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2023 DIGILAW 252 (HP)

Rabinder Nath Sharma v. State of H. P.

2023-05-10

SATYEN VAIDYA

body2023
JUDGMENT : Satyen Vaidya, J. By way of instant petition, prayer has been made to quash FIR No. 8 of 2012, dated 18.07.2012, registered at Police Station SV & ACB Mandi under Sections 4, 5 of the Himachal Pradesh Prevention of Specific Corrupt Practices Act along with all consequential criminal proceedings arising therefrom. 2. Brief facts necessary for adjudication of the petition are that petitioner No.3 was awarded the work to provide cement concrete on existing road to Village Hattan R.D. 0.00 meters to 0.350 meters. Costs of work was Rs.2,33,550/-. Award letter was issued on 07.02.2009. Petitioner No.3 completed the work in the year 2010. 3. Villagers of Village Hattan filed compliant No. 6770/2009 against petitioner No.3 alleging inter alia that the work done by petitioner No.3 was sub-standard. An inquiry was conducted and nothing was found against petitioner No.3. The road had been repaired to the satisfaction of the villagers and they had withdrawn the complaint filed by them. Accordingly, the State Vigilance and Anti Corruption Bureau closed the case. 4. On 18.07.2012, yet another complaint came to be filed against petitioner No.3 by some of the villagers of Village Hattan with the allegations of sub-standard work done by petitioner No.3 in pursuance to award dated 07.02.2009. A preliminary inquiry was conducted. The samples of the concrete used on the road constructed by petitioner No.3 were sent for examination to RFSL Gutkar. The report from RFSL Gutkar confirmed the allegations and the samples were found sub-standard. SV & ACB Mandi registered FIR No.8 of 2012. The report under Section 173(2) of the Cr.P.C. has not yet been submitted. 5. Petitioners have placed reliance on the documents, according to which the experts, on consultation in relation with the investigation of the FIR No.8 of 2012, have clearly opined that the work executed by petitioner No.3 was not sub-standard and was as per the required specifications. Additional Superintendent of Police, SV & ACB Mandi vide communication dated 23.08.2012 had sought opinion from the Chief Engineer, Uhal Division-II, Beas Valley Power Corporation Limited as to the technical specifications used by petitioner No.3 while executing the work in pursuance to award letter dated 07.02.2009. The Beas Valley Power Corporation appointed an inquiry committee of three members. Additional Superintendent of Police, SV & ACB Mandi vide communication dated 23.08.2012 had sought opinion from the Chief Engineer, Uhal Division-II, Beas Valley Power Corporation Limited as to the technical specifications used by petitioner No.3 while executing the work in pursuance to award letter dated 07.02.2009. The Beas Valley Power Corporation appointed an inquiry committee of three members. As per the report submitted by the Committee, it was found that the concrete topping of entire portion of the road was intact and the general condition was satisfactory. The vehicles were found to be plying on the road smoothly. Some cracks at 2-3 places were observed which were found to be the result of settlement of sub grade and not due to poor quality/specifications. Report was submitted on 29.12.2012. 6. The work in question was again re-assessed in the year 2017 and vide communication dated 05.09.2017, the Executive Director (Personal), H.P. State Electricity Board Ltd., Shimla informed the Managing Director, Beas Valley Power Corporation, Jogindernagar, that the work was found satisfactory and the vehicles had been plying on the road ever since the completion of work. However, it was desired that fresh tests be conducted for pavement concrete . The matter was referred to NIT Hamirpur which also reported that the work done by petitioner No.3 was as per specifications. The Managing Director, Beas Valley Power Corporation accordingly informed the Executive Director (Personal) HPSEBL vide communication dated 15.11.2017 which reads as under:- “Kindly refer to your office letter vide which it was desired to get the fresh tests conducted for the pavement concrete of Hattan road and submit the detailed report as per the decision taken in the Whole Time Directors Meeting held on 23.06.2017. In this regard, it is informed that NIT Hamirpur was requested to conduct compressive strength test on samples of concrete from the concrete pavement of the Hattan road. They had taken samples from different locations of the road and conducted uniaxial compressive strength in their lab, on the cores of concrete from road pavement and result of the same has been received from NIT Hamirpur. (Copy enclosed). They had taken samples from different locations of the road and conducted uniaxial compressive strength in their lab, on the cores of concrete from road pavement and result of the same has been received from NIT Hamirpur. (Copy enclosed). It is added that the concrete grade of the road leading to Hattan Village was 1:2:4 (MI15), as per specifications, for which the required compressive strength is 15N/nm2 as per IS 456:2000 whereas as per the results of the core sample received from NIT Hamirpur, the UCS of all core samples is more that 15N/nm2. These tests results also vindicate the earlier findings of the investigation committee as intimated vide this office letter No. BVBPCL/MD/Confd./2016-538-39 dated 21.12.2016 addressed to the Under Secretary (V&J), HPSEBL, Shimla (copy enclosed).” 7. In the teeth of report of NIT Hamirpur, Beas Valley Power Corporation even showed its reluctance in according prosecution sanction against petitioners No.1 and 2 and another accused named Uttam Chand Thakur. This fact is evident from correspondence dated 05.10.2018 from Managing Director, Beas Valley Power Corporation to the Execution Director (Personal) HPSEBL, which reads as under:- “Reference is invited to your office letter bearing No.1118-19 dated 28.09.2018 vide which it has been advised to this office to accord prosecution sanction against the contractor Sh. Vijay Kumar in the subject cited case. In this context, it is intimated that this office has sent the case on loose noting by linking all the correspondence in this behalf including the report of NIT,m Hamirpur. The entire case on file stand submitted to your office vide this office No. BVPCL/MD/Confd./Complaint/3614 dated 7.9.2018, comments where upon are still awaited. It is, however, once again intimated that the said report in writing cannot be issued in view of the report of NIT, Hamirpur which is self explanatory and finding of which contradict the finds done by the Police/Vigilance. This office has also discussed the case with the Standing Counsel of the HPSEBL at Jogindernagar and it was opined by him that BVPCL authority might lead into unnecessary legal complexity once it issues the report in writing against any of the officers/officials including the contractor, in view of the NIT, Hamirpur report, which indicates that the work done was as per the specifications. This is for your information and further necessary action in the matter, please.” 8. This is for your information and further necessary action in the matter, please.” 8. The petitioners along with one Uttam Chand Thakur were named as accused in FIR No.8 of 2012. Petitioner No.1 was posted as Executing Engineer and Petitioner No.2 was working as Junior Engineer in Beas Valley Power Corporation at the time of execution of work by petitioner No.3. Beas Valley Power Corporation was the executing agency of the work. Shri Uttam Chand Thakur was also posted as Sub Divisional Officer in Beas Valley Power Corporation at the time of award and execution of work. Petitioners No.1, 2 and Uttam Chand Thakur have been arrayed as accused on the allegations that they were incharge of the work and work was executed under their supervision. Since, petitioner No.3 had executed substandard work, he could not have done so without connivance with petitioners No.1 & 2 and Shri Uttam Chand Thakur. 9. Shri Uttam Chand Thakur, separately approached this Court by way of Cr.MMO No. 431 of 2021 for quashing of FIR No. 8 of 2012, dated 18.07.2012, under Section 4, 5 of the Himachal Pradesh Prevention of Specific Corrupt Practices Act, 1983, registered at SV & ACB Mandi and a coordinate bench of this Court vide judgment dated 24.02.2022 while allowing his petition observed as under:- “8. From the reading of FIR and other documents which have come on record, no case is made out against the petitioner, as neither he was involved with the consumption/non-consumption of the cement bags nor there is any allegation that he has mis-used the cement bags . Further, the investigation is pending for more than 9 years and the Government did not even grant prosecution sanction under Section 197 Cr.PC. which clearly shows that the pendency of the investigation and FIR is nothing, but a torture, without there being any allegation against the petitioner. In these circumstances, the present is a fit case where judicial discretion is required to be exercised in favour of the petitioner to secure the ends of justice. 9. Consequently, the instant petition is allowed and FIR No.8/2012, dated 18.07.2012, under Section 4.5 of the Himachal Pradesh Prevention of Specific Corrupt Practices Act 1983, registered with Anti Corruption, Superintendent of Police (Vigilance), Mandi, H.P. qua the petitioner along with consequent proceedings arising out of the said FIR, is ordered to be quashed.” 10. 9. Consequently, the instant petition is allowed and FIR No.8/2012, dated 18.07.2012, under Section 4.5 of the Himachal Pradesh Prevention of Specific Corrupt Practices Act 1983, registered with Anti Corruption, Superintendent of Police (Vigilance), Mandi, H.P. qua the petitioner along with consequent proceedings arising out of the said FIR, is ordered to be quashed.” 10. In reply submitted on behalf of the respondents, it is submitted that the FIR No.8 of 2012 was registered by SV & ACB Mandi, after satisfying itself as to the authenticity of allegations. On the complaint of the villagers of village Hattan, the samples were got analysed from RFSL Kutkar and it was reported that the work done by petitioner No.3 was sub-standard. In stead of 749 bags of cement only 268 bags of cement were used. Petitioner No.3 had used the ratio of 1:6:12 in stead of required ratio of 1:2:4 of cement, sand and aggregate. It is further alleged that the petitioners No.1 & 2 and Shri Uttam Chand Thakur had connived and conspired with petitioner No.3 and the payments were made to him without proper verification. In this manner, petitioner No.3 had obtained wrongful gain of Rs. 85,074/- and a corresponding loss to the State exchequer was caused. Final report under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. is stated to be ready, however, the same could not be presented for want of prosecution sanction which was awaited. 11. I have heard Mr. Maan Singh, Advocate, for the petitioners and Mr. H.S. Rawat, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State and have also gone through the record carefully. 12. The parameters relevant for quashing of FIR by High Court in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. have been culled out by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana and others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, as under:- “102. 12. The parameters relevant for quashing of FIR by High Court in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. have been culled out by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana and others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, as under:- “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Articles 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. “(1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused; (2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code; (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or 'complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused; (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code; (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party; (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 13. Reply filed on behalf of the respondents/State reveals that the respondent is still basing its case on the report submitted by RFSL Gutkar in the year 2012. Respondent has conveniently avoided to submit specific reply to the averments made in the petition with respect to the subsequent reports of experts obtained during investigation. Reply filed on behalf of the respondents/State reveals that the respondent is still basing its case on the report submitted by RFSL Gutkar in the year 2012. Respondent has conveniently avoided to submit specific reply to the averments made in the petition with respect to the subsequent reports of experts obtained during investigation. Firstly, three member committee appointed by Beas Valley Power Corporation had found no substance in the allegations of sub standard work executed by petitioner No.3 and later NIT Hamirpur had submitted a report, which had also not found the work to be sub-standard. Though, this Court is not to assess the probative value of the evidence collected during investigation, yet eyes cannot be closed to ignore the material available on record. The fact that the respondents have not taken any specific stance in respect of the report of the experts, as noticed above, is sufficient to infer that on facts the respondents have no material to deny such averments. That being so, the success of prosecution story in light of available material is in the realm of speculation. 14. It also is a cause of concern that even after lapse of 11 years of registration of FIR, report under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. has not been submitted. There is no explanation from respondents/State for such huge and inordinate delay. The right to speedy trial includes right to speedy investigation also as denial of one will automatically deny the other. 15. In Raghubir Singh and others vs. State of Bihar, (1986)4 SCC 481 , the Supreme Court has observed as under:- “9. The constitutional position is now well-settled that the right to a speedy trial is one of the dimensions of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed by Art. 21 of the Constitution: Vide Hussainara Khatton (I) v. State of Bihar, [1979] 5 SCR 169 (per Bhagwati and Koshal, JJ), Kadra Pehdiya (I) v. State of Bihar, AIR 1981 SC 939 (per Bhagwati and Sen, JJ.), Kadra Pehdiya (II) v. State of Bihar, AIR 1982 SC 1167 (per Bhagwati and Eradi, JJ) and State of Maharashtra v. Champa Lal Punjaji Shah, [1981] 3 SCR 610 (per Chinnappa Reddy, Sen and Baharul Islam, JJ). In foreign jurisdictions also, where the right to a fair trial within a reasonable time is a constitutionally protected right, the infringement of that right has been held in appropriate cases sufficient to quash a conviction or to stop further proceedings: Strunk v. United States, 37 Law Ed. 2d 56 and Barkar v. Wingo, 407 US 514 two cases decided by the United States Supreme Court and Bell v. Director of Public Prosecutions. Jamaica, [1985] (II) All ER 585 a case from Jamaica decided by the Privy Council. Several questions arise for consideration. Was there delay? How long was the delay? Was the delay inevitable having regard to the nature of the case, the sparse availability of legal services and other relevant circumstances? Was the delay unreasonable? Was any part of the delay caused by the wilfulness or the negligence of the prosecuting agency? Was any part of the delay caused by the tactics of the defence? Was the delay due to causes beyond the control of the prosecuting and defending agencies? Did the accused have the ability and the opportunity to assert his right to a speedy trial? Was there a likelihood of the accused being prejudiced in his defence? Irrespective of any likelihood of prejudice in the conduct of his defence, was the very length of the delay sufficiently prejudicial to the accused? Some of these factors have been identified in Barker v. Wingo (supra). A host of other questions may arise which we may not be able to readily visualise just now. The question whether the right to a speedy trial which forms part of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed by Art. 21 has been infringed is ultimately a question of fairness in the administration of criminal justice even as 'acting fairly' is of the essence of the principles of natural justice (In re K. (H) an infant 1967(1) All ER 226) and a 'fair and reasonable procedure' is what is contemplated by the expression 'procedure established by law' in Art. 21(Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, (1978)1 SCC 248 ).” 16. In Abdul Rehman Antulay and others vs. R.S. Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225 , the Supreme Court has highlighted the imminence of speedy trial as under:- “86. In view of the above discussion, the following propositions emerge, meant to serve as guidelines. We must forewarn that these propositions are not exhaustive. In Abdul Rehman Antulay and others vs. R.S. Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225 , the Supreme Court has highlighted the imminence of speedy trial as under:- “86. In view of the above discussion, the following propositions emerge, meant to serve as guidelines. We must forewarn that these propositions are not exhaustive. It is difficult to foresee all situations. Nor is it possible to lay down any hard and fast rules. These propositions are : 1. Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily. Right to speedy trial is the right of the accused. The fact that a speedy trial is also in public interest or that it serves the societal interest also, does not make it any-the-less the right of the accused. It is in the interest of all concerned that the guilt or innocence of the accused is determined as quickly as possible in the circumstances. 2. Right to Speedy Trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial. That is how, this Court has understood this right and there is no reason to take a restricted view. 3. The concerns underlying the Right to speedy trial from the point of view of the accused are : (a) the period of remand and pre-conviction detention should be as short as possible. In other words, the accused should not be subjected to unnecessary or unduly long incarceration prior to his conviction; (b) the worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to his vocation and peace, resulting from an unduly prolonged investigation, inquiry or trial should be minimal; and (c) undue delay may well result in impairment of the ability of the accused to defend himself, whether on account of death, disappearance or non- availability of witnesses or otherwise. 4. At the same time, one cannot ignore the fact that it is usually the accused who is interested in delaying the proceedings. As is often pointed out, "delay is a known defence tactic". Since the burden of proving the guilt of the accused lies upon the prosecution, delay ordinarily prejudices the prosecution. Non-availability of witnesses, disappearance of evidence by lapse of time really work against the interest of the prosecution. Of course, there may be cases where the prosecution, for whatever reason, also delays the proceedings. Since the burden of proving the guilt of the accused lies upon the prosecution, delay ordinarily prejudices the prosecution. Non-availability of witnesses, disappearance of evidence by lapse of time really work against the interest of the prosecution. Of course, there may be cases where the prosecution, for whatever reason, also delays the proceedings. Therefore, in every case, where the Right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the first question to be put and answered is-who is responsible for the delay? Proceedings taken by either party in good faith, to vindicate their rights and interest, as perceived by them, cannot be treated as delaying tactics nor can the time taken in pursuing such proceedings be counted towards delay. It goes without saying that frivolous proceedings or proceedings taken merely for delaying the day of reckoning cannot be treated as proceedings taken in good faith. The mere fact that an application/petition is admitted and an order of stay granted by a superior court is by itself no proof that the proceeding is not a frivolous. Very often these stays obtained on exparte representation. 5. While determining whether undue delay has occurred (resulting in violation of Right to Speedy Trial) one must have regard to all the attendant circumstances, including nature of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the work-load of the court concerned, prevailing local conditions and so on-what is called, the systemic delays. It is true that it is the obligation of the State to ensure a speedy trial and State includes judiciary as well, but a realistic and practical approach should be adopted in such matters instead of a pedantic one. 6. Each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the accused. Some delays may indeed work to his advantage. As has been observed by Powell, J. in Barker "it cannot be said how long a delay is loo long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate". The same ideal has been stated by White, J. in U.S. v. Ewell, 15 Law Edn. Some delays may indeed work to his advantage. As has been observed by Powell, J. in Barker "it cannot be said how long a delay is loo long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift but deliberate". The same ideal has been stated by White, J. in U.S. v. Ewell, 15 Law Edn. 2nd 627, in the following words : '…..the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial is necessarily relative, is consistent with delays, and has orderly expedition, rather than more speed, as its essential ingredients; and whether delay in completing a prosecution amounts to an un-constitutional deprivation of rights depends upon all the circumstances.' However, inordinately long delay may be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice. In this context, the fact of incarceration of accused will also be a relevant fact. The prosecution should not be allowed to become a persecution. But when does the prosecution become prosecution, again depends upon the facts of a given case. 7. We cannot recognize or give effect to, what is called the 'demand' rule. An accused cannot try himself; he is tried by the court at the behest of the prosecution. Hence, an accussed's plea of denial of speedy trial cannot be defeated by saying that the accused did at no time demand a speedy trial. If in a given case, he did make such a demand and yet he was not tried speedily, it would be a plus point in his favour, but the mere non- asking for a speedy trial cannot be put against the accused. Even in U.S.A., the relevance of demand rule has been substantially watered down in Barker and other succeeding cases. 8. Ultimately, the court has to balance and weigh the several relevant factors-'balancing test' or 'balancing process'-and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case. 9. Ordinarily speaking, where the court comes to the conclusion that Right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed. But this is not the only course open. The nature of the offence and other circumstances in a given case may be such that quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. But this is not the only course open. The nature of the offence and other circumstances in a given case may be such that quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a case, it is open to the court to make such other appropriate order- including an order to conclude the trial within a fixed time where the trial is not concluded or reducing the sentence where the trial has concluded-as may be deemed just and equitable in the circumstances of the case. 10. It is neither advisable nor practicable to fix any time-limit for trial of offences. Any such rule is bound to be qualified one. Such rule cannot also be evolved merely to shift the burden of proving justification on to the shoulders of the prosecution. In every case of complaint of denial of Right to speedy trial, it is primarily for the prosecution to justify and explain the delay. At the same time, it is the duty of the court to weigh all the circumstances of a given case before pronouncing upon the complaint. The Supreme Court of U.S.A. too as repeatedly refused to fix any such outer time limit inspite of the Sixth Amendment. Nor do we think that not fixing any such outer limit in effectuates the guarantee of Right to speedy trial. 11. An objection based on denial of Right to speedy trial and for relief on that account, should first be addressed to the High Court. Even if the High Court entertains such a plea, ordinarily it should not stay the proceedings, except in a case of grave and exceptional nature. Such proceedings in High Court must, however, be disposed of on a priority basis.” 17. Similarly in Kartar Singh vs. State of Punjab, (1994)3 SCC 569 , a similar reiteration has been made in following terms:- “86. The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21 as an essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. Similarly in Kartar Singh vs. State of Punjab, (1994)3 SCC 569 , a similar reiteration has been made in following terms:- “86. The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21 as an essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed by arrest and consequent incarceration and continues at all stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any possible prejudice that may result from impermissible and avoidable delay from the time of the commission of the offence till it consummates into a finality, can be averted. In this context, it may be noted that the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial is properly reflected in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” 18. In State of Andhra Pradesh vs. P. V. Pavithran (1990)2 SCC 340 it has been observed as under:- “7. There is no denying the fact that a lethargic and lackadaisical manner of investigation over a prolonged period makes an accused in a criminal proceeding to live every moment under extreme emotional and mental stress and strain and to remain always under a fear psychosis. Therefore, it is imperative that if investigation of a criminal proceeding staggers on with tardy pace due to the indolence or inefficiency of the investigating agency causing unreasonable and substantial delay resulting in grave prejudice or disadvantage to the accused, the Court as the protector of the right and personal liberty of the citizen will step in and resort to the drastic remedy of quashing further proceedings in such investigation. 8. While so, there are offences of grave magnitude such as diabolical crimes of conspiracy or clandestine crimes committed by members of the underworld with their tentacles spread over various parts of the country or even abroad. The very nature of such offences would necessarily involve considerable time for unearthing the crimes and bringing the culprits to book. Therefore, it is not possible to formulate inflexible guidelines or rigid principles of uniform application for speedy investigation or to stipulate any arbitrary period of limitation within which investigation in a criminal case should be completed. 9. The very nature of such offences would necessarily involve considerable time for unearthing the crimes and bringing the culprits to book. Therefore, it is not possible to formulate inflexible guidelines or rigid principles of uniform application for speedy investigation or to stipulate any arbitrary period of limitation within which investigation in a criminal case should be completed. 9. The determination of the question whether the accused has been deprived of a fair trial on account of delayed or protracted investigation would also, therefore, depend on various factors including whether such delay was unreasonably long or caused deliberately or intentionally to hamper the defence of the accused or whether such delay was inevitable in the nature of things or-whether it was due to the dilatory tactics adopted by the accused. The Court, in addition, has to consider whether such delay on the part of the investigating agency has caused grave prejudice or disadvantage to the accused.” 19. Recently in Hasmukhlal D. Vora and Another vs. State of Tamil Nadu, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1732, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “25. In the present case, the Respondent has provided no explanation for the extraordinary delay of more than four years between the initial site inspection, the show cause notice, and the complaint. In fact, the absence of such an explanation only prompts the Court to infer some sinister motive behind initiating the criminal proceedings. 26. While inordinate delay in itself may not be ground for quashing of a criminal complaint, in such cases, unexplained inordinate delay of such length must be taken into consideration as a very crucial factor as grounds for quashing a criminal complaint. 27. While this court does not expect a full-blown investigation at the stage of a criminal complaint, however, in such cases where the accused has been subjected to the anxiety of a potential initiation of criminal proceedings for such a length of time, it is only reasonable for the court to expect bare-minimum evidence from the Investigating Authorities. 28. At the cost of repetition, we again state that the purpose of filing a complaint and initiating criminal proceedings must exist solely to meet the ends of justice, and the law must not be used as a tool to harass the accused. 28. At the cost of repetition, we again state that the purpose of filing a complaint and initiating criminal proceedings must exist solely to meet the ends of justice, and the law must not be used as a tool to harass the accused. The law, is meant to exist as a shield to protect the innocent, rather than it being used as a sword to threaten them.” 20. Reverting to the facts of the case, there is no hesitation to hold that there is absolutely no explanation for such an inordinate delay in submission of report under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C. Not even a single circumstance has been highlighted which may blame the petitioners in causing delay in investigation. Petitioners have already suffered mental torture, trauma besides having been physically and financially exhausted for such a long period. Petitioner No.1 has even retired during the intervening period. The delay caused in the investigation in all probabilities is likely to prejudice the defence of petitioners as the material defence evidence may not available to them. 21. Thus, keeping in view the facts of the case as also the exposition of law noted above, I consider it appropriate to exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash FIR No. FIR No. 8 of 2012, dated 18.07.2012, registered at Police Station SV & ACB Mandi along with all consequential criminal proceedings arising therefrom. 22. It also cannot be ignored that FIR No. 8 of 2012, dated 18.07.2012, registered at Police Station SV & ACB Mandi qua another co-accused namely Uttam Chand Thakur stands already quashed vide judgment dated 24th February, 2022 passed by a coordinate bench of this Court in Cr.MMO No. 431 of 2021. It is not the case of the respondents that the order of quashment of FIR qua Uttam Chand Thakur has been challenged. It has also not been pointed out that the case of Uttam Chand Thakur was different than the case of the petitioners. Even otherwise, with the allegations of criminal conspiracy and connivance, the case of Shri Uttam Chand Thakur could not be segregated from that of petitioners. 23. In result, the petition succeeds and the same is allowed. It has also not been pointed out that the case of Uttam Chand Thakur was different than the case of the petitioners. Even otherwise, with the allegations of criminal conspiracy and connivance, the case of Shri Uttam Chand Thakur could not be segregated from that of petitioners. 23. In result, the petition succeeds and the same is allowed. Accordingly, FIR No. 8 of 2012, dated 18.07.2012, registered at Police Station SV & ACB Mandi under Section 4, 5 of the Himachal Pradesh Prevention of Specific Corrupt Practices Act along with all consequential criminal proceedings arising therefrom qua the petitioners are ordered to be quashed in the interest of justice. 24. The petition is accordingly disposed of. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.