ORDER : Defendant in the suit filed the above civil revision petition against order, dated 22.11.2022 passed in I.A.No.514 of 2022 in O.S.No.55 of 2017 on the file of learned Senior Civil Judge, Yelamanchili. 2. Plaintiff filed O.S.No.55 of 2017 for recovery of amount on the strength of promissory note. 3. Defendant, by filing written statement, is contesting the suit. 4. When the suit was posted for cross examination of PW1, neither the defendant nor his counsel appeared. Suit was decreed ex-parte on 23.01.2019. 5. Pursuant to the decree, decree holder filed E.P No.44 of 2019. Pending the E.P, JDR filed the above application to condone delay of 1322 days in filing the petition to set-aside the ex-parte decree dated 23.01.2019. 6. In the affidavit filed in support of the application judgment debtor contended that he engaged advocate and gave instructions after receiving summons in execution petition and handed over the same to counsel, who in turn filed vakalath. Later, the application is filed to condone delay of 1322 days in filing petition to set-aside ex-parte decree. 7. Decree holder filed counter and opposed the application. 8. Trial court by order dated 22.11.2022 dismissed the application. Aggrieved by the same the above revision is filed. 9. Heard Sri Venkateswarlu Sanisetty, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri A.S.C. Bose, learned counsel for the respondent. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the petitioner, in fact explained the delay. However, trial Court without considering the explanation dismissed the application. He also would contend that petitioner being illiterate, is not aware of the Court procedure. He also would contend that for the fault of the advocate the client should not be suffered and hence prays to set aside the order of the trial Court. 11. Learned counsel for the respondent supported the order of the trial court. 12. The point for consideration is whether the petitioner showed sufficient cause to condone delay of 1322 days in filing petition to set-aside ex-parte decree dated 23.01.2019? 13. Suit O.S.No.55 of 2017 was filed for recovery of an amount of Rs.9,40,917/-. Plaintiff filed affidavit in lieu of chief examination and the matter was being adjourned from time to time for cross examination of PW-1. Defendant having engaged counsel failed to cross examination the witness. Defendant was set ex-parte and the Court below passed ex parte decree on 23.01.2017. 14. Plaintiff filed affidavit in lieu of chief examination and the matter was being adjourned from time to time for cross examination of PW-1. Defendant having engaged counsel failed to cross examination the witness. Defendant was set ex-parte and the Court below passed ex parte decree on 23.01.2017. 14. Pursuant to the decree, decree holder issued legal notice dated 10.04.2019 and the same was received by the judgment debtor on 13.04.2019. 15. E.P.No.44 of 2019 was filed by the Decree Holder. Judgment debtor received the notice on 25.11.2019. Since no counter was filed by judgment debtor, he was set ex parte. Subsequently, judgment debtor filed E.A.Nos.60 of 2020 and 61 of 2020 to set-aside the ex-parte order and to receive the counter, respectively. Both the applications were allowed on 28.01.2021. 16. The enquiry in execution petition was proceeded with and the matter was being adjourned from time to time. As can be seen from the order of the Court below judgment debtor also stated that the matter was likely to be compromised. On that ground E.P. underwent several adjournments and on some occasions, costs were also imposed. Later it seems judgment debtor changed advocate and filed interlocutory application under Order 21 Rule 26. The said application was returned. 17. At that juncture, JDR filed the present application to condone delay of 1322 days in filing petition to set aside the ex-party decree dated 23.01.2019. 18. Perusal of the above revision would disclose that judgment debtor is aware of the decree passed by the Court. In fact judgment debtor participated in execution proceedings at one point of time and also reported that the matter is likely to be compromise. In the affidavit filed in support of the petition, which is filed to condone delay, judgment debtor tried to blame his advocate. 19. In Balwant Singh (dead) v. Jagdish Singh and Ors., (2010) 8 SCC 685 after referring to earlier case law, the Hon’ble Apex Court held at paragraphs 24 and 25 as under; “We may state that even if the term “sufficient cause” has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of “reasonableness” as it is understood in its general connotation. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of “reasonableness” as it is understood in its general connotation. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly.” 20. In Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649 , the Hon’ble Apex Court broadly culled out the following principles: i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justiceoriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. ii) The terms sufficient cause should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation. iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 16. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are: a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a half hazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non- serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a non-challan manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters. 21. In Majji Sannemma alias Sanyasirao Vs. Reddy Sridevi and others, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1260, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed:- “17. In the case of Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. [( 1962 2 SCR 762 ] (supra), it is observed and held as under:— In construing sec. 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be lightheartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chattappan, (1890) J.L.R. 13 Mad. 269, “s. 5 gives the Court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words „sufficient cause’ receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant.” 18. In the case of P.K. Ramachandran Vs. In the case of P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala [ (1997) 7 SCC 556 ] (supra), while refusing to condone the delay of 565 days, it is observed that in the absence of reasonable, satisfactory or even appropriate explanation for seeking condonation of delay, the same is not to be condoned lightly. It is further observed that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. It is further observed that while exercising discretion for condoning the delay, the court has to exercise discretion judiciously. 19. In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil Vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project [ (2008) 17 SCC 448 ] (supra), it is observed as under:— “The laws of limitation are founded on public policy. Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as “statutes of peace”. An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for public order. The principle is based on the maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium”, that is, the interest of the State requires that there should be end to litigation but at the same time laws of limitation are a means to ensure private justice suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and preventing oppression. The object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.” 20. In the case of Basawaraj Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer [ (2013) 14 SCC 81 ] (supra), it is observed and held by this Court that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case. It is further observed that the expression “sufficient cause” cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. It is further observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of a party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. It is further observed that the expression “sufficient cause” cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. It is further observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of a party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. It is further observed that in case a party has acted with negligence, lack of bona fides or there is inaction then there cannot be any justified ground for condoning the delay even by imposing conditions. It is observed that each application for condonation of delay has to be decided within the framework laid down by this Court. It is further observed that if courts start condoning delay where no sufficient cause is made out by imposing conditions then that would amount to violation of statutory principles and showing utter disregard to legislature.” A conspectus of the judgments referred to supra, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. Hon’ble Apex Court also cautioned that if the delay is occasioned by party deliberately to gain time, then the Court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. Litigant should be vigilant. The explanation should not be fanciful and concocted. The Courts while dealing with an application to condone delay should keep in mind the right accrued to other side and should deal with such application with utmost care. 22. This court also considered the aspect of condoning delay in decision reported in Chatta Chinna Pullamma vs. Chatta Pullaiah and others, 2202 (6) ALT 97. 23. The affidavit, as stated supra does not indicate sufficient reasons to condone delay of 1322 delay in filing the petition to set aside the ex-parte decree. Petitioner is aware of passing on decree and in fact participated in execution of proceedings. The conduct of the petitioner shows that the petitioner is aware of the legal consequences. No reasons were explained to condone delay. Trial Court on consideration of the facts of the case, dismissed the application. Petitioner is aware of passing on decree and in fact participated in execution of proceedings. The conduct of the petitioner shows that the petitioner is aware of the legal consequences. No reasons were explained to condone delay. Trial Court on consideration of the facts of the case, dismissed the application. This court does not find any illegality in the order passed by trial Court warranting interference of this court. Hence this revision is liable to be dismissed. 24. Accordingly, this Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. No costs. As a sequel, all the pending miscellaneous applications shall stand closed.