JUDGMENT : Sharad Kumar Sharma, J. This C482 Application itself has a chequered background. It’s not in dispute, that the present applicant had solemnized the marriage with respondent No. 2 on 07.03.1988. Seeking its dissolution, the applicant had filed a Suit, being Suit No. 80 of 1997, Kharak Singh Dhapola Vs. Sarojini Dhapola, under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, which was decreed by the learned trial Court vide its judgment dated 17.08.2001. 2. Being aggrieved against the judgment and decree dated 17.08.2001, rendered by the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Almora, under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, a Civil Appeal, being Civil Appeal No. 5 of 2021, Sarojini Dhapola Vs. Kharak Singh Dhapola, was preferred by the respondent wife, which was allowed and as a consequence thereto, the judgment of the learned trial Court was set aside by the judgment and decree dated 23.09.2003. Meaning thereby, the effect setting aside of the trial Court’s judgment by the First Appellate Court would ultimately result into revival of the matrimonial relationship between the plaintiff and the opposite party which was being sought to be dissolved. 3. It is not even that. After the appellate Court’s judgment dated 23.09.2003, the applicant had preferred a Second Appeal, being Second Appeal No. 101 of 2003, Kharak Singh Dhapola Vs. Sarojini Dhapola, and the same was dismissed by the High Court on 23.03.2009. The resultant effect of dismissal of the Second Appeal, which has attained finality would be, that the matrimony of 07.03.1988 still survives in the eyes of law. 4. It’s, that during the intervening period, the applicant had admittedly solemnized the second marriage with one Indu Dhapola, and as such, the opposite party No. 2 i.e. Sarojini Dhapola, had filed a complaint case, being Complaint Case No. 2019 of 2015, Sarojini Dhapola Vs. Kharak Singh Dhapola, for prosecuting the present applicant for the offences under Sections 494, 504 of IPC to be read with Section 357 of CrPC, for the grant of compensation as per U.P. Amendment as made applicable under the Reorganization Act. 5. The opposite party No. 2 was examined under Section 246 of CrPC. Kharak Singh Dhapola, for prosecuting the present applicant for the offences under Sections 494, 504 of IPC to be read with Section 357 of CrPC, for the grant of compensation as per U.P. Amendment as made applicable under the Reorganization Act. 5. The opposite party No. 2 was examined under Section 246 of CrPC. The other witnesses who were otherwise not listed among the list of witnesses, as provided by opposite party No. 2 herein, under sub-Section (2) of Section 204 of the CrPC, as it was supplied by the opposite party on 12.04.2022 i.e. by the opposite party No. 2. 6. The opposite party No. 2 thus had filed an Application under Section 311 of CrPC, praying for that Indu Dhapola and Km. Sakshi @ Shruti Dhapola, i.e. the daughter of the present applicant born from the second wife Indu Dhapola and the Principal of Nirmala Convent School, may be summoned to be examined while exercising its powers under Section 311 of CrPC. 7. The Application under Section 311 of CrPC in Criminal Case No. 2019 of 2015, came up for consideration before the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Haldwani, District Nainital, and the learned Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, vide its order dated 05.07.2022 had partly allowed the application and had summoned Indu Dhapola, allegedly the second wife of the present applicant, and on 27.08.2022, the learned Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, held that since the statement under Section 313 of CrPC has already been recorded and at that stage the complainant has not adduced any additional evidence, hence she cannot be permitted to adduce additional evidence under Section 311 of CrPC, in order to fill up the lacunas of evidence during the course of the trial, which the applicant has faced. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgment dated 27.08.2022, the opposite party No. 2 filed a CriminalRevision, being Criminal Revision No. 126 of 2022, Smt. Sarojni Dhapola Vs. State of Uttarakhand and others, which has been partially allowed by the Court of learned Revisional Court of Second Additional Sessions Judge, Haldwani, District Nainital, by the impugned judgment under challenge in the present C482 Application dated 03.03.2023, whereby by the judgment passed by the learned trial Court, was partly modified and the direction was issued that the Principal of Nirmala Convent School, may be summoned along with the records. It is being aggrieved against this order, which has been put to challenge by the applicant in the present C482 Application. The challenge, as given by the present applicant in the C482 Application is on the following grounds:- 9. Firstly, while giving challenge to the said order, the learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that as against the order passed on an Application under Section 311 of CrPC, no revision would be maintainable. In fact, if the revisional Court’s order itself is taken into consideration, the question of jurisdiction it ought to have been raised by the party contesting the proceedings at the first available opportunity. He cannot take the advantage of his own mistake, by participating in the proceedings and after the judgment being rendered against him when the same is put to challenge before the superior Court, then take a plea of jurisdiction, because if the question of jurisdiction goes to the basic sustainability of the proceedings, it is rather the responsibility of thepresent applicant he ought to have opposed the same at the stage of inception of the proceedings itself and the logic behind is that, for example, had it been if the revisional Court had dismissed the revision of opposite party No. 2, in all probability and under all rationale, the applicant might not have taken this plea about the sustainability of the revision on the ground, that since it is being an interlocutory order, the revision would not lie. Thus once he had submitted to the jurisdiction of the proceedings and has contested the same on its merits, he cannot upon loosing the case take a somersaulted stand about the maintainability of the principal proceedings. As this would in itself be an abuse of process of law and wasting the valuable time of the Court, but putting a challenge to it on loosing the case. This is what has been laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the following authorities, as reported in 2005 (7) SCC 791 , Harshad Chiman Lal Modi Vs. DLF Universal Ltd. and Another, the relevant observation is extracted hereunder:- “30. We are unable to uphold the contention. The jurisdiction of a court may be classified into several categories. The important categories are (i) territorial or local jurisdiction; (ii) pecuniary jurisdiction; and (iii) jurisdiction over the subject-matter. DLF Universal Ltd. and Another, the relevant observation is extracted hereunder:- “30. We are unable to uphold the contention. The jurisdiction of a court may be classified into several categories. The important categories are (i) territorial or local jurisdiction; (ii) pecuniary jurisdiction; and (iii) jurisdiction over the subject-matter. So far as territorial and pecuniary jurisdictions are concerned, objection to such jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in any case at or before settlement of issues. The law is well settled on the point that if such objection is not taken at the earliest, it cannot be allowed to be taken at a subsequent stage. Jurisdiction as to subject-matter, however, is totally distinct and stands on a different footing. Where a court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit by reason of any limitation imposed by statute, charter or commission, it cannot take up the cause or matter. An order passed by a court having no jurisdiction is a nullity.” 11. A similar view has been expressed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a judgment reported in 2019 (3) SCC 594 , Sneh Lata Goel Vs. Pushplata and others, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court, in its paras 12, 13 & 14, which are extracted hereunder, has observed that the objection to the jurisdiction has had to be raised before the Court at the first instance or at the earliest available opportunity. “12. In assessing the merits of the rival submissions, it would, at the outset, be necessary to advert to the provisions of Section 21 CPC. “21. Objections to jurisdiction.—(1) No objection as to the place of suing shall be allowed by any appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and in all cases where issues are settled at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. (2) No objection as to the competence of a court with reference to the pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction shall be allowed by any appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity, and, in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice. (3) No objection as to the competence of the executing court with reference to the local limits of its jurisdiction shall be allowed by any appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the executing court at the earliest possible opportunity, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice.” 13. Sub-section (1) of Section 21 provides that before raising an objection to territorial jurisdiction before an appellate or revisional court, two conditions precedent must be fulfilled: (i) The objection must be taken in the court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity; and (ii) There has been a consequent failure of justice. This provision which the legislature has designedly adopted would make it abundantly clear that an objection to the want of territorial jurisdiction does not travel to the root of or to the inherent lack of jurisdiction of a civil court to entertain the suit. Hence, it has to be raised before the court of first instance at the earliest opportunity, and in all cases where issues are settled, on or before such settlement. Moreover, it is only where there is a consequent failure of justice that an objection as to the place of suing can be entertained. Both these conditions have to be satisfied. 14. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents has submitted that the objection as to the lack of territorial jurisdiction was raised in the written statement before the trial court. But evidently the suit was decreed ex parte after the respondents failed to participate in the proceedings. The provisions of Section 21(1) contain a clear legislative mandate that an objection of this nature has to be raised at the earliest possible opportunity, before issues are settled. Moreover, no such objection can be allowed to be raised even by an appellate or revisional jurisdiction, unless both sets of conditions are fulfilled.” 12. The reason of the mandate is that if the Court ceased with the proceedings is not competent to decide the matter, then the party and the Court too should not be forced to venture into decide the matter on merits and upon being unsuccessful the unsuccessful party cannot take the liberty to raise the objection that the Court was not competent to decide the revision when he himself to address the Court on merits of the revision. 13. In the matters of Nusli Neville Wadia Vs. 13. In the matters of Nusli Neville Wadia Vs. Ivory Properties and others, as reported in 2020 (6) SCC 557 , though it was a matter relating to a civil case, but the wider principles about the competence of Court to try a case would be equally applicable in principle, in the present case where it relates to a question of deciding the jurisdiction. The ‘word’ jurisdiction has been interpreted by the Hon’ble Apex Court in para 20 and 21 of the said judgment, which are extracted hereunder, which provides for it’s a power of the Court to decide not a power merely to decide correctly. “20. Jurisdiction is the power to decide and not merely the power to decide correctly. Jurisdiction is the authority of law to act officially. It is an authority of law to act officially in a particular matter in hand. It is the power to take cognizance and decide the cases. It is the power to decide rightly or wrongly. It is the power to hear and determine. Same is the foundation of judicial proceedings. It does not depend upon the correctness of the decision made. It is the power to decide justiciable controversy and includes questions of law as well as facts on merits. Jurisdiction is the right to hear and determine. It does not depend upon whether a decision is right or wrong. Jurisdiction means power to entertain a suit, consider merits, and render binding decisions, and "merits" means the various elements which enter into or qualify plaintiff's right to the relief sought. If the law confers a power to render a judgment or decree, then the court has jurisdiction. The court must have control over the subject matter, which comes within classification limits of law under which Court is established and functions. 21. The word “jurisdiction” is derived from Latin words "juris" and "dico," meaning "I speak by the law" and does not relate to rights of parties as between each other but to the power of the court. Jurisdiction relates to a class of cases to which a particular case belongs. Jurisdiction is the authority by which a judicial officer takes cognizance and decides the cases. It only presupposes the existence of a duly constituted court having control over subject matter which comes within classification limits of the law under which court has been established. Jurisdiction relates to a class of cases to which a particular case belongs. Jurisdiction is the authority by which a judicial officer takes cognizance and decides the cases. It only presupposes the existence of a duly constituted court having control over subject matter which comes within classification limits of the law under which court has been established. It should have control over the parties litigant, control over the parties' territory, it may also relate to pecuniary as well as the nature of the class of cases. Jurisdiction is generally understood as the authority to decide, render a judgment, inquire into the facts, to apply the law, and to pronounce a judgment. When there is the want of general power to act, the court has no jurisdiction. When the court has the power to inquire into the facts, apply the law, render binding judgment, and enforce it, the court has jurisdiction. Judgment within a jurisdiction has to be immune from collateral attack on the ground of nullity. It has co-relation with the constitutional and statutory power of tribunal or court to hear and determine. It means the power or capacity fundamentally to entertain, hear, and determine.” 14. Jurisdiction is an authority vested in the Court to decide a foundational issue which is raised before it. 15. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment in para 62 has observed on the basis of the judgment reported in 2006 (3) SCC 634 , Gunwantbhai Mulchand Shah and Others Vs. Anton Elis Farel and others, that raising of an objection to a territorial jurisdiction of the Court or with regard to the subject which the Court is dealing with, has had to be raised at the first instance i.e. at an earliest available opportunity. Para 62 of the said judgment is extracted hereunder:- “62. In Gunwantbhai Mulchand Shah v. Anton Elis Farel and others, (2006) 3 SCC 634 , the suit was filed for specific performance. The Court held that the question of limitation in the facts could not have been decided as a preliminary issue. The suit could not have been dismissed as barred by limitation for the relief of specific performance. Though the Court held that there was jurisdiction, the matter was remitted to the trial court to decide all the issues, including limitation after parties adduced evidence. The suit could not have been dismissed as barred by limitation for the relief of specific performance. Though the Court held that there was jurisdiction, the matter was remitted to the trial court to decide all the issues, including limitation after parties adduced evidence. In Indian Bank v. Maharashtra State Cooperative Marketing Federation Ltd., (1998) 5 SCC 69 , it is observed that there is jurisdiction to entertain when the question is of applicability of Section 10. This Court in Sneh Lata Goel v. Pushplata and others, (2019) 3 SCC 594 observed that given the provisions of Section 21 of CPC, no objection as to the place of suing should be allowed by the appellate court unless there is a consequent failure of justice. An objection raised in adjudicating court was as to territorial jurisdiction, which did not travel to the root or to the inherent lack of jurisdiction of a civil court to entertain the suit. The competence to try a case has been considered in Hiralal Patni v. Kali Nath, AIR 1962 SC 199 referred to in Sneh Lata Goel (supra), in which this Court has observed thus: “13. Subsection (1) of Section 21 provides that before raising an objection to territorial jurisdiction before an appellate or revisional court, two conditions precedent must be fulfilled: (i) The objection must be taken in the court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity; and (ii) There has been a consequent failure of justice. This provision which the legislature has designedly adopted would make it abundantly clear that an objection to the want of territorial jurisdiction does not travel to the root of or to the inherent lack of jurisdiction of a civil court to entertain the suit. Hence, it has to be raised before the court of first instance at the earliest opportunity, and in all cases where issues are settled, on or before such settlement. Moreover, it is only where there is a consequent failure of justice that an objection as to the place of suing can be entertained. Both these conditions have to be satisfied. 14. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents has submitted that the objection as to the lack of territorial jurisdiction was raised in the written statement before the trial court. But evidently, the suit was decreed ex parte after the respondents failed to participate in the proceedings. Both these conditions have to be satisfied. 14. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents has submitted that the objection as to the lack of territorial jurisdiction was raised in the written statement before the trial court. But evidently, the suit was decreed ex parte after the respondents failed to participate in the proceedings. The provisions of Section 21(1) contain a clear legislative mandate that an objection of this nature has to be raised at the earliest possible opportunity before issues are settled. Moreover, no such objection can be allowed to be raised even by an appellate or revisional jurisdiction, unless both sets of conditions are fulfilled.” It is in the context of the inherent lack of jurisdiction to entertain the suit, the expression has been used in Section 9A. IN RE: MIXED QUESTION OF LAW AND FACT AND ORDER VII RULE 11 CPC 16. That means there is a division in the interpretation that the first instance would relate to where it is the Court of principle jurisdiction which is deciding the matter and the terminology used at an earliest possible opportunity, would relate to when the question of jurisdiction entails consideration at an appellate or a revisional stage, and if the same has not been raised before the Court at the earliest available opportunity, when the issues are settled, the settlement thus arrived at, there is a consequential failure for raising of an objection at the stage of suing cannot be a condition which could be agitated or raised before the superior Court about the lack of jurisdiction being vested with the Court to decide the matter. 17. The second argument extended by the learned counsel for the applicant is that after recording of the statement under Section 313 of CrPC, no witness could be summoned under the provisions of Section 311 of CrPC. For that purposes, the reference is made to the provisions contained under Section 311 of CrPC itself becomes necessary to be considered. Section 311 of CPC is extracted hereunder:- “311. Power to summon material witness, or examine person present. Any Court may, at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, summon any person as a witness, or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or. Section 311 of CPC is extracted hereunder:- “311. Power to summon material witness, or examine person present. Any Court may, at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, summon any person as a witness, or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or. recall and re- examine any person already examined; and the Court shall summon and examine or recall and reexamine any such person if his evidence appears to it to be essential to the just decision of the case.” 18. The provisions of Section 311 of CrPC uses some of the adjectives, which are required to be referred to that the powers which are to be exercised by the Court under Section 311 of CrPC, it uses the word ‘may’, that means it is exclusively left at the wisdom of the Court, based on facts, that when under the given set of circumstances of a particular case, when the Court feels it necessary to summon a material witness. It is exclusively the prerogative, wisdom or rationale of the Court to summon the witness in order to facilitate an effective adjudication of the case on its own merits. 19. The argument of the learned counsel for the applicant is that the witness cannot be summoned after the stage of the proceedings under Section 313 of CrPC is concerned, the answer to it would be, that the provisions contained under Section 311 of CrPC itself do not legislatively create any absolute restriction, as such that after recording the statement under Section 313 of CrPC, the summoning of material witness, which may have vital bearing to a case cannot be resorted to by passing an order under Section 311 of CrPC, for the reason being that the legislature has used the word ‘at any stage of inquiry, trial or other proceedings’. This scope of entertaining of an application under Section 311 of CrPC, do not exclude the entertainment of an application after the proceedings have reached to the stage under Section 313 of CrPC. 20. Learned counsel for the applicant has referred to a judgment rendered by the Madras High Court in the matters of Cr. R.C. No. 1000 of 1998, Dandy Knit Garments & Another Vs. M/s Subiksha Spinners (P) Ltd, particularly, he has made reference to para 8 of the said judgment, the same is extracted hereunder:- 8. 20. Learned counsel for the applicant has referred to a judgment rendered by the Madras High Court in the matters of Cr. R.C. No. 1000 of 1998, Dandy Knit Garments & Another Vs. M/s Subiksha Spinners (P) Ltd, particularly, he has made reference to para 8 of the said judgment, the same is extracted hereunder:- 8. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the respondent cannot be allowed to examine a witness to fill up the lacuna. Already P.Ws. 1 to 3 were examined and the petitioners were also examined under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The respondent filed an application under Section 311 of the CrPC to examine one Thiru L. Subramaniam. The respondent also wanted to mark a document said to have been given by the other directors of the company authorising Thiru L. Subramaniam to look after the management of the mill. The resolution copy of the other directors given in favour of Thiru L. Subramaniam was not mentioned either in the complaint or in the course of evidence. Even the power of attorney filed in the case does not indicate that Thiru L. Subramaniam was authorised by the other directors. Thiru L. Subramaniam was also not cited as a witness in the complaint and, as such, it was stated that he cannot be examined as an additional witness. Defects cannot be cured by marking of a document at a belated stage. The respondent has come forward with a specific case that L. Subramaniam gave power of attorney to Swami Anandan to conduct the case. This being so, the present application filed by the respondent under Section 311 of the CrPC ought not to have been entertained by the trial court.” 21. The restrictions imposed therein the judgment of Hon’ble Madras High Court, was in the context, when PWs 1 and 3 were already examined, the petitioners have also examined the witnesses under Section 313 of CrPC and it was at that stage that the Application under Section 311 of CrPC was filed by the respondent to examine the certain witness, whom the respondent wanted to be marked to be examined in relation to the document, which related to the affairs of the company, as engaged consideration therein, in the said judgment. 22. 22. If the said judgment is taken into consideration, in fact, para 8 is only a contention which had been raised by the learned counsel for the applicant, during the course of his argument, it was not a ratio of law laid down by the Hon’ble Madras High Court, that as if the law was creating any absolute bar, that after the stage of the proceedings Section 313 of CrPC, no material witness could be permitted to be examined under Section 311 of the CrPC. This was in the context, that since the matter related to the affairs of the company, it was the attorney holder, who was sought to be summoned therein by the Court under Section 311 of CrPC for being examined as an additional witness, who was actually in the helm of affairs of the company. 23. The aforesaid principle will not factually apply in the instant case, which happens to be trying the present applicant for the offences under Section 494, 504 of IPC to be read with Section 357 of the CrPC. Apart from that, the learned counsel for the applicant has also argued, that there happens to be already a prior order which was passed by this Court for expediting the proceedings of the trial Court. The directions given by the High Court to expedite the proceedings of the trial will not itself create any procedural restriction, as such for the Courts to create any legal embargo or impediment for the Courts to resort to avoid or not to adhere to the prescribed procedure provided under law, particularly when it affects a valuable right of the party and which is necessary for the purposes of disposal of the case. Direction for expeditious disposal of a case doesn’t mean that the procedural part of a proceedings would be eradicated or could be avoided by the Court, merely because a superior Court has issued a direction to decide the matter expeditiously. 24. The argument of the learned counsel for the applicant is, that since there happens to be a prior order passed by the High Court for expeditious disposal of the proceedings, that would create an impediment in considering the application under Section 311 of CrPC. 24. The argument of the learned counsel for the applicant is, that since there happens to be a prior order passed by the High Court for expeditious disposal of the proceedings, that would create an impediment in considering the application under Section 311 of CrPC. In response to the said argument, this Court is of the opinion, that in the light of the judgment reported in 2006 (5) SCC 386 , K.P. Sudhakaran and Another Vs. State of Kerala and others, the Hon’ble Apex Court, in its para 18, which is extracted hereunder, has observed, that merely because there is delay in disposal of the proceedings that itself will not defeat the procedural right of the party litigating. 25. The procedure contemplated under law, has to be commonly and without any special distinction, as such, has to be applied to all the persons, in order to enable them to avail the best possible opportunity to lead their evidence. Para 18 of the said judgment of K.P. Sudhakaran and Another (supra) is extracted hereunder:- “18. The learned counsel for the contesting private respondents lastly submitted that by now the appellants and the contesting private respondents have all been promoted from the posts of LDC to UDC and several of them have also been promoted as Sub-Registrars and the matter should not be unsettled after such a long time. We find that the matter has been continuously under litigation ever since 1990 and the delay in disposal cannot defeat the rights of appellants.” 26. The learned counsel for the applicant has referred to some of the judgments, which though not relevant under the backdrop of the present case, where he has observed that the aspect of bigamy to bring an offence under Section 494 would be exclusively be a domain to be established by the complaint, who has raised an allegation against the opposite party and that burden is to be discharged by him or her, who has raised an allegation. 27. 27. Filing of an Application under Section 311 of CrPC for summoning the witness in order to prove the factum of bigamy in order to bring an offence under Section 494 by summoning the Principal, in whose school the daughter, who was born out of the second matrimony was studying, was rather a relevant piece of document and evidence which was required to be considered by the Court in order to establish beyond doubt the fact of bigamy under Section 494. As the Second Appeal, arising out of the proceedings under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, filed by the applicant was dismissed, and hence the first marriage was still subsisting. 28. The learned counsel for the applicant has attempted to argue the matter in the context of the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court as reported 2009 (65) ACC 607, Sethuraman Vs. Rajamanickam he has referred to para 4, in order to substantiate his argument that the orders passed under Section 311 of CrPC are interlocutory orders and no revision would lie. “4. Secondly, what was not realized was that the order passed by the Trial Court refusing to call the documents and rejecting the application under Section 311 Cr.P.C., were interlocutory orders and as such, the revision against those orders was clearly barred under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. The Trial Court, in its common order, had clearly mentioned that the cheque was admittedly signed by the respondent/accused and the only defence that was raised, was that his signed cheques were lost and that the appellant/complainant had falsely used one such cheque. The Trial Court also recorded a finding that the documents were not necessary. This order did not, in any manner, decide anything finally. Therefore, both the orders, i.e., one on the application under Section 91 Cr.P.C. for production of documents and other on the application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. for recalling the witness, were the orders of interlocutory nature, in which case, under Section 397(2), revision was clearly not maintainable. Under such circumstances, the learned Judge could not have interfered in his revisional jurisdiction. The impugned judgment is clearly incorrect in law and would have to be set aside. It is accordingly set aside. The appeals are allowed.” 29. Under such circumstances, the learned Judge could not have interfered in his revisional jurisdiction. The impugned judgment is clearly incorrect in law and would have to be set aside. It is accordingly set aside. The appeals are allowed.” 29. Apart from the fact that this ground was not taken or chosen to be argued by the applicant, when he was participating in the proceedings under Section 311 of CrPC, he cannot be an opportunist because, if the converse position of the result of litigation is perceived and is taken into consideration, had the revision being dismissed, and the applicant would have been a beneficiary of the proceedings after participation of the same obviously he wouldn’t have raised this plea at all, contrary to his interest. 30. This has been a consistent argument of the learned counsel for the applicant, that the provisions contained under Section 311 of CrPC cannot be invoked when the proceedings of the trial has crossed the stage under Section 313 of CrPC. 31. This question has been answered to the contrary by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a judgment reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 986, Varsha Garg Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others, it was arising out of a judgment of the Indore Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, in a proceedings emanating from a judgment which was rendered in C482 Application, in a matters relating to the offence under Section 302. The address and challenge given therein was to the correctness of rejecting the application under Section 311 of CrPC to summon the nodal officers for assessment of certain cellular titles for decoding the material, which would have been relevant for consideration of the trial. The question was, as to whether the said provision could be invoked after the stage of Section 313 of CrPC. 32. The Court while considering the language used under Section 311 of CrPC, which has been extracted above, in its para 31, 32 & 33 has observed, that the legislature, in its wisdom, while incorporating the provisions contained under Section 311 of CrPC, had provided that the Courts may summon any person or a witness at any stage. The relevant para Nos. 31, 32 & 33 of the judgment rendered in the judgment of Varsha Garg (supra) are extracted hereunder:- “31. The relevant para Nos. 31, 32 & 33 of the judgment rendered in the judgment of Varsha Garg (supra) are extracted hereunder:- “31. Having clarified that the bar under Section 301 is inapplicable and that the appellant is well placed to pursue this appeal, we now examine Section 311 of CrPC. Section 311 provides that the Court “may”:(i) Summon any person as a witness or to examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness; and (ii) Recall and re-examine any person who has already been examined. 32. This power can be exercised at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under the CrPC. The latter part of Section 311 states that the Court “shall” summon and examine or recall and re-examine any such person “if his evidence appears to the Court to be essential to the just decision of the case”. Section 311 contains a power upon the Court in broad terms. The statutory provision must be read purposively, to achieve the intent of the statute to aid in the discovery of truth. 33. The first part of the statutory provision which uses the expression “may” postulates that the power can be exercised at any stage of an inquiry, trial or other proceeding. The latter part of the provision mandates the recall of a witness by the Court as it uses the expression “shall summon and examine or recall and reexamine any such person if his evidence appears to it to be essential to the just decision of the case”. Essentiality of the evidence of the person who is to be examined coupled with the need for the just decision of the case constitute the touchstone which must guide the decision of the Court. The first part of the statutory provision is discretionary while the latter part is obligatory. 33. Thus, this Court is of the view, that this power can be exercised at any stage means a stage of inquiry or a trial or other proceedings under the CrPC, which will not exclude the proceedings at the stage under Section 313 of CrPC. 34. A similar view was expressed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matters of Zahira Habibullah Sheikh (5) and Another Vs. 34. A similar view was expressed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matters of Zahira Habibullah Sheikh (5) and Another Vs. State of Gujarat and others, as reported in 2006 (3) SCC 374 , where the Hon’ble Apex Court, in the said judgment, which was yet again arising out of the Criminal Proceedings, was considering the implications of Section 311 of CrPC and the relevant observations has been made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in para 27, 28 & 29 of the said judgment, which are extracted hereunder:- “27. The object underlying Section 311 of the Code is that there may not be failure of justice on account of mistake of either party in bringing the valuable evidence on record or leaving ambiguity in the statements of the witnesses examined from either side. The determinative factor is whether it is essential to the just decision of the case. The section is not limited only for the benefit of the accused, and it will not be an improper exercise of the powers of the court to summon a witness under the section merely because the evidence supports the case of the prosecution and not that of the accused. The section is a general section which applies to all proceedings, enquiries and trials under the Code and empowers the Magistrate to issue summons to any witness at any stage of such proceedings, trial or enquiry. In Section 311 the significant expression that occurs is “at any stage of any inquiry or trial or other proceeding under this Code”. It is, however, to be borne in mind that whereas the section confers a very wide power on the court on summoning witnesses, the discretion conferred is to be exercised judiciously, as the wider the power the greater is the necessity for application of judicial mind. 28. As indicated above, the section is wholly discretionary. The second part of it imposes upon the Magistrate an obligation : it is, that the court shall summon and examine all persons whose evidence appears to be essential to the just decision of the case. It is a cardinal rule in the law of evidence that the best available evidence should be brought before the court. Sections 60, 64 and 91 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (in short “the Evidence Act”) are based on this rule. It is a cardinal rule in the law of evidence that the best available evidence should be brought before the court. Sections 60, 64 and 91 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (in short “the Evidence Act”) are based on this rule. The court is not empowered under the provisions of the Code to compel either the prosecution or the defence to examine any particular witness or witnesses on their side. This must be left to the parties. But in weighing the evidence, the court can take note of the fact that the best available evidence has not been given, and can draw an adverse inference. The court will often have to depend on intercepted allegations made by the parties, or on inconclusive inference from facts elicited in the evidence. In such cases, the court has to act under the second part of the section. Sometimes the examination of witnesses as directed by the court may result in what is thought to be “filling of loopholes”. That is purely a subsidiary factor and cannot be taken into account. Whether the new evidence is essential or not must of course depend on the facts of each case, and has to be determined by the Presiding Judge. 29. The object of Section 311 is to bring on record evidence not only from the point of view of the accused and the prosecution but also from the point of view of the orderly society. If a witness called by the court gives evidence against the complainant, he should be allowed an opportunity to cross-examine. The right to cross-examine a witness who is called by a court arises not under the provisions of Section 311, but under the Evidence Act which gives a party the right to crossexamine a witness who is not his own witness. Since a witness summoned by the court could not be termed a witness of any particular party, the court should give the right of cross-examination to the complainant. These aspects were highlighted in Jamatraj Kewalji Govani v. State of Maharashtra [ (1967) 3 SCR 415 : AIR 1968 SC 178 : 1968 Cri LJ 231]. 35. Since a witness summoned by the court could not be termed a witness of any particular party, the court should give the right of cross-examination to the complainant. These aspects were highlighted in Jamatraj Kewalji Govani v. State of Maharashtra [ (1967) 3 SCR 415 : AIR 1968 SC 178 : 1968 Cri LJ 231]. 35. Widely speaking, the Hon’ble Apex Court, by virtue of the aforesaid paragraphs, it provides that Section 311 of CrPC is not circumscribed only for the benefit of an accused or any party to the proceedings, but rather it only enables the Magistrate to effectively decide an issue by summoning any of the witnesses whose expression may be significant to decide the matter and when the legislature uses the word at any stage of inquiry or a trial, it should be kept in mind, that this implications of the language used under Section 311 of CrPC is wide enough to include to summon the witnesses at the discretion of the Court to judiciously decide the matter and which could be at any stage thus the summoning of witness would not be bared if the proceedings has reached the stage of 313 of CrPC. 36. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment of Zahira Habibullah Sheikh (supra), had even gone to an extent to lay down, that the basic intention of Section 311 of CrPC is to bring on record all the relevant evidence and none of the parties to the proceedings may be deprived of their legal right to establish their innocence or to establish the noninvolvement of an accused person in commission of offence which was being tried, by depriving him or her an opportunity to adduce evidence, which he or she otherwise thinks it to be relevant and necessary for the purposes to decide the issue about the involvement of an accused person in commission of offence or to the contrary. In fact, this proposition of the Hon’ble Apex Court, is based upon the principle that all important and star witness are to be called upon at the discretion of the Court when the Court on an Application under Section 311 of CrPC arrives at a conclusion that adducing of an evidence by summoning a person or a document would facilitate in effective decision to be rendered by the Court in a controversial criminal matter, thus no bar as such has been imposed by the legislature, that after or during the stage of the proceedings, under Section 313 of CrPC, Section 311 of CrPC cannot be invoked. 37. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in yet another judgment has almost taken an identical view as detailed above in the judgment reported in 2008 (15) SCC 652 , Hanuman Ram Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court was scrutinizing the judgment of the learned Single Judge of Rajasthan High Court, pertaining to the correctness of the order rejecting the application under Section 311 of CrPC. The Hon’ble Apex Court in para 6 & 7, while making reference to the provisions contained under Section 311 of CrPC and had extracted paras 26, 27 & 29 of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a judgment reported in AIR 1968 SC 178 , Jamatraj Kewalji Govani Vs. State of Maharashtra, has observed that recording of an evidence under Section 311 of CrPC is only from the perspective, that the accused and the prosecution must also facilitate the proceedings, from the view point in order to defend themselves after enabling them to cross examine the witnesses on an evidence to be adduced by them or by producing any additional document, which may be necessary for establishing an innocence for accused of an offence or for proving the innocence. Para 6 and 7 of the said judgment of Hanuman Ram (supra) are extracted hereunder:- “6. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the High Court ought (sic not) to have accepted the prayer as made because the parameters governing Section 311 of the Code had no application to the facts of the case. Learned counsel for the State supported the stand of the appellant. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the High Court ought (sic not) to have accepted the prayer as made because the parameters governing Section 311 of the Code had no application to the facts of the case. Learned counsel for the State supported the stand of the appellant. Learned counsel for Respondents 2 and 3 submitted that ultimately the best evidence has to be brought on record for doing justice and the High Court's order, therefore, does not suffer from any infirmity. 7. “26. … reference may be made to Section 311 of the Code which reads as follows: ‘311. Power to summon material witness, or examine person present.—Any court may, at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, summon any person as a witness, or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or recall and re-examine any person already examined; and the court shall summon and examine or recall and reexamine any such person if his evidence appears to it to be essential to the just decision of the case.’ The section is manifestly in two parts. Whereas the word used in the first part is ‘may’, the second part uses ‘shall’. In consequence, the first part gives purely discretionary authority to a criminal court and enables it at any stage of an enquiry, trial or proceeding under the Code (a) to summon anyone as a witness, or (b) to examine any person present in the court, or (c) to recall and re-examine any person whose evidence has already been recorded. On the other hand, the second part is mandatory and compels the court to take any of the aforementioned steps if the new evidence appears to it essential to the just decision of the case. This is a supplementary provision enabling, and in certain circumstances imposing on the court the duty of examining a material witness who would not be otherwise brought before it. It is couched in the widest possible terms and calls for no limitation, either with regard to the stage at which the powers of the court should be exercised, or with regard to the manner in which it should be exercised. It is couched in the widest possible terms and calls for no limitation, either with regard to the stage at which the powers of the court should be exercised, or with regard to the manner in which it should be exercised. It is not only the prerogative but also the plain duty of a court to examine such of those witnesses as it considers absolutely necessary for doing justice between the State and the subject. There is a duty cast upon the court to arrive at the truth by all lawful means and one of such means is the examination of witnesses of its own accord when for certain obvious reasons either party is not prepared to call witnesses who are known to be in a position to speak important relevant facts.27. The object underlying Section 311 of the Code is that there may not be failure of justice on account of mistake of either party in bringing the valuable evidence on record or leaving ambiguity in the statements of the witnesses examined from either side. The determinative factor is whether it is essential to the just decision of the case. The section is not limited only for the benefit of the accused, and it will not be an improper exercise of the powers of the court to summon a witness under the section merely because the evidence supports the case of the prosecution and not that of the accused. The section is a general section which applies to all proceedings, enquiries and trials under the Code and empowers the Magistrate to issue summons to any witness at any stage of such proceedings, trial or enquiry. In Section 311 the significant expression that occurs is ‘at any stage of any inquiry or trial or other proceeding under this Code’. It is, however, to be borne in mind that whereas the section confers a very wide power on the court on summoning witnesses, the discretion conferred is to be exercised judiciously, as the wider the power the greater is the necessity for application of judicial mind. 29. The object of Section 311 is to bring on record evidence not only from the point of view of the accused and the prosecution but also from the point of view of the orderly society. 29. The object of Section 311 is to bring on record evidence not only from the point of view of the accused and the prosecution but also from the point of view of the orderly society. If a witness called by the court gives evidence against the complainant, he should be allowed an opportunity to cross-examine. The right to cross-examine a witness who is called by a court arises not under the provisions of Section 311, but under the Evidence Act which gives a party the right to cross-examine a witness who is not his own witness. Since a witness summoned by the court could not be termed a witness of any particular party, the court should give the right of cross-examination to the complainant. These aspects were highlighted in Jamatraj Kewalji Govani v. State of Maharashtra [ AIR 1968 SC 178 ]” 38. Besides this, there is another reason, that an order under Section 311 of CrPC would have been an interlocutory order only when the application has been rejected in its totality. But, since some of the witnesses were summoned and others were leftover and declined to be summoned, which was rectified by the learned Revisional Court, this Court is of the view that summoning of a witness which is a material witness in order to substantiate his argument with regards to establishment of offence under Section 494, the impugned revisional Court’s order by virtue of which the Court has summoned the Principal of Nirmala Convent School along with the records, in order to establish the fact as to whether out of the second matrimony the daughter was born or not, would not be barred by the provisions contained under Section 311 of CrPC, nor would be barred by the principles which has been attempted to be argued by the learned counsel for the applicant in the context of the judgment of Sethurama (supra) as already answered earlier. 39. Owing to the aforesaid, this Court is of the view that C482 Application lacks merit and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.