ORDER : 1. Heard learned Advocate Mr. D.M. Devnani with learned Advocate Ms. Janaki Bhatt on behalf of the appellant and learned Advocate Mr. A.K. Clerk on behalf of the opponents no. 1.1 and 1.2. 2. At this stage, it would be relevant to mention that opponents no. 2 to 46 who were original defendants in the Civil Suit though have been joined as party respondents in the first appeal and whereas, in spite of service, either they have not engaged a learned Advocate and in some case as in case of respondent no. 13, the said respondent is stated to have expired, yet, in spite of the said position, more particularly, in view of the final decision which would be taken by this Court, this Court deems it expedient to hear the first appeal even in absence of anyone appearing on behalf of the private respondents or in absence of legal heirs of those private respondents who have unfortunately expired in the interregnum. 3. By way of this appeal the appellant has assailed judgment and order passed by the learned Court no. 13 City Civil Court, Ahmedabad in Civil Suit No. 63 of 1995 dated 31.03.2003. Learned City Civil Court vide the impugned judgment and order had inter alia declared that the plaintiff was entitled to get promotion in the grade of inspector with defendant no. 1-appellant herein with effect from 01-05-1971 and in the grade of Assistant Senior Inspector 01.02.1991 and further direction for fixing of seniority and emoluments of salary for the said period was also directed. The learned Trial Court had also directed payment of interest on the arrears amount at the rate of 12% from the date of filing of the suit within two months till the date of realization. 3.1. It appears that at the time of admission of the first appeal, this Court had inter alia directed the appellant to calculate the arrears that could be payable to the appellant and whereas, an affidavit had been submitted by the appellant in Civil Application No. 4354 of 2003 in the present first appeal inter alia submitting calculation for the difference which could be payable to the respondent no. 1 between April 1984 - April 1996. 1 between April 1984 - April 1996. It was also submitted by the appellant-Bank that since records prior to April 1984 was not available with the appellant-Bank therefore, difference of salary for the said period had not been computed. 3.2. It also appears that as per the appellant, the difference that could be payable from 1984 to 1996 was Rs. 1,63,273/- and whereas, it also appears that since the calculation prior to 1984 could not be placed therefore, a learned Co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide an order dated 23.03.2006 had directed the appellant-applicant to deposit an ad hoc amount of Rs. 3 lakhs and whereas, upon depositing, the said amount was directed to be deposited in Fixed Deposit and whereas, the interest accruing thereupon was directed to be paid to the respondent no. 1- original plaintiff. 3.3. It further appears that after the said amount had been deposited, the respondent no. 1-original plaintiff and later on upon his demise his legal heirs i.e. respondent no. 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 are receiving the amount of interest accrued on the amount of Rs. 3lakhs as per the order of this Court. 4. Learned Advocate D.M. Devnani on behalf of the appellant has assailed the impugned decision only on the ground that the Civil Court did not have jurisdiction to try the dispute raised by the original plaintiff and whereas, the Labour Court was the right forum which the original plaintiff ought to have approached. Learned Advocate Mr. Devnani would submit that since the impugned order is itself without jurisdiction, the same requires to be interfered with. 5. As against the same, learned Advocate Mr. A.K. Clerk on behalf of the respondent no. 1.1 to 1.3 would submit that such a contention could not be taken by the appellant, more particularly, according to the learned Advocate Mr. Clerk, the respondent is estopped from raising such an issue before this Court. Learned Advocate Mr. Clerk would elaborate by submitting that subject matter of the dispute was with regard to grant of promotion and consequential emoluments to the original plaintiff and whereas, it is submitted that originally since the appellant-Bank had not passed on appropriate benefits to the original plaintiff, the plaintiff had preferred Application No. 1011 of 1978 before the learned Labour Court. Clerk would elaborate by submitting that subject matter of the dispute was with regard to grant of promotion and consequential emoluments to the original plaintiff and whereas, it is submitted that originally since the appellant-Bank had not passed on appropriate benefits to the original plaintiff, the plaintiff had preferred Application No. 1011 of 1978 before the learned Labour Court. It was submitted that the said application being rejected, more particularly, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, an appeal had been preferred by the original plaintiff before the learned Industrial Court being Appeal No. 209 of 2002 and whereas, the order of the learned Labour Court had been confirmed by the learned Industrial Court. 5.1. Learned Advocate Mr. Clerk would submit that the present applicant had thereafter preferred a review application with the learned Industrial Court and whereas, the learned Industrial Court had rejected the said review application vide order dated 02.07.1992. Learned Advocate Mr. Clerk would further submit that against the said decision, the original plaintiff had approached this Court by filing Special Civil Application No. 5569 of 1992 and whereas, this Court had been pleased to dispose of the writ petition, more particularly, upon the original plaintiff withdrawing the said petition. Learned Advocate Mr. Clerk would submit that withdrawal was with a liberty reserved in favour of the original plaintiff to approach the appropriate forum and whereas, the said order also inter alia imposed an embargo upon the appellant herein that the appellant herein shall not raise any objection with regard to other grounds which had been concluded in the orders of the learned Labour Court as well as Industrial Tribunal. 6. According to learned Advocate Mr. Clerk, this Court had also clarified that any observations made in the decisions impugned before this Court will not come in the way of the concerned Court which will try the fresh application preferred by the original plaintiff. Learned Advocate Mr. Clerk would submit that the present appellant, having contested the proceedings preferred by the original plaintiff before the learned Labour Court as well as before the Industrial Court as the case may be contending that the Courts did not have any jurisdiction to entertain the dispute of the original plaintiff, more particularly, the said aspect having been noted by the learned Civil Court at paragraph no. 20, and furthermore, since the appellant Bank had been represented before the learned Co-ordinate Bench when Co-ordinate Bench of this Court had permitted the original plaintiff to withdraw the writ petition to avail appropriate remedy, now it would not be open for the appellant to raise the issue of jurisdiction of the learned Labour Court to decide the issue raised by the original plaintiff. Thus, submitting learned Advocate Mr. Clerk would request this Court to reject the first appeal. 7. Heard learned Advocates for the respective parties who have not contended anything further. 8. The following issue arises for consideration of this Court: [1] whether the appellant would be estopped from raising any issue with regard to jurisdiction of the learned Civil Court to decide the dispute raised by the original plaintiff. [2] whether the learned Civil Court had the jurisdiction to decide the dispute in question. [3] what would be the final order. 9. My answers to the issues framed as below: [1] in negative [2] in affirmative [3] as per the final order 10. The reasons for coming to above conclusions are as below. Since the issues no. 1 & 2 are inter related, the discussion for reaching above conclusion is stated here in below jointly. Issues no. 1 & 2. 10.1. It would appear that the original plaintiff, had joined the services of the appellant-Bank as a secretary in Security Pool Scheme and whereas, his services were terminated by the Bank vide an order dated 30.04.1971. The original plaintiff had challenged the said termination order by filing Bombay Industrial Relations Application No. 702 of 1972 before the learned Labour Court. The said application had been allowed vide judgment and order dated 22.11.1972. The said decision had been challenged by the Bank before the Industrial Court by filing appeal, the said appeal failing, the Bank preferred a writ petition before this Court and the same not being entertained the Bank had preferred an SLP before Hon'ble Apex Court. The decision of the learned Labour Court to reinstate the original plaintiff with all back wages, had been confirmed up to the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The decision of the learned Labour Court to reinstate the original plaintiff with all back wages, had been confirmed up to the Hon'ble Supreme Court. It would appear that in spite of same since Bank had not reinstated the original plaintiff, the plaintiff had preferred Recovery Application No. 541 of 1975 on 27.02.1975 and whereas, the plaintiff was reinstated during the recovery proceedings and whereas, proceedings had been disposed of on basis of a settlement between the parties dated 04.02.1977. 10.2. As far as the issue raised in the suit is concerned, the settlement inter alia granted the benefit of being treated as a clerk and entitlement to the said grade with effect from 01.03.1969 and whereas, actual benefits including benefits of salary and difference of salary etc. was to be paid to the original plaintiff with effect from 01.01.1972. It appears that since even after the original plaintiff had been reinstated since the plaintiff was not being issued appropriate promotion with effect from the date when persons junior to him had been promoted, the original plaintiff had preferred an Application no. 1011 of 1978 before the learned Labour Court and whereas, vide order dated 16.05.2019 the learned Labour Court had dismissed the application on the ground that the Labour Court did not have jurisdiction to decide a dispute of promotion which had been raised by the original plaintiff. As noted herein above, the said order had been challenged before the Industrial Court where the said challenge had failed even a review application preferred before the Industrial Court had also failed. The original plaintiff had therefore, preferred writ petition being Special Civil Application No. 5569 of 1992 before this Court and whereas, a learned Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, had permitted the original plaintiff to withdraw the writ petition reserving liberty in favour of the original plaintiff to approach proper forum. 10.3. At this stage, it would be relevant to note that the order permitting withdrawal and reserving liberty in favour of the original plaintiff was not an order simplicitor. 10.3. At this stage, it would be relevant to note that the order permitting withdrawal and reserving liberty in favour of the original plaintiff was not an order simplicitor. A perusal of the said order reveals that this Court, had while permitting the original plaintiff to approach the proper forum had also deemed it appropriate to direct that observations/ conclusions in the orders passed by the learned Labour Court as well as the Industrial Court, would not come in the way of the original plaintiff in the application preferred by him for the very self-same prayers before the proper forum. 11. This Court had also clarified that the respondent-appellant herein would not raise any objection as regards the application that may be filed by the original plaintiff before the proper forum, more particularly, with regard to any conclusion that had been arrived at by the learned Labour Court or the Industrial Court as the case may be. Further even the proper forum had been excluded from raising any objection with regard to delay in approaching the proper forum. 11.1. It would appear thus that this Court, while disposing of the writ petition preferred by the original plaintiff, had noted that while the learned Labour Court or the Industrial Court as the case may be had or might have observed or concluded on any aspect raised or which may be raised by the original plaintiff in the application before the proper forum but neither the rights of the original plaintiff would be governed by such observation nor it would be open for the respondent-Bank-appellant herein to rely upon any of those observations before the proper forum where the application would be preferred by the plaintiff. 12. It would further to relevant to mention here that the said order does not reveal that such a course of action had been objected to by the Bank i.e. the aspect of permission the withdrawal and the aspect of reserving liberty, had been passed by this Court vide the order referred herein above, without any objection from the respondent-Bank. It also requires to be mentioned that the order had become final between the parties. 12.1. It would also be worthwhile at this stage, to refer to an observation by the learned Civil Court in the impugned judgment and decision, more particularly, at paragraph no. It also requires to be mentioned that the order had become final between the parties. 12.1. It would also be worthwhile at this stage, to refer to an observation by the learned Civil Court in the impugned judgment and decision, more particularly, at paragraph no. 20 where the learned Civil Court inter alia notes that “therefore, the defendant raised dispute about the jurisdiction when plaintiff filed application before the Labour Court and contended that Labour Court has no jurisdiction.” 13. Thus, it would appear that even before the learned Civil Court while such an objection had been raised, the learned Civil Court had while deciding the said aspect, had observed that the defendant i.e. the appellant-Bank herein, had, when the original plaintiff had approached the Labour Court, had raised the dispute with regard to maintainability of such application on ground of jurisdiction before the Labour Court. 14. Thus, the Bank, having raised the issue of jurisdiction before learned Labour Court and the Industrial Court, having rightly come to conclusion that the dispute raised by the plaintiff would not be within their jurisdiction to decide, the plaintiff had approached this Court and this Court had permitted the plaintiff to approach appropriate forum and whereas, at that stage, no objection also had been raised by the respondent-Bank. All these aspects in the considered opinion of this Court, would go to show that while the bank may be justified in having raised objection with regard to jurisdiction before the learned Labour Court, after the decision of this Court reserving liberty infavour of the plaintiff to approach the proper forum and the plaintiff having approached the learned Civil Court being the proper forum, the bank would not be justified in raising an objection with regard to jurisdiction, more particularly, contending that it would be the Labour Court which would have jurisdiction to decide the dispute which was raised by the original plaintiff. Such a finding notwithstanding the legal proposition that jurisdiction cannot be conferred by acquiescence and whereas, the reason for coming to such a conclusion would be discernible from the later discussion. 15. Such a finding notwithstanding the legal proposition that jurisdiction cannot be conferred by acquiescence and whereas, the reason for coming to such a conclusion would be discernible from the later discussion. 15. It would also appear that the issue with regard to jurisdiction had also been elaborately discussed by the learned Civil Court and whereas, it would appear that the learned Civil Court had discussed the aspect as regards jurisdiction, more particularly, with regard to Section 42 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act and also with regard to Schedule 2 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. The learned Civil Court had come to a conclusion that as regards exercise of powers under Section 42 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, a dispute with regard to promotion, would not be an aspect which would be covered under Schedule 2 or 3 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. This Court had perused schedule 2 and schedule 3 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act and whereas, it would appear that while the said schedules cover a number of issues with regard to a service related dispute between an employee and his employer, the schedules would not cover within its ambit, a dispute with regard to non-grant of promotion and consequential benefits accruing from the promotion. 16. Under such circumstances, in the considered opinion of this Court, while the appellant herein-original defendant, would be estopped from raising an issue with regard to jurisdiction, more particularly, estopped from contending that the dispute raised by the original plaintiff would be within the realm of the Labour Court to decide, on the other hand, it would appear that the Labour Court would not have any jurisdiction to entertain the dispute, more particularly, even in relation to the jurisdiction exercised by the Labour Court under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. Thus, the Civil Court had rightly exercised jurisdiction with regard to the dispute raised by the original plaintiff. Under such circumstances, issue no. 1 as noted herein above is answered in negative and issue no. 2 is answered in affirmative. 17. Thus, the Civil Court had rightly exercised jurisdiction with regard to the dispute raised by the original plaintiff. Under such circumstances, issue no. 1 as noted herein above is answered in negative and issue no. 2 is answered in affirmative. 17. Insofar as the dispute with regard to seniority is concerned in view of the fact that the dispute relates to seniority position with effect from the date of joining and since after such a long time disturbing the existing seniority, more particularly, when the parties to the dispute would not be any more in service, this Court deems it appropriate to set aside the direction of the learned Civil Court only with regard to fixation of seniority qua private respondent. It is further clarified that no part of the order whereby benefit of promotion and consequential benefits which were directed to be given to the plaintiff is interfered with. 18. Insofar as the final order, as noted herein above, the learned Civil Court having directed that the petitioner is entitled to promotion in the grade of Inspector with effect from 01.05.1971 and in the grade of Assistant Senior Inspector with effect from 01.02.1991 and whereas, the bank, upon direction of this Court, had calculated arrears from 1984 to 1996 i.e. from which the record was available with the Bank till the date of retirement of the original plaintiff and whereas, since the arrears from 1984 to 1996, came to around Rs. 1,63,173/- a figure of Rs. 3lakhs was directed to be deposited by this Court, as ad hoc payment towards the entire arrears payable to the original plaintiff. It would also appear the original plaintiff or his legal heirs as the case may be have received interest from the year 2003 till date upon the amount of Rs. 3 lakhs. At this stage, it would be relevant to mention that though the calculation by the Bank appears to be disputed by the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs by producing a calculation which had been prepared by the original plaintiff, prior to his demise yet, considering that directing the bank to now re-calculate the arrears would result in an unending exercise, this Court deems it appropriate to fix amount of arrears as at Rs. 3lakhs as directed by this Court vide order dated 23.03.2006. 19. 3lakhs as directed by this Court vide order dated 23.03.2006. 19. Thus, the only question that would arise would be as regards directing transferring of the said amount in favour of the legal heirs of the original plaintiff and with regard to interest for the period between 01.04.1996 i.e. date of superannuation of the original plaintiff till 18.04.2006 i.e. the date of depositing Rs. 3lakhs, as directed by this Court. It would be relevant to note here that the learned Civil Court vide the impugned decision had directed payment of the arrears with interest at the rate of 12% per annum. In the considered opinion of this Court, since this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned decision, more particularly, on the ground raised by the appellant-Bank and further considering that the original petitioner, appears to be entitled to promotional benefits with effect from 01.05.1971 and since the issue is being concluded at the stage by this Court approximately after 5 decades, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the rate of interest as directed by the learned Civil Court. 19.1. Furthermore, since it appears that certain directions had been issued by the learned Civil Court as regards initiation of civil/criminal proceedings against office bearers of the appellant-Bank, who according to the learned Civil Court had caused monetary loss on account of vindictive and rigid approach, it is directed, more particularly, without expressing any opinion of such observations that there shall not be any further proceedings with regard to the said directions, more particularly, in view of the fact that the jurisdiction of the learned Civil Court was confined to prayer sought for and the issues framed for determination. It does not appear that the plaintiff in his suit had sought for any such prayer nor such an issue had been framed by the learned Civil Court for determination. Furthermore, in a suit filed in the year 1994-1995 where the impugned decision was passed in the year 2003, at this stage, permitting such observations to continue may result in further litigation at various levels. Hence, all such observations, more particularly, at paragraph no. 45 to 50 of the impugned decision may be treated as expugned. 20. In this view of the matter, the present first appeal is disposed of as rejected with the following directions being issued: (1) Registry shall disburse the amount of Rs. Hence, all such observations, more particularly, at paragraph no. 45 to 50 of the impugned decision may be treated as expugned. 20. In this view of the matter, the present first appeal is disposed of as rejected with the following directions being issued: (1) Registry shall disburse the amount of Rs. 3 lakhs in favour of the respondent no. 1.2 by account payee cheque. (2) The appellant-Bank shall calculate interest at the rate of 12% on Rs. 3 lakhs from 01.04.1996 to 18.04.2006 and shall pay the same by issuing an account payee cheque in favour of respondent no. 1.1 within period of 6 weeks from today. 21. With these observations and directions, appeal stands disposed of as rejected. Registry to transmit record and proceedings back to the concerned Trial Court.