JUDGMENT : N. KOTISWAR SINGH, J. 1. Heard Mr. Altaf Haqani, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants. Also heard Mr. M.A. Qayoom, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. The present appeal has been preferred against the Order dated 02.11.2021 passed by the learned Single Judge in SWP No. 1044/2014, by which learned Single Judge directed the appellants to consider the case of the writ petitioner-respondent for regularization to the post of Deputy General Manager (Passenger) with effect from 06.07.1990 and to give him all the consequential benefits within a period of two months. 3. The grievance of the appellants is that the direction is not merely to consider the case of the respondent-writ petitioner but also to give him all the consequential benefits as mentioned in Para 7 of the judgment, which is reproduced hereunder: “7. In view of above, writ petition is disposed of with a direction to respondents to consider the case of petitioner for regularization as Deputy General Manager with effect from 06.07.1990 and give him all consequential benefits, within a period of two months from the date copy of this order is served upon them.” 4. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants submits that the learned Single Judge totally ignored the issue of delay and laches which the appellants had specifically raised in their objections before the Ld. Single Judge and issued the aforesaid impugned direction. 5. In order to appreciate the contentions of learned Senior Counsel for the appellants and the present respondent no. 1 (the writ petitioner), brief facts of the case as may be relevant are reproduced hereunder: (i) That the writ petitioner was earlier serving as a Traffic Manager and by virtue of Order dated 06.07.1990, he was directed to temporarily look after the work of higher post of Deputy General Manager (Passenger), Srinagar in addition to his own duties. (ii) Thereafter, he was promoted to the post of Divisional Manager vide Order dated 16.08.1997 passed by the Managing Director, J&K State Road Transport Corporation, Srinagar which is equivalent to the post of Deputy General Manager. (iii) Vide Order dated 01.08.1998, he was posted as General Manager (Operations), Kashmir in his own pay and grade and subsequently, by Order dated 05.02.1999, he was promoted as General Manager (Operations) on substantive basis. (iv) It is the admitted position that the writ petitioner retired from service on 31.05.2007. (iii) Vide Order dated 01.08.1998, he was posted as General Manager (Operations), Kashmir in his own pay and grade and subsequently, by Order dated 05.02.1999, he was promoted as General Manager (Operations) on substantive basis. (iv) It is the admitted position that the writ petitioner retired from service on 31.05.2007. He, thereafter, filed this writ petition seeking parity in treatment with two other persons namely Shri Vidhya Sagar-respondent No. 3, and Shri Mohammad Abdullah-respondent No. 4, as regards retrospective regularization to the post of Deputy General Manager. (v) It was the case of the petitioner in the writ petition that the aforesaid two persons were given retrospective regularization to the post of Deputy General Manager w.e.f. 01.07.1994 and 08.10.1992 respectively, that too long after their retirement. (vi) The learned Single Judge after hearing the parties directed the appellants to consider granting retrospective regularization in favour of the writ petitioner-respondent herein as mentioned above. 6. It is the plea of the appellants herein that the writ petitioner-respondent No. 1 herein was directed to look after the work of Deputy General Manager (Passenger) in his substantive post of Manager and merely because he was directed to look after the said post did not mean that he was promoted to the higher post of Deputy General Manager (Passenger). As such, he was not entitled to any benefit of the higher post. 7. It was also contended that there was inordinate delay in approaching the Writ Court by the petitioner seeking the aforesaid relief as he approached the Court after 24 years of passing of the order directing him to look after the post of Deputy General Manager (Passenger) and after 07 years of his retirement from service. 8. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants submits that nothing has been explained as to why he approached the Writ Court after such an inordinate delay except for making representations. Though the writ petitioner has mentioned that he had submitted number of representations on various occasions, in spite of alleged non-response from the authorities, he remained quiet and approached this Court by filing writ petition only in the year 2014. 9. Though the writ petitioner has mentioned that he had submitted number of representations on various occasions, in spite of alleged non-response from the authorities, he remained quiet and approached this Court by filing writ petition only in the year 2014. 9. It has also been submitted by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants that his case for retrospective regularization was duly forwarded by the then Managing Director, J&K State Road Transport Corporation, Srinagar to Chairman, J&K State Road Transport Corporation, Srinagar on 20.06.2002 for promotion to the post of Deputy General Manager w.e.f. 06.07.1990 but the Government did not act upon it, yet the writ petitioner chose not to approach the Court at the earliest seeking the relief. 10. According to the appellants, what can be seen is that the writ petitioner had merely been submitting representation after representation, but did not raise any grievance as regards the alleged inaction by the authorities to consider his case for retrospective regularization to the post of Deputy General Manager and as such, the writ petition being hopelessly time barred will be hit by delay and laches. 11. It has also been submitted that his conduct would clearly indicate that he had reconciled to the alleged inaction of the respondent-authorities and as such, the writ petition is also hit by acquiescence. 12. In support of his submission, the learned Senior Counsel has referred to the following decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court: (i) Ramakant Shripad Sinal Advalpalkar vs. Union of India and Others, AIR 1991 SC 1145 (ii) K.V. Rajalakshmiah Setty and Others vs. State of Mysore and Others, AIR 1967 SC 993 (iii) State of Orissa vs. Pyarimohan Samantaray and Others, AIR 1976 SC 2617 (iv) Institute of chartered accounts of India vs. J.R. Willam Singh, 2021(12) SCC 127 (v) Union of India and Others vs. M.K. Sarkar, 2010 (2) SCC 59 (vi) State of Tamil Nadu vs. Seshachalam, 2007 (10) SCC 137 (vii) Union of India and Others vs. N. Murugesan an Others, 2022 (2) SCC 25 13. It has been submitted that while the appellants had contested the claim of the writ petitioner on the ground of delay and laches, the said issue unfortunately was not at all considered by the learned Single Judge, but proceeded to grant the relief merely on the basis of parity as granted to the respondent Nos.2 and 3. 14. It has been submitted that while the appellants had contested the claim of the writ petitioner on the ground of delay and laches, the said issue unfortunately was not at all considered by the learned Single Judge, but proceeded to grant the relief merely on the basis of parity as granted to the respondent Nos.2 and 3. 14. It has been submitted by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants that even if the petitioner had some claim for parity of treatment yet, because of the delay and laches and acquiescence, such a claim would be defeated which unfortunately was not considered by the learned Single Judge. 15. In response, the learned counsel for the writ petitioner-respondent has submitted that the entire argument of the appellants in this appeal is based on two grounds: (i) firstly, that the writ petitioner is not entitled to retrospective regularization as envisaged under law. (ii) secondly, the petition is hit by delay and laches as well as acquiescence. 16. Coming to the first limb of argument that the respondent No. 1-writ petitioner is not entitled to retrospective regularization, learned counsel has drawn attention of this Court to Article 85 of J&K Civil Service Regulations (CSR), 1956 which provides as under: “85. Combination of appointments and salaries: (1) A Government servant may be: (a) assigned the charge of another post in addition to his own duties. (b) appointed to be in charge of a higher post independent of his own duties. (2) The case falling under (i) (a) above may be of one of the following nature: (i) where an employee is assigned the charge of an additional post either identical or higher, in the same office or a different office simply to discharge its current routine duties. (ii) where the additional charge is assigned to another identical or equivalent post not in the same office and additional charge so assigned involves full duties and responsibilities of the post. (iii) where the additional charge of an identical or equivalent post not in the same office and additional charge so assigned involves full duties and responsibilities of the post. (iv) where the additional charge of an identical or equivalent post, involves full responsibilities of the post in the same office and there being no possibility of the work of the other post being distributed amongst other. (iv) where the additional charge of an identical or equivalent post, involves full responsibilities of the post in the same office and there being no possibility of the work of the other post being distributed amongst other. (v) where the additional charge is allowed of a higher post in the same or different office and Government servant hold the plenary responsibility for the duties of additional post. (vi) where the additional charge is allowed of a lower of a lower office/post in the same or different office. (3) The cases falling under (1) (b) above may be one of the following nature: (i) whereof for administrative reasons or non-completion of formalities for appointment to the higher post, a person cannot be appointed to that post formally and is appointed in his own pay and grade to be in charge of the higher post and required to discharge full duties and responsibilities of the post either in the same office or in a different office, in the same cadre/line of promotion or in a different cadre/line of promotion. (ii) where a Government servant is appointed to a higher post simply to be incharge of its current/routine duties and is not required to hold plenary responsibilities of the duties of the post e.g. a Superintending Engineer is appointed in charge of the current duties of the post of a Chief Engineer independent of his own. Government Instruction: (a) It is wrong in principle to appoint a Government servant to a higher post in his own cadre/line of promotion without observing the required formalities of clearance from Departmental Promotion committee etc. where, however, for reasons to be recorded, the Administrative authorities cannot without detriment to public interests wait for formal appointments temporary stop-gap arrangements may be made by them against such posts. [xxx xxx xxx] In making such arrangements the competent authorities will ensure that only such officers are appointed who satisfy all the requirements for higher appointments and can stand the scrutiny of the Departmental Promotion Committee etc. Persons so appointed shall be appointed in their own pay and grade as in-charge of the higher posts, and will be required to discharge the full duties and responsibilities of these posts. As soon as such officers are declared by the Departmental Promotion Committee etc. Persons so appointed shall be appointed in their own pay and grade as in-charge of the higher posts, and will be required to discharge the full duties and responsibilities of these posts. As soon as such officers are declared by the Departmental Promotion Committee etc. fit for appointment to higher posts without any break in the stop-gap arrangements, they will be allowed full pay of those posts allowance etc. if any, drawn to be adjusted in full against the retrospective increases in pay. (b) In cases where appointments to higher posts are to be made on short term basis for a limited period of a time and not on a regular basis and if admissible to be made on ad hoc basis or without reference to Departmental Promotion Committee etc. the person so appointed should not be put in charge of the post but appointed to that post formally and given the fully pay of the post. 17. In this regard learned counsel for the respondent no. 1-petitioiner has drawn the attention of this Court to the nature of internal arrangement as per order dated 06.07.1990 which, according, to him clearly shows that the incumbent namely Ravi Kumar who was holding the post of Deputy General Manager (Plg) had migrated to Jammu and to which post one Nazir Ahmad Bhat (Passenger) was directed to report, and the writ petitioner was given additional charge to look after the work of Deputy General Manager (Passenger) which was held by Nazir Ahmad Bhat in addition to his duties temporarily. 18. According to the respondent-writ petitioner, as the office of the Deputy General Manager (Passenger) became vacant after the said Deputy General Manager (Passenger) was given charge of the post of the higher post of General Manager (Plg), the additional charge, given to the respondent-petitioner to the post of Deputy General Manager (Passenger), therefore, would mean that he was given full charge of the said post of Deputy General Manager (Passenger) though it may be by way of temporary arrangement. 19. Accordingly, it has been submitted that the case of the respondent-writ petitioner is covered by Article 85 (iv) of J&K Civil Service Regulation, 1956. 20. It has been submitted that the said Regulation has to be read along with the “Government Instructions” issued in that regard. 19. Accordingly, it has been submitted that the case of the respondent-writ petitioner is covered by Article 85 (iv) of J&K Civil Service Regulation, 1956. 20. It has been submitted that the said Regulation has to be read along with the “Government Instructions” issued in that regard. The Government Instructions make it clear that normally the government servant should not be appointed to higher posts without observing the formalities required for appointment to higher posts. However, when any such appointment is required to be made, the same should be made by taking into consideration the eligibility criteria of such person and subsequently, if it is found by the Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) that such a person is fit for appointment to the higher post which he is holding without any break, in that eventuality, such person shall be allowed to be appointed and paid in full along with consequential benefits/allowances to the post. 21. In the present case, the writ petitioner was holding the said post of in-charge/look after basis without any interruption and subsequently, he was found to be eligible and suitable for promotion to the higher post and, accordingly, was promoted on regular basis to the higher post of Divisional Manager (Traffic), which is equivalent to the post of Deputy General Manager in the year 1997. Thus, by virtue of aforesaid Article 85 (iv) of J&K Civil Service Regulations, 1956, the writ petitioner would be entitled to the benefit of retrospective appointment to the post of Divisional Manager/Deputy General Manager as clarified by the “Government Instructions.” 22. Further, as regards the other legal argument that the petition is time barred and that the writ petitioner was making representation after representation, it has been submitted that the said contention cannot be accepted for the reason that it is not a mere case of making representation after representation. 23. It has been submitted that the writ petitioner was made to understand by the authorities that his case will be considered in due course. In this regard, learned counsel has drawn attention of this Court to the communication addressed by the then State Government to the Managing Director of the Corporation regarding confirmation of the writ petitioner to the post of Deputy General Manager for necessary consideration which would clearly indicate that the Government was not averse to the same. In this regard, learned counsel has drawn attention of this Court to the communication addressed by the then State Government to the Managing Director of the Corporation regarding confirmation of the writ petitioner to the post of Deputy General Manager for necessary consideration which would clearly indicate that the Government was not averse to the same. Thereafter, the respondent-writ petitioner submitted another representation to which the General Manager (Adm.) of the Corporation responded by way of communication dated 22-06-1994 wherein it was stated that the confirmation of the writ petitioner to the post of Deputy General Manager would be considered at an appropriate time. Thus, the writ petitioner was under genuine belief that his case will be duly considered by the authorities in due course. 24. It was submitted that in the meantime, the case of one Mohammad Abdullah was considered by the authorities by giving him the benefit of retrospective regularization to the post of Deputy General Manager w.e.f. 08-10-1992 as can be seen from the recommendation made by Managing Director, JKSRTC to the Chairman, JKSRTC vide his communication dated 12-07-2001, and accordingly, the writ petitioner-respondent herein again submitted representation to the Managing Director of the Corporation for giving him the similar benefit. 25. It has been submitted that the similar benefits of retrospective regularization were given to two persons, namely, Vidhya Sagar and Mohammad Abdullah i.e. respondent Nos. 3 and 4 is not disputed. Further, the fact that they were junior to the writ petitioner can also be verified from the seniority list in the grade of Traffic Manager in which the name of the writ petitioner is shown at serial No. 1, whereas, they are shown at Serial Nos. 4 and 8 respectively. More so, the benefit was given after they retired from service. 26. It has been submitted that subsequently, the Managing Director of the Corporation wrote a letter to the Chairman of the corporation on 20.06.2002 recommending the case of the writ petitioner for promotion with retrospective benefit to the post of Deputy General Manager with effect from 06-07-1990 as had been done in respect of the other two respondents. The respondent no. It has been submitted that subsequently, the Managing Director of the Corporation wrote a letter to the Chairman of the corporation on 20.06.2002 recommending the case of the writ petitioner for promotion with retrospective benefit to the post of Deputy General Manager with effect from 06-07-1990 as had been done in respect of the other two respondents. The respondent no. 2 having recommended the case of the writ petitioner in terms of his letter dated 20-6-2002 also appreciated his work and conduct by stating that he was the only single officer in the corporation who had rendered service very dedicatedly and had served the people and the Government in most difficult conditions. When the writ petitioner did not get any positive response from the authorities, he again submitted representation on 21.11.2006 seeking benefit of retrospective regularization and subsequently, he retired from services on 31-05-2007 and thereafter, he continued to submit a number of representations on 14.11.2011, 28.05.2012 and 27.08.2013 before he filed the writ petition on 23.05.2014. 27. Accordingly, it has been submitted that it is not the case that the writ petitioner was sleeping over the matter but he has been pursuing his claim consistently and served a notice of demand upon the respondents through his counsel on 10-04-2014 before he filed the writ petition. 28. It has been submitted that the issue of delay and laches which would bar the writ petitioner from seeking relief from the Court as submitted by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants has to be examined on the facts and circumstances of each case. 29. It has been submitted that the principle of delay and laches invoked is not a rule of law but a rule of practice and as such, whether there was a delay and laches have to be considered in the given facts and circumstances obtained in each case. 30. It has been further submitted that in the present case the claim of the writ petitioner does not involve or disturb the accrued right of any third person or cause any prejudice to the Corporation, rather he is making a claim on the basis of relief granted to other two persons seeking parity of treatment by invoking Article 14 of the Constitution of India and when there is any violation of Fundamental Rights, the plea of delay and laches cannot be invoked. 31. 31. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner further submits that as can be seen from the recommendation made by Managing Director, JKSRTC to Chairman JKSRTC on 20.06.2002, when the writ petitioner was made to work as Deputy General Manager on look after basis, at that point of time the posts i.e. Deputy General Manager as well as General Manager were lying vacant and as such, no prejudice can be said to have caused to the appellants if the benefit of retrospective regularization is given to the respondent-writ petitioner. 32. In support of his argument, learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon the judgments mentioned below: (i) Gopi Nath Wali vs. State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 1958 J&K 11 (ii) Jagannath Mishra vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1990 Patna 11 (iii) Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar and Others vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, AIR 1974 SC 259 (iv) State of U.P. and Others vs. Raj Bahadur Singh and Others, 1998 (8) SCC 685 (v) Olga Tells and Others vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Others, AIR 1986 SC 180 (vi) Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Company Limited vs. District Board, Bhojpur and Others, AIR 1993 SC 802 33. In response, Ld. Senior Counsel for the appellants submits that the fact remains that the Ld. Single Judge has not dealt at all with the issue of delay and laches and on this ground alone, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside as not sustainable. 34. Ld. Senior Counsel for the appellants further submits that from the record it is very clear that the respondent-writ petitioner did not make any attempt to approach this Court inspite of favourable recommendation made on 26-06-2002 and he waited for twelve (12) long years before he approached the Court. It has been submitted that it is very clear that he had been sleeping over his claim/rights and was not vigilant and in this regard, in support of this contention, learned counsel for the appellants has referred to judgment titled U.P. Jal Nigam and Another vs. Jaswant Singh and Another, 2006 (11) SCC 464 . 35. It has been submitted that what is to be noted is that the issue before this Court is about a stale claim made by the writ petitioner. 35. It has been submitted that what is to be noted is that the issue before this Court is about a stale claim made by the writ petitioner. Even if he had a reason to claim the said right for retrospective regularization, the fact remains that he approached the Court after a period of more than twelve years, that too after his retirement. It clearly indicates that the writ petitioner-respondent was making a stale claim as such, his claim need not to be entertained. Further, by giving retrospective regularization to the writ petitioner, the Corporation would be saddled with additional financial burden, which the Corporation, at this stage, cannot afford to, since the Corporation has not even been able to pay regular salaries for the employees. Thus, because of the fact that the claim was made by the writ petitioner very belatedly and he remained not vigilant and he slept over his rights/claim, and in view of the precarious financial conditions of the Corporation, the equitable jurisdiction of this Court cannot be invoked to grant him the relief sought. 36. As regards the submission made by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants that the learned Single Judge has not addressed the issue of delay and laches, it has been submitted by the Ld. Counsel for the respondent that since the appeal is in continuation of the writ proceedings, this issue can be decided by this Appellate Forum also, rather than remanding the matter to the Writ Court at this stage, which will cause further delay. Further, it has been submitted that as far the financial implication is concerned, the impact will be minimal as can be seen from the recommendation made by Managing Director, JKSRTC to the Chairman JKSRTC. He further contends that the argument which has been advanced by the counsel for the appellants about claim being stale is not correct, in as much as, the writ petitioner was alive and awake regarding his claim and had been pursuing his claim all through. 37. As evident, two issues arise for consideration before us. Firstly, whether the writ petition is barred by delay and laches and the connected issue as to whether the matter should be remanded to the Ld. Single Judge, as this issue was not considered by Ld. Single Judge. Secondly, whether the writ petitioner has any claim for retrospective regularization. 38. 37. As evident, two issues arise for consideration before us. Firstly, whether the writ petition is barred by delay and laches and the connected issue as to whether the matter should be remanded to the Ld. Single Judge, as this issue was not considered by Ld. Single Judge. Secondly, whether the writ petitioner has any claim for retrospective regularization. 38. We would like to observe that before we consider as to whether the writ petition is barred by delay and laches, if it is found that the writ petitioner had no right, whether choate or inchoate, to claim, we may not consider the writ petition and dismiss the same without examining the issue whether it is hit by delay or not. 39. The respondent-writ petitioner is making the claim for retrospective regulation to the post of Deputy General Manager w.e.f. 06.07.1990 when he was directed to look after the work of Deputy General Manager in the Corporation vide order dated 06.07.1990. Though, the arrangement made appears to be a stop gap arrangement upon the migration of an officer in the rank of Deputy General Manager from Srinagar to Jammu, yet the respondent-petitioner continued to look after the said post till he was promoted to the post of Divisional Manager (an equivalent post of Deputy General Manager) vide order dated 16.08.1997, thus clearly indicating that he was looking after a post in which there was substantive vacancy. It may be noted that after two years, the writ petitioner was promoted to the higher post of General Manager vide order dated 05.02.1999 and subsequently was appointed as In-charge Joint Managing Director. 40. The claim of the respondent-writ petitioner that he was otherwise eligible and suitable for appointment to the post of Deputy General Manager does not appear to be disputed. Further, in view of the Government Instructions appended to the Article 85 of the J&K Civil Service Regulation (CSR) 1956, it appears that the writ petitioner could be eligible for full pay and allowances. However, these are aspects which would be required to be considered by the competent authority which the respondent-petitioner is seeking, for which the Writ Court may not be appropriate forum. 41. However, these are aspects which would be required to be considered by the competent authority which the respondent-petitioner is seeking, for which the Writ Court may not be appropriate forum. 41. Consequently, we can say that the respondent-writ petitioner may have a legitimate claim for granting him retrospective regularization to the post of Deputy General Manager w.e.f. 06.07.1990, more so in the light of the assertion of the respondent-writ petitioner that two officers who were junior to him, namely Vidhya Sagar and Mohammad Abdullah Wani, the respondents no. 2 and 3 respectfully had been given retrospective regularisation w.e.f. 01.07.1994 and 08.10.1992, that too after their retirement. 42. Thus, we are satisfied that the respondent-writ petitioner can certainly make a claim for consideration for grant of retrospective regularisation, which can be certainly considered by the competent authority of the appellant, and not by this Court at this stage. 43. In view of the above, we will have to examine as to whether the writ repetition is barred by delay and laches. 44. We have taken note of the fact that the Ld. Single Judge did not consider the issue of delay and laches urged by the appellants before the Writ Court. We have also taken note of the submission advanced by the Ld. Counsel for the respondent-writ petitioner that instead of remanding the matter to the Ld. Single Judge to decide the issue of delay and latches, this Appellate Court itself can proceed to examine this issue. We are also of the view that remanding the matter to the Ld. Single Judge to decide on this issue of delay would further prolong the litigation and are of the view that we should decide the matter in this appellate forum itself. Accordingly, we proceed to examine this issue ourselves. 45. From the various decisions cited before us by the contesting parties, it can be stated without any doubt that the issue relating to delay and laches specially in a writ proceeding is a rule of practice and cannot be decided purely in a lineal time frame and each case must depend on its own facts. 45. From the various decisions cited before us by the contesting parties, it can be stated without any doubt that the issue relating to delay and laches specially in a writ proceeding is a rule of practice and cannot be decided purely in a lineal time frame and each case must depend on its own facts. There are many facets which should be factored into by this Court while considering the plea of delay and laches: (i) In Ramachandra Shankar Deodhar vs. State of Maharashtra, (1974) I SCC 317, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court observed as follows: “10............In the first place, it must be remembered that the rule which says that the Court may not inquire into related and stale claims is not a rule of law, but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and there is no inviolable rule that whenever there is delay, the court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition. Each case must depend on its own facts. The question, as pointed out by Hidayatullah, C.J. in Tilockchand Motichand vs. H.B. Munshi, (1969) 1 SCC 110 “is one of discretion for this Court to follow from case to case. There is no lower limit aid there is no upper limit...It will all depend on what the breach of the Fundamental Right and the remedy claimed are and how the delay arose..........” (ii) In Tridip Kumar Dingal vs. State of West Bengal, (2009) 1 SCC 768 it was observed as follows: “57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ-Court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime [vide State of M.P. and Another vs. Bhailal Bhai, (1964) 6 SCR 261 , Moon Mills vs. Industrial Court, Bombay, AIR 1967 SC 1450 , Bhoop Singh vs. Union of India and Others, (1992) 2 SCR 969 ]. This principle applies even in case of an infringement of fundamental right [vide Trilokchand Motichand vs. H.B. Munshi, (1969) 1 SCC 110 , Durga Prasad vs. Chief Controller, (1969) 1 SCC 185 , Rabindranath Bose vs. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 84 ]. 58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to when a person can approach a Court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before the Court depending on and vary from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose.” 46. We have taken note of the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent-writ petitioner that the present case does not involve unsettling of any settled position nor would adversely affect any accrued right of any third party. Further, it is a clear case of claim of discrimination amongst persons who are similarly situated as the appellant-authorities given the benefit of retrospective regularization to these persons and such, it can amount to violation of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. It has been submitted that there cannot be any estoppel against violation of fundamental right and what the petitioner is seeking is parity in treatment and such the delay in filing the writ petition cannot be a ground for denying the relief claimed. 47. While examining this aspect, we have kept in mind the important dates which have a bearing on this issue of delay which has occurred: (i) The claim relates to a period occurring in 1990, of which the petitioner had been making several representations continuously and the petitioner was made to understand that his case would be considered. (ii) The Managing Director wrote to the Chairman of the Corporation in 2002 to approve the grant of retrospective regularization to respondent-writ petition. (iii) However, before his case was considered, the petitioner retired from service on 31.05.2007, though he submitted several representations prior to his retirement on 10.08.2006 and 21.11.2006. (iv) After he retired from service on 31.05.2007, he filed a representation to the authorities on 14.11.2011 which was followed by three representations dated 28.05.2012, 27.08.2013 and 10.04.2014 before filing of the writ petition on 23.05.2014. 48. (iv) After he retired from service on 31.05.2007, he filed a representation to the authorities on 14.11.2011 which was followed by three representations dated 28.05.2012, 27.08.2013 and 10.04.2014 before filing of the writ petition on 23.05.2014. 48. From the above, what can be ascertained is that the writ petitioner had been consistently pursuing his claim for grant of retrospective regularization, though there is period of silence for about four years after he retired from service on 31.05.2007. He submitted the representation on 14.11.2011, that is, about four years after his retirement from service. Under normal circumstances, this silence for four long years would have made us the inference that he is no more interested in his claim and has acquiesced to the inaction of the authorities and thus, reject his claim. Yet, he sought to resurrect his claim by submitting his representations on 14.11.2011, 28.05.2012, 27.08.2013 and lastly, on 10.04.2014 before he filed his writ petition on 23.05.2014. 49. Under the aforesaid facts and circumstances, can it be said that his claim is stale, and that he had slept over his rights and acquiesced to the inaction of the authorities and hence estopped from making his claim through this belated writ petition filed on 23.05.2024? 50. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case as have been revealed, we are of the view that in spite of certain delay which is clearly discernible, the said delay cannot be said to be fatal, and it cannot be said that he was sleeping over his rights so as to deny consideration of his claim. 51. We have been persuaded to take this view for the following reasons: (i) The claim of the respondent-petitioner does not appear to be wholly impermissible in view of the fact that in respect of similarly situated cases the authorities had given retrospective regularization to two officers who were junior to the petitioner. (ii) We have also noted that the aforesaid two junior officers, were granted the benefit of retrospective regularization long after their retirement. The respondent no. 3, Vidhya Sagar, retired from service in July 1995, but on his request, he was given retrospective regularization to the post of Deputy General Manager for the period he was working on in charge basis as Deputy General Manager vice order dated 13.07.2000 by promoting him with retrospective effect from 01.02.1994. (iii) Similarly, the respondent no. The respondent no. 3, Vidhya Sagar, retired from service in July 1995, but on his request, he was given retrospective regularization to the post of Deputy General Manager for the period he was working on in charge basis as Deputy General Manager vice order dated 13.07.2000 by promoting him with retrospective effect from 01.02.1994. (iii) Similarly, the respondent no. 3, Mohammad Abdullah retired from service on 31.05.1997, who was also asked to work as Deputy General Manager in the year 1992 and was given the benefit of retrospective regularization on analogy of the respondent no. 2 with effect from 08.10.1992 vide order dated 30.10.2001. (iv) Thus, if two juniors’ officers were given retrospective regularization long after their retirement, the petitioner certainly deserves to be considered for grant of similar benefit. (v) We have also noted that when the then Managing Director of JKSRTC was recommending the case of the respondent-writ petitioner on 20.06.2002, it was clearly mentioned that the writ petitioner was one single officer in the Corporation in the Kashmir Province who had rendered service very dedicatedly and served the people, Government, Security Forces and the Army in the most difficult conditions and functioned at the risk of his life and he should be given due credit and appreciation for the work he had rendered. (vi) The consideration of claim of the petitioner will not involve unsettling any settled position under the Corporation nor would it adversely affect any accrued right of any third person. (vii) We do not consider his certain inactions at certain period to be an act of acquiescence which amount to laches by sleeping over his claim, in view of the persistent and continuous representations submitted by him as mentioned above, in spite of certain gaps and delay which has occurred. Accordingly, we do not consider this delay to be fatal to his claim. 52. For the reasons discuss above, we dismiss the appeal and uphold the impugned judgment and order dated 02.11.2021 passed by the Ld. Single Judge in SWP No. 1044/2014 by directing the appellants to consider the case of the petitioner for regularization to the post of Deputy General Managing with effect from 06.07.1990, and if such benefit is granted, he shall be also provided with all the consequential benefits as given to other respondents no. Single Judge in SWP No. 1044/2014 by directing the appellants to consider the case of the petitioner for regularization to the post of Deputy General Managing with effect from 06.07.1990, and if such benefit is granted, he shall be also provided with all the consequential benefits as given to other respondents no. 2 and 3 within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 53. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with the above observations and directions.