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2023 DIGILAW 248 (CAL)

Saurav Roy v. Triveni Holdings Pvt. Ltd.

2023-02-16

PARTHA SARATHI CHATTERJEE, TAPABRATA CHAKRABORTY

body2023
JUDGMENT : TAPABRATA CHAKRABORTY, J. 1. The present appeal has been preferred challenging the judgment and decree dated 15th June, 2016 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) 2nd Court at Barasat, District-North 24 Parganas in Title Suit No. 74 of 2011. 2. The dispute amongst the parties is pertaining to a plot of land (including a two storied building) being plot no. 84 in Block-BC in Sector-I in Northern Salt Lake City Extension Area in the district of 24 Parganas (North). The genesis of the dispute involves five instruments being a tenancy agreement dated 1st July, 1993 between the lessee, namely, Sunil Kumar Roy (in short, Sunil) since deceased and the respondent no. 2, a memorandum of understanding dated 18th Februay,1994 between Sunil and Smt. Ganga Bohra, an agreement for construction dated 5th March,1994 between Sunil and M/s. J.P. Bohra & Company Private Limited, an agreement for tenancy dated 15th March, 1994 between Sunil and the respondent no. 2 and an agreement for tenancy dated 22nd February, 1995 between Sunil and the respondent no. 1. 3. The suit for declaration and injunction being Title Suit No. 74 of 2011 was preferred by Mira Roy (in short, Mira), widow of Sunil against M/s. Triveni Holdings Private Limited represented by its director Ganga Bohra and M/s. Argan Traders Private Limited represented by its director Jagadish Bohra. As the plaintiff’s son, namely, Saurav Roy (in short, Saurav) was not available at the time of filing of the suit, he was impleaded as a proforma defendant. During pendency of the appeal, Mira expired and Saurav was transposed as the appellant. 4. The plaint case is that Sunil applied to the Government of West Bengal for a lease of the land detailed in schedule-‘A’. Such lease was executed on 26th September, 1972 and possession was handed over to Sunil, who was employed under Damodar Valley Corporation. After his retirement, he was suffering from neurological problems and financial crunch, as such it became impossible for him to raise construction on the concerned plot above plinth level within the time stipulated in the deed, as per the sanction plan obtained on 26th March, 1993. Accordingly, Sunil approached the respondent no. 1 to provide finance for raising construction. The said respondent no. 1 along with the respondent no. Accordingly, Sunil approached the respondent no. 1 to provide finance for raising construction. The said respondent no. 1 along with the respondent no. 2 agreed to invest money to be adjusted towards the rental of the schedule property and to that effect a tenancy agreement was entered into by Sunil with the respondent nos.1 and 2 on 22nd February, 1995. By virtue of the said agreement the respondent no. 1 was inducted as tenant of the entire ground floor of the building with roof. At the time of such settlement, the defendants/respondents also procured Sunil’s signature on some blank stamp papers and demy papers. After the demise of Sunil on 20th June, 2007, Mira and Saurav applied for mutation and their names were duly incorporated in the records by the competent authority. Mira thereafter could ascertain that a further tenancy agreement was entered into by Sunil on 1st July, 1993. The building was constructed in the year 1996 and that at no point of time the respondents did ever pay any single penny to Sunil or his heirs. After the demise of Sunil on 20th June, 2007, Mira and Saurav approached the respondents on 1st March, 2011 to get back possession of the property upon liquidating the alleged loan amount of Rs. 5,28,000/- advanced to Sunil and to that effect the respondents were asked to furnish the accounts as regards the dues which they denied. In course of such interaction it was also disclosed by the respondents that Sunil had executed a purported will in their favour and on the basis of the same they have became the owners of the property. Admittedly, such loan amount along with interest had been liquidated through adjustment of rent and as such the respondents had no right to occupy the said property. Mira thereafter repeatedly requested the respondents to hand over possession of the property but in vain and as such she was constrained to prefer the suit. 5. The respondent nos.1 and 2 entered appearance and filed a written statement denying and disputing the contention of the plaintiff. It was categorically denied that signature of Sunil was obtained in blank papers and that Sunil at that juncture was suffering from neurological problems. 5. The respondent nos.1 and 2 entered appearance and filed a written statement denying and disputing the contention of the plaintiff. It was categorically denied that signature of Sunil was obtained in blank papers and that Sunil at that juncture was suffering from neurological problems. Upon denying the averments made in paragraphs 1 to 21 of the plaint, the respondents in paragraph 27 of the written statement admitted that Sunil was allotted the plot of land through a registered deed of lease and he got possession on 24th August, 1973. A sanction building plan was obtained on 26th March, 1993 and thereafter Sunil, Mira and Saurav approached the respondent no. 1 for raising construction over the said property. On behalf of the respondent no. 1 it was stated that it would take the help of the respondent no. 2 for raising such construction and accordingly two memorandum of understanding were executed on 18th February, 1994. Sunil signed the same. Mira and Saurav also signed the documents as witnesses. Thereafter, Sunil executed a further agreement in favour of M/s. J.P. Bohra & Company Private Limited on 15th March, 1994 for the purpose of construction of two storied residential building over the concerned plot of land and accordingly possession of the land along with incomplete structure thereupon was handed over to the developer. As Sunil was not requiring the entire accommodation and was unable to maintain the entire building, he intended to let out the land with the building constructed thereupon and to that effect a tenancy agreement was executed by Sunil on 15th March, 1994 towards adjustment of the loan through the monthly rent. The costs of construction of the concerned building was near about Rs. 12,75,000/- and such amount was due and payable to M/s. J.P. Bohra & Company Private Limited and that a memorandum of understanding was also executed by Sunil and the respondents on 18th February, 1994 and on the said date the respondents paid an amount of Rs. 50,000/- to Sunil. The said document was executed by Sunil. Mira and Saurav also put their signature in the same as witnesses. The respondents further claimed that they had paid an amount of Rs. 6,18,000/- to Sunil and such payment was within the knowledge of Mira and Saurav. The said payments were made through cheques and in total an amount of Rs. 7,18,000/- was paid. 6. Mira and Saurav also put their signature in the same as witnesses. The respondents further claimed that they had paid an amount of Rs. 6,18,000/- to Sunil and such payment was within the knowledge of Mira and Saurav. The said payments were made through cheques and in total an amount of Rs. 7,18,000/- was paid. 6. In the suit Saurav was impleaded as proforma defendant and he also filed a written statement supporting the contention of the plaintiff. In corroboration of the statements made in the plaint, Mira deposed as PW1 and exhibited the lease deed as Ext.1, the death certificate of Sunil as Ext.2, a memorandum of understanding as Ext.3, medical treatment sheets collectively as Ext.4, a mutation order as Ext.5 and an agreement for tenancy dated 22nd February, 1995 as Ext.6. On the other hand, in corroboration of the statements made in the written statement and on behalf of the defendants, one Jagadish Bohra deposed as DW1, one Indrajit Prasad Singh deposed as DW-2. On behalf of the respondents an extract of the minutes of a meeting dated 17th December, 2011, an undated memorandum of understanding, a memorandum of understanding dated 18th February, 1994, a tenancy agreement dated 1st July, 1993, a tenancy agreement dated 15th March, 1994 and an agreement for construction dated 15th March,1994 were exhibited as Ext.A to Ext.F respectively. 7. On the basis of the pleadings, the learned Court below framed the following issues: (i) Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form and in law? (ii) Whether the plaintiff has any cause of action of filing this suit? (iii) Whether the predecessor in interest of the plaintiff and the proforma defendant was the creditor of the principal defendants? (iv) Whether the principal defendants are liable to be evicted from the suit property? (v) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get a decree as prayed for? (vi) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get any relief or other reliefs under law and equity? 8. Upon contested hearing, the suit was dismissed upon arriving at a finding that the payment made by the principal defendants to Sunil in the year 1993 was not a loan and that the defendants had borne the cost of construction work and had invested money for completion of the building. 8. Upon contested hearing, the suit was dismissed upon arriving at a finding that the payment made by the principal defendants to Sunil in the year 1993 was not a loan and that the defendants had borne the cost of construction work and had invested money for completion of the building. The defendants had no money lending licence and as such they had no right to give any loan to Sunil. On the issue of eviction, the Court observed that no specific prayer had been made for eviction of the defendants as trespassers or as tenants and that as such the suit was not maintainable. It was also observed that the story of execution of will by the deceased Sunil was an out and out false and concocted story. 9. Mr. Mukherjee, learned advocate appearing for the appellant argues that in paragraph 27 of the written statement filed by the respondents it has been admitted that Sunil intended ‘to let out the newly constructed entire building including roof right covered garage and all vacant space in between the building and boundary wall and seeking suitable persons who shall bear the cost of construction and completion of the building and the said Sunil Kumar Roy who was the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff and the defendant No. 3 propose the defendant No. 1 & 2 to show that the amount which expenses by defendant No. 1 & 2 this amount shall be treated as Loan to be paid by adjustment/appropriative of monthly rent as such a two sheets of tenancy agreement was made in between the Sunil Kumar Roy and defendant No. 1 & 2 on the same day i.e. 15/03/1994’. In view of such admitted facts there was no justification towards framing and adjudication of an issue as to whether ‘the predecessor in interest of the plaintiff and the proforma defendant was the creditor of the principal defendants’ since a material proposition affirmed by the plaintiff was not denied by the defendants. 10. He submits that the respondents exhibited an agreement for tenancy dated 1st July, 1993. In the said agreement it has been stated in clause 14 that the tenancy shall initially be for a period of 19 years to be renewed thereafter without executing any separate document for renewal for another 19 years and that such process will continue till the loan amount/deposit compound interest is fully recovered. In the said agreement it has been stated in clause 14 that the tenancy shall initially be for a period of 19 years to be renewed thereafter without executing any separate document for renewal for another 19 years and that such process will continue till the loan amount/deposit compound interest is fully recovered. Another agreement for construction dated 5th March, 1994 was also exhibited by the respondents as Ext.F. In clause 7 of the said agreement it has been categorically stated that Sunil was seeking suitable persons to bear the cost of construction and completion of the building on condition that such amount shall be treated as loan to be repaid by adjustment/appropriative of monthly rent. In another agreement for tenancy dated 15.03.1994, it has been categorically stated that the tenant agreed to pay an amount of Rs. 2,28,000/- as rent in advance for 19 years together with further loan/deposit amount of Rs. 3,00,000/- for the purpose of construction and completion of the building. In clause 2 of the said agreement it was also stated that ‘the amount thus received and shall further be received as stated herein shall be treated as loan by the tenant to the landlord and to be repaid by adjustment/appropriation of monthly rent for successive terms’. A composite reading of the averments made in paragraph 27 of the written statement along with contents of the Ext. nos. ‘D’, ‘E’ and ‘F’ would reveal that the fact of advancement of loan by the respondents was inextricably bound with the condition that such loan would be adjusted with rent on the basis of the agreements exhibited by the respondents and as such the learned Court below erred in law in arriving at a finding that the payment made by the respondents to Sunil in the year 1993 was not a loan. 11. According to Mr. Mukherjee, the learned Court below erroneously proceeded on the basis that as the respondents had no money lending licence, they had no legal right to give any loan to Sunil failing to appreciate that a man does not become a money lender by reason of occasional loans to relations, friends and acquaintances. There is no material on record to establish that the money advanced by the respondents comes within the definition of ‘loan’ in Section 2(12) of the Bengali Money-Lenders Act. There is no material on record to establish that the money advanced by the respondents comes within the definition of ‘loan’ in Section 2(12) of the Bengali Money-Lenders Act. In support of such contention reliance has been placed upon the judgments delivered in the cases of Vipin Kumar and Another vs. Mewa Singh and Sitaram Poddar vs. Bhagirath Choudhary, 2011 (2) CHN (Cal) 969. 12. He argues that the learned Court below erred in dismissing the suit on a misconception of law that the plaintiff had failed to substantiate that the defendants are trespassers. The admitted acceptance of loan and handing over possession on condition towards adjustment of the loan advanced with the rent accrued necessarily suggests that the respondents were inducted as permissive occupiers and they were certainly not trespassers at that juncture. There is no dispute that Sunil was granted lease for 999 years by the competent authority and as such his status stands confirmed and on the basis of the tenancy agreement the respondents’ right to possess the property stood extinguished after 19 years. As such, they had no right to occupy the property any further thereafter. The protection of Court can only be granted or extended to a person who has valid, subsisting rent agreement, lease agreement or licence agreement in his favour. In support of such contention reliance has been placed upon the judgments delivered in the case of Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes and Others vs. Erasmo Jack De Sequeira (Dead) through LRs. (2012) 5 SCC 370 . Such proposition of law squarely applies also in view of the specific admission on the part of DW1 in course of cross-examination to the effect that ‘the first period of tenancy agreement has been completed. It was completed in the year 2013-14. After 2013-14 we have not paid any rent’. 13. He contends that from clause 7 of the registered lease deed it would be explicit that there was a specific bar upon the lessee to sub-divide or sub-let the land or the building to be constructed. In view thereof, there was no subsisting landlord tenant relationship between Sunil and the respondents. The provisions of the subsequent notification dated 22nd August, 1988 would also not be applicable since there was no registered document. In view thereof, there was no subsisting landlord tenant relationship between Sunil and the respondents. The provisions of the subsequent notification dated 22nd August, 1988 would also not be applicable since there was no registered document. Similar prohibition as contained in the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment delivered in the case of Jayamma vs. Maria Bai Dead by Proposed LRs. and Another, (2004) 7 SCC 459 and the Court arrived at a finding that except partition amongst the co-sharers, no transfer of the property in any manner is permissible. In a case involving similar facts it was observed that restriction on sub-division or sub-letting of land in the deed is total and comprehensive and would also apply to bequest of tenancy right by will [See the judgment delivered in the case of Pawan Kumar Agarwal vs. State of West Bengal, 2014 (1) CHN (Cal) 83]. Considering a clause similar to clause 7 of the lease deed executed in favour of Sunil, the Hon’ble Court in the case of Satyendra Nath Basu Roy vs. Monoj Biswas, 2014 (5) CHN (Cal) 539 arrived at a conclusion that there was a complete restriction upon the lessee towards sub-division and sub-letting of land by assignment of his interest thereon. 14. He contends that irrespective of the argument advanced as regards restriction on sub-division and sub-letting, the tenancy right could not have proceeded beyond 19 years from the date of the last agreement between the parties on 22nd February, 1995 and the respondents’ right to possess the property stood extinguished entitling the appellant to acquire possession of the property. In support of such contention reliance has been placed upon a judgment delivered in the case of Tarumoni Mondal and Others vs. Prafulla Kumar Mondal and Others, 2006 (3) CHN (Cal) 1 wherein it was held that ‘the moment the plaintiff establishes absolute title to the property and the defendant fails to establish his title in the property, the plaintiff is entitled to get a decree for eviction as a matter of course simply on the basis of his title’. 15. Per contra, Mr. 15. Per contra, Mr. Banerjee, learned advocate appearing for the respondents submits that the argument of the appellant to the effect that Sunil was suffering from neurological disorder and/or that Mira and Saurav had no knowledge of execution of the tenancy agreements is unfounded inasmuch as the said agreements would clearly reveal that the same were executed in presence of both Mira and Saurav, who signed as witnesses. The allegation that signatures of Sunil were obtained in blank papers by the respondents is unfounded. The appellant has sought to mislead the Court and has come to the Court with unclean hands suppressing the material facts. The tenancy agreements dated 22nd February, 1995 and 1st July, 1993 were also not challenged by the plaintiff in the suit. 16. In paragraph 12 of the plaint, it has been categorically stated that such building was constructed over the ‘A’ schedule property in the year 1996 and neither the principal defendant no. 1 nor the defendant no. 2 ever paid any single farthing either to Sunil or to the plaintiff or to the proforma defendant no. 3 at any point of time whereas the PW1 in cross-examination stated inter-alia that ‘the entire monitory transaction were made in cheques which were issued in favour of my husband. From the month of March in the year 1994 such payment were made. The defendant no. 1 and 2 incurred Rs. 7,28,000/- for constructing building over the suit land’. According to Mr. Banerjee such inconsistency and contradiction warrants rejection of the plaintiff’s claim. 17. Mr. Banerjee argues there was no condition or clause in the tenancy agreement dated 22nd February, 1995 that any loan had been advanced by the respondent no. 1 to Sunil. In the earlier tenancy agreement dated 1st July, 1993, Sunil gave right to the respondent no. 2 even to induct a sub-tenant in the property and Sunil further agreed that renewal of such lease would be automatic and absolute. In the memorandum of understanding dated 18th February, 1994, Sunil even agreed to transfer and/or assign the plot of land including construction up to plinth level in favour of Ganga Bohra at a price of Rs. 7,15,000/-. In the construction agreement dated 15th March, 1994, it was agreed that cost of construction shall be borne by the developer and that such cost was estimated to be Rs. 7,15,000/-. In the construction agreement dated 15th March, 1994, it was agreed that cost of construction shall be borne by the developer and that such cost was estimated to be Rs. 12,00,000/- and that the owner shall be liable to refund the same with 18% compound interest. None of the agreements have been challenged by the appellant and she had miserably failed to establish that the tenancy agreement dated 22nd February, 1995 was a loan transaction. 18. According to Mr. Banerjee, the plaintiff had sought relief on the basis of mere surmises and bald allegations. Sunil miserably failed to establish the alleged fact that the loan amount granted to him stood liquidated. The plaintiff herself asked for and incorporated a prayer for rendering accounts since the principal amount together with interest was still due. The appellant’s plea is mutually destructive. On one hand the appellant had claimed accounts towards dues and on the other hand had prayed for recovery of possession. 19. Mr. Banerjee contends that the principles of promissory estoppel are clearly applicable to the facts of the present case inasmuch as the respondents altered their position based on the promises made by Sunil and advanced huge amount of money. Having consciously inducted tenants by executing agreements, Sunil is estopped from claiming recovery of possession of the suit property inasmuch as estoppel would have the effect of creating substantive rights against the party estopped. In support of such contention reliance has been placed upon the judgments delivered in the case of B.L. Sreedhar and Others vs. K.M. Munireddy (Dead) and Others, (2003) 2 SCC 355 . 20. Mr. Banerjee further argues that the lease deed does not absolutely bar the creation of tenancy but provides consequences if the lessee inducts a sub-tenant. Neither the Government Grants Act, 1895 nor the West Bengal Government (Land Regulation of Transfer) Act, 1993 does create any statutory bar and that the restrictions stipulated in the lease deed would at best operate as a contractual bar of transfer, which is binding between the Government and the lessees. Neither the Government Grants Act, 1895 nor the West Bengal Government (Land Regulation of Transfer) Act, 1993 does create any statutory bar and that the restrictions stipulated in the lease deed would at best operate as a contractual bar of transfer, which is binding between the Government and the lessees. In support of such contention reliance has been placed upon the judgments delivered in the cases of State of West Bengal and Others vs. Smt. Kusum Agarwal and Another, 2018 (5) CHN 441 and Dipsikha Chakraborty and Another vs. Arun Kanti Basu and Sabita Basu, both deceased, substituted by their heirs and Legal Representatives Samita Bardhan Majumdar and Another, 2022 SCC Online (Cal) 2385. 21. Mr. Banerjee argues that the respondents were inducted as tenants in a property which fell under Bidhannagar Municipality but on the date of filing of suit, Bidhannagar Municipality was not formed and the premises were, thus, governed by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. The first agreement dated 1st July, 1993 is a tenancy protected under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act and as such it cannot be treated as a transfer of property which is required to be registered. Non-registration of agreement does not create any bar. The Court on several occasions have clarified that even if an instrument is not registered, a monthly tenancy would be created. In support of such contention reliance has been placed upon the judgments delivered in the cases of Biswabani Pvt. Ltd. vs. Santosh Kumar Dutta and Others, (1980) 1 SCC 185 and Food Corporation of India and Others vs. Babulal Agarwal, (2004) 2 SCC 712 . 22. He submits that in the plaint, the plaintiff has not even described whether she is asking for recovery of possession from a tenant or a licensee or a trespasser. The absence of a specific prayer for eviction upon declaring them as trespassers is not sustainable. 23. In reply, Mr. Mukherjee argues that Sunil allowed the respondents to occupy the property up to the date of liquidation and as such there cannot be any application of the principles of promissory estoppel in the facts of the present case. Denying the contention of Mr. Banerjee that there was no bar towards execution of tenancy agreements, Mr. 23. In reply, Mr. Mukherjee argues that Sunil allowed the respondents to occupy the property up to the date of liquidation and as such there cannot be any application of the principles of promissory estoppel in the facts of the present case. Denying the contention of Mr. Banerjee that there was no bar towards execution of tenancy agreements, Mr. Mukherjee submits that there was a specific bar in the lease deed to sub-divide or sub-let the land or the building to be constructed and that Section 2 of the Government Grants Act, 1895 creates an embargo as regards application of the provisions of Transfer of Property Act. 24. The key to unravel the complexities of the problem posed lies in the pleadings and the deposition tendered by the respective parties. The precise degree of imperfections needs to be investigated and categorised on the rudiments of preponderance of probabilities. Inference from the evidence and significances must be carefully distinguished from conjectures or stipulation. 25. It is well known that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. Even a slight distinction in fact or an additional fact may make a lot of difference in decision making process. There is no dispute as regards the proposition of law laid down in the judgments cited by the respective parties but the application of such proposition is certainly dependent on the specific facts and circumstances of the respective cases. In the case of B.L. Sreedhar and Others (Supra), the suit was for declaration and injunction and in the same no statutory bar was involved. In the case of Smt. Kusum Agarwal (Supra), the issue was pertaining to legality of bequeath of property by a will. In the case of Dipsikha Chakraborty (Supra), the tenancy agreement and the rent receipt were admitted and as such the plaintiff’s prayer for khas possession was turned down. In the case of Biswabani Pvt. Ltd. (Supra), the nature of lease deed was different. In the case of Food Corporation of India and Others (Supra) the suit was for damages for breach of contract, the lease deed was for three years and no statutory bar was involved. Judgment is a precedent for the issue of law that is raised and decided and not observations made in the facts of any particular case. In the case of Food Corporation of India and Others (Supra) the suit was for damages for breach of contract, the lease deed was for three years and no statutory bar was involved. Judgment is a precedent for the issue of law that is raised and decided and not observations made in the facts of any particular case. Plentitude of pronouncements leaves cleavage in the opinions formed in the respective cases. 26. The assertion on the part of the defendants/respondents that they are not having money lending licence, appears to have weighed with the learned Judge in answering the issue of maintainability without appreciating the fact that the defendants invested money for developing the property from the plinth level and it was agreed that after development they will utilize the property till liquidation of the loan amount and will hand over the possession to the plaintiff. The Court itself arrived at a finding that the Bengal Money-Lenders Act, 1940 (in short, Act of 1940) was not applicable to the suit and as such the plaintiff’s prayer for issuance of necessary direction upon the defendants to deliver possession could not have been denied on the ground that the lender had no registration and licence as money lender. The advancement of an occasional loan does not attribute the status of a money lender upon such lender. 27. In the written statement it was averred by the principal defendants that they have paid the amount to Sunil as loan to be paid by adjustment as monthly rent. It was a transaction which led to execution of documents towards tenancy. The fact that the loan advanced stood liquidated stands corroborated though the deposition of the defendants. Admittedly, the defendants have not preferred any counter claim as nothing remained unpaid by the plaintiff. Jagadish Bohra, in course of his cross-examination deposed that ‘Sunil Babu had no capacity to bare financial expenses for construction work’ and that Rs. 2,28,000/- was paid by us to Sunil Babu as an amount of rent. At the same time, however, he deposed that ‘I do not claim money and its interest’ and that ‘after demise of Sunil Babu I have not paid rent to the legal heirs of Sunil Babu’. 28. The argument of Mr. 2,28,000/- was paid by us to Sunil Babu as an amount of rent. At the same time, however, he deposed that ‘I do not claim money and its interest’ and that ‘after demise of Sunil Babu I have not paid rent to the legal heirs of Sunil Babu’. 28. The argument of Mr. Mukherjee that there had been an admission on the part of the respondents in the written statement that Sunil let out the newly constructed entire building and that the said amount shall be treated as loan to be paid by adjustment of monthly rent, cannot be discounted. The web of the facts involved in the lis juxtaposed to the evidence on record establishes the plaintiff’s claim. 29. It is no longer res integra that sub-division or sub-letting of the land held by a tenant in a Salt Lake property is not valid. The assignment of leasehold interest attracts the restriction as contained in the lease deed and the instruments towards such assignment did not create any right in favour of the defendants to indefinitely occupy the property. Their right at best was restricted to demand the un-liquidated loan amount, if any. 30. The argument of Mr. Banerjee that the contents of the agreements as exhibited clearly confer right upon the respondents to continue in possession, is not acceptable to this Court since the loan has been repaid. The advancement of loan and the execution of the tenancy agreements are bound inextricably. The learned Court, in our opinion had proceeded on an erroneous premise. The initial entry of the respondents in the property was not illegal since such entry was on the basis of agreements executed between the parties. Thus, at the time of entry the respondents were not trespassers. It is only after the entire loan was repaid by Sunil upon adjustment of the rent amount on the basis of the agreements executed, the respondents lost their right to continue in their possession. In the said conspectus there was no necessity to make any specific prayer for eviction of the respondents as trespassers. 31. For the reasons as discussed above we are of the opinion that the judgment and decree impugned in the present appeal is not sustainable in law. 32. Accordingly, we pass the following order: (i) The appeal is allowed. In the said conspectus there was no necessity to make any specific prayer for eviction of the respondents as trespassers. 31. For the reasons as discussed above we are of the opinion that the judgment and decree impugned in the present appeal is not sustainable in law. 32. Accordingly, we pass the following order: (i) The appeal is allowed. (ii) The judgment and decree dated 15th June, 2016 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) 2nd Court at Barasat, District-North 24 Parganas in Title Suit No. 74 of 2011 are quashed and set aside. (iii) The respondents shall hand over possession of the suit property to the appellant within two months, failing which the appellant would be at liberty to take steps for execution of the decree. 33. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. 34. Let a decree be drawn up accordingly. 35. Let a copy of this judgment along with the LCR be sent to the learned Court below forthwith.