JUDGMENT : 1. Rule. Mr.Jayneel Parikh, learned AGP waives service of notice of rule on behalf of the respondents. 2. As a short issue is involved in the present writ petitions, the same are decided today. 3. By way of the present petitions, the petitioners are challenging the orders dated 27.12.2021, which were received by the petitioners on 25.1.2022, whereby respondent No.2 has refused to send reference of the petitioners to the District Court under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (“the Act” for short) on the ground of delay and non-payment of court fee. 4. The short facts giving rise to the present petition are such that the land of the petitioners being Survey No.33 admeasuring 0-46-13 Sq.mtr of village Vanod, Taluka Dasada, District Surendranagar came to be acquired for construction of branch canal by the Sardar Sarovar Nigam. The Collector had passed an award on 24.5.1996 in Case No.122/92. It is the specific case of the petitioners that notice, as contemplated under section 12(2) of the Act, has been not issued and served upon the petitioners, and therefore, the petitioners were not aware about the passing of the award by the Collector. The petitioners and their representative were also not present in the office of respondent No.2 when the award came to be passed. The petitioners, in the month of November 2017, came to know about passing of the award by the Collector, and therefore, by a written application dated 14/11/2017 requested office of respondent no.2 to provide him a copy of award and notice under section 12 (2) of the Act. The office of respondent no.2 by a letter dated 12/03/2018 provided copy of the award to the petitioners and informed the petitioners that copy of notice under section 12 (2) of the Act is not available in the record of respondent no.2. After getting copy of award on 12/03/2018 the petitioners, without any delay, filed a reference application in the office of respondent no.2 on 19/03/2018. The office of the respondent no.2 by the notice dated 13.11.2018 informed the petitioners that the reference application filed by the petitioners is beyond the period of limitation, and therefore, fixed the matter for preliminary hearing on delay on 30/11/2018. On 30/11/2018 the petitioners along with their advocate appeared before respondent no.2 and explained reasons for delay in filling the reference application. On 30/11/2018 the petitioners along with their advocate appeared before respondent no.2 and explained reasons for delay in filling the reference application. It is also specifically pleaded by the petitioners that notice under section 12 (2) of the Act was not served upon the petitioners and therefore, limitation will not commence from the date of award. Since the petitioners received the copy of award on 12/03/2018 from the office of respondent no.2 and hence, within 7 days, they have filed the reference application in the office of respondent no.2 with a prayer to send the same to the District Court for adjudication on merit. It is the case of the petitioners that after hearing the matter by respondent no.2 on 30/11/2018 the same was kept for order by respondent no.2 and it was orally informed to the petitioners that copy of the order will be sent to his address. On 27/06/2019 the petitioners by an application inquired from the office of respondent no.2 regarding status of the order. Since even after passage of more than 1 year, the respondent no.2 did not pass any order in the matter, the petitioners filed a writ petition being Special Civil Application No.1910 of 2020 seeking a direction on the respondent to pass order within time bound schedule. This Court by an order dated 05/03/2021 directed the respondent no.2 to hear and decide the application of the petitioners within three months, in any case, latest by 30/06/2021. As per the direction of this Court, respondent no.2 heard the petitioners and by the impugned order dated 27/12/2021 dismissed the land reference of the petitioners, and therefore, the present petitions are filed challenging the impugned order 27/12/2021. 5. Learned advocate Mr.Aakash Patel appearing for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order is required to be quashed and set aside since the notice under section 12(2) of the Act has not been received by the petitioners. He has submitted that, in fact, when the petitioners filed a RTI application, howeve, no detail of such notice has been found in the record. Learned advocate Mr.Patel has further submitted that law on this point is well settled and he has placed reliance on the judgment of the Honourable Apex Court in the case of Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh Vs The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353 . Learned advocate Mr.Patel has further submitted that law on this point is well settled and he has placed reliance on the judgment of the Honourable Apex Court in the case of Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh Vs The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer, reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353 . He has also placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Gopalbhai Becharbhai Vs State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 1989 Guj 56 . Learned advocate has further placed reliance on the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court dated 14.8.2017 passed in Special Civil Application No.5674 of 2017. Finally, learned advocate Mr.Patel has submitted that the petitioners has made a specific statement in grounds (K) that the petitioners will not claim any interest on the intervening period. Thus, it is submitted that the impugned order may be set aside. 6. Per contra, learned AGP Mr.Parikh has submitted that the impugned order does not require interference as the same has been appropriately passed. He submits that the petitioners has belatedly approached this Court after considerable delay and hence, the impugned order cannot be interfered with. 7. The established facts from the record are that the Collector has passed an award on 24.5.1996 in Case No.122/92, which pertains to lands of village Vanod, Taluka Dasada, District Surendranagar, which have been acquired for construction of branch canal by Sardar Sarovar Nigam. When the petitioners came to know about the award, they made an application dated 14.11.2017 requesting respondent No.2 to provide him a copy of such an award. After receipt of the copy of the aforesaid award, the petitioners filed an application seeking to impleade them as a party and also seeking condonation of delay. It is also coming on record that notice issued under section 12(2) of the Act was never served to the petitioners as there is no record available. Ultimately, by the impugned order dated 27.12.2021 passed by the Land Acquisition Officer, the reference application of the petitioners under section 18 of the Act has been dismissed on the ground of limitation. At this stage, it would be apposite to refer to the observations made by the Division Bench of this Court in the order dated 14.8.2017, which are analogous to the facts of the case in hand. At this stage, it would be apposite to refer to the observations made by the Division Bench of this Court in the order dated 14.8.2017, which are analogous to the facts of the case in hand. The Division Bench has observed thus : [6.1] Now, so far as the issue whether the application for reference under Section 18 of the Act, 1894 was barred by limitation or not is concerned, it appears and does not seems to be in dispute that as the petitioners were not served with the notice under Section 12(2) of the Act, 1894 and therefore, as such as per the catena of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as this Court from the date of knowledge, the limitation is required to be considered. In the present case it is required to be noted that though the award under Section 11 of the Act, 1894 was declared on 21.05.1996, the petitioners were paid the amount of compensation only in the month of December 2001 and even the possession of the acquired land has been taken over in the year 2002. Immediately thereafter from the date of knowledge of the award on receiving the amount of compensation and taking over the possession, the application for reference under Section 18 of the Act, 1894 was made on 16.01.2003. As observed hereinabove and it is an admitted position that no notice under Section 12(2) of the Act, 1894 was served upon the petitioners – original land owners. Under the circumstances, as such on merits the impugned decision of the Special Land Acquisition Officer to file the application for reference under Section 18 of the Act, 1894 on the ground of limitation cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be quashed and set aside and the appropriate Authority is required to be directed to make a reference under Section 18 of the Act, 1894 to the concerned District Court. [6.2] Now, so far as the submission on behalf of the State to dismiss the present petition on the ground of delay and laches, as though the petitioners were communicated as far as back on 12.03.2012 that their application for reference under Section 18 of the Act, 1894 is filed on the ground of limitation, the present petition is preferred in the year 2017 is concerned, the same has no substance and cannot be accepted. As observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Tukaram Kana Joshi and Ors. (Supra), right of the land owners to get the just compensation cannot be taken away and/or denied on the ground of delay. While considering the aspect of delay and laches with respect to the claim of the compensation of the acquired lands, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed and held as under: “11. There are authorities which state that delay and laches extinguish the right to put forth a claim. Most of these authorities pertain to service jurisprudence, grant of compensation for a wrong done to them decades ago, recovery of statutory dues, claim for educational facilities and other categories of similar cases, etc. Though, it is true that there are a few authorities that lay down that delay and laches debar a citizen from seeking remedy, even if his fundamental right has been violated, under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution, the case at hand deals with a different scenario altogether. Functionaries of the State took over possession of the land belonging to the appellants without any sanction of law. The appellants had asked repeatedly for grant of the benefit of compensation. The State must either comply with the procedure laid down for acquisition, or requisition, or any other permissible statutory mode. There is a distinction, a ? true and concrete distinction, between the principle of "eminent domain" and "police power" of the State. Under certain circumstances, the police power of the State may be used temporarily, to take possession of property but the present case clearly shows that neither of the said powers have been exercised. A question then arises with respect to the authority or power under which the State entered upon the land. It is evident that the act of the State amounts to encroachment, in exercise of "absolute power" which in common parlance is also called abuse of power or use of muscle power. To further clarify this position, it must be noted that the authorities have treated the land owner as a 'subject' of medieval India, but not as a 'citizen' under our constitution. 12. The State, especially a welfare State which is governed by the Rule of Law, cannot arrogate itself to a status beyond one that is provided by the Constitution. Our Constitution is an organic and flexible one. 12. The State, especially a welfare State which is governed by the Rule of Law, cannot arrogate itself to a status beyond one that is provided by the Constitution. Our Constitution is an organic and flexible one. Delay and laches is adopted as a mode of discretion to decline exercise of jurisdiction to grant relief. There is another facet. The Court is required to exercise judicial discretion. The said discretion is dependent on facts and circumstances of the cases. Delay and laches is one of the facets to deny exercise of discretion. It is not an absolute impediment. There can be mitigating factors, continuity of cause action, etc. That apart, if whole thing shocks the judicial conscience, then the Court should exercise the discretion more so, when no third party interest is involved. Thus analysed, the petition is not hit by the doctrine of delay and laches as the same is not a constitutional limitation, the cause of action is continuous and further the situation certainly shocks judicial conscience. 13. The question of condonation of delay is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of the facts of the case at hand, as the same vary from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226, nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter, after the passage of a certain length of time. There may be a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, that the High Court would be inclined to interfere in spite of delay. Ultimately, it would be a matter within the discretion of the Court and such discretion, must be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and not to defeat it. The validity of the partys defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. (Vide: P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N. AIR 1974 SC 2271 ; State of M.P. & Ors. v. Nandlal Jaiswal & Ors. AIR 1987 SC 251 ; and Tridip Kumar Dingal & Ors. vs. State of West Bengal & Ors., (2009) 1 SCC 768 ;) 14. The validity of the partys defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. (Vide: P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N. AIR 1974 SC 2271 ; State of M.P. & Ors. v. Nandlal Jaiswal & Ors. AIR 1987 SC 251 ; and Tridip Kumar Dingal & Ors. vs. State of West Bengal & Ors., (2009) 1 SCC 768 ;) 14. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches. Discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably. In the event that the claim made by the applicant is legally sustainable, delay should be condoned. In other words, where circumstances justifying the conduct exist, the illegality which is manifest, cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have a vested right in the injustice being done, because of a non-deliberate delay. The court should not harm innocent parties if their rights have infact emerged, by delay on the part of the petitioners. (Vide: Durga Prasad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports & Ors., AIR 1970 SC 769 ; Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. v. Mst. Katiji & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 1353 ; Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Company Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur & Ors., AIR 1993 SC 802 ; Dayal Singh & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2003 SC 1140 ; and Shankara Coop Housing Society Ltd. v. M. Prabhakar & Ors., AIR 2011 SC 2161 ) 15. In the case of H.D Vora v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 1984 SC 866 , this Court condoned a 30 year delay in approaching the court where it found violation of substantive legal rights of the applicant. In that case, the requisition of premises made by the State was assailed. 17. Depriving the appellants of their immovable properties, was a clear violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. In a welfare State, statutory authorities are bound, not only to pay adequate compensation, but there is also a legal obligation upon them to rehabilitate such persons. In that case, the requisition of premises made by the State was assailed. 17. Depriving the appellants of their immovable properties, was a clear violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. In a welfare State, statutory authorities are bound, not only to pay adequate compensation, but there is also a legal obligation upon them to rehabilitate such persons. The nonfulfillment of their obligations would tantamount to forcing the said uprooted persons to become vagabonds or to indulge in anti-national activities as such sentiments would be born in them on account of such illtreatment. Therefore, it is not permissible for any welfare State to uproot a person and deprive him of his fundamental/constitutional/human rights, under the garb of industrial development. 18. The appellants have been deprived of their legitimate dues for about half a century. In such a fact situation, we fail to understand for which class of citizens, the Constitution provides guarantees and rights in this regard and what is the exact percentage of the citizens of this country, to whom Constitutional/statutory benefits are accorded, in accordance with the law.” [6.3] Applying the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision, the petitioners cannot be denied just compensation for the acquired land on the ground of delay and laches. At the most the petitioners can be denied the interest on the amount of compensation which may be determined from the date of the impugned order till the petition was filed, to which the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners is agreeable. At this stage it is required to be noted that even it took 9 years time for the State/Special Land Acquisition Officer to inform the petitioners that their application for reference under Section 18 of the Act, 1894 is rejected on the ground of limitation. Therefore, at the most the petitioners can be denied the interest only from the year 2012 till the petition is filed. [7.0] In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, present petition succeeds. Impugned order dated 12.03.2012 passed by the respondent – Special Land Acquisition Officer filing/rejecting the application of the petitioners for reference under Section 18 of the Act, 1894 on the ground of limitation is hereby quashed and set aside. [7.0] In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, present petition succeeds. Impugned order dated 12.03.2012 passed by the respondent – Special Land Acquisition Officer filing/rejecting the application of the petitioners for reference under Section 18 of the Act, 1894 on the ground of limitation is hereby quashed and set aside. The respondent – appropriate Authority is hereby directed to make a reference to the concerned Court under Section 18 of the Act, 1894 within a period of 8 weeks from today and thereafter the learned Reference Court to finally decide and dispose of the reference within a period of one year from such reference, as the land has been acquired as far as back in the year 1996. However, it is observed and even as agreed by the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners, petitioners may be denied the interest on the amount of compensation so determined in the Reference, for the period between 12.03.2012 till the present petition is filed i.e. February 2017. Rule is made absolute accordingly to the aforesaid extent. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.” 8. Thus, it is well settled proposition of law that the petitioners, who lost the land because of acquisition proceedings, cannot be denied compensation only on the ground of delay. The writ petitions are allowed in terms of observations and directions issued by this Court in the preceding judgment. 9. In backdrop of the aforesaid facts, writ petitions are allowed. The impugned orders dated 27.12.2021 passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Narmada Yojna, Surendranagar are quashed and set aside. The Special Land Acquisition Officer is directed to make reference to the concerned Court under section 18 of the Act within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of this order. It is clarified that as per the statement made by the petitioners in the writ petitions, they will not be entitled to any interest for the intervening period. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent.