JUDGMENT : ALEXANDER THOMAS, J. The prayers in the instant Writ Petition (Crl) are as follows: “i) Issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ or order calling for records leading to Exhibit P1 and P5 and quash the same; ii) Issue any other order as this Hon’ble court deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case and also that are prayed for during the pendency of the WP(C) ; iii) Dispense with the filing of translation of Vernacular Documents.” 2. Heard Sri.P.M.Manoj, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri.K.A. Anas, the learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondents. 3. The petitioner herein is aggrieved by the impugned Exhibit P1 order dated 19.8.2022, issued by 3rd respondent-The Deputy Inspector General of Police [for short ‘DIG’], whereby the petitioner has been restrained from entering into the territorial limits of Malappuram District for a period of one year from the date of receipt of the said order, by exercising the powers under Section 15(1)(a) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 [for short ‘KAAP Act’]. 4. The brief facts leading to the issuance of the aforesaid Writ proceedings are hereunder: Six crimes had been reckoned for treating the petitioner herein as a ‘Known Goonda’, as conceived under Section 2(j) r/w section 2(o)(i) of the above Act. The details of the six crimes are mentioned in page 3 of Ext.P1 externment order [See page 29 of the WP(Crl] and the same has also been reiterated in paragraph No.7 of page 3 of the counter affidavit dated 01.03.2023, filed by 3rd respondent-DIG. The last one of the six crimes (supra) is said to have been committed by the petitioner on 22.01.2022. He was arrested in relation to his involvement in the said crime on 08.02.2022 and was remanded to judicial custody and thereafter, the Sessions Court, Manjeri has granted bail to him on 03.03.2022 and he was released on bail accordingly. The investigation has been completed in the said sixth crime and final report, by way of charge sheet, has been filed by the Investigating Agency on 23.03.2022. 5. The investigation has been completed in the said sixth crime and final report, by way of charge sheet, has been filed by the Investigating Agency on 23.03.2022. 5. Thereafter, the 4th respondent, the District Police Chief, Malappuram as sponsoring authority has submitted report dated 21.7.2022, recommending to the 3rd respondent, the District Inspector General of Police, that in view of the facts and circumstances of the said report, this is a fit case to enable the 3rd respondent to issue an externment order conceived under Section 15(1)(a) of the KAAPA Act, so as to restrain the petitioner herein from entering into the territorial limits of Malappuram district, with a view to prevent him from committing any further prejudicial anti-social activities, as conceived under Section 2(a) of the Act. After consideration of the said report, the 3rd respondent-DIG of Police has issued statutory show cause notice dated 26.7.2022 to the petitioner directing him to show cause as to why an order of externment, as conceived under Section 15(1)(a), shall not be issued against him, so as to restrain him from entering into the territorial limits of Malappuram District, as otherwise, he is likely to indulge in further serious prejudicial anti-social activities. The showcause notice was received by the petitioner on 30.07.2022. The statutory mandate of hearing was complied with by the 3rd respondent-DIG of Police, after affording the petitioner an opportunity of personal hearing in the above matter on 5.8.2022. It is thereafter that the 3rd respondent has issued Ext.P1 externment order dated 19.8.2022, directing that the petitioner shall not enter into the territorial limits of Malappuram district, for the reasons stated therein, for a period of one year from the date of receipt of copy of the said order. Exhibit P1 order was served on the petitioner on 23.8.2022 and so, the period of one year fixed in Ext.P1, was upto 22.8.2023. 6. Thereafter, the petitioner has filed statutory representation dated 5.9.2022, under Section 15(2) of the KAAPA Act, before the Advisory Board within the statutorily prescribed time limit. The Advisory Board has, thereupon, issued Ext.P5 proceedings dated 30.9.2022 reducing the period of externment covered by Ext.P1 for a period of six months and hence, the period of externment now stands reduced and modified upto to 22.2.2023. 7. The Advisory Board has, thereupon, issued Ext.P5 proceedings dated 30.9.2022 reducing the period of externment covered by Ext.P1 for a period of six months and hence, the period of externment now stands reduced and modified upto to 22.2.2023. 7. Later, according to the respondents, the petitioner had violated the terms and conditions of Ext.P1 externment order on 26.8.2022, by entering into the territorial limits of Malappuram district without permission. So, according to the respondents, they were constrained to register F.I.R. as Crime No.636/2022 of Thanur Police Station for the offence punishable under Section 15(4) of the KAAPA Act, in which the petitioner herein has been arrayed as the sole accused therein. The petitioner thereafter was arrested and remanded to judicial custody, on account of his involvement in the said crime No.636/2022 of Thanur Police Station. Later, he was released on bail in that case and final report, by way of charge sheet, was also filed in Crime No.636/2022, which has now led to the pendency of Calendar Case-C.C No.1337/2022 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Parappanangadi (arising out of Crime No.636/2022 of Thanur Police Station, Malappuram District). The petitioner would allege that Ext.P1 externment order was sought to be served on the petitioner when he was travelling from Malappuram to Ernakulam. He had told the police officials that he was going to Ernakulam and would return immediately and collect the externment order. The petitioner was given the impression that he may do so. After reaching the destination at Ernakulam, he had to come back to Malappuram only for transit and he was under the genuine impression, based on the assurance given by the Police authorities, that the said entry to Malappuram district, at that point of time, will not be a violation of Ext.P1 order etc. But , contrary to the said assurance, the police authorities have deliberately registered the aforesaid crime No.636/2022 of Thanur Police Station etc. The aforesaid rival pleas, regarding the registration of the crime, for violation of Ext.P1 conditions, need not detain our attention in this case, as the same may not form the subject matter of the consideration in this proceedings, which is essentially regarding the legality of Ext.P1 externment order. Such rival pleas, regarding the institution of the aforesaid crime No.636/2022, are left open to be raised in other appropriate proceedings, in the manner known to law. 8. Such rival pleas, regarding the institution of the aforesaid crime No.636/2022, are left open to be raised in other appropriate proceedings, in the manner known to law. 8. Two contentions have been raised by Sri.P.M.Manoj, the learned counsel for the petitioner. The first contention is that, indeed a proposal was given by the Station House Officer concerned to the Revenue Divisional Officer (Executive Magistrate) for initiating proceedings under section 107 of Cr.PC against the petitioner after the commission of the aforesaid six crimes. The RDO (Executive Magistrate), by exercising its statutory powers, declined to take an action in terms of Section 107 Cr.PC. Hence, it is urged that, since the Executive Magistrate (RDO) was satisfied that the petitioner is not likely to commit any breach of peace or disturb the public tranquility or do any wrongful act that may probably occasion a breach of peace or disturb the public tranquility etc., as conceived under Section 107 Cr.PC., the subjective satisfaction formed by the 3rd respondent-DIG of Police, in terms of Ext.P1, that the petitioner is likely to indulge in further prejudicial activities, after the commission of the six crimes, is fraud and vitiated and is therefore liable for interdiction in judicial proceedings. 9. The above said contention has been strongly opposed by Sri.K.A.Anas, the learned Prosecutor, by urging that the consideration for exercising of jurisdiction, in terms of section 107 Cr.PC, which is only a security proceeding for keeping peace by the Executive Magistrate, like the RDO etc, are qualitatively and substantially different from the subjective satisfaction to be formed in terms of section 15(1) of KAAPA Act by an authorized officer, like the 3rd respondent-DIG of Police. 10. We have considered the rival pleas. Section 107 of Cr.PC reads as follows: “107. Security for keeping the peace in other cases. 10. We have considered the rival pleas. Section 107 of Cr.PC reads as follows: “107. Security for keeping the peace in other cases. (1) When an Executive Magistrate receives information that any person is likely to commit a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquility or to do any wrongful act that may probably occasion a breach of the peace or disturb the public tranquility and is of opinion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding, he may, in the manner hereinafter provided, require such person to show cause why he should not be ordered to execute a bond, with or without sureties, for keeping the peace for such period, not exceeding one year, as the Magistrate thinks fit.” Section 15(1) of the KAA(P)A Act provides s as follows: “15(1). Power to make orders restricting the movements of certain persons. - (1) The District Magistrate or a police officer of and above the rank of Deputy Inspector General having jurisdiction, if satisfied on information received in respect of a known goonda or known rowdy, after having given him an opportunity to be heard by notice served on him or pasted at his ordinary place of residence, if any in Kerala, that he is indulging in or about to indulge in or likely to indulge in anti-social activities and with a view to prevent him from so acting at any place within the jurisdiction of such magistrate or officer, may make an order.” The jurisdictional facts required for the invocation of the powers under Section 107 of Cr.PC, are that the Executive Magistrate should receive information that any person is likely to commit a breach of peace or disturb public tranquility or do any wrongful act that may probably occasion a breach of the peace or disturb public tranquility and on this basis, the Executive Magistrate is of the opinion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding, then he may issue show cause to the affected party, as to why he should not be ordered to execute a bond with or without sureties, for keeping of peace for such period, not exceeding one year, as the Magistrate thinks fit. Whereas, the power to order externment, as conceived under section 15(1), could be exercised if the authorized officer is satisfied on information received in respect of a person who satisfies the definition of ‘Known goonda’ and ‘non-rowdy’ as per the Act, after having heard him upon a notice to be served on him that, he is indulging in or about to indulging in or likely to indulge in anti-social activities and that to prevent him from so acting in any place within the jurisdiction of the Executive Magistrate, the officer may make an order to restrain him from entering into any specified area etc., as conceived in the said provision. So, the affected party concerned should satisfy the objective criteria of Known goonda or Known rowdy, as defined under the Act and the authorized officer should have a subjective satisfaction, based on the materials, that he is indulging in or is about to indulge in or is likely to indulge in anti-social activities, as conceived in section 2(a) of the KAAPA Act. Further that, in order to prevent him from so acting, restrictive conditions, as conceived under the Act, can be resorted to. 11. Antisocial Activities has been defined as per Section 2(a) of the KAAPA Act, which reads as follows: “(2a) ‘Anti-social activity’ means acting in such manner as to cause or is likely to cause, directly or indirectly, any feeling of insecurity, danger or fear among the general public or any section thereof, or any danger to the safety of individuals, safety of public, public health or the ecological system or any loss or damage to public exchequer or to any public or private property or indulges in any activities referred in clauses (c), (e), (g), (h), (i), (l), (m),(n),(q) and (s) of this section.” Going by the cumulative impact of section 2(a) of the Act read with clauses (c),(e),(d),(h),(i),(l),(m),(n),(q),(qb) and (s), the activities conceived therein are not merely confined to the activities affecting public tranquility and public order and could be activities of various other natures, provided it satisfies the wider definition of section 2(a) read with various sub clauses mentioned in section 2(a). For instance, section 2(c) mentions about ‘bootlegger’, section 2(e) deals with ‘counterfeiter’, section 2(g) mentions about ‘depredator of environment’, section 2(h) deals with ‘digital data and copyright pirate’, section 2(i) deals with ‘drug-offender’. For instance, section 2(c) mentions about ‘bootlegger’, section 2(e) deals with ‘counterfeiter’, section 2(g) mentions about ‘depredator of environment’, section 2(h) deals with ‘digital data and copyright pirate’, section 2(i) deals with ‘drug-offender’. So also, clause (l) defines ‘hawala racketeer’, clause (m) deals with ‘hired ruffian’, clause (n) deals with ‘Immoral traffic offender' clause (q) deals with ‘loan shark’, clause (qb) deals with ‘money chain offender’ and clause (s) deals with ‘property grabber’, respectively. So, the scope and ambit of anti-social activities, as covered under Section 2(a) of KAAPA Act, is wider in its scope and ambit and it is not necessarily confined to an activity which prejudicially affects public tranquility and public order etc. 12. Dealing with such aspect of this matter, regarding the issue of public order vis a vis anti-social activities, as conceived under Section 2(a) of the KAAPA Act, the Division Bench of this Court in the decision reported in Uma v. State of Kerala [ 2010 (4) KLT 511 ] as held, in paragraphs 28 and 29, as follows: “28. The learned counsel for the petitioner raises the next contention that even if cases Sl.Nos.1 to 6 were taken into consideration and, at any rate, if cases Sl.Nos.1 and 2 alone are taken into consideration, it cannot be concluded that the activities of the alleged detenu pose any threat to public order. At worst, there is only violation of the provisions of the Abkari Act and by no stretch of imagination can it be held to be posing any threat to public order. We find no merit in this contention. 29. Before us, in this Writ Petition, the constitutional validity of the KAAPA is not challenged. “Anti-social activity” is defined in S.2(a) of the KAAPA. A person indulging in anti-social activity is defined to be a goonda under S.2(j). A goonda answering the descriptions given in S.2(o) is a known goonda. Such a known goonda if he poses a threat of committing anti- social activity again in future can be ordered to be detained under S.3 of the KAAPA. We find that in the absence of a challenge to the constitutional validity of the KAAPA the petitioner cannot be heard to contend that anti-social activity as defined under S.2 of the KAAPA does not amount to any threat to public order. We find that in the absence of a challenge to the constitutional validity of the KAAPA the petitioner cannot be heard to contend that anti-social activity as defined under S.2 of the KAAPA does not amount to any threat to public order. S.3 authorises the preventive detention of a detenu if such detention is necessary “with a view to preventing such person from committing any anti-social activity within the State of Kerala”. So reckoned the question to be considered is whether the prediction or inference drawn by the detailing authority that the detenu is likely to indulge in anti-social activity which as per the definition under S.2(a) includes the activity of bootlegging.” In the case of Jancy Joseph v. State of Kerala and others (WP(Crl) No.720/2022), a judgment was rendered by the Division Bench of this Court on 29.9.2022 in this regard, the relevant paragraphs of which are extracted hereunder: 22. That, in the facts of Ram Manohar Lohia's case, the detention order was issued by the District Magistrate by citing the ground of law and order, and therein it was held by the Apex Court that detention for preventing the detenu from committing acts, which are prejudicial to law and order, would not suffice, and the detention order can be justified only if it is for preventing the detenu from committing any of the activities which are enumerated in the said Rule, including activities which are prejudicial to public order, and that public order and law and order cannot be equated to have the same gravity, and it is in that regard that the judgment has been rendered. Further that, a reading of the decision of the Apex Court in Mallada K.Sri Ram's case supra would clearly indicate that the said case involved the preventive detention law, provided as per the Telangana Act mentioned in that case and Sec.2(a) of the said Telangana Act specifically provided that the activities should be one which would adversely affect or are likely to adversely affect, the maintenance of public order. Further that, Sec.3(1), regarding the power to make orders of detention, also specifically mandated that the detention order should be with a view to prevent the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, etc. Further that, Sec.3(1), regarding the power to make orders of detention, also specifically mandated that the detention order should be with a view to prevent the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, etc. That, the parameters in the KAAP Act, deals with anti-social activities and the parameters involved in the Defence of India Rules and the abovesaid Telagana Act, which are the subject matter of the afore cited decisions of the Apex Court, is in the matter of preventing activities, which are prejudicial to public order and that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority will have to be adjudged from the parameters in the Act concerned. That, in the instant case, there is no dispute regarding the classification of the detenu as “known rowdy” as per Sec.2(p)(iii) read with Sec.2(t) and that anti-social activities will have to be understood vis-a-vis the specific definition pointed as per Sec.2(a) of the KAAP Act. Therefore, the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in the afore cited decisions, which are involved in preventive detention laws for preventing activities which are prejudicial to public order, etc. will have to be understood with reference to the legal parameters in those statutory enactments concerned. 23. After hearing both sides, we are of the view that the issue in regard to this last contention is covered against the detenu by the dictum laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in paras 28, 29 & 30 of the decision in Uma v. State of Kerala [ 2010 (4) KLT 511 ] which read as foll ows:- "28.The learned counsel for the petitioner raises the next contention that even if cases Sl.Nos.1 to 6 were taken into consideration and, at any rate, if cases Sl.Nos.1 and 2 alone are taken into consideration, it cannot be concluded that the activities of the alleged detenu pose any threat to public order. At worst, there is only violation of the provisions of the Abkari Act and by no stretch of imagination can it be held to be posing any threat to public order. We find no merit in this contention. 29. Before us, in this writ petition, the constitutional validity of the KAAPA is not challenged."Anti-social activity" is defined in Sec.2(a) of the KAAPA. A person indulging in anti-social activity is defined to be a goonda under Sec.2(j). We find no merit in this contention. 29. Before us, in this writ petition, the constitutional validity of the KAAPA is not challenged."Anti-social activity" is defined in Sec.2(a) of the KAAPA. A person indulging in anti-social activity is defined to be a goonda under Sec.2(j). A goonda answering the descriptions given in Sec.2(o) is a known goonda. Such a known goonda if he poses a threat of committing anti-social activity again in future can be ordered to be detained under Sec.3 of the KAAPA. We find that in the absence of a challenge to the constitutional validity of the KAAPA the petitioner cannot be heard to contend that anti-social activity as defined under Sec.2 of the KAAPA does not amount to any threat to public order. Sec.3 authorises the preventive detention of a detenu if such detention is necessary "with a view to preventing such person from committing any anti-social activity within the State of Kerala". So reckoned the question to be considered is whether the prediction or inference drawn by the detailing authority that the detenu is likely to indulge in anti-social activity which as per the definition under Sec.2(a) includes the activity of bootlegging. 30. We have gone through the nature of allegations raised in Crimes Sl.Nos.1 and 2 as also Sl.Nos.3 to 6. By no stretch of imagination can it be held that the activities alleged in Crimes Sl.Nos.1 and 2 do not amount to anti-social activity. In these circumstances, we take the view that there is no merit in the contention that crimes Sl.Nos.1 and 2 taken separately or when taken along with Crimes Sl.Nos.3 to 6 do not reveal any threat to public order. Threat of the detenu committing anti-social activity is clearly revealed from crimes Sl.Nos.1 and 2 by themselves. Needless to say, Crimes Sl.Nos.3 to 6 also reveal that threat of the detenu indulging in anti-social activity -bootlegging particularly. The contention raised under Ground No.2 that the apprehended threat is not really a threat to public order is, in these circumstances, found to be without any merit." 13. Needless to say, Crimes Sl.Nos.3 to 6 also reveal that threat of the detenu indulging in anti-social activity -bootlegging particularly. The contention raised under Ground No.2 that the apprehended threat is not really a threat to public order is, in these circumstances, found to be without any merit." 13. The distinctive nature of the powers to be exercised under section 15(1) of the KAAPA Act vis-a-vis the nature of the power to be exercised under Section 107 Cr.PC has been dealt with by the Division Bench of this Court in the decision in Thejas v. Inspector General of Police, Kannur Range [ 2015 (3) KHC 656 ] : 2015 (3) KLT 1 : ILR 2015 (3) Ker. 270]. It is important to refer paragraph No.20 of this case, which reads as follows: “20. The main contention raised is that if proceedings are initiated against the person concerned under S.107 Cr.P.C., it is necessary that he should have indulged in another criminal activity in order to enable the authority to pass an order of detention under S.3 or an order of externment under S.15 of the KAAPA. This argument is fallacious. As stated above, S.3 as well as S.15 of the KAAPA are intended to be applied against a “known goonda” or a “known rowdy”. S.2(p) defines “known rowdy”. A person becomes a “known rowdy” if any of the conditions mentioned in sub-clauses (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause (p) of S.2 are satisfied. Sub-clause (i) applies to a person who was made guilty by a competent Court at least once for an offence of the nature under item (i) of clause (t) of S.2 or any offence notified as such under the said clause. It is sufficient if he has been made guilty with respect to an act done within the previous seven years of the order imposing any restriction or detention under the Act. “Known goonda” is defined under S.2(o) of the KAAPA. A person becomes a “known goonda” if any of the conditions in sub-clauses (i) or (ii) of clause (o) of S.2 is satisfied. Sub-clause (i) would apply if the person concerned was found guilty, with respect to an act done within the previous seven years, by a competent Court or authority at least once for an offence within the meaning of the term ‘goonda’ as defined in clause (j) of S.2. Sub-clause (i) would apply if the person concerned was found guilty, with respect to an act done within the previous seven years, by a competent Court or authority at least once for an offence within the meaning of the term ‘goonda’ as defined in clause (j) of S.2. If a person can be detained or externed under S.3 or S.15 respectively, on being found guilty for a single act within a period of seven years, how could it be said that he cannot be proceeded with under S.3 or S.15 unless and until he indulges in a criminal act after initiation of the proceeding under S.107 Cr.P.C.? If such an interpretation is taken, we would be putting fetters on the power given to the authorities under the KAAPA. That would be adding to the conditions in clauses (o) and (p) of S.2 of KAAPA. It is true that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority or the authority passing an order of externment as provided in the KAAPA is required. But such subjective satisfaction cannot be circumscribed by a condition that the person concerned should have committed another crime after the date of initiation of proceedings under S.107 Cr.P.C. against him. The KAAPA does not contain such a condition. The Code of Criminal Procedure also does not provide anywhere of such a condition in the matter of preventive detention or externment under any law for preventive detention. The Constitution of India also does not provide for the same. The existence of an order under S.107 Cr.P.C. would be relevant only in the realm of subjective satisfaction of the authority concerned before passing an order under S.3 or S.15 of the KAAPA. That subjective satisfaction is with respect to the likelihood of the person concerned indulging in any antisocial activity and the measures to be taken to prevent the same. That subjective satisfaction is with respect to the likelihood of the person concerned indulging in any antisocial activity and the measures to be taken to prevent the same. If a particular act constitutes an anti-social activity and if any of the conditions prescribed under sub-clauses (i) to (iii) of clause (p) or sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of clause (o) of S.2 of KAAPA applies in a particular case, the power conferred on the authority under the KAAPA cannot be further restricted with a condition that the person concerned should have indulged in another criminal act after initiation of the proceedings under S.107 Cr.P.C. That will be adding something to the legislative enactment.” It can be seen that the nature of the jurisdictional facts and parameters to be satisfied, for invoking the power under Section 15(1)of the Act, is substantially different from that to be exercised in terms of Section 107 Cr.PC. The affected parties should satisfy the definition of Known goonda or Known rowdy, as per sections 2(o) and 2(p), respectively, of the Act and on the basis of the materials, the authorized competent authority should reach its subjective satisfaction, that such a person is indulging in or is about to indulge in or is likely to indulge in anti-social activities, as envisaged under section 2(a) of the Act. Merely because an Executive Magistrate of the rank of RDO has declined to exercise the jurisdiction under Section 107 Cr.PC, cannot be a basis to contend that the exercise of power under Section 15(1) of the KAAPA Act, in the matter of externment, is legally a fraud on the power of colourable exercise of power and vitiated etc. Of course, the affected party, covered by Section 15(1), should satisfy the objective criteria of Known goonda or Known rowdy, as per section 2(o) and 2(p), as the case may be and there should be materials to enable the competent authority to arrive at a subjective satisfaction that such a person is indulging in or is about to indulge in or is likely to indulge in anti-social activities and that therefore, it is necessary to prevent him from committing such activities etc. Hence, in the light of these aspects, we are not in a position to accept the aforesaid first contention raised by the petitioner. Hence, in the light of these aspects, we are not in a position to accept the aforesaid first contention raised by the petitioner. However, it is made clear that the issue as to whether the subjective satisfaction, arrived at by the 3rd respondent-DIG of Police, is otherwise vitiated or not will be determined while dealing with the 2nd contention of the petitioner. 14. The 2nd contention urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there has been inordinate and unexplained delay as between the last prejudicial activity (6th crime) committed on 22.1.2022 and the issuance of Ext.P1 externment order dated 19.8.2022 and that the long delay of six months and 28 days would vitiate the decision making process. Otherwise, it is urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purposes of the externment have vitiated the entire proceedings, in view of the inordinate and unexplained delay as above. 15. The above said contention of the petitioner has been opposed by the learned Public Prosecutor by urging that the delay is properly explained. Further, in that regard, he would point out that, it may be true that the last prejudicial activity was recorded on 22.1.2022, but thereafter he was arrested and remanded to judicial custody and was released on bail only on 3.3.2022, and it is not necessary in all cases that the detaining authority/externment authority should immediately act after the commission of the last crime and that a flexible discretion is there for the authority concerned for further action in a case where the execution of externment is ordered on account of his involvement in the last crime. For strategic reasons, the authority may decide to wait and ascertain as to whether the party would secure bail etc. and that they may deal with the matter for preventive detention or externment, as the case may be, after the person is let upon bail. So also, the authority will have discretion to act, even otherwise, immediately after the commission of the last crime and without waiting to see whether he would be released on bail or not. and that they may deal with the matter for preventive detention or externment, as the case may be, after the person is let upon bail. So also, the authority will have discretion to act, even otherwise, immediately after the commission of the last crime and without waiting to see whether he would be released on bail or not. The option or choice is that of the competent authority and for various strategic reasons, for dealing with Known goonda and Known rowdy, the flexibility is sufficiently available to the decision maker and that some “free play” is in the “joints” of the decision maker. Further that, after the petitioner was released on bail on 3.3.2022, the police authorities had to take time to collect the factual details and that the Station House Officer had given their report in the matter on 1.7.2022 to the Deputy Superintendent of Police concerned, who thereafter had given the report to the 4th respondent, the District Police Chief in the rank of Superintendent of Police, who, in turn, as sponsoring authority, has given the report on 21.7.2022 to the 3rd respondent-DIG of Police. The statutory formalities of the show cause notice, personal hearing etc. have to be mandatorily observed and therefore, the time taken from 26.7.2022 (issuance of showcause notice) upto the issuance of the externment order dated 19.8.2022, need not be strictly evaluated and that therefore, the prosecution would contend the delay involved in this case is, in substance only from 3.3.2022 (the date of bail) upto 21.7.2022 (the date of submission of the report by the District Police Chief etc. that the delay is so properly explained, it is urged. 16. After hearing both sides, we are constrained to overrule the above said contentions of the Prosecutor and thus, allow the 2nd condition of the petitioner, due to reasons more than one. Firstly, the aforesaid contentions put forward by the learned Public Prosecutor do not find a place in the grounds given by the 3rd respondent, externment authority in Ext.P1 order, as to the reason for explaining the delay as above. The only explanation for the delay in that regard has been explained in paragraphs 13 and 14 of Ext.P1 externment (internal pages 8 and 9 of Ext.P1 externment order (See pages 34 & 35 of WP(Crl)). The only explanation for the delay in that regard has been explained in paragraphs 13 and 14 of Ext.P1 externment (internal pages 8 and 9 of Ext.P1 externment order (See pages 34 & 35 of WP(Crl)). The relevant portions of paragraphs 13 and 14 of Ext.P1 order, explaining the delay, are as follows: OTHER LANGUAGE A reading of paragraphs 13 and 14 (supra) of Ext.P1 would indicate that the explanation given by the 3rd respondent is that the last crime out of the six crimes has occurred on 21.1.2022 and reported on 22.1.2022 and further that, the investigation thereof was completed and further that the petitioner/accused was released on bail, on account of his involvement in the said crime on 3.3.2022. Further, it is stated in paragraph 14 (supra) of Ext.P1 that some time was taken for the police authorities to collect the precise factual details and then give a report to the superior who, in turn, had to give a report to the District Police Chief and hence, it is stated that there is no unexplained and inordinate delay in the issuance of Ext.P1 externment order. The above said submissions made by the learned Public Prosecutor do not find a proper place in the grounds for explaining the delay, as given by 3rd respondent in Ext.P1. It is well established that such grounds/reasons should find a place in the impugned order itself and if those grounds are not stated in the impugned statutory order, the same cannot be supplanted by reasons given in the affidavit or by giving reasons at the time of argument before the court. That apart, it is to be noted that, even if it is conceded that the time between 3.3.2022(the date of grant of bail) upto 21.7.2022 (the date of submission of the report by the District Police Chief) alone is to be reckoned, still the time in that regard is 4 ½ months. If the competent authority was of the considered opinion that, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it is more advisable to wait to ascertain as to whether the accused is released on bail in the last crime, but still they had an objection to take recourse to an extra-ordinary measure urgently in terms of section 15(1) of externment process and then the authorities concerned should have been ready and prepared to deal with the contingency etc. 17. 17. In the instant case, it appears that the crime was committed on 22.1.2022 and the petitioner was arrested on 8.2.2022 and he was released on bail on 3.3.2022. Even going by the version of the respondents, for the first time, the Station House Officer has given the report dated 1.7.2022 to the Deputy Superintendent of Police concerned and thereafter, the Deputy Superintendent of Police had given a report to the District Police Chief, who, in turn, had given the report to the 3rd respondent-District Inspector General of Police only on 21.7.2022. The above said conduct of the authorities would show that they did not really have the sense of urgency, so as to justify the externment measure, as envisaged under Section 15(1) of the Act. The delay, as above, even as between 3.3.2022 (the date of release on bail) upto 21.7.2022, the date of submission of the report by the Deputy Inspector General of Police cannot be said to be reasonable and properly explained in the facts and circumstances of the case. 18. The plea of delay in a similar externment case was considered by the Division Bench of this Court in the judgment in Asker Ali v. State of Kerala and Others [WP(Crl.)No.873 of 2022]. As per the judgment rendered in the said case, the bail was granted to the accused on 10.01.2022 and the date of submission of the report was on 21.03.2022. In that case, the delay that occurred in between the date of bail and the submission of the report by the authority was not reasonably and properly explained and it was held that the externment order vitiates the entire proceedings (See paragraphs 17 and 18 thereof). Moreover, the time required for expeditious and effective early action has been reiterated in the decision making process in preventive detention laws, including in the case of Sushantakumar Banik v. State of Tripura and Others [(2022)SCC Online 1333). Moreover, the time required for expeditious and effective early action has been reiterated in the decision making process in preventive detention laws, including in the case of Sushantakumar Banik v. State of Tripura and Others [(2022)SCC Online 1333). In that decision, a three Bench of the Apex Court, after placing reliance on various other case laws as in S.K.Nizamuddin v. State of West Bengal [ (1975)3 SCC 395 ], Suresh Mahato v. the District Magistrate, Burdwan[ (1975)3 SCC 554 ], Serajul v. State of West Bengal [ (1975)2 SCC 78 ] and Bhawarlal Ganeshmalji v. State of Tamilnadu [ (1979)1 SCC 465 ], has reiterated the legal imperativeness for ensuring that the live link between the last prejudicial activity and the purposes of the measure should not be snapped and the live and proximate link should be maintained and unexplained and inordinate delay, as between initial stage of detention order or in executing the detention order etc. would invite the invalidation of the proceedings. 19. In the light of the above aspects, we are of the view that the petitioner is entitled to succeed in the above second contention, as the delay has not been properly explained. In other words, the delay is inordinate. Hence, the link between the last prejudicial activity and the purpose of externment has been likely snapped, as also the live link and proximate link has been snapped which invites the interdiction of this Court in judicial review. 20. In view of the matter, the impugned Ext.P1 externment order dated 19.08.2022, issued by the 3rd respondent-District Inspector General of Police, as modified by impugned Ext.P5 order dated 30.09.2022, in OP No.42/2022 rendered by the Advisory Board, will stand set aside and quashed. 21. Though, the counsel for the petitioner has made a submission that the proceedings in C.C.No.1337/2022 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Parappanangadi, arising out of Crime No.636/2022 of Thanur Police Station, registered under Section 15(4) of the KAAPA Act is also liable for the interdiction of this Court, no such prayer has been raised by the petitioner. So, we are of the view that, the said plea need not be considered in the present proceedings and in case the petitioner has any legally justiciable grievance, he may work out the remedies, by challenging the same in the manner known to law. So, we are of the view that, the said plea need not be considered in the present proceedings and in case the petitioner has any legally justiciable grievance, he may work out the remedies, by challenging the same in the manner known to law. All such issues are left open to be raised and decided in such other appropriate proceedings. No other orders or directions are called for. The learned counsel for the petitioner would also submit that, the above said criminal proceedings has been initiated only for the alleged violation of Ext.P1 externment order and now, since Ext.P1 has been quashed by this Court, consequent action will not have any independent leg to stand etc. It is for the petitioner to urge all such contentions in other appropriate proceedings. With these observations and directions, the above W.P.(Crl) will stand disposed of.