JUDGMENT : SINDHU SHARMA, J. 1. This application under Section 34 of the Jammu and Kashmir Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997 (hereinafter referred to as Arbitration Act) for setting aside of the arbitration award dated 07.12.2013 passed by the sole Arbitrator Er. Zahoor Ahmad Chat, Executive Director, JKSPDC. 2. Lakes and Water Development Authority (LAWDA) (applicant herein), invited tenders vide NIT No. 2 of 5/2001, dated 11.05.2021 issued by the Executive Engineer, Civil Division, LAWDA, Srinagar vide its Endorsement No. CD/LWDA/577-606, dated 11.05.2001 for Mechanical Dredging/Desilting of Bed of Dal Lake near Shalimar Bridge to the required depth including all types of leads and lifts, carriages up to dumping site, dumping, leveling and dressing etc., as a complete job, as per the requirements of the Authority at the cost of Rs. 19,38,850/-. The respondent participated in the NIT and upon being successful was allotted the aforesaid work which was to be completed within stipulated time as mentioned in the NIT. 3. Dispute arose between the parties pertaining to the payment on account of work done. The applicant asked the respondents for signing of works register for an amount of Rs. 6,45,635/- but the respondent refused to sign the Works Register for an amount of Rs. 6,45,635/-, as settled by the authority and submitted his own bill for an amount of Rs. 19,05,250/-. The applicants did not agree to the amount raised by the respondent and consequently, no payment was released to the respondents. 4. The respondent No. 1, i.e., Contractor, aggrieved of inaction of respondent for releasing his work done payment, approached this Court by filing the writ petition bearing OWP No. 654/2003 regarding release of payment for the works executed by him. This writ petition was dismissed on 03.11.2006, as being not maintainable, however, the respondent was granted liberty to agitate the same through appropriate proceedings. Aggrieved of the judgment in the writ petition, the respondent filed LPA No. 177/2008. The appellate court, dismissed the appeal by the applicant against the judgment dated 16.04.2010 with the observation that the dismissal of the appeal shall not prevent the respondent to avail appropriate remedy as may be available to him under the provisions of law. 5. The respondent No. 1, thereafter, approached the Civil Court by filing a suit for recovery and injunction and sought a decree to recover of an amount of Rs. 5. The respondent No. 1, thereafter, approached the Civil Court by filing a suit for recovery and injunction and sought a decree to recover of an amount of Rs. 35,33,850/- along with interest @ 18% and also permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the respondents from recovery of his loan amount till full and final payment is released. During the pendency of this suit, applicants (LAWDA) filed an application seeking a reference of the dispute raised by the respondent for arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. In his response to the application to reference, the respondent submitted his no objection to the reference of the dispute for arbitration, as sought by the applicant. The applicants thereafter also provided a list of the arbitrators for reference of the dispute of the arbitration to which the respondent gave his concurrence. The learned 4th Additional District Judge referred the matter to the Arbitrator for adjudication of the dispute vide order dated 26.07.2011. 6. The Arbitrator passed the impugned award on 07.12.2013 awarding an amount of Rs. 30,01,527/- in favour of the claimant to be paid by respondent Nos. 1 to 3. The applicants have assailed this order of arbitration on the following grounds: a. That the award passed by the Arbitrator is illegal as the claim put forth by the respondent No. 1 was time barred. Since the period of limitation prescribed for availing the opportunity of remedy in arbitration proceedings is three years and in the present case, the proceedings were initiated in the year 2011, as such, the claim put forth by the respondent was barred by limitation in terms of Section 43 of Jammu and Kashmir Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997, therefore, the same was required to be dismissed. The award is bad, as such, is required to be set aside. The plea of limitation was to be considered by the Arbitrator and not the Court, as such, the award is vitiated and is required to be set aside. b. That there is an error of law apparent on the face of award as the Arbitrator has observed that there is no arbitration agreement between the parties, as such, the proceedings before the Arbitrator were non est in the eyes of law, as such, proceedings before the Arbitrator were without jurisdiction. b. That there is an error of law apparent on the face of award as the Arbitrator has observed that there is no arbitration agreement between the parties, as such, the proceedings before the Arbitrator were non est in the eyes of law, as such, proceedings before the Arbitrator were without jurisdiction. c. That the award is also without jurisdiction as the Arbitrator has failed to decide all the issues in accordance with law. It is further submitted that the learned Arbitrator has not appreciated the claim put forth by the applicant in allowing the claim of the respondent. The applicants were entitled to recover damages, as the respondent did not complete the work. d. That the award is also liable to the set aside as the same is in conflict with the public policy of the State, as the same being exorbitant, unfair and unreasonable, shocks ones conscious and, as such, requires to be set aside. e. That the award is also vitiated by the fact that the respondent has failed to carry out the execution of the work to its logical end and instead abandoned the same in midway, as such, the relief granted by the Arbitrator is nothing but to windfall profit without carrying the obligation to execute the work and the award has been passed on technicalities and is required to be set aside. f. The award is against facts of law, as such, is required to be set aside. 7. Before considering the grounds of challenge raised by the applicants, it would be relevant to refer to Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, which provides as under: 34. Application for setting aside arbitral award: (1) Recourse to a Court against on arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3). (2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if: (a) the party making the application furnishes proof that: (i) A party was under some incapacity. (ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon under the law for the time being in force. (iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceeding or was otherwise unable to present his case. (iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceeding or was otherwise unable to present his case. (iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration: Provided that, if the decision on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside. (v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this part from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement was not in accordance with this Part. (b) the Court finds that: (i) The subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force. (ii) The arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of the State. Explanation - Without prejudice to the generality of sub-clause (ii) of Clause (b), it is hereby declared for the avoidance of any doubt, that an award is in conflict with the public policy of the State if the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was in violation of Section 58 or Section 64. 8. The ambit and power of the Court while considering Section 34 of the Act has been well settled by the Supreme Court in UHL Power Co. Ltd. v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2022) 4 SCC 116 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the scope of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act has held as under: “11. As far as Section 34 is concerned, the position is well-settled by now that the Court does not sit in appeal over the arbitral award and may interfere on merits on the limited ground provided under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) i.e. if the award is against the public policy of India. As far as Section 34 is concerned, the position is well-settled by now that the Court does not sit in appeal over the arbitral award and may interfere on merits on the limited ground provided under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) i.e. if the award is against the public policy of India. As per the legal position clarified through decisions of this Court prior to the amendments to the 1996 Act in 2015, a violation of Indian Public Policy, in turn, includes a violation of the fundamental Policy of Indian law, a violation of the interest of India, conflict with justice or morality, and the existence of patent illegality in the arbitral award. Additionally, the concept of the “fundamental policy of Indian law” would cover compliance with statutes and judicial precedents, adopting a judicial approach, compliance with the principles of natural justice, and Wednesbury reasonableness. Furthermore, “patent illegality” itself has been held to mean contravention of the substantive law of India, contravention of the 1996 Act, and contravention of the terms of the contract.” “17. A similar view, as stated above, has been taken by this Court in K. Sugumar v. Hindustan Petroleum Corp. Ltd. wherein it has been observed as follows: (SCC p. 540, Para 2) “2. The contours of the power of the Court under section 34 of the Act are too well established to require any reiteration. Even a bare reading of Section 34 of the Act indicates the highly constricted power of the civil court to interfere with an arbitral award. The reason for this is obvious. When parties have chosen to avail an alternate mechanism for dispute resolution, they must be left to reconcile themselves to the wisdom of the decision of the arbitrator and the role of the court should be restricted to the bare minimum. Interference will be justified only in cases of commission of misconduct by the arbitrator which can find manifestation in different forms including exercise of legal perversity by the arbitrator.” 9. Similarly, in Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd. v. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation, (2022) 1 SCC 131 , it was held that: “28. This Court has in several other judgments interpreted Section 34 of the 1996 Act to stress on the restraint to be shown by Courts while examining the validity of the arbitral awards. Similarly, in Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd. v. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation, (2022) 1 SCC 131 , it was held that: “28. This Court has in several other judgments interpreted Section 34 of the 1996 Act to stress on the restraint to be shown by Courts while examining the validity of the arbitral awards. The limited grounds available to Courts for annulment of arbitral awards are well known to legally trained minds. However, the difficulty arises in applying the well established principles for interference to the facts of each case that come up before the courts. There is a disturbing tendency of Courts of setting aside arbitral awards, after dissecting and reassessing factual aspects of the cases to come to a conclusion that the award needs intervention and thereafter, dubbing the award to be vitiated by either perversity or patent illegality, apart from the other grounds available for annulment of the award. This approach will lead to corrosion of the object of the 1996 Act and the endeavors made to preserve this object, which is minimal judicial interference with arbitral awards. That apart, several judicial pronouncements of this Court would become a dead letter if arbitral awards are set aside by categorizing them as perverse or patently illegal without appreciating the contours of the said expressions.” 10. The jurisdiction of the Court to set aside the award passed by the Arbitrator is very limited and cannot be interfered except on the ground provided under section 34 of the Act. 11. In view of the principles of law, as laid down in these judgments and provision of Section 34 of the Act, the grounds of challenge to the award are to be considered. 12. The scope of interference with an Arbitral Award under section 34 of the Arbitration Act is fairly limited and narrow. The law, as laid down by the Apex Court in this regard is well settled, the Courts do not sit in an appeal adjudicating the challenge to the award. The Arbitrator is the master of evidence after due consideration of facts, circumstances, evidence and material before him. 13. The arbitrator framed as many as twenty five issues in which two issues were treated as preliminary issues. The Arbitrator is the master of evidence after due consideration of facts, circumstances, evidence and material before him. 13. The arbitrator framed as many as twenty five issues in which two issues were treated as preliminary issues. The preliminary objections were raised by the applicant with regard to the period of limitation to institute the arbitration petition and also regarding non-existence of basic arbitration agreement between the claimant and Respondent Nos. 1 and 3. 14. The respondents submit that they were prosecuting the proceedings in the writ petition in good faith and with due diligence, though, the writ petition as well as appeal was dismissed but the Hon'ble Court had observed that the dismissal of the same shall not prevent the applicant to avail the appropriate remedy as may be available to him under the provisions of law. The respondent, therefore, filed a suit before the 4th Additional District Judge, Srinagar, for recovery. The applicant, during the pendency, filed an application under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act seeking reference of the dispute raised by the plaintiff for Arbitrator in the suit. The respondents submitted that they had consented for out of Court settlement through arbitration. The Trial Court referred the adjudication of dispute consent of parties for Arbitration on 30.05.2011. 15. The applicant filed a list of Arbitrators and with the concurrence of the respondents on 26.07.2011, an Arbitrator was appointed. These preliminary issues were considered and decided by the arbitrator on 07.12.2013, by holding that the claim was neither time barred nor any agreement existed between the parties and also the arbitrator recorded a finding that limitation in the present case could not defeat the claim, particularly when the plea was neither raised nor accepted by the Court of 4th Additional District Judge, Srinagar, therefore, the respondents were precluded from raising the same in this application. 16. The Arbitrator, after considering the preliminary issues vide order dated 03.07.2012 held as under: “17. I am satisfied that it has been clearly made out that neither the claim is time barred nor any arbitration agreement exists between the parties also issue with respect to limitation cannot defeat the claim of the petitioner particularly when this plea was neither raised nor accepted by the Court of learned 4th Additional District Judge. I am satisfied that it has been clearly made out that neither the claim is time barred nor any arbitration agreement exists between the parties also issue with respect to limitation cannot defeat the claim of the petitioner particularly when this plea was neither raised nor accepted by the Court of learned 4th Additional District Judge. Rejecting the arbitral proceeding without touching merits of the case on the plea of limitation would also be contrary to the order of the Civil Court constituting the Arbitral Tribunal, especially when the respondents have themselves willingly and knowingly offered for an out of court settlement through Arbitrator, which was consented to by the petitioner. The respondents, if aggrieved of the appointment of Arbitrator, to adjudicate the matter on merits, were free to call in question, the order of Civil Court and having not chosen that coarse, the Arbitral Tribunal cannot scuttle the proceedings in mid way and reject the Arbitration application on the technical plea. I am afraid that this was not the intention of the order of Civil Court, constituting the Arbitral Tribunal, nor was so intended by the respondents, who were claiming the resolution of dispute through Arbitral proceedings right from 2003, but are now in the same breath backtracking on the stand taken by them firstly before the Hon'ble High Court and then in the Civil Court. 18. In view of the foregoing discussion, I find no merit in the plea set up by Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 on the other hand I find sufficient grounds that the claim in question has been made within the period of limitation. Accordingly, I reject the plea of Respondent Nos. 1 to 3, on question of maintainability of the instant application on account of Limitations and accept the plea of petitioner to the effect that no Arbitration agreement exists between the petitioner and respondent.” 17. It is well settled that valid award made by a voluntary reference is final and conclusive judgment between the parties, respecting all the matters referred by the submission and binds the rights of the parties at all time without appeal, both as to fact and law. 18. The dispute was referred to arbitration after the consent of both the parties. It is well settled that valid award made by a voluntary reference is final and conclusive judgment between the parties, respecting all the matters referred by the submission and binds the rights of the parties at all time without appeal, both as to fact and law. 18. The dispute was referred to arbitration after the consent of both the parties. The Arbitrator rightly held that the applicant's intention was to settle the dispute out of Court by Arbitration and any parties can seek the intervention of the Court for settling the dispute by Arbitration. 19. The order of reference, which was passed at the instance of the applicant, was not questioned by the applicant. These issues were raised before the Arbitrator and the arbitrator vide its order dated 26.07.2013, decided the issues of jurisdiction as well as limitation which has attained finality and cannot be re-opened. 20. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Varindera Constructions Ltd. (2018) 7 SCC 794 , while discussing the object of arbitration held as under: “12. The primary object of the arbitration is to reach a final disposition in a speedy, effective, inexpensive and expeditious manner. In order to regulate the law regarding arbitration, legislature came up with legislation which is known as Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. In order to make arbitration process more effective, the legislature restricted the role of courts in case where matter is subject to the arbitration. Section 5 of the Act specifically restricted the interference of the courts to some extent. In other words, it is only in exceptional circumstances, as provided by this Act, the court is entitled to intervene in the dispute which is the subject-matter of arbitration. Such intervention may be before, at or after the arbitration proceeding, as the case may be. In short, court shall not intervene with the subject matter of arbitration unless injustice is caused to either of the parties.” 21. The matter once adjudicated upon by arbitrators with the consent of parties cannot be permitted to be opened again is because it is expedient that there should be an end to litigation when once a matter has been decided between the parties. The applicant is, thus, precluded from raising the same. The matter once adjudicated upon by arbitrators with the consent of parties cannot be permitted to be opened again is because it is expedient that there should be an end to litigation when once a matter has been decided between the parties. The applicant is, thus, precluded from raising the same. Once on the asking of the parties, the reference was made by the Civil Court and on the admission of the parties, the same could only be challenged on the ground that it was coerced or due to undue influence or otherwise. 22. No doubt, the objection regarding validity of reference or award can be taken even after the award is filed but if the parties themselves have referred the matter to arbitrator, they cannot take the plea that no dispute was in existence which was capable of adjudication as held in State of U.P. vs. Om Metals & Minerals Ltd. 1996 (1) ARBLR 119 (All) and State of U.P. vs. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. 1996 All H.C. 1431. The applicant, after seeking reference of the dispute has waived his right regarding validity of agreement and limitation, thus, the finding of the arbitrator needs no interference. 23. It is next submitted that this award is against the public policy, as the award is in violation of statutory provisions, as the award is exorbitant, unfair and unreasonable and has adversely affected the interest of the State, so it needs to be set aside. 24. The scope of award under section 34 is well settled that the award can be interfered if it is against public policy, violation of statute, justice or morality, patent illegality or when the terms of contract is without any reason. The Court can also decide the misconduct of arbitrator beyond Section 34, i.e., if the arbitrator travels beyond the contract or when the award is without justification. 25. The contravention of public policy of India is also an indispensable consideration while adjudging an arbitral award and a challenge thereto. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in BCCI v. Cricket Association & Ors. (2015) 3 SCC 251 , on the question of public policy, has held as under: “96. To sum up: public policy is not a static concept. It varies with times and from generation to generation. But what is in public good and public interest cannot be opposed to public policy and vice versa. (2015) 3 SCC 251 , on the question of public policy, has held as under: “96. To sum up: public policy is not a static concept. It varies with times and from generation to generation. But what is in public good and public interest cannot be opposed to public policy and vice versa. Fundamental Policy of Law would also constitute a facet of public policy. This would imply that all those principles of law that ensure justice, fair play and bring transparency and objectivity and promote probity in the discharge of public functions would also constitute public policy. Conversely, any deviation, abrogation, frustration or negation of the salutary principles of justice, fairness, good conscience, equity and objectivity will be opposed to public policy. It follows that any rule, contract or arrangement that actually defeats or tends to defeat the high ideals of fairness and objectivity in the discharge of public functions no matter by a private non-governmental body will be opposed to public policy................” 26. The public policy doctrine which is well prevalent that the Court shall take into account the fact that inconvenience is caused to public at large and deserves more attention, therefore, it is suggested that law would defer the public good or private good and mischief to one can avoid prejudice to many, thus, the public policy exception remains to intervene and check whether applicable rule of law would derogate from the existing fundamental notion of justice delivery system. The interpretation of public policy as provided is when patent illegality is added to a separate clause for avoiding arbitral award on the grounds of public policy. There is nothing in award to show that there is anything opposed to public policy. 27. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority, 2015 (3) SCC 49 , has held that it is clear that the juristic principle of a “judicial approach” demands that a decision be fair, reasonable and objective. On the obverse side, anything arbitrary and whimsical would obviously not be a determination which would either be fair, reasonable or objective. 28. The Arbitrator considered the submissions and objections of the parties, framed issues, appreciated the material facts and evidence and then passed the Award by giving sufficient reasoning. On the obverse side, anything arbitrary and whimsical would obviously not be a determination which would either be fair, reasonable or objective. 28. The Arbitrator considered the submissions and objections of the parties, framed issues, appreciated the material facts and evidence and then passed the Award by giving sufficient reasoning. There is nothing in the impugned Award to suggest that it suffers from patent illegality and the findings therein are perverse and will shock the conscience of this Court. 29. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the applicants have failed to substantiate the grounds for setting aside the impugned Arbitral Award, as such, there is no merit in this petition and the same is, accordingly, dismissed. 30. Disposed of accordingly.