JUDGMENT : GOUTAM BHADURI, J. 1. The present appeal is against the judgment and decree dated 17.03.2017 passed by the 3rd Additional District Judge to the Court of First Additional District Judge, Raigarh in Civil Suit No. 92A/2010, whereby the suit filed by the plaintiff was dismissed. The suit was filed by one Smt. Surinder Kour for Declaration of title, permanent injunction and to declare the so-called Godnama executed in favor of defendant no. 1 and the WILL executed by the parents of the plaintiff in favor of defendant No. 1 as null and void. Further prayer was made to declare sale deed executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant Nos. 2 to 6 as null and void and possession was also claimed for. 2. The brief facts of the case are that defendant No. 1 Rajendra Singh is biological son of Smt. Surinder Kour, who is the plaintiff. The mother of the plaintiff was Ram Pyari, who died on 03.06.2003 and father Sant Singh died on 02.07.2005. According to the plaintiff, the plaintiff is the sole daughter of Sant Singh and Ram Pyari. It was further contended that even after her marriage, she used to visit her parents to look after them and the grandchildren also used to visit there and also prosecuted their studies there. The plaintiff stated that her elder son namely Rajendra Singh (Defendant No. 1) was kept at her father’s place for upbringing him and for studies. The things were at rest but the dispute started in July, 2007 wherein defendant No. 1 told plaintiff that after death of Sant Singh and Ram Pyari, all the properties left behind by them are recorded in name of Sant Singh and he is the sole and exclusive owner of the said property. Having come to know such fact, the plaintiff enquired into the revenue records, wherein plaintiff alleges that it was then discovered on the basis of forged adoption deed (Godnama) and forged WILL, the entire property of Sant Singh and Ram Pyari were mutated in the name of defendant No. 1. Having known the fact, the plaintiff stated that she being mother neither given his consent for adoption of his son Rajendra Singh and nor any rituals were performed for adoption. Having known the fact, the plaintiff stated that she being mother neither given his consent for adoption of his son Rajendra Singh and nor any rituals were performed for adoption. She further states that the adoption deed i.e. Godnama do not bear her signature, thereby it will not confer any right on the defendant No. 1, to claim to be son of Sant Singh and Ram Pyari, thereby to claim entire property of them. 3. Plaintiff further pleaded that the subsequent WILL does not disclose the fact about such adoption and the plaintiff is the sole and exclusive legal heir and in order to deprive her legitimate right, the forged WILL was prepared by her own son, which would not confer any right or title in favour of the defendant No. 1. The plaintiff further referred to certain Revenue cases to plead that exclusively the name of Defendant No. 1 was got recorded in the revenue records for which the reports were also made to the police. The plaintiff further states that the property which is situated at village Baikunthpur, bearing Khasra No. 213 admeasuring 1.263 Hectares have been sold to defendant Nos. 2 to 5 by registered sale deed dated 27.05.2006 and the lands situated at village Kouhakunda, bearing Khasra No. 39 admeasuring 0.085 hectares has been sold to defendant No. 6 by sale deed dated 17.10.2007. The plaintiff further asserted that since the adoption deed and the WILL is forged, therefore, by subsequent sale of the property in favour of Defendants 2 to 6, they would not get any title over the said property. Consequently, the pleading was made that the said sale deed be declared null and void. Further the possession of the suit property was also claimed by the plaintiff. 4. Per contra, defendant No. 1, who is the main contestant stated that in the year 1970 while the defendant was about 3 months old, according to the mutual consent, defendant No. 1 was given in adoption to Sant Singh and Ram Pyari who are his maternal Grandfather and maternal Grandmother. In a consequence thereof on 18.11.1970 an adoption deed (Godpatra) was written. The defendant further states that because of such adoption, defendant No. 1 would be treated as the son, since after his adoption he was in the company and custody of his maternal grandparents, who adopted him as their son. In a consequence thereof on 18.11.1970 an adoption deed (Godpatra) was written. The defendant further states that because of such adoption, defendant No. 1 would be treated as the son, since after his adoption he was in the company and custody of his maternal grandparents, who adopted him as their son. The defendant further stated that all the properties in question are self acquired property of Sant Singh and Ram Pyari and both of them voluntarily, being conscious of the fact in presence of the witnesses on 15.12.1989 executed a registered WILL deed, whereby the entire property has devolved on defendant No. 1. Therefore, defendant No. 1 is the exclusive owner of the subject property. The defendant further states that the plaintiff admitted the fact by way of affidavit and other declaration before the revenue authorities that she has three sons and three daughters wherein name of defendant No. 1 was omitted, which would show that he was adopted by Sant Singh and Ram Pyari and during admission in School in lieu of Father's name of Rajendra Singh, name of Sant Singh is recorded. The defendant further states that he being the exclusive and sole owner has subsequently executed the sale deed in favour of the subsequent purchasers. 5. Defendant Nos.2 to 6 filed separate written statement. They also supported the contention of defendant No. 1 that the property in question was bequeathed by way of WILL in favour of Rajendra Singh and the name of defendant No. 1 was recorded in the revenue records. It was stated that they have purchased the same for a valuable consideration and are bona fide purchasers. Consequently, they also prayed for dismissal of the suit. 6. Learned trial Court has framed as many as 8 issues with respect to the adoption, the finding was given that adoption is proved and legal. With respect to the WILL dated 15.12.2009, the Court also proved that WILL too is proved as genuine. With respect to the sale deed executed by Rajendra Singh, the Court also held it in favour of purchasers and eventually dismissed the claim of plaintiff. Hence the appeal. 7. With respect to the WILL dated 15.12.2009, the Court also proved that WILL too is proved as genuine. With respect to the sale deed executed by Rajendra Singh, the Court also held it in favour of purchasers and eventually dismissed the claim of plaintiff. Hence the appeal. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the trial Court completely misjudged the law to apply the same in the facts of this case, inasmuch as, in order to prove an valid adoption, necessary requirement under Sections 7, 9 and 11 (vi) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act 1956 (hereinafter referred as the Act, 1956) has not been proved. He would further submit that the bare perusal of the adoption deed (part of Ex.P/1), would show that it was on a stamp paper of Rs.1, whereas, according to Stamp Act, it should have been executed on a document of Rs. 500/-. He would further submit that no consent of the mother and father i.e. husband and wife was recorded, thereby the adoption cannot be given effect to. He placed his reliance in the case of Ghisalal vs. Dhapubai (Dead) by LRs. and Others, 2011 AIR SCW 592 and M. Vanaja vs. M. Sarla Devi (Dead), (2020) 5 SCC 307 . 8. While making the submission of WILL, he would submit that the attesting witnesses namely Habel Singh and Balakram were not examined to prove the WILL. Hence it was not proved. It is stated that despite the existence of so called WILL, one application was filed by defendant before the revenue officer for mutation wherein Sant Singh also wanted to get his name recorded in respect of the certain properties which were left over by Ram Pyari, the wife. So existence of WILL becomes doubtful. Further referring to the Nazul order Ex.P/10 the counsel would submit that name of Smt. Surinder Kour, the plaintiff, was jointly recorded, which proves that the WILL was never executed at all. He would further submit that in order to prove the WILL, attesting witnesses are required to be examined as per Indian Evidence Act and Succession Act, therefore, in absence of proof of WILL, no right can be conferred in favour of defendant No. 1. He would further submit that in order to prove the WILL, attesting witnesses are required to be examined as per Indian Evidence Act and Succession Act, therefore, in absence of proof of WILL, no right can be conferred in favour of defendant No. 1. He would further submit that consequently the sale executed by him in favour of Defendants No. 2 to 6 would also fall for want of absolute right and there would be number of sharers. 9. Per contra, Shri Prafull N. Bharat, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Harshal Chouhan; Shri B.P. Sharma, learned Advocate assisted by Shri Hari Agrawal, Advocate; Shri Prakash Tiwari, Advocate along with Shri Palash Tiwari, Advocate; and Shri Praveen Shrivastava, learned panel lawyer, would submit that the documents which are placed before the Court would show that while defendant No. 1 was admitted to the school, name of his father was shown as Sant Singh which would show the intention of the parties and actually giving and taking of the child happened. They would further submit that when the admission documents are compared with the other admission documents which show the name of the father of defendant No. 1 was shown as Sant Singh would also lead to show that defendant No. 1 (Respondent No. 1) was adopted by Sant Singh and Ram Pyari. 10. The counsel would further submit that the cases of like nature are required to be decided on the principles of ‘preponderance of probability’ and such existence of fact of name of Sant Singh as father would lead to show that plaintiff was very well in know of the fact that the son was given in adoption. It is further submitted that while disclosing the names of the heirs before authorities, the plaintiff omitted the name of defendant No. 1. It also leads to corroborate the fact that defendant No. 1 was given on adoption. The counsel would further submit that the WILL which is marked as Ex.P/1 is a registered one and they placed reliance in the case of Prem Singh and Others vs. Birbal and Others, (2006) 5 SCC 353 to submit that in cases of registered document the presumption of correctness would follow. The counsel would further submit that the WILL which is marked as Ex.P/1 is a registered one and they placed reliance in the case of Prem Singh and Others vs. Birbal and Others, (2006) 5 SCC 353 to submit that in cases of registered document the presumption of correctness would follow. They would also submit that as per the pleading of the plaintiff, they admitted the fact of existence of WILL, therefore, when the document is proved to be registered then in such case, the correctness of WILL can be questioned. 11. Further with respect to the adoption, reliance is placed in the case of Kamla Rani vs. Ram Lalit Rai alias Lalak Rai (Dead) through Legal Representatives and Others, (2018) 9 SCC 663 and would submit that the circumstances and the evidence which is proved would show that the adoption was validly made. The reliance was also placed in the case of L. Debi Prasad (Dead) by LRs. vs. Smt. Tribeni Devi and Others, (1970) 1 SCC 677 to submit that considering the act of the plaintiff would show the name of defendant No. 1 was specifically excluded as her son would lead to show that the plaintiff has acquiesced in for a considerable time to accept defendant No. 1 to be the adopted son of Sant Singh and Ram Pyari. It is further submitted that the statement of Habel Singh, who was an attesting witness to the document, recorded before the police authorities in such statement execution of WILL was admitted and it would be a relevant fact to be considered in favour of execution of WILL. Learned counsel would submit that exclusion of other heir in a WILL cannot be considered as doubtful, when the property was self acquired. Reliance is placed in the case of Swarnalatha and Others vs. Kalavathy and Others, AIR 2022 SC 1585 and Ved Mitra Verma vs. Dharam Deo Verma, (2014) 15 SCC 578 . They would also submit that the purchasers are the bona-fide purchasers and the purchase was made after perusal of the revenue records, which reflected the name of defendant No. 1 exclusively. Therefore, the purchasers cannot be held liable on the wrong side and prayed for dismissal of suit. 12. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents. Therefore, the purchasers cannot be held liable on the wrong side and prayed for dismissal of suit. 12. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents. For the sake for brevity as per the pleading of the parties, the genealogical tree of plaintiff and defendant is shown hereunder: Sant Singh Father of Plaintiff (Died on 20.07.2005) Ram Pyari Mother of Plaintiff (Died on 03.06.2003) Surinder Kaur Daughter Plaintiff Swaroop Singh Husband of Plaintiff Rajendra Singh Defendant No. 1 13. According to the plaintiff, defendant No. 1 Rajendra Singh, who is the biological son, claimed entire property left by father and mother of plaintiff, who is daughter of Sant Singh and Ram Pyari. The claim is on the basis of adoption deed and WILL. Defendant Nos. 2 to 6 are purchasers from defendant No. 1 Rajendra Singh. The plaintiff claimed relief to declare the adoption deed and the WILL to be void and further declaration to the effect that the sale deed executed in favour of defendant Nos. 2 to 6 would not be binding on them. The plaintiff Sant Singh Father of Plaintiff (Died on 20.07.2005) Ram Pyari Mother of Plaintiff (Died on 03.06.2003) Surinder Kaur Daughter Plaintiff Rajendra Singh Defendant No. 1 Swaroop Singh Husband of Plaintiff further prayed that the construction raised over the subject property be demolished and the vacant possession be given to them and defendant further be restrained to raise any construction to alienate the same. 14. The defendant No. 1 Rajendra Singh, who is the biological son of Surinder Kour, the plaintiff, claimed that he was adopted by his Grandfather and Grandmother (Nana and Nani) during his childhood. The adoption deed is marked as Ex.P/1. The adoption deed purports that Swajeet Singh Khurana (Biological Father of defendant No. 1) handed over the custody of child namely Rajendra Singh on 18.11.1970 to his father-in-law and mother-in-law by giving them into the lap and declares that Rajendra Singh would be considered to be the son of Sant Singh. 15. Plaintiff Surinder Kour, mother, in her statement says that she has not given the son into adoption to her parents and no rituals or formalities were performed. In respect of Ex.P/1 she states that it does not bear her signature. The signature of her husband was also denied. 15. Plaintiff Surinder Kour, mother, in her statement says that she has not given the son into adoption to her parents and no rituals or formalities were performed. In respect of Ex.P/1 she states that it does not bear her signature. The signature of her husband was also denied. In order to create a valid adoption, Section 7, 9 and relevant part of 11 (vi) of the Hindu Adoptions And Maintenance Act, 1956 would be relevant which are reproduced herein-below: 7. Capacity of a male Hindu to take in adoption - Any male Hindu who is of sound mind and is not a minor has the capacity to take a son or a daughter in adoption: Provided that, if he has a wife living, he shall not adopt except with the consent of his wife unless the wife has completely and finally renounced the world or has ceased to be a Hindu or has been declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be of unsound mind. Explanation: If a person has more than one wife living at the time of adoption, the consent of all the wives is necessary unless the consent of any one of them is unnecessary for any of the reasons specified in the preceding proviso. 9. Persons capable of giving in adoption: (1) No person except the father or mother or the guardian of a child shall have the capacity to give the child in adoption. (2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (4), the father, of mother if alive, shall have equal right to give a son or daughter, in adoption: Provided that such right shall not be exercised by either of them save with the consent of the other unless one of them has completely and finally renounced the world or has ceased to be a Hindu or has been declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be of unsound mind. (3) Where both the father and mother are dead or have completely and finally renounced the world or have abandoned the child or have been declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be of unsound mind or where the parentage of the child is not known, the guardian of the child may give the child in adoption with the previous permission of the court to any person including the guardian himself. (4) Before granting permission to a guardian under sub-section (4), the court shall be satisfied that the adoption will be for the welfare of the child, due consideration being for this purpose given to the wishes of the child having regard to the age and understanding of the child and that the applicant for permission has not received or agreed to receive and that no person has made or given or agreed to make or give to the applicant any payment or reward in consideration of the adoption except such as the court may sanction. Explanation: For the purposes of this section: (i) the expressions “father” and “mother” do not include an adoptive father and an adoptive mother. (ia) “guardian” means a person having the care of the person or a child or of both his person and property and includes: (a) a guardian appointed by the will of the child's father or mother. (b) a guardian appointed or declared by a court. (ii) “court” means the city civil court or a district court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the child to be adopted ordinarily resides. 11. Other conditions for a valid adoption - In every adoption, the following conditions must be complied with: (vi) the child to be adopted must be actually given and taken in adoption by the parents or guardian concerned or under their authority with intent to transfer the child from the family of its birth 1 [or in the case of an abandoned child or child whose parentage is not known, from the place or family where it has been brought up] to the family of its adoption. 16. Even for the sake of argument if signature of Swaroop Singh Khurana, the husband of the plaintiff is ignored, however, proviso to Section 9 of the Act, 1956 postulates that such right shall not be exercised by either of them save with consent of the other unless one of them has completely and finally renounced the world or has ceased to be a Hindu. The Supreme Court in the case of Ghisalal vs. Dhapubai (Dead) by LRs. and Others, 2011 AIR SCW 592 has observed that while giving and taking the child in adoption the consent cannot be inferred. The Supreme Court in the case of Ghisalal vs. Dhapubai (Dead) by LRs. and Others, 2011 AIR SCW 592 has observed that while giving and taking the child in adoption the consent cannot be inferred. The same analogy would be applicable in the instant case and when there is specific denial by the mother that she has not given the child on adoption, which remains un-rebutted, the finding cannot be considered favourably for defendant No. 1 of valid adoption. 17. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in the matter of M. Vanaja vs. M. Sarla Devi (Dead), (2020) 5 SCC 307 while dealing the provisions of Section 7 and 9 along with 11 (vi) of the Act, 1956 has held that the person should be capable to give the child in adoption and the adoption must be actually given and taken. In the instant case, the statement of the appellant/mother remained un-rebutted that she has not consented to such giving of son in adoption and further says that the ceremony of actual adoption never happened. There is no evidence on behalf of defendant No. 1, the son, to show that he was adopted. More so, the document Ex.D/1 on which the adoption is relied on nothing can be inferred for warrant of consent by mother, the plaintiff. 18. Respondent No. 1 has relied on the document Ex.D/1 to show that in the year 1971-72 name of the father of defendant No. 1 was shown as Sant Singh Ajmani, whereas Ex.D/2 is of Amarjeet Singh, who is the another son of plaintiff, wherein the name of father is shown as Swaroop Singh Khurana. However, when the mandatory consent which is required under Section 9 to give in for adoption i.e. consent of mother is absent no other evidence is before us to appreciate the fact that her biological son was given in adoption by her consent to her father and mother. The other documents on which defendant placed his reliance to say that plaintiff omitted name of Rajendra Singh as his son, while giving particulars of his son and daughter i.e. affidavit of Surindra Kour, the same was not confronted to her during her cross-examination. Therefore, in view of the oral statement, which is against valid adoption, the affidavit cannot be given a preference over the un-rebutted statement of mother. Therefore, in view of the oral statement, which is against valid adoption, the affidavit cannot be given a preference over the un-rebutted statement of mother. In a consequence thereof, we are of the view that the adoption as pleaded as a defence by defendant No. 1 Rajendra Singh was not validly proved before the Court. Hence wrong finding was arrived at. 19. With respect to the WILL, whereby defendant No. 1 Rajendra Singh claimed that the property devolved onto him, the said document is Ex.P/1. The said document was executed on 15.12.1989 whereas the adoption deed is of 1970. Perusal of the WILL reflects that factum of adoption was not written in such WILL and the status of defendant No. 1 Rajendra Singh was shown as Nati i.e. grandson. As per the defence, defendant No. 1 claimed to be adopted son. Being the son why grandfather and grandmother while executing the WILL shown him as to be grandson remains unexplained. Such human conduct, appears to be little doubtful to draw inference against adoption, inasmuch as, he was not shown as a son. 20. Further in order to assess the correctness of the Will, on the basis of which right is claimed by defendant, the Courts are required to resort to arm chair theory. Meaning thereby the Court is required to sit at the arm chair of the testator. This proposition has been laid down by the Supreme Court in Lakshmana Nadar vs. B. Ramier, AIR 1953 SC 304 further followed by Navneet Lal alias Rangi vs. Gokul, AIR 1976 SC 794 . Further in Rajkumari vs. Surendra Pal Sharma reported in Civil Appeal No. 9683/2019, it is held that the propounder in order to succeed the WILL as genuine, is required to prove by satisfactory evidence that (i) the will was signed by the testator; (ii) the testator at the time was in a sound and disposing state of mind; (iii) the testator understood the nature and effect of the dispositions and (iv) that the testator had put his signature on the document of his own free WILL. Similar proposition has been laid down in Shivkumar vs. Sharanbasappa, (2021) 11 SCC 277 : 2020 SCC Online SC 385 wherein the parameters have been laid down to test as to the circumstances which may give right to suspicious circumstances about the WILL in question. 21. Similar proposition has been laid down in Shivkumar vs. Sharanbasappa, (2021) 11 SCC 277 : 2020 SCC Online SC 385 wherein the parameters have been laid down to test as to the circumstances which may give right to suspicious circumstances about the WILL in question. 21. The Supreme Court in Shivkumar vs. Sharanabasappa (supra) has laid down the adjudicatory process concerning the proof of Will and summarized it as under: “12. For what has been noticed hereinabove, the relevant principles governing the adjudicatory process concerning proof of a Will could be broadly summarised as follows: 12.1. Ordinarily, a Will has to be proved like any other document; the test to be applied being the usual test of the satisfaction of the prudent mind. Alike the principles governing the proof of other documents, in the case of Will too, the proof with mathematical accuracy is not to be insisted upon. 12.2. Since as per Section 63 of the Succession Act, a Will is required to be attested, it cannot be used as evidence until at least one attesting witness has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive and capable of giving evidence. 12.3. The unique feature of a Will is that it speaks from the death of the testator and, therefore, the maker thereof is not available for deposing about the circumstances in which the same was executed. This introduces an element of solemnity in the decision of the question as to whether the document propounded is the last Will of the testator. The initial onus, naturally, lies on the propounder but the same can be taken to have been primarily discharged on proof of the essential facts which go into the making of a Will. 12.4. The case in which the execution of the Will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances stands on a different footing. The presence of suspicious circumstances makes the onus heavier on the propounder and, therefore, in cases where the circumstances attendant upon the execution of the document give rise to suspicion, the propounder must remove all legitimate suspicions before the document can be accepted as the last Will of the testator. 12.5. The presence of suspicious circumstances makes the onus heavier on the propounder and, therefore, in cases where the circumstances attendant upon the execution of the document give rise to suspicion, the propounder must remove all legitimate suspicions before the document can be accepted as the last Will of the testator. 12.5. If a person challenging the Will alleges fabrication or alleges fraud, undue influence, coercion et cetera in regard to the execution of the Will, such pleas have to be proved by him, but even in the absence of such pleas, the very circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will may give rise to the doubt or as to whether the Will had indeed been executed by the testator and/or as to whether the testator was acting of his own free will. In such eventuality, it is again a part of the initial onus of the propounder to remove all reasonable doubts in the matter. 12.6. A circumstance is “suspicious” when it is not normal or is “not normally expected in a normal situation or is not expected of a normal person.” As put by this Court, the suspicious features must be ‘real, germane and valid’ and not merely the “fantasy of the doubting mind.” 12.7. As to whether any particular feature or a set of features qualify as “suspicious” would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. A shaky or doubtful signature; a feeble or uncertain mind of the testator; an unfair disposition of property; an unjust exclusion of the legal heirs and particularly the dependents; an active or leading part in making of the Will by the beneficiary thereunder et-cetera are some of the circumstances which may give rise to suspicion. The circumstances above-noted are only illustrative and by no means exhaustive because there could be any circumstance or set of circumstances which may give rise to legitimate suspicion about the execution of the Will. On the other hand, any of the circumstance qualifying as being suspicious could be legitimately explained by the propounder. However, such suspicion or suspicions cannot be removed by mere proof of sound and disposing state of mind of the testator and his signature coupled with the proof of attestation. 12.8. On the other hand, any of the circumstance qualifying as being suspicious could be legitimately explained by the propounder. However, such suspicion or suspicions cannot be removed by mere proof of sound and disposing state of mind of the testator and his signature coupled with the proof of attestation. 12.8. The test of satisfaction of the judicial conscience comes into operation when a document propounded as the Will of the testator is surrounded by suspicious circumstance/s. While applying such test, the Court would address itself to the solemn questions as to whether the testator had signed the Will while being aware of its contents and after understanding the nature and effect of the dispositions in the Will? 12.9. In the ultimate analysis, where the execution of a Will is shrouded in suspicion, it is a matter essentially of the judicial conscience of the Court and the party which sets up the Will has to offer cogent and convincing explanation of the suspicious circumstances surrounding the Will.” 22. In the instant case, the attesting witnesses namely Habel Singh and Balakram either of them were not examined. Apart from the fact the document Ex.P/7 which is an application for mutation of name after death of Ram Pyari in the year 2003, Sant Singh filed an application to record his name along with his son and not for the son exclusively in respect of the property leftover by Ram Pyari. Further in the Nazul cases when the dispute arose and enquiry was made, the name of Surindra Kour, the plaintiff, was recorded jointly in the Nazul record. Therefore, in view of such suspicion, which is not removed apart from the fact that any of the attesting witnesses were not examined, the WILL cannot be held to be proved. 23. Another argument was advanced by the respondent that in case the adoption and WILL are not held to be correct, the property sold to the extent of share to respondent Nos. 2 to 6 be validated and reference is made to order passed by this Court in the matter of Smt. Mamta Agrawal and Another vs. Ghanshyam and Others in F.A. No. 70/2019, decided on 04.01.2023. In the instant case, the number of sharers are not known. 2 to 6 be validated and reference is made to order passed by this Court in the matter of Smt. Mamta Agrawal and Another vs. Ghanshyam and Others in F.A. No. 70/2019, decided on 04.01.2023. In the instant case, the number of sharers are not known. During the submission it is said that out of 3.172 hectares of land 1.348 hectares was sold which is less than 50%, therefore, considerable property is left behind. In the case in hand, the number of sharers are not known or are before the Court. Therefore, any order of the like nature would lead to reduce the right of other legal heirs which could have been adjudicated in a proper legal proceeding. Since the property was devolved on Surendra Kour and the other legal heirs, the relief to the extent to validate the sale made to respondent Nos. 2 to 6 by Respondent No. 1 cannot be ordered. Accordingly, since defendant No. 1 did not have any exclusive right to sale the property, the sale made in favour of defendant Nos. 2 to 6 are declared null and void. 24. The plaintiff, therefore, would be entitled to get the vacant possession of the land and the superstructure comprised over Khasra No. 213, admeasuring 1.263 hectares at village Baikunthpur; vacant possession of land bearing Khasra No. 39, admeasuring 0.085 Hectares situated at Kohakunda and shall also be entitled to receive the ratable land henceforth. 25. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. 26. A decree be drawn.