority, where the order appealed against is made by an authority subordinate to it; or (b) to the Governor, where such order is made by any other authority, where such Government servant is or was a member of a State Civil Service Class III or Class IV or holder of a State Civil Post, Class III or Class IV, to the authority to which the authority making the order appealed against is immediately subordinate. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1),- (i) an appeal against an order in a common proceeding held under Rule 18 shall lie to the authority to which the authority functioning as the disciplinary authority for the purpose of. that proceeding is immediately subordinate; (ii) where the person who made the order appealed against becomes by virtue of his subsequent appointment or otherwise, the appellate authority in respect of such order, an appeal against such order shall lie to the authority to which such person is immediately subordinate. 11. As per the Schedule annexed with Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules the petitioner is working as Class IV employee with the Panchayat and Social Welfare Department his appointing authority is Dy. Director, Panchayat as defined in Rule 24 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. Thus, Collector has not been given power to appoint the petitioner or to take disciplinary action. These Rules have been made under Article 309 of the Constitution of India which has overriding effect. Director, Panchayat as defined in Rule 24 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. Thus, Collector has not been given power to appoint the petitioner or to take disciplinary action. These Rules have been made under Article 309 of the Constitution of India which has overriding effect. The Rules framed by the State in its statutory powers will prevail over the executive instructions. This issue has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of decisions. 12. The issue with regard to prevailing of Rules made under statutory power with executive instruction has come up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in catena of decisions in B.N. Nagrajan v. State of Mysore, AIR 1966 SC 1942 ; Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan and Ors., AIR 1967 SC 1910 ; Union of India and Ors. v. Majji Jangammyya and Ors., AIR 1977 SC 757 ; B.N. Nagarajan and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors., AIR 1979 SC 1676 ; P.D. Agrawal and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors., (1987) 3 SCC 622 ; M/s. Beopar Sahayak (P) Ltd. and Ors. v. Vishwa Nath and Ors., AIR 1987 SC 2111 ; State of Maharashtra v. Jagannath Achyut Karandikar, AIR 1989 SC 1133 ; Paluru Ramkrishananiah and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1990 SC 166 ; Comptroller and Auditor General of India and Ors. v. Mohan Lal Malhotra and Ors., AIR 1991 SC 2288 : State of Madhya Pradesh v. G.S. Dall and Flour Mills, AIR 1991 SC 772 ; Naga People's Movement of Human Rights v. Union of India and Ors.. AIR 1998 SC 431 : C. Rangaswamacah and Ors. v. Karnataka Lokayukta and Ors, AIR 1998 SC 96.] 13. It is also well settled position that executive instructions cannot amend or supersede the statutory rules or add something therein, nor the orders can be issued in contravention of the statutory rules for the reason that an administrative instruction is not a statutory Rule nor does it have any force of law; while statutory rules have full force of law provided the same are not in conflict with the provisions of the Act. (Vide State of U.P. and Ors. v. Babu Ram Upadhyaya, AIR 1961 SC 751 ; and State of Tamil Nadu v. M/s. Hind Stone etc., AIR 1981 SC 711 ). 14. (Vide State of U.P. and Ors. v. Babu Ram Upadhyaya, AIR 1961 SC 751 ; and State of Tamil Nadu v. M/s. Hind Stone etc., AIR 1981 SC 711 ). 14. Again Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Sri Somasundaram Vishwanath, AIR 1988 SC 2255 , observed that if there is a conflict between the executive instruction and the Rules framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, the Rules will prevail. Similarly, if there is a conflict in the Rules made under the pro- viso to Article 309 of the Constitution and the law, the law will prevail. Similar view has been reiterated in Union of India v. Rakesh Kumar, AIR 2001 SC 1877 ; Swapan Kumar Pal and Ors. v. Samitabhar Chakraborty and Ors., AIR 2001 SC 2353 ; Khet Singh v. Union of India, (2002) 4 SCC 380 ; Laxminarayan R. Bhattad and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Anr., (2003) 5 SCC 413 ; and Delhi Development Authority v. Joginder S, Monga, (2004) 2 SCC 297 , observing that statutory rules create enforceable rights which cannot be taken away by issuing executive instructions. 15. In Ram Ganesh Tripathi v. State of U.P., { AIR 1997 SC 1446 }, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered a similar controversy and held that any executive instruction/ order which runs counter to or is inconsistent with the statutory rules cannot be enforced, rather deserves to be quashed as having no force of law. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under: "They (respondents) relied upon the order passed by the State. This order also deserves to be quashed as it is not consistent with the statutory rules. It appears to have been passed by the Government to oblige the respondents and similarly situated ad hoc appointees." 16. Thus, in view of the above, it is evident that executive instructions cannot be issued in contravention of the Rules framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution and statutory rules cannot be set at naught by the executive fiat. 17. The Apex Court in the case of Punjab Water Supply & Sewerage Board vs. Ranjodh Singh and others, (2007) 2 SCC 491 in para 19 of the judgment held that any departmental letter or executive instruction cannot prevail over statutory rule and constitutional provisions. 18. 17. The Apex Court in the case of Punjab Water Supply & Sewerage Board vs. Ranjodh Singh and others, (2007) 2 SCC 491 in para 19 of the judgment held that any departmental letter or executive instruction cannot prevail over statutory rule and constitutional provisions. 18. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and another vs. Ashok Kumar Agrawal, {(2013) 16 SCC 147}, has held in paras 58 to 60 which read as under:- “58. A Constitution Bench of this Court while dealing with a similar issue in respect of executive instructions in Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., AIR 1967 SC 1910 , held: “7. It is true that the Government cannot amend or supersede statutory Rules by administrative instruction, but if the Rules are silent on any particular point, the Government can fill-up the gap and supplement the rule and issue instructions not inconsistent with the Rules already framed.” 59. The law laid down above has consistently been followed and it is a settled proposition of law that an authority cannot issue orders/office memorandum/ executive instructions in contravention of the statutory Rules. However, instructions can be issued only to supplement the statutory rules but not to supplant it. Such instructions should be subservient to the statutory provisions. (Vide: Union of India & Ors. v. Majji Jangammayya & Ors., AIR 1977 SC 757 ; P.D. Aggarwal and Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 1676 ; Paluru Ramkrishnaiah & Ors. v. Union of India & Anr., AIR 1990 SC 166 ; C. Rangaswamaiah & Ors. v. Karnataka Lokayukta and Ors., AIR 1998 SC 2496 ; and JAC of Airlines Pilots Association of India & Ors. v. The Director General of Civil Aviation & Ors., AIR 2011 SC 2220 ). 60. Similarly, a Constitution Bench of this Court, in Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights v. Union of India., AIR 1998 SC 431 , held that the executive instructions have binding force provided the same have been issued to fill upthe gap between the statutory provisions and are not inconsistent with the said provisions”. 19. It is settled position of law that executive instruction cannot supplement or replace the rules. 19. It is settled position of law that executive instruction cannot supplement or replace the rules. Therefore, the order passed by the Collector terminating the petitioner from service which has already been quashed by this Court on the issue of competency of the Collector has attained finality, therefore, grant of 50% back wages treating no work no pay is illegal and suffers from arbitrariness on the part of the respondent No. 3. The respondent No. 3 without considering when the principle of no work no pay is applicable, has applied the principle, as such, denial of 50% back wages is against well settled position of law by Hon'ble Supreme Court that if employee is not allowed to join the duties without his fault, in such a situation wages cannot be denied to him. 20. The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Others v. K.V.Jankiraman & Others [ 1991 (4) SCC 109 ] while dealing with similar circumstances though in a case of a departmental enquiry in para 24 and 25 has held as under:- “24. It was further contended on their behalf that the normal rule is “no work no pay”. Hence a person cannot be allowed to draw the benefits of a post the duties of which he has not discharged. To allow him to do so is against the elementary rule that a person is to be paid only for the work he has done and not for the work he has not done. As against this, it was pointed out on behalf of the concerned employees, that on many occasions even frivolous proceedings are instituted at the instance of interested persons, sometimes with a specific object of denying the promotion due, and the employee concerned is made to suffer both mental agony and privations which are multiplied when he is also placed under suspension. When, therefore, at the end of such sufferings, he comes out with a clean bill, he has to be restored to all the benefits from which he was kept away unjustly. 25. We are not much impressed by the contentions advanced on behalf of the authorities. The normal rule of “no work no pay” is not applicable to cases such as the present one where the employee although he is willing to work is kept away from work by the authorities for no fault of his. 25. We are not much impressed by the contentions advanced on behalf of the authorities. The normal rule of “no work no pay” is not applicable to cases such as the present one where the employee although he is willing to work is kept away from work by the authorities for no fault of his. This is not a case where the employee remains away from work for his own reasons, although the work is offered to him. It is for this reason that F.R. 17(1) will also be inapplicable to such cases.” 21. The reason for the Supreme Court to draw such analogy was for the reason that an employee if he is not found blameworthy in the least for not getting the advantage of promotion and is also not been visited with a penalty or even an order of censure, he is entitled and has to be given the benefits of the higher posts along with other benefits from the date on which he would have normally been promoted to the said post but for the act of the Respondent-State. 22. Relying upon the aforesaid judgment of K.V. Jankiraman (supra), the Supreme Court again in the case of State of A.P. v. K.V.L. Narasimha Rao & Others [ 1999 (4) SCC 181 ] has held as under : “A wrong had been committed in unduly delaying the finalisation of seniority and giving promotions thereto and hence denial of monetary benefits to them would be arbitrary in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. In normal circumstances, when the retrospective promotions are effected all benefits flowing therefrom, including monetary benefits, must be extended to an officer who has been denied promotion earlier.” 23. Recently, the Supreme Court in one of the matters reported in 2007 (6) SCC 524 (State of Kerala & Others v. E.K. Bhaskaran Pillai) following and relying upon the principles laid down in the case of K.V. Jankiraman (supra) and other subsequent judgments, has held that so far as the situation with regard to monetary benefits with retrospective promotion is concerned that depends upon case to case as there are various facets which have to be considered. Particularly, when administration has wrongly denied the employee his due then in that case he should be given full benefits including monetary benefits. Particularly, when administration has wrongly denied the employee his due then in that case he should be given full benefits including monetary benefits. Further, in such circumstances, principle of “no work no pay” cannot be accepted as a thumb rule. 24. Even the termination order has been set aside by this Court on the ground of incompetence of the Collector, therefore, there was no occasion for the respondent Collector not to comply with the order. 25. Accordingly, it is directed that the petitioner be paid allowance during his suspension period and 50% of the back wages after termination till his reinstatement. The respondent No. 3 is also directed to fix the correct pay of the petitioner in the pay scale which he was entitled to get and arrears be paid to him within two months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. Thereafter, the respondent No. 3 will send the necessary papers to the Director Pension and Treasury to revise pension and for releasing of arrears of pension within further three months as the petitioner has already retired from service on 31.12.2019. Since the termination of the petitioner is quashed by this Court and he has been reinstated in service, his services shall be considered and counted from termination to reinstatement for all service benefits. 26. With the aforesaid observation and direction, the instant writ petition is allowed.