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2023 DIGILAW 243 (AP)

Iqbal Hyder v. A. Ravi

2023-01-31

D.V.S.S.SOMAYAJULU

body2023
ORDER : This Court has heard Dr. Iqbal Hyder, the party-in-person, and learned senior counsel Sri Y.V. Ravi Prasad appearing for the respondents. 2. This contempt case is filed alleging that respondents have willfully disobeyed the order dated 20.09.2021 in W.P.No.14684 of 2021 passed by this Court. 3. The order is to the following effect: Learned standing counsel for the University appears and states that the counter is being filed today. He also submits that in view of the interim order passed in W.P.No.9677 of 2021, by which the University was directed to go with the interviews, but not to declare the results, the University is only conducting the interviews, but it will not disclose the results or announce the same. In that view of the matter, he submits that there is no urgency for hearing the matter today and that the matter can be heard after the counter is filed. The proof of service filed shows that notices to respondents 5 and 6 are served on them but they do not appear through a counsel. List on 20.10.2021.’ 4. The party-in-person argued the matter at length and points out that despite the undertaking granted to this Court that they will not disclose the results, the respondents on 07.02.2022 disclosed the results and selected two candidates. He submits that this is a willful disobedience of the Court’s order. According to him, an undertaking given to the Court cannot also be breached or overlooked. He submits that a breach of undertaking is also contempt. He relies upon case law to the effect. He points out that a reading of the order of appointment issued to third parties on 07.02.2022 shows that the appointment orders are subject to the outcome of the writ petitions including W.P.No.9677 of 2021 and W.P.No.14684 of 2021. Therefore, it is contended that the respondents are aware of the existence of the writ orders and this is the reason why they made the appointments subject to the result of the writ petitions. With regard to the contention raised by the respondents that the interim order was not extended beyond the particular point of time, the petitioner relies upon N.Mahalakshmi and others v. Principal Secretary (LA) and others, 2016 (6) ALT 727, wherein it is held as follows: 8. With regard to the contention raised by the respondents that the interim order was not extended beyond the particular point of time, the petitioner relies upon N.Mahalakshmi and others v. Principal Secretary (LA) and others, 2016 (6) ALT 727, wherein it is held as follows: 8. Thus, by this order, I convey to the Bar at large that specific extension of interim orders is not necessary in cases where there are interim orders, with a direction to list the matters after certain date or after a few weeks, and the matter is not listed or not taken up by the Court on that date. In such eventuality, the interim orders shall continue to be in operation till the matter is listed and taken up for hearing and a specific order vacating the interim orders is passed by the Court. 9. At the cost of repetition, I make it clear that if the Court grants an interim order in the first instance for a limited period, and simultaneously directs the matter be listed after a few weeks or after a certain date, then the interim orders granted earlier shall continue to remain in force till the matter is listed before the Court or till a specific order vacating the earlier interim orders is passed by the Court. 5. Relying on this judgment and other judgment to a similar effect, the party-in-person submits that the respondents are guilty of willful breach and should be punished. 6. Learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents also argues the matter at length. He does not doubt the proposition of law that an undertaking given to the Court is also like an order passed and if the respondents commit a breach, they are liable for punishment. However, learned senior counsel submits that each case has to be decided on its own facts and a universal principle cannot be applied. He points out that the language used in the order is also important and in W.P.No.9677 of 2021, he submits that this Court granted an order which is reproduced in para 5 of the counter/reply. He points out that the respondents were permitted to proceed with the selections, but they shall not issue appointment orders to the selected candidates till 21.06.2021. He lays stress on the word ‘till’ and argues that the Court limited the operation of the order till a particular period/date only. He points out that the respondents were permitted to proceed with the selections, but they shall not issue appointment orders to the selected candidates till 21.06.2021. He lays stress on the word ‘till’ and argues that the Court limited the operation of the order till a particular period/date only. He points out that in W.P.No.14684 of 2021, in which the present contempt is filed, this Court took note of this order based upon the submissions made by the counsel for the University. Learned senior counsel submits that the interim order granted in W.P.No.9677 of 2021 was being extended to specific dates and till the date of the next posting. He points out that after 07.05.2021, the order was extended “till 28.06.2021 and till 26.07.2021, so on and again they were extended ‘till’ 09.11.2021. Thereafter, W.P.No.9677 of 2021 and W.P.No.14684 of 2021 were directed to be listed together. 7. Relying upon the reply affidavits filed and also copies of the cause lists that were filed, learned counsel points out that both the writ petitions were being called together and were listed on 09.11.2021, 10.11.2021, 15.11.2021 and 07.02.2022. He also points out that by virtue of the Covid Pandemic, the Division Bench of this Court passed general orders extending all subsisting interim orders till 15.11.2021. Therefore, the submission of counsel for the respondents in conclusion is that the interim order, which is granted for a specific period, was not extended. He relies upon the language used and the words like ‘till then’ to support his contention that the extensions were for specific periods only and that once the period expires, the interim order automatically expires. He points out that this matter being listed along with W.P.No.9677 of 2021; no effort was made by the party-in-person to seek extension of the interim order. Therefore, he submits that by virtue of this, there is no willful disobedience of the order, which was not extended to the date of the alleged contempt. He also relies upon a Division Bench judgment of the combined High Court in W.P.No.7631 of 2016 in support of his contention. 8. COURT: This Court after considering the submissions made notices that a lot of case law was submitted by the party-in-person in support of his contention that an interim order passed till a certain date will continue to operate till it is expressly varied or modified. 8. COURT: This Court after considering the submissions made notices that a lot of case law was submitted by the party-in-person in support of his contention that an interim order passed till a certain date will continue to operate till it is expressly varied or modified. It is also submitted that if for any reason, the matter could not be heard, the time bound stay orders do not cease to be effective by efflux of time. Petitioner essentially relied upon judgments of the Allahabad High Court in support of his contention and the judgment of the A.P.High Court in Mahalakshmi’s case (supra). The legal rationale behind this proposition is that a party should not suffer for the actions of the Court. This is an accepted principle - that a party should not suffer (actus curiae neminem gravabit). 9. In the judgment of the learned senior single Judge of this Court in Mahalakshmi’s case (supra), the findings at para 8 and 9 are reproduced earlier. 10. In Mahalakshmi's case an order of status quo was passed with a direction to list the matter on 27.07.2016. From 27.07.2016, the matter was posted to 03.08.2016 when a request for extension of the order was made. In these circumstances, the learned single Judge came to the conclusion that if the matter is not listed or not taken up by the Court, the interim order will continue to operate. 11. In that case, the single Judge was dealing with a situation where the matter was not listed or was not taken up by the Court. In those circumstances, learned single Judge held that the interim order shall continue to be in operation till the matter is listed and taken up for hearing and a specific order vacating the interim order was passed by the Court. Such a fact situation does not exist in the present contempt case. This writ petition was directed to be listed along with W.P.No.9677 of 2021. The dates on which the matter was adjourned were also spelt out in the counter affidavit and the cause lists are also filed as documents. On none of these dates, a request was made to the Court to extend the interim order that was granted. This is an essential fact which makes a difference to the applicability of this case to the present facts. The law of precedents is also clear. On none of these dates, a request was made to the Court to extend the interim order that was granted. This is an essential fact which makes a difference to the applicability of this case to the present facts. The law of precedents is also clear. A little difference in facts can make a difference in the precedential value. (State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan- (2011) 7 SCC 639 ). 12. There is also a practice prevalent in this Court of getting matters posted under the caption ‘for extension of interim orders’. The petitioner did not make any effort to file an application for extension of the interim order under the caption for extension of interim orders. 13. However, in the present case, in which the Contempt is filed, the order allegedly flouted is not an open ended order, but is an order limited to a particular period. The words used in the orders are ‘till then’ or ‘extended till’. These cannot be lost sight of. They set out a clear outer limit or end point. The Division Bench order relied upon by the respondents is also applicable, wherein the Division Bench held that the expression ‘in the mean time’ takes a colour from the context and that the outer limit is fixed by virtue of the said words. To a similar effect is the judgment in N.Rathinasabapathy and others v. K.S.Palaniappa Kandar and others, (1996) 7 SCC 205 . The decision in Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2007) 3 SCC 470 , also records the following: 12. The term of the order of the learned Judge, in our opinion, does not leave any manner of doubt whatsoever that the interim order was only extended from time to time. The interim order having been extended till a particular date, the contention raised by the respondents herein that they were under a bona fide belief that the injunction order would continue till it was vacated cannot be accepted.” 14. It is also settled law that in a contempt jurisdiction, the quality of proof is very high and almost on par with a criminal case. The existence of a ‘mental intention’ to willfully and wantonly disobey the order should also be present. The law on the subject is well settled and need not be repeated here once again. 15. It is also settled law that in a contempt jurisdiction, the quality of proof is very high and almost on par with a criminal case. The existence of a ‘mental intention’ to willfully and wantonly disobey the order should also be present. The law on the subject is well settled and need not be repeated here once again. 15. If the present case is examined against the backdrop of the orders passed by this particular Court and the standard of proof in contempt, it is it clear that the petitioner is not able to prove that there is a willful, wanton disobedience of the Court order. More than one interpretation is also possible of the order. The order of appointment which is said to be contemptuous is passed on 07.02.2022. Even if the suo motu extension of limitation for Covid is taken, it is clear that the order was extended up to 15.11.2021 only. This Court therefore holds in these circumstances that there was no interim order in force on 07.02.2022 which could be said to have been violated, either voluntarily or involuntarily. In view of the Division Bench order and the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar’s case (3 supra) this Court holds that the judgments cited by the party-in-person are per incuriam. 16. In view of all of the above, this Court finds no merit in the contempt case and accordingly the same is dismissed. It is also to be noted that the appointments granted are subject to the result of the writ petition only. As a sequel, the miscellaneous petitions if any shall stand dismissed.