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2023 DIGILAW 249 (JK)

Shabir Ahmad Zahri v. State of J&K

2023-06-16

MOKSHA KHAJURIA KAZMI, N.KOTISWAR SINGH

body2023
JUDGMENT : MOKSHA KHAJURIA KAZMI, J. 1. This intra court appeal has been filed against the judgment dated 07.03.2017 hereinafter referred to as (“impugned judgment”) passed by the Writ Court in a writ petition bearing SWP No. 517/2004, whereby, the writ petition of the petitioner/appellant herein, has been dismissed being without any merit. BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE: 2. The case of the appellant, precisely, is that he had been engaged as ad-hoc Junior Assistant in the respondent department way back in the year 1995 and after having put in long years of service as such, was treated as a temporary employee. In terms of Government Order No. 1285-GAD of 2001 dated 06.11.2001, which provided that all ad-hoc appointments made till the issuance of said order shall be considered for regularization after completion of seven years subject to certain conditions mentioned in the said Government order, thereby making the appellant eligible for regularization. However, he was not regularized pursuant to such Government order. It further appears that the Government of Jammu & Kashmir, subsequently, passed yet another order bearing No. 168-GAD of 2004 dated 09.02.2004 which inter-alia provided that all ad-hoc appointments made after 28th July, 1989 and continued till the date of issuance of the said order and also those ad-hocees who were appointed by the General Administration Department or with the approval of the General Administration Department and continued till August, 2002 or thereafter shall be converted into contractual appointments w.e.f. 01.02.2004 which shall subsist till 31.12.2004 or till such selection against these posts is made whichever is earlier. 3. The order dated 09.02.2004 could not be implemented as it was challenged in various writ petitions. The petitioner-appellant also chose to file a writ petition against the said order. Since the subject matter of these writ petitions was similar, therefore, all such petitions were heard and decided together by the Single Bench of this Court at its Jammu Wing reported as Thomas Masih vs. State of J&K, 2004 (2) JKJ 197 (HC). The petitioner-appellant’s writ petition was decided later in time, as it was segregated from the batch of writ petitions decided on 05.04.2004, on the request of learned counsel that the subject matter of the writ petition is not similar to the batch of petitions being decided. The petitioner-appellant’s writ petition was decided later in time, as it was segregated from the batch of writ petitions decided on 05.04.2004, on the request of learned counsel that the subject matter of the writ petition is not similar to the batch of petitions being decided. The decision, however, in the writ petition of the petitioner-appellant was also the same, as the court was of the opinion that the said writ petition is squarely covered by the decision dated 05.04.2004 rendered in Thomas Masih supra. Feeling aggrieved of the writ court order, the petitioner-appellant challenged the same by way of a Letters Patent Appeal. During the pendency of said appeal, a legislation known as the J&K Civil Services (Special Provisions Act, 2010) hereinafter referred to as an “Act of 2010” came to be enacted which provided for regularization of ad-hoc, consolidated, and contractual employees in the Government Departments of the State. 4. The petitioner-appellant’s service came to be regularized vide Order No. 1356- LD (Estt) of 2016 dated 31.03.2016 in terms of the provisions of the Act of 2010. Since the appellant had filed LPA against the judgment of the writ court which was pending consideration when the appellant was regularized, the appellant sought permission to challenge his regularization order also by amending his writ petition, which was granted. 5. The Appellant by the medium of the litigation that he has indulged in has tried to project that his ad-hoc appointment was converted into temporary appointment in terms of the corrigendum issued to his appointment order vide order bearing endorsement No. UC/LD(Estt)/P/SAZ/95 dated 17.01.1996 in terms of the Rule 3 of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Service (Temporary Service Rules) 1961, therefore, he is deemed to be a quasi permanent employee after rendering three years service on the post. This is what had prompted the appellant to challenge the Government Order No. 168-GAD of 2004 dated 09.02.2004, the Communication No. LD(A)92/127 dated 19.03.2004, as also his order of regularization bearing Government Order No. 1356-LD(Estt) of 2016 dated 31.03.2016. 6. The Writ court, however, upon consideration of the matter, after exhaustive deliberation on the issue held that the relief prayed for by the writ petitioner/ appellant is exactly similar to the one projected in the batch of writ petitions, Thomas Masih, therefore, the decision rendered in such petitions shall govern the case of the petitioner/appellant also. 7. 6. The Writ court, however, upon consideration of the matter, after exhaustive deliberation on the issue held that the relief prayed for by the writ petitioner/ appellant is exactly similar to the one projected in the batch of writ petitions, Thomas Masih, therefore, the decision rendered in such petitions shall govern the case of the petitioner/appellant also. 7. Aggrieved of the writ court judgment, the appellant has challenged the same on the grounds taken in the memo of Letters Patent Appeal. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, went through the impugned judgment and considered the submissions made. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant while reiterating the grounds of the LPA has referred to and relied upon the judgments reported as AIR 1980 SC 1098 : AIR 1970 J&K, 90. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents referred to and relied upon the judgments delivered by the Supreme Court in cases titled Parvati Devi vs. State of U.P. and Others, 2007 SCC Online All. 1282, Ram Niranjan Kajaria vs. Sheo Prakash Kajaria and Others, (2015) 10 SCC 203 , Gautam Sarup vs. Leela Jetly and Others, (2008) 7 SCC 85 and P.M. Salim vs. Vasudevan Namboothiri and Others delivered by the High Court of Kerala at Ernikulam. 10. The Appellant is challenging the impugned judgment inter-alia on the grounds that, in terms of Rule 14 of the Classification Control and Appeal Rules, 1956, the temporary appointment is for a period of 09 months which ceases to exist after such term, while as in terms of the Temporary Service Rules, the temporary appointment is continuous and takes the shape of a quasi permanent, as such, the two rules work differently, therefore, the view of the learned Single Judge that the temporary appointment of the appellant is governed by the Rule 14 of CCA Rules, 1956 is bad in law. The appellant has undergone Secretariat Training Course, contributed to GPF Fund, continued his service for more than 03 years, therefore, he falls within the ambit of Temporary Service Rules, 1961 and not under Rule 14 of CCA Rules, 1956, as such, the view of the learned Single Judge that the case of the appellant is governed by the judgment of Thomas Masih is against facts and law. The Act of 2010 has wrongly been applied to the case of the appellant by the writ court as the corrigendum bearing No. 56/UC/LD(Estt) dated 28/6/1995 issued under No. UC/LDEstt/P/SAZ/95 dated 17.11.1995 has not been refuted by the respondents in their reply filed in opposition to the writ petition which in terms of the Rule 5 of Order VIII of the Code of Civil Procedure makes the appointment of appellant as temporary and not an ad-hoc. The appellant has been discriminated inasmuch as one Rafiq Ahmad Naik though similarly placed, was regularized as regular-temporary which fact has not been appreciated by the writ court. The learned Single Judge, has, on the face of the orders passed by the Division Bench and the Full Bench that the case of the appellant is not covered by Thomas Masih judgment, brought the appellant’s case within the ambit of such judgment. 11. In order to understand the case of the appellant in its right perspective, it is noted, at the cost of repetition, that the appellant had been appointed as an ad-hoc Junior Assistant vide Government Order No. 56UC/LW(Estt) of 1995 dated 28.06.1995 in the respondent department and vide a subsequent order issued under endorsement No. UC/LD(Estt)P/ SAZ/95 dated 17.01.1996 in terms of the Rule 3 of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Service (Temporary Service Rules) 1961, he believes to be deemed to have attained the status of a quasi permanent employee after rendering three years of ad-hoc service on the post. The said status was not conferred upon the appellant, therefore, he challenged the Government Order No. 168-GAD of 2004 dated 09.02.2004, the communication No. LD(A)92/127 dated 19.03.2004, as also the order of regularization bearing No. 1356-LD(Estt) of 2016 dated 31.03.2016 being violative of principles of natural justice and Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The writ court while taking note of the reliefs prayed for and after hearing learned counsel for the parties held that the case of the appellant is squarely covered by the ratio of the Thomas Masih judgment. The writ court while taking note of the reliefs prayed for and after hearing learned counsel for the parties held that the case of the appellant is squarely covered by the ratio of the Thomas Masih judgment. The reason put forth by the learned Single Judge in reaching to such conclusion is that the ad-hoc employees who were petitioners in the Thomas Masih judgment had also challenged the Government Orders sought to be challenged by the appellant in the writ petition and since the court has considered such challenge and returned findings on the similar issues, therefore, the case of appellant is also covered by such findings. It would be profitable to reproduce Para 14 to 16 of the writ court judgment herein: “14. Having heard the learned counsel and considered the matter, I am of the view that the writ petition of the petitioner is wholly covered by the decision rendered in Thomas Masih vs. State of J&K (supra). This is borne out by paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the judgment which are quoted hereunder: “2. By virtue of the aforesaid order, it was also provided that, as a matter of policy, the contractual appointments be made in accordance with Rules to be notified separately. Simultaneous with the issue of the aforesaid order, Government issued Notification SRO 255 dated 5th August, 2003 promulgating the Jammu and Kashmir Contractual Appointment Rules, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as the Contractual Appointment Rules, 2003. These Rules were made applicable to the posts notified vide Government order No. 1018-GAD of 2003 dated 5th August, 2003 and to such other posts as may be notified from time to time in the General Administration Department by Government order. These Rules, inter-alia, provide that the appointee under the Rules shall be paid a consolidated monthly salary equivalent to the minimum of the pay scale of the post to which he may be appointed and that he shall not be entitled to any other allowances or monetary benefits, whatsoever. Subsequent to the promulgation of aforesaid Rules, The Government, in super-session of earlier Government order No. 1285- GAD of 2001 dated 06.11.2001, issued order No. 168-GAD of 2004 dated 9th February, 2004 read with the two Government orders both bearing one and the same No. and date, i.e. 237-GAD of 2004 dated 20.2.2004, under the caption policy relating to ad-hoc appointments. By virtue of the aforesaid Government Order, it has been, inter-alia, ordered that all ad-hoc appointments made after 28.07.1989 and continued in service till the date of issue of the aforesaid order and also those ad-hocees, who were appointed by the General Administration Department or with approval from the General Administration Department and continued in service till August 2002 or thereafter, shall be converted into contractual appointments with effect from Ist February, 2004, and these contractual appointments shall subsist till 31st December, 2004 or till selections against these posts are made by the concerned selection agencies, whichever be earlier. It has been further ordered that these contractual appointees shall be required to execute an agreement in accordance with the format appended to the Jammu and Kashmir Contractual Appointment Rules with the concerned Drawing and Disbursing Officer upto 25th February, 2004 and that if any ad-hocee/contractual appointee failed to execute the agreement, he shall cease to be in the employment of the Government. The posts held by the ad-hocees were required to be referred by the concerned Administrative Departments to the competent selection agencies by or before 29th February, 2004, if such posts had not already been referred to the selection agencies, for selection in accordance with the rules. 3. Numerous petitions have been filed before this Court by ad-hocees, challenging the Government order converting their ad-hoc appointments into contractual appointments and the direction contained therein that such contractual appointees shall be paid a consolidated salary equal to the minimum of the scale attached to the posts held by them with effect from 1st February, 2004. They have sought for quashment of Government order dated 9th February, 2004 together with the corrigendum dated 20th February, 2004 and prayed for a direction to the concerned authorities to regularize their services on their respective posts. Few of these writ petitions, as delineated above, are the subject matter of decision herein. 4. The petitioners herein have been appointed on ad-hoc basis either to different non-gazetted or class IV posts. They have given particulars of their respective orders of appointment, the authorities who issued these orders and the allied statement of facts. The fact that some of the ad-hocees are continuing since the dates just around 28th July, 1989 and some have been appointed thereafter or even after August 2002 is rather clearly admitted in the impugned order itself. They have given particulars of their respective orders of appointment, the authorities who issued these orders and the allied statement of facts. The fact that some of the ad-hocees are continuing since the dates just around 28th July, 1989 and some have been appointed thereafter or even after August 2002 is rather clearly admitted in the impugned order itself. Therefore, I need not narrate these facts in this judgment to indicate that the petitioners had, in fact, been appointed on ad-hoc basis and are continuing ever since their respective dates of appointment. However, there are certain aspects pleaded in these petitions, which may have to be referred to and dealt with at appropriate place in this judgment. When these petitions came up for hearing on admission, the learned Advocate General appeared and opted not to file any counter-affidavit. He submitted that outcome of these petitions hinged only on certain settled legal propositions; therefore, he opted to argue the cases without filing any counter-affidavit. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners did not object to that course. By this common judgment, therefore, I propose to dispose of finally all the abovementioned petitions.” It is clearly borne out by the above paragraphs from the judgment that therein the ad-hocees had challenged the very same Government order no. 168-GAD of 2004 dated 9.02.2004 converting their ad-hoc appointments into contractual appointments and sought for quashing of the same together with the corrigendum dated 20.02.2004 and prayed for a direction to the concerned authorities to regularize their services on their respective posts. The petitioner had made substantially similar prayers in his writ petition, which are quoted hereunder: “In the premises, it is, therefore, prayed: That by issuance of a writ of certiorari the impugned order dated 09.02.04, bearing No. 168-GAD of 2004, alongwith communication letter dated 19.03.2004, may either be quashed or the respondents be directed not to apply the said government order against the petitioner by issuance of a writ of mandamus. And the respondents be directed to regularise the services of the petitioner in light of the government order dated 06.11.2001, i.e. the regularization policy of the government bearing No. 1285 GAD of 2001, and other policies in vogue for regularisation of services of ad-hoc employees as the Hon’ble Court may deem applicable in case of the petitioner in the interests of justice. Any other writ, order or direction which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit in the circumstances of the case may also be passed in favour of the petitioner and against the respondents in the interests of justice and equity.” Obviously, therefore, insofar as the reliefs prayed for by the petitioner in his pre-amended writ petition were concerned, the same were substantially same as had been the subject matter in Thomas Masih vs. State of J&K (supra). 15. Now, in the amended writ petition, the petitioner, apart from challenging his own regularization order dated 31.03.2016, has added the prayer to command the respondents to declare him to have attained quasi permanency in Government service from July, 1998 and to provide him all service benefits. This claim of the petitioner is founded by him on the provisions of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Service (Temporary Service) Rules, 1961. This specific plea was also taken by the petitioners in Thomas Masih vs. State of J&K (supra) and the learned Writ Court thoroughly considered the issue therein and rendered its findings and decision thereon in the judgment. Paras 9 to 16 thereof, which are relevant in this connection, are quoted hereunder: “9. It was next, alternatively, argued that the petitioners, who have put in more than three years of continuous service, have acquired a right to be declared quasi-permanent. In this connection, the learned counsel have referred to Rule 3(1) of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Service (Temporary Service) Rules, 1961. To buttress this contention, the learned counsel for the petitioners have cited and relied upon the judgment of one of the learned Single Judges of this Court in Mohd. Yousuf Pukhta vs. State of J&K, 1989 SLJ 62. This is one of the vital issues involved in these petitions and is also linked to the first argument advanced by the learned counsel. 10. The Jammu and Kashmir Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Temporary Service Rules) were promulgated vide Notification No. 416-F dated 15th November, 1961. The relevant provisions, which are contained in Rules 1, 2 and 3 of the aforesaid Rules, are extracted below: “1. (1) These rules may be called the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1961. The relevant provisions, which are contained in Rules 1, 2 and 3 of the aforesaid Rules, are extracted below: “1. (1) These rules may be called the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1961. (2) Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (3), these rules shall apply to all persons who hold a civil post under the Government and who are under the rule making control of the Government but who do not hold a lien on any post under the Government or any other State Government or the Central Government. (3) Nothing in these rules shall apply to: (a) Personnel of Jammu and Kashmir Militia. (b) Government servants engaged on contract. (c) Government servants not in whole time employment. (d) Government servants paid out of contingencies. (e) Persons employed in work charged establishments. (f) Such other categories of employees as may be specified by the Government. (g) Temporary Government servants who have earned pension in respect of their previous military or civil service. Provided that the ex-servicemen who are re-employed after their retirement from army at the age of 45 years or earlier shall not be debarred from the benefits of these rules if they otherwise fulfil the requirements of these rules. 2. In these rules unless the context otherwise requires: (a) Government service means temporary service under the Government. (b) quasi-permanent service means temporary service commencing from the date on which a declaration issued under rule 3 takes effect and consisting of periods of duty and leave (other than extraordinary leave without allowances) after that date. (c) Deleted. (d) temporary service means service against a temporary post and officiating service in a permanent post under the Government. 3. (1) A Government servant shall be eligible for being declared as quasi-permanent if he has been in continuous Government service for more than 3 years in a Department which is not as a whole temporary: (a) employees may be declared quasi-permanent against permanent posts or such temporary posts which have been in existence for 3 years or more. (b) against such temporary posts transferred from plan to non-plan establishment which have been in existence for three years or more on non-plan establishment. (c) No person may be declared quasi-permanent against a plan post.” 11. (b) against such temporary posts transferred from plan to non-plan establishment which have been in existence for three years or more on non-plan establishment. (c) No person may be declared quasi-permanent against a plan post.” 11. From a bare perusal of the aforesaid Rules, among other things, it emerges that: (i) in terms of sub-rule (2) of Rule 1, except the categories specified in sub-rule (3), the Temporary Service Rules apply to all such persons who hold a civil post. (ii) in terms of clause (f) of sub-rule (3), the Government has power to bring out of the purview of these rules such other categories of employees as may be specified. (iii) the Rules do not prescribe for temporary appointments. (iv) in terms of Rule 3(1), if a person has been in continuous Government service for more than 3 years, he shall be eligible for being declared as quasi-permanent. (v) sub-rule 3(1)(a) confers a discretion on the competent authority to declare an employee as quasi-permanent against a permanent or a temporary post. 12. Though a relevant question arises whether an ad-hocee holds a civil post, yet, at first, I deem it appropriate to deal with the argument of the learned counsel that Rule 3(1) of the Temporary Service Rules, 1961 has created a vested right in those of the ad-hocees who have been in continuous ad-hoc appointment for more than three years for being declared as quasi-permanent employees. 13. The Temporary Service Rules, 1961 do not prescribe for temporary appointments. Temporary appointments are provided under and governed by Rule 14 of the Classification, Control and Appeal, 1956. Rule 14 of the Classification, Control and Appeal Rules, 1956 was amended vide Notification No. 291 dated 28th July, 1989. Prior to its amendment, it read as under: “14. Temporary appointments: (1) Where it is necessary in the public interest owing to an emergency which has arisen and could not have been foreseen, to fill immediately a vacancy in a post borne on the cadre of a service, class or category and the making of an appointment to such vacancy in accordance with these rules would involve undue delay, excessive expenditure or administrative inconvenience, the appointing authority may appoint a person otherwise than in accordance with these rules temporarily until a person is appointed in accordance with these rules but such temporary appointment shall in no case exceed three months on each occasion. (2) Every appointment made under sub-rule (1) together with all the particulars relating to the persons so appointed, namely, the date of appointment, the duration of the vacancy and the period or periods, if any, for which the same person had previously held a post borne on the cadre of the same service, class or category, the nature of the emergency or inconvenience and the reasons for the appointment shall be reported without delay to the Minister-in-charge, if the order is passed by a lower authority. (3) A person appointed under sub-rule (1) shall be replaced as soon as possible by a member of the service or a candidate qualified and considered fit to hold the post under these rules. (4) A person appointed under sub-rule (1) shall not be regarded as a probationer in such service, class or category, or be entitled by reason only of such appointment to any preferential claim to future appointment to such service, class or category.” The amended Rule 14 of the Classification Control and Appeal Rules reads as under: “14. Temporary appointments: (1) Where it is necessary in the public interest owing to an emergency which has arisen and could not have been foreseen, to fill immediately a vacancy in a post borne on the cadre of service, class or category and the making of an appointment to such vacancy in accordance with these rules would involve undue delay, excessive expenditure or administrative inconvenience, the appointing authority may appoint a person otherwise than in accordance with these rules temporarily with the prior approval of the Chief Minister in Coordination until a person is appointed in accordance with these rules but such temporary appointment shall in no case exceed three months on each occasion and not more than nine months in all. (2) A person appointed under sub-rule (1) shall be replaced as soon as possible by a member of the service or a candidate qualified and considered fit to hold the post under these rules. (3) A person appointed under sub-rule (1) shall not be regarded as a probationer in such service, class or category, or be entitled by reason only of such appointment to any preferential claim to future appointment to such service, class or category.” (Underlining supplied) 14. (3) A person appointed under sub-rule (1) shall not be regarded as a probationer in such service, class or category, or be entitled by reason only of such appointment to any preferential claim to future appointment to such service, class or category.” (Underlining supplied) 14. As is seen, the pre-amended Rule 14 of the Classification, Control and Appeal Rules, 1956 envisaged continuation of an ad-hocee until a person was appointed in accordance with the Rules. Cases could be conceived that an ad-hocee was continued for more than three years. A protection of deemed eligibility for being declared as quasi-permanent, subject to the conditions as mentioned in Rule 3A, was carved out in respect of such ad-hocees in terms of Rule 3(1) of the Temporary Service Rules, 1961. However, whereas the pre-amended Rule 14 did not prescribe any limitation on the total period an ad-hocee could continue, the amended Rule 14 expressly bars continuation of an ad-hoc appointment beyond the period of nine months. There is no other provision on the subject either in the Classification, Control and Appeal Rules or the Temporary Service Rules, 1961. Therefore, Rule 3(1) of the Temporary service Rules, 1961 has to be read together with Rule 14 of the Classification, Control and Appeal Rules. Reading the two provisions together, since the continuation of ad-hoc appointment beyond nine months has been expressly barred, as a necessary implication, the deemed eligibility that was envisaged by Rule 3(1) of Temporary Service Rules, 1961 becomes redundant. In other words, Rule 3(1) of the Temporary Service Rules, 1961 has no application to persons appointed on ad-hoc basis. Continuation of a person beyond nine months, dehors the express provision of Rule 14 of the Classification, Control and Appeal Rules, will not alter the aforesaid legal implication. Consequently, no authority can exercise the discretion of declaration as quasi-permanent conferred under Rule 3 (1)(a) of Temporary Service Rules, 1961 on such authority vis-a-vis a person appointed on ad-hoc basis under the amended Rule 14 of Classification, Control and Appeal Rules, 1956. 15. It be further seen that Rule 3(1) says, a Government servant shall be eligible for being declared as quasi permanent. Government service has been defined to mean temporary service, which in turn has been defined to mean even officiating service in a permanent post. 15. It be further seen that Rule 3(1) says, a Government servant shall be eligible for being declared as quasi permanent. Government service has been defined to mean temporary service, which in turn has been defined to mean even officiating service in a permanent post. It is not shown by any of the petitioners that he has been rendering officiating service against a permanent post. Even if it were assumed that the petitioners have been officiating against permanent posts and that Rule 3 has still any application to ad-hoc appointees, it is axiomatic from a reading of Rule 3(1) that it lays down only the eligibility criterion of such an employee for being considered to be declared as quasi-permanent. If an ad-hoc employee fulfilled the eligibility criterion as laid down in Rule 3(1), that fact by itself would not create a right, muchless a vested right, in him to be declared as quasi-permanent. Such an employee had to fulfill other conditions and the competent authority had to be satisfied that the employee at the time of entry into such service possessed the minimum service age, qualification, required standard of character and antecedents etc. The competent authority had also to issue a declaration regarding his suitability, work and conduct during the past period of temporary service. In any case, Rule 3(1) does not envisage creation of any right in such an employee to be declared as quasi-permanent. The relevant provision, i.e. sub-rule 3(1)(a) confers only a discretion on the competent authority to declare an employee eligible under sub-rule 3(1) of the Rules as quasi-permanent. It is only if it were shown that the competent authority had, in fact, exercised this discretion in favour of similarly circumstanced person or persons, as the petitioners, that the petitioners could make a grievance of denial of equal treatment or seek an equal treatment. That is not the case; the petitioners herein have not brought anything on record to show that any of the ad-hoc appointees engaged after 28th July, 1989, the date when Rule 14 of the Classification, Control and Appeal Rules was amended, has been declared as quasi-permanent under Rule 3(1)(a) of the Temporary Service Rules, 1961. 16. That is not the case; the petitioners herein have not brought anything on record to show that any of the ad-hoc appointees engaged after 28th July, 1989, the date when Rule 14 of the Classification, Control and Appeal Rules was amended, has been declared as quasi-permanent under Rule 3(1)(a) of the Temporary Service Rules, 1961. 16. Coming again to the first argument of learned counsel for the petitioners as to their position being similar to the ad-hocees governed by Government order dated 11th September, 1989, the ad-hocees appointed prior to 28th July, 1989 were governed by the pre-amended Rule 14 which, in its relevant texture, was entirely different from the amended provision of Rule 14. Therefore, it cannot be said that the two sets of ad-hocees one governed by the pre-amended provision and the other governed by the amended provision constitute one class. Where the appointments are governed by two different sets of Rules, with two different relevant textures, the appointees would not constitute one single class. The two stand on two different footings and, therefore, constitute two different classes. Judgment in Mohd. Yousuf Pukhta vs. State of J&K (supra), cited and relied upon by the learned counsel, is not attracted herein. Firstly because that judgment related to an ad-hocee governed by the pre-amended Rule 14; secondly that judgment is a judgment per incurium because the Hon'ble Judge had failed to take note of the settled position of law, as enunciated by the Apex Court holding the field; thirdly, the provisions of Temporary Service Rules, 1961 were not directly involved therein nor referred to in the judgment and fourthly the petitioner in that petition was a Peon working in the Department where 25% of the posts of Junior Assistants were reserved for in-service candidates. The petitioner therein was otherwise eligible and entitled to be promoted to the post of Junior Assistant as an in-service candidate. Therefore, the judgment does not help the petitioners herein. Similarly, the judgment in Raj Nath vs. State of J&K, 1993 KLJ 410 is not applicable because that case basically pertained to daily rated workers and, in any case, there was a direction contained in that judgment to the Government to frame a policy which was put in place by the State Government by virtue of SRO 64 of 1994. Similarly, the judgment in Raj Nath vs. State of J&K, 1993 KLJ 410 is not applicable because that case basically pertained to daily rated workers and, in any case, there was a direction contained in that judgment to the Government to frame a policy which was put in place by the State Government by virtue of SRO 64 of 1994. Consequently, I am of the view that the Temporary Service Rules, 1961 have no application to the case of the petitioners. In that view of the matter, the argument advanced by the learned counsel that the petitioners have acquired a right to be declared as quasi-permanent under Rule 3(1)(a) of the Temporary Service Rules, 1961 is misconceived and untenable. Since I have come to the conclusion that the Temporary Service Rules, 1961 are not attracted to these cases, I need not go to the point whether the petitioners can be said to be holding civil posts.” 16. So far as the Government order 168-GAD of 2004 dated 09.02.2004 is concerned, which is challenged herein, the said order was challenged in the aforesaid writ petitions as well and the learned Court had returned a finding thereon. Paras 24 and 25 of the judgment in that behalf may be extracted hereunder: “24. Coming to the impugned order dated 9th February, 2004, it is not shown to have been issued pursuant to Rule 3 of the aforesaid Rules. It is based on Cabinet Decision No. 27/2 dated 25th January, 2004 adopting a policy relating to settlement of ad-hoc appointments. Even if it is assumed that by virtue of the impugned order, the ad-hoc appointments of the petitioners have been converted into contractual appointments in pursuance of Rule 3 of the Rules and, therefore, does not constitute a policy, even that course was available to the Government since appointments of the petitioners were not governed by any Rules or a valid Government order, their term of appointment under Rule 14 of the Classification, Control and Appeals Rules, 1956 having come to an end long back. In normal course, as per the aforesaid Rules, the ad-hocees, even for contractual appointment, were required to face the due process of selection as prescribed and described above. The ad-hocees have not been made liable or asked to underego this process. In normal course, as per the aforesaid Rules, the ad-hocees, even for contractual appointment, were required to face the due process of selection as prescribed and described above. The ad-hocees have not been made liable or asked to underego this process. As a matter of policy, the Government has extended to them the benefit of deemed selection inasmuch as they have been ordered to continue on contractual appointment basis upto 31st December, 2004 and have been directed to enter into agreements in the prescribed form. It may be reiterated that under sub-rule (3) of Rule 4 of the Rules, it is only if a person is selected by the prescribed Selection Committee after undergoing the selection process and appointed that he is required to execute the agreement in question. Further, for purposes of this contractual appointment, the condition of eligibility prescribed under Rule 5 of the Rules has not been enforced. Since these ad-hocees, who had no right to continue against the respective posts, could not even be appointed on contractual basis dehors the Contractual Appointment Rules, 2003, the Government has taken a policy decision to extend such a benefit to them. The policy has to be read in that context. Therefore, it is imaginable why the order has been issued as a matter of policy lest the contractual appointments of the ad-hocees, dehors the Contractual Appointment Rules, 2003 as well, should be challenged by eligible candidates desirous of seeking such contractual jobs. In that view of the matter, I am of the view that to that extent the Government has been fair and reasonable enough in extending this benefit to the ad-hocees. Before proceeding further I deem it relevant to quote hereunder paragraph 12 onwards of the impugned order: ............... 25. The object of the aforesaid order is clearly indicated in clauses (iv), (v) and (v) of the operative portion thereof, as quoted above, i.e. first, the posts held by the ad-hocees have been ordered to be referred to the competent selection agencies by 29th February, 2004. This order has been made applicable to all class or category of posts, including the Gazetted posts, non-gazetted posts and Class IV posts. Such a course is totally lawful and according to the constitutional requirements. This order has been made applicable to all class or category of posts, including the Gazetted posts, non-gazetted posts and Class IV posts. Such a course is totally lawful and according to the constitutional requirements. Selection of candidates to the three categories of posts , namely, Gazetted posts, nongazetted posts and Class IV posts, are made by three different agencies, namely, the State Public Service Commission vis-avis the Gazetted posts, the Service Selection Board for non-gazetted posts and District Level Committees for Class IV posts. Under clause (v) it has been specifically said that the ad-hocees who may have crossed the upper age limit prescribed for Government service and who may apply before the selection agencies shall also be considered by such selection agencies and their upper age limit shall be deemed to have been relaxed to the extent required for this purpose. In this manner, the Government has taken due care that each such ad-hocee gets a fair opportunity of competing in the selection process. As regards the Class IV employees, it has been ordered that a separate mechanism for selection of ad-hocees shall be formulated. According to the learned Advocate General, this scheme has not so far been framed and the reason put forth is the enforcement of Model Code of Conduct. I have gone through the judgments cited and relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners. The latest law on the subject is that the process of recruitment prescribed by statutory rules cannot be bypassed by issuing directions for regularization of the services of the ad-hoc employees who had come to the service through back-door entry. Even the leverage extended in extraordinary cases earlier by the Courts by directing the Government to frame a scheme and regularize such employees is not being insisted now. The emphasis of the law, as it exists now, is on entrusting such matters to the concerned selection authority. Reference in this regard may be had to J&K Public Service Commission vs. Dr. Narinder Mohan, (1994) 2 SCC 630 , Dr. Surrinder Singh Jamwala vs. State of J&K, (1996) 9 SCC 619 , Dr. Meera Massey vs. Dr. S.R. Mehrotra, (1998) SCC 88, P. Ravindran vs. Union Territory of Pondicherry, (1997) 1 SCC 350 and Suraj Parkash Gupta vs. State of J&K, (2000) SCC 561. Narinder Mohan, (1994) 2 SCC 630 , Dr. Surrinder Singh Jamwala vs. State of J&K, (1996) 9 SCC 619 , Dr. Meera Massey vs. Dr. S.R. Mehrotra, (1998) SCC 88, P. Ravindran vs. Union Territory of Pondicherry, (1997) 1 SCC 350 and Suraj Parkash Gupta vs. State of J&K, (2000) SCC 561. Therefore, I am of the opinion that various directions and decisions taken by virtue of the impugned order, as referred to above, are in line with the mandate of law.” The judgment so rendered by the learned Writ Court squarely covers the pleas raised by the petitioner in his writ petition.” 12. The perusal of the writ records would ex facie show that the reliefs claimed by the appellant/petitioner are no different than those projected by similarly placed persons in the Thomas Masih judgment, therefore, there is no possibility of an opinion different than the one taken by the learned Single Judge. The appellant has not at all been able to show as to how his case is different than those dealt with and decided in terms of Thomas Masih Judgment. Every single point raised by the petitioner/appellant has very apparently been agitated by the petitioners of the said writ petition, therefore, the learned Single Judge was quite justified in holding that the case of the appellant falls squarely within the ambit of the judgment delivered in Thomas Masih case supra. 13. Furthermore, the appellant, after his regularization made in terms of the provisions of the Act of 2010, has, while challenging such regularization and seeking the benefit of quasi-permanency in terms of Rule 3 of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Service (Temporary Service Rules), 1961, enjoyed its usufruct simultaneously. 14. The learned Single Judge appears to have dealt with the controversy in its right perspective and returned findings on the touchstone of law. We do not see any illegality attached with the impugned judgment warranting interference. 15. In view of above, the instant appeal is held to be without any merit, therefore, dismissed along with connected CM(s). As a sequel thereto, the impugned judgment is maintained. Interim direction, if any, passed in this appeal shall stand vacated.