JUDGMENT : 1. This second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 06.12.1999 in A.S.No.62 of 1997 on the file of the Court of I Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy District (for short, ‘lower appellate Court’), wherein and whereby the judgment and decree dated 17.04.1997 in O.S.No.74 of 1978 on the file of the Court of Principal District Munsif, West & South, Ranga Reddy District (for short, ‘trial Court’), was confirmed. The appellants have filed said suit for declaration of title and prohibitory injunction. 2. Originally, appellant Nos.1 to 14 herein filed the suit for declaration of title and to pass restraint order against respondent No.1 herein from imposing and collecting ‘Sivai Jamabandi’ in respect of land admeasuring Ac.84-30 guntas in Sy.No.46, situated at Rayadurg Village (Paigah), Hyderabad West Taluk (hereinafter, it is referred to as ‘suit property’). The trial Court dismissed the said suit vide judgment dated 17.04.1997. Challenging the same, A.S.No.62 of 1997 was filed and the said appeal was also dismissed by the lower appellate Court. Challenging the same, the present second appeal is filed. 3. For the sake of convenience, the parties hereinafter are referred to as they were arrayed in the suit. The word ‘plaintiffs’ includes their successors-in-interest either in the array of plaintiffs or defendants, who are sailing with the original plaintiffs. The words ‘unofficial defendants’ mean and include original private defendants and subsequently impleaded parties, who are sailing with unofficial defendants. 4. The sum and substance of the case of the plaintiffs is that Syed Shah Akbar Hussaini was the absolute owner and possessor of the suit property, which was assigned to him by the Jagirdar. After his death, succession enquiry was conducted by the competent forum. Later, as per the compromise dated 12.03.1924 (1334 Fasli), the suit property was allotted to Waliullah Hussaini, who is one of the sons of Syed Shah Akbar Hussaini. The original plaintiffs have been cultivating the suit property as tenants for the last 20 years prior to filing of the suit by paying amount to Waliullah Hussaini. Later, Waliullah Hussaini agreed to sell the suit property to the original plaintiffs. Accordingly, Waliullah Hussaini obtained permission under proceedings dated 13/18451/61, dated 29.10.1962, for alienation of the suit property under Sections 47 and 48 of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950. Later, Waliullah Hussaini agreed to sell the suit property to the original plaintiffs. Accordingly, Waliullah Hussaini obtained permission under proceedings dated 13/18451/61, dated 29.10.1962, for alienation of the suit property under Sections 47 and 48 of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950. Basing on such permission, Syed Waliullah Hussaini had executed sale deeds in favour of the original plaintiffs in respect of suit property in the year 1962. 5. It is the further case of the plaintiffs that due to mischief of Patwari of the village, penalty was imposed in the year 1951, which was assailed before the District Collector by way of an appeal. The District Collector allowed the appeal on 18.10.1951 and set aside the imposition of penalty. Subsequently, further dispute was raised in respect of the suit property touching the title of the plaintiffs’ predecessor-in-title, for which, the plaintiffs again preferred an appeal to the District Collector. The District Collector, vide order dated 15.10.1954 in Letter No.128/87/54, allowed the appeal in favour of Waliullah Hussaini. In spite of the same, village Patwari again imposed penalty in the form of ‘Sivai Jamabandi’. Challenging imposition of Sivai Jamabandi, an appeal was preferred before the District Collector. The District Collector, in Case No.59/2/54, dated 12.09.1954, allowed the appeal. Later, disputes arose among different persons in respect of suit property. On the directions of Board of Revenue, the District Collector passed order in File No.F3/2486/56, dated 15.03.1968, deciding the suit property as Government land. The plaintiffs were not parties to such proceedings. Later, challenging such order, an appeal was filed before the Board of Revenue and such appeal was dismissed vide proceedings No.V3/587/1968, dated 11.02.1971. Consequently, Patwari was directed to collect Sivai Jamabandi. When the Patwari, for the purpose of collecting Sivai Jamabandi, frequently visited the house of the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs filed the present suit. 6. The pleadings of defendant Nos.1 and 2 show that no records are available to show that the suit property was assigned by the Jagirdar. They were unaware of succession enquiry as well as compromise. The revenue records show that the plaintiffs are not the tenants over the suit property. Prior to 1954-55, the land in Sy.No.46 was recorded as ‘Khariz Katha’. 7. The pleadings of defendant Nos.1 and 2 further show that in the year 1955-56, the Collector, Hyderabad, has mistakenly granted patta in the name of Waliullah Hussaini. The revenue records show that the plaintiffs are not the tenants over the suit property. Prior to 1954-55, the land in Sy.No.46 was recorded as ‘Khariz Katha’. 7. The pleadings of defendant Nos.1 and 2 further show that in the year 1955-56, the Collector, Hyderabad, has mistakenly granted patta in the name of Waliullah Hussaini. The Patwari collected Sivai Jamabandi on the directions of competent authority. The grant of patta by the Collector was cancelled by Board of Revenue vide letter dated 15.05.1951 in Case No.101 and such order was implemented in the year 1966. The land in Sy.No.46 is recorded as Khariz Katha and the plaintiffs are the encroachers over the suit land. The Revenue Inspector made an enquiry and submitted a report stating that the lands in Sy.No.46 are Kharij Khata, and therefore, Sivai Jamabandi was imposed on the plaintiffs treating them as encroachers. 8. The pleadings of defendant Nos.1 and 2 further show that prior to 1954-55, the lands in Sy.No.46 was government land and patta was granted to Waliullah Hussaini on his wrong representation. Subsequently, such patta was cancelled and the land is classified as ‘Khariz Katha’ in the revenue records. The Tahsildar is the competent authority to implement the order of penalty and collect the penalty amount. Most of the suit property is hillock track and cultivable land was only Ac.3-00 guntas. However, in the year 1977-78, an extent of land admeasuring Ac.13-00 guntas was shown to be under dry cultivation. On the above pleadings, they prayed to dismiss the suit. 9. The pleadings of defendant Nos.3 to 5 show that they admitted that originally, the suit property belongs to Syed Shah Akbar Hussaini. They also admitted the compromise dated 12.03.1335 Fasli (1925). They denied the claim of the plaintiffs that the suit property fell to the share of Waliullah Hussaini. According to them, as per the compromise, out of the suit property, they were entitled to 1/3 share. Similarly, Waliullah Hussaini is also entitled to 1/3 share, Azizulla Hussaini and Ali Hyder Hussaini are entitled to 1/6 share as per the succession statement. In the year 1335 Fasli (1925), the H.E.H. Nizam confirmed the above succession and compromise by issuing Firman dated 18.07.1343 Fasli. Similarly, Waliullah Hussaini is also entitled to 1/3 share, Azizulla Hussaini and Ali Hyder Hussaini are entitled to 1/6 share as per the succession statement. In the year 1335 Fasli (1925), the H.E.H. Nizam confirmed the above succession and compromise by issuing Firman dated 18.07.1343 Fasli. They further pleaded that Syed Waliullah Hussaini had no right to sell entire extent of land, as such, 2/3 of suit property is liable to be reverted back to them and the suit has to be dismissed to the extent of 2/3 share. 10. The pleadings of defendant Nos.3 to 5 further show that the plaintiffs took the suit property on yearly right to cut the grass and collect usufructs of tamarind, mango and seethaphal on seasonal basis. They denied the plaintiffs’ claim of tenancy. They stated that they were not aware of imposition of penalty and that the suit property does not belong to the Government. At the time of proceedings of the Government, they were minors and their father was alive, but he was not made party. Basing on the above pleadings, they sought to dismiss the suit. 11. The pleadings of defendant No.6 show that he denied the plaintiffs’ claim of tenancy and they claimed that they are not parties to the various orders of Collector and Board of Revenue; as such, they are not binding on them. He also denied the succession enquiry and compromise and exclusive entitlement of Waliullah Hussaini. He also claimed that the suit is barred by limitation and is also liable to be dismissed for mis-joinder and non-joinder of proper and necessary parties. 12. The pleadings of defendant No.6 further show that Syed Shah Akbar Hussaini died leaving his two sons and two daughters viz., Ahmed Hussaini and Waliullah Hussaini, Mahaboob Begum and Gousia Begum to succeed him. The brother of Waliullah Hussaini viz., Ahmed Hussaini had sold away his share of land admeasuring Ac.28-10 guntas in favour of Syed Nizamuddin Hussaini who is the second son of Waliullah Hussaini and he died issueless and this defendant and Syed Ameenuddin Hussaini equally succeeded his interest. Syed Ameenuddin Hussain had purchased an extent of Ac.14-05 gts from Smt. Mahaboob Begum. The only son of Gousia Begum viz., Ali Hyder Hussaini has executed release deed for an extent of land admeasuring Ac.14-05 guntas in favour of defendant No.6. Syed Ameenuddin Hussain had purchased an extent of Ac.14-05 gts from Smt. Mahaboob Begum. The only son of Gousia Begum viz., Ali Hyder Hussaini has executed release deed for an extent of land admeasuring Ac.14-05 guntas in favour of defendant No.6. As such, defendant No.6 became the absolute owner of land admeasuring Ac.31-28 guntas. Basing on the above pleadings, he sought to dismiss the suit. 13. The trial Court, on the basis of the above pleadings, has framed the following issues: “1. Whether the suit lands are patta lands and the plaintiffs are entitled for declaration? 2. Whether the defendant No.3 to 6 can claim any right over the suit schedule property? 3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for perpetual injunction? 4. To what relief?” 14. The plaintiffs, to support their case, examined P.Ws.1 to 5 and relied upon Exs.A-1 to A-37. Defendant Nos.1 and 2, to support their case, examined D.Ws.1 and 6 and relied upon Exs.B-46 to B-81. Defendant Nos.3 to 6, to support their case, examined D.Ws.2 to 5 and relied upon Exs.B-1 to B-45. 15. The trial Court, after appreciating the evidence on record, held that defendant Nos.1 and 2 – Government established that the suit property is Government land. Therefore, the Government is justified in collecting Sivai Jamabandi from the plaintiffs. Having held so, the trial Court rejected the claim of the plaintiffs and dismissed the suit. Challenging the same, the plaintiffs filed A.S.No.62 of 1997, and the lower appellate Court, dismissed the same confirming the judgment of the trial Court. Challenging the same, the plaintiffs filed the present Second Appeal. 16. This Court framed the following substantial questions of law. “(i) Whether the findings of the first Appellate Court holding bar of suit on the principle of res judicata based on Ex.B46, in the absence of any pleadings from the defendants with regard to bar of suit on the ground of res judicata, suffer from any perversity? (ii) Whether the findings of both the Courts below in denying the relief of declaration of title of the plaintiff in the background of proceedings under Ex.B72 in spite of grant of permission by the Tahsildar under Sections 47 and 48 of Hyderabad Tenancy & Agricultural Lands Act 1950 (Ex.A33) and other revenue records and admission of defendant No.1 suffer from any perversity? (iii) Whether the findings of the Courts below in declaring the title of the Government (defendant No.1) in a suit filed by the plaintiff for declaration, was correct, if not so, whether such findings suffer from any perversity? (iv) Whether the findings of the Courts below in holding that the suit schedule property is released from Court of Wards in the light of the conduct of the parties in transacting or dealing with the properties under Ex.A14 and the entries in the Revenue Records when Ex.A14 shows the release of property was subject to notification to be issued under the Courts of Wards Act, suffers from any perversity? And whether the presumption with regard to official act can be invoked by virtue of Section 114(e) of the Evidence Act with regard issuance of notification consequent to Ex.A14 Order? And whether objections to such findings can be raised without pleadings by defendant No.6 or his legal heirs? (v) Whether defendants No.3 to 5 can impugn the findings of both Courts on the aspect of release of suit property from Court of Wards when they allowed the findings in other suit i.e., O.S.No.47 of 1985 to attain finality by virtue of withdrawal of the second appeal in the present appeal? (vi) Whether the first defendant can raise issue of limitation without such pleadings for the first time in the second appeal, if so, whether the suit is barred by limitation?” 17. Heard all the learned counsel appearing for plaintiffs, defendants and implead parties. 18. Before dealing with substantial questions of law as framed by this Court, the question is whether the present appeal involves resolution of any substantial questions of law. 19. The counsel representing the plaintiffs and unofficial defendants contended that the appeal involves various substantial questions of law since judgments of both the Courts below suffer from perversity, non-consideration of relevant evidence and violation of established principles of law. The learned counsel representing the Government has contended that the scope of second appeal is very limited and it cannot be extended to interfere with concurrent finding of fact even on the ground of erroneous finding of fact howsoever gross or inexcusable error. Thus, the present appeal does not contain any substantial questions of law. 20. To answer such contentions, it is required to know what is substantial question of law and when such substantial question of law would arise. 21. Thus, the present appeal does not contain any substantial questions of law. 20. To answer such contentions, it is required to know what is substantial question of law and when such substantial question of law would arise. 21. To understand clearly, it is suffice to refer the recent decision of Apex Court in Nazir Mohamed vs. J. Kamala, MANU/SC/0619/2020 instead of reference to all the decisions relied upon by the parties, wherein the Apex Court had occasion to consider what is substantial question of law and the relevant portion reads hereunder: “29. The principles for deciding when a question of law becomes a substantial question of law, have been enunciated by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 1314 , where this Court held: The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law. 30. In Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal (2006) 5 SCC 545 , this Court referred to and relied upon Chunilal v. Mehta and Sons (supra) and other judgments and summarised the tests to find out whether a given set of questions of law were mere questions of law or substantial questions of law. 31. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment of this Court in Hero Vinoth (supra) are set out hereinbelow: 21. The phrase "substantial question of law", as occurring in the amended Section 100 Code of Civil Procedure is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying "question of law", means of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. The phrase "substantial question of law", as occurring in the amended Section 100 Code of Civil Procedure is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying "question of law", means of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with-technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of "substantial question of law" by suffixing the words "of general importance" as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran Ditta v. Ram Ditta [(1927-28) 515 IA 235 : AIR 1928 PC 172 ] the phrase substantial question of law as it was employed in the last Clause of the then existing Section 100 Code of Civil Procedure (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of general importance but a substantial question of law which was involved in the case. In Sir Chunilal case [1962 Supp (3) SCR 549 : AIR 1962 SC 1314 ] the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju AIR 1951 Mad 969 : (1951) 2 MLJ 222 (FB)]:(Sir Chunilal case [1962 Supp (3) SCR 549 : AIR 1962 SC 1314 ], SCR p. 557) When a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular fact of the case it would not be a substantial question of law. 32. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular fact of the case it would not be a substantial question of law. 32. To be "substantial", a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by the law of the land or any binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case and/or the rights of the parties before it, if answered either way. 33. To be a question of law "involved in the case", there must be first, a foundation for it laid in the pleadings, and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact, arrived at by Courts of facts, and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. 34. Where no such question of law, nor even a mixed question of law and fact was urged before the Trial Court or the First Appellate Court, as in this case, a second appeal cannot be entertained, as held by this Court in Panchagopal Barua v. Vinesh Chandra Goswami AIR 1997 SC 1047. 35. Whether a question of law is a substantial one and whether such question is involved in the case or not, would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The paramount overall consideration is the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and the impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis. This proposition finds support from Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (2001) 3 SCC 179 . 36. In a Second Appeal, the jurisdiction of the High Court being confined to substantial question of law, a finding of fact is not open to challenge in second appeal, even if the appreciation of evidence is palpably erroneous and the finding of fact incorrect as held in Ramchandra v. Ramalingam AIR 1963 SC 302 . An entirely new point, raised for the first time, before the High Court, is not a question involved in the case, unless it goes to the root of the matter. 37. An entirely new point, raised for the first time, before the High Court, is not a question involved in the case, unless it goes to the root of the matter. 37. The principles relating to Section 100 Code of Civil Procedure relevant for this case may be summarised thus: (i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact, but the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document, involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents, and, involves a debatable legal issue. (iii) A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the Court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law. (iv) The general Rule is, that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the Courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. A decision based on no evidence, does not refer only to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding. 22. Keeping in view of above principles, I will advert to each of the substantial questions of law framed by this Court on remand from the Apex Court. Substantial question of law No.(i): 23. The claim of the Government is that while pending the present O.S.No.74 of 1978 before the trial Court, they have filed Land Grabbing Case No.34 of 1994 on the file of the Special Court under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) at Hyderabad (hereinafter referred to as ‘Land Grabbing Court’), in respect of land admeasuring Ac.12-00 guntas forming part of Sy.No.46 of Raidurg Village. Though the said Land Grabbing Case was subsequently filed, the Land Grabbing Court disposed of such case prior to disposal of the suit, holding that the Government is the owner of the subject land in the Land Grabbing Case. There was no contest from the plaintiffs. Therefore, the findings in the Land Grabbing Case operate res judicata in O.S.No.74 of 1978. This aspect has not been properly dealt with by the trial Court but lower appellate Court rightly held that the said findings of the Land Grabbing Court operate res judicata on common issues in Land Grabbing Case and O.S.No.74 of 1978. 24. The contention of the plaintiffs is that they filed suit for declaration of title in respect of land admeasuring Ac.84-30 guntas in Sy.No.46 of Raidurg village, whereas the extent of land covered in the Land Grabbing Case was only Ac.12-00 guntas in Sy.No.46 of Raidurg village. Hence, the subject matter in the Land Grabbing Case is not entire suit land. Further, all the plaintiffs are not parties to the said Land Grabbing Case. They also contended that the Land Grabbing Case was disposed of ex parte and not on merits. Therefore, such findings do not bind so as to apply res judicata. 25. Hence, the subject matter in the Land Grabbing Case is not entire suit land. Further, all the plaintiffs are not parties to the said Land Grabbing Case. They also contended that the Land Grabbing Case was disposed of ex parte and not on merits. Therefore, such findings do not bind so as to apply res judicata. 25. The plaintiffs further contended that the Land Grabbing Court gave findings on title to the property without jurisdiction. It is their case that the Land Grabbing Court assumes jurisdiction when there is land grabbing. When the Land Grabbing Court had given findings that there was no land grabbing, it could not have decided the title since it lost the jurisdiction. In the present case, the findings were rendered on title, in spite of holding that the land was not grabbed, and therefore, such findings were without jurisdiction. Hence, such findings are from incompetent Court and they do not bar adjudication of title issue in the present suit by invoking principles of res judicata. Lastly, it is contended that the Government has not specifically raised the issue of res judicata before the trial Court. The Government has also not filed required material like pleadings etc., but only filed a copy of judgment in the said Land Grabbing Case. Such issue was raised at the time of arguments and findings were rendered without an opportunity to the plaintiffs to rebut such plea. Unless pleadings and cause of action pleaded in previous proceedings are brought on record, the plea of res judicata which is both of fact and law cannot be adjudicated. 26. To answer the above contentions raised by both sides, it is apt to refer to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which reads as under: “Section 11: Res judicata: No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court. Explanation I.-- The expression former suit shall denote a suit which has been decided prior to a suit in question whether or not it was instituted prior thereto. Explanation II.-- For the purposes of this section, the competence of a Court shall be determined irrespective of any provisions as to a right of appeal from the decision of such Court. Explanation III.--The matter above referred to must in the former suit have been alleged by one party and either denied or admitted, expressly or impliedly, by the other. Explanation IV.-- Any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit. Explanation V.-- Any relief claimed in the plaint, which is not expressly granted by the decree, shall for the purposes of this section, be deemed to have been refused. Explanation VI.-- Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of a public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating. Explanation VII.-- The provisions of this section shall apply to a proceeding for the execution of a decree and references in this section to any suit, issue or former suit shall be construed as references, respectively, to a proceeding for the execution of the decree, question arising in such proceeding and a former proceeding for the execution of that decree. Explanation VIII.-- An issue heard and finally decided by a Court of limited jurisdiction, competent to decide such issue, shall operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit, notwithstanding that such Court of limited jurisdiction was not competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised.” 27. A close analysis of the above provision of Section 11 of C.P.C, the following are the essential requirements to be established to apply bar of res judicata to any suit or issue: (i) The matter must be directly and substantially in issue in the former suit and in the later suit. (ii) The prior suit should be between the same parties or persons claiming under them. (iii) Parties should have litigated under the same title in the earlier suit. (ii) The prior suit should be between the same parties or persons claiming under them. (iii) Parties should have litigated under the same title in the earlier suit. (iv) The matter in issue in the subsequent suit must have been heard and finally decided in the first suit. (v) The court trying the former suit must have been competent to try the particular issue in question. 28. As per Explanation-I of Section 11 of C.P.C., the ‘former suit’ denotes the suit which has been decided prior to the suit in question, whether or not such a suit instituted prior to other suit or not. This means, the former suit shall not be taken to mean that the suit instituted first, which shall be taken to mean that it is decided first. 29. The plea of res judicata is a restraint on the right of a plaintiff to have an adjudication of his claim. Such a plea must be clearly established. Before plaintiff sought to be prevented from adjudication of his suit or issue, he should have notice of such a plea and he must be given an opportunity to put forth his contention against such a bar. 30. The rule of res judicata is founded on principles of public policy that finality should attached to the binding decision pronounced by Court of competent jurisdiction. It is founded on two grounds, the first is based on maxim nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa (no one ought to be twice vexed for one and the same cause), and the second one is based on the principle there ought to be an end to the same litigation. 31. The main purpose of the doctrine is that once the matter has been adjudicated in a former proceeding, it should not be open to parties to re-agitate the matter again and again. Explanation-III of Section 11 of C.P.C makes it clear that for an issue to be hit by res judicata, it must have been raised by one party and expressly denied by the other party. 32. In this regard, it is relevant to refer to the decision of Apex Court in Smt.V.Rajeshwari v. T.C. Saravanabava, MANU/SC/1057/2003, whereunder it held as follows: “11. We have heard Shri S. Balakrishnan, the learned senior counsel for the appellant and Shri A.K. Ganguli, the learned senior counsel for the respondent. 32. In this regard, it is relevant to refer to the decision of Apex Court in Smt.V.Rajeshwari v. T.C. Saravanabava, MANU/SC/1057/2003, whereunder it held as follows: “11. We have heard Shri S. Balakrishnan, the learned senior counsel for the appellant and Shri A.K. Ganguli, the learned senior counsel for the respondent. The learned counsel for the parties have taken us through all the relevant material available on record. We are satisfied that the High Court has clearly erred in allowing the defendant's appeal and setting aside the judgments and decrees of the courts below and this we say for more reasons than one. 12. The rule of res judicata does not strike at the root of the jurisdiction of the court trying the subsequent suit. It is a rule of estoppel by judgment based on the public policy that there should be a finality to litigation and no one should be vexed twice for the same cause. 13. The plea of res judicata is founded on proof of certain facts and then by applying the law to the facts so found. It is, therefore, necessary that the foundation for the plea must be laid in the pleadings and then an issue must be framed and tried. A plea not properly raised in the pleadings or in issues at the stage of the trial, would not be permitted to be raised for the first time at the stage of appeal (See: (Raja) Jagadish Chandra Deo Dhabal Deb Vs. Gour Hari Mahato & Ors. AIR 1936 Privy Council 258, Medapati Surayya & Ors. Vs. Tondapu Bala Gangadhara Ramakrishna Reddi & Ors. AIR 1948 Privy Council 3, Katragadda China Anjaneyulu & Anr. Vs. Kattragadda China Ramayya & Ors. AIR 1965 A.P. 177 Full Bench). The view taken by the Privy Council was cited with approval before this Court in The State of Punjab Vs. Bua Das Kaushal (1970) 3 SCC 656 . However, an exception was carved out by this Court and the plea was permitted to be raised, though not taken in the pleadings nor covered by any issue, because the necessary facts were present to the mind of the parties and were gone into by the Trial Court. The opposite party had ample opportunity of leading the evidence in rebuttal of the plea. The opposite party had ample opportunity of leading the evidence in rebuttal of the plea. The Court concluded that the point of res judicata had throughout been in consideration and discussion and so the want of pleadings or plea of waiver of res judicata cannot be allowed to be urged. 14. Not only the plea has to be taken, it has to be substantiated by producing the copies of the pleadings, issues and judgment in the previous case. May be in a given case only copy of judgment in previous suit is filed in proof of plea of res judicata and the judgment contains exhaustive or in requisite details the statement of pleadings and the issues which may be taken as enough proof. But as pointed out in Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai (Dead) By Lrs. & Ors. Vs. Mohd. Hanifa (Dead) by Lrs. & Ors. (1976) 4 SCC 780 , the basic method to decide the question of res judicata is first to determine the case of the parties as put forward in their respective pleadings of their previous suit and then to find out as to what had been decided by the judgment which operates as res judicata. It is risky to speculate about the pleadings merely by a summary of recitals of the allegations made in the pleadings mentioned in the judgment. The Constitution Bench in Gurbux Singh Vs. Bhooralal (1964) 7 SCR 831 , placing on a par the plea of res judicata and the plea of estoppel under Order II 3 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, held that proof of the plaint in the previous suit which is set to create the bar, ought to be brought on record. The plea is basically founded on the identity of the cause of action in the two suits and, therefore, it is necessary for the defence which raises the bar to establish the cause of action in the previous suit. Such pleas cannot be left to be determined by mere speculation or inferring by a process of deduction what were the facts stated in the previous pleadings. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Kali Krishna Tagore Vs. Secretary of State For India in Council & Anr. Such pleas cannot be left to be determined by mere speculation or inferring by a process of deduction what were the facts stated in the previous pleadings. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Kali Krishna Tagore Vs. Secretary of State For India in Council & Anr. (1887-88) 15 Indian Appeals 186, pointed out that the plea of res judicata cannot be determined without ascertaining what were the matters in issues in the previous suit and what was heard and decided. Needless to say these can be found out only by looking into the pleadings, the issues and the judgment in the previous suit.” 33. It is also apt to refer to decision of Division Bench of United High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Devarapu Narasimha Rao v. Yerrabothula Peda Venkaiah, MANU/AP/0649/1997, whereunder it is held as follows: “19. Thus, whenever the plea of res judicata is raised, the Court has to investigate the facts in order to determine whether the requirements of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure have been fulfilled or not. The concerned party has to file copy of the pleadings of the earlier suit as also copy of the issues and the judgment so that the Court can see whether the required elements are present on record or not. Where the concerned party does not place the relevant material before the Court, the question of making an investigation into the facts and invoking the doctrine of res judicata does not arise, because, it is not a pure question of law and the plea of res judicata is not the one which affects the jurisdiction of the Court. Thus, it is a plea in bar of trial of a suit or an issue, as the case may be, which a party can choose to waive.” 34. A reading of the above decisions, they make clear that the res judicata does not strike at the root of the jurisdiction of the Court trying the subsequent suit. It is a rule of estoppel of judgment based on public policy. The plea of res judicata rests upon proof of certain basic facts; then, the application of law to the facts so founded. Thus, it is necessary that the foundation for such a plea must be in the pleadings and an issue must be framed and tried. It is a rule of estoppel of judgment based on public policy. The plea of res judicata rests upon proof of certain basic facts; then, the application of law to the facts so founded. Thus, it is necessary that the foundation for such a plea must be in the pleadings and an issue must be framed and tried. A plea not properly raised in the pleadings or not in issue at the stage of trial, such a plea will not be permitted to raise first time in the appeal. However, there is an exception to the said rule. If necessary facts were present to the mind of the parties and were gone into by the Trial Court and the opposite party had full opportunity of leading the evidence in rebuttal of plea, such plea can be raised without any pleadings and issues. 35. The Apex Court in Satyendra Kumar v. Rajnath Dubey, MANU/SC/0529/2016 held that an ex parte decree also operates as res judicata. It is a decree as good as the decree passed after contest. It binds the parties to such proceedings and operates res judicata unless it is set aside on the ground of fraud or collusion. 36. One of the requirements to apply the principles of res judicata is the judgment in the former suit must be delivered by the Court of competent jurisdiction. The concept of jurisdiction of the Court refers to pecuniary jurisdiction, territorial jurisdiction and jurisdiction of subject matter. The defect of jurisdiction whether it is pecuniary, territorial or subject matter, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any order and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties. 37. The Apex Court in The Church South India Trust vs. the Telugu Church Council, MANU/SC/0262/1996 held that competent jurisdiction referred under Section 11 of C.P.C relates to only pecuniary and subject matter competency and not territorial competency. 38. Admittedly, in the present case, the pleadings relating to Land Grabbing Case have not been filed. However, the judgment under Ex.B-46 refers cursory reference of pleadings and no reference of cause of action. 38. Admittedly, in the present case, the pleadings relating to Land Grabbing Case have not been filed. However, the judgment under Ex.B-46 refers cursory reference of pleadings and no reference of cause of action. The Apex Court in Smt.V.Rajeshwari’s case (supra) held that it is unsafe to rely on cursory pleadings referred in the judgment equivalent of pleadings without looking into the total pleadings and cause of action of the parties, to restrain the plaintiff from seeking adjudication of his suit or issue in the subsequent suit. 39. The Land Grabbing Court referred short pleadings in paragraph No.2 of its judgment. Further, the said Land Grabbing Case was filed against seven persons, they are (1) Mala Ramulu, (2) Mala Muthamma, (3) Salam Babaiah, (4) Denaboina Balaiah, (5) Neeradi Lakshmaiah, (6) Ningampally Swamy and (7) Neeradi Anajaih. Whereas, O.S.No.74 of 1978 was filed by the original plaintiff Nos.1 to 7, who are (1) Mala Ramloo, (2) Salam Balaiah, (3) Neeradi Laxmaiah, (4) Lingampally Swamy, (5) D.Boina Babaiah, (6) Neeradi Anjaiah and (7) Mala Narsimha. Mala Narsihma is not party to the LGC proceedings. 40. A comprehensive analysis of pleadings referred in the Land Grabbing Case and the pleadings referred in plaint in the suit, it is clear that plaintiff No.7 is not party to the Land Grabbing Case proceedings. The other important aspect is that the suit was filed in respect of larger extent of land admeasuring Ac.84-30 guntas in Sy.No.46 of Raidurg Village, whereas the Land Grabbing case was filed in respect of land admeasuring Ac.12-00 guntas forming part of Sy.No.46 of Raidurg Village. The entire subject matter of the suit was not subject matter of the Land Grabbing Case. 41. The Apex Court, in Union of India (UOI) v. S.Narasimhulu Naidu (Dead) through L.Rs, MANU/SC/0582/2021 had an occasion to consider the applicability of principles of res judicata, where the subject matter is not one and the same and held as follows: “40…The judgment is clearly not applicable in the present case as the title over the land in question before the Tribunal is distinct from the land which was the subject matter in the first suit. The first suit was only in respect of the land purchased by the Plaintiff and not the entire land, though his claim was based on sale by the father of the applicants.” 42. The first suit was only in respect of the land purchased by the Plaintiff and not the entire land, though his claim was based on sale by the father of the applicants.” 42. In the said judgment, the subject matter in the former suit was not entire land, though claim is overlapping with regard to acquisition of title. In the said circumstances, the Apex Court held that since the entire subject matter is not subject matter in the former suit, the principles of res judicata does not apply. 43. In the present case also, the extent of land referred in Land Grabbing Case is only Ac.12-00 guntas of land, whereas the extent of subject matter in the suit is Ac.84-30 guntas of land. The said facts disclose that the entire subject matter is not subject matter in the former suit. Thus, the principle of res judicata cannot be readily invoked to the facts in present case. 44. A reading of the judgment of Land Grabbing Court shows that the findings were given that the respondents therein, who are plaintiff Nos.1 to 6 in the suit, are not land grabbers. Thus, the principle of res judicata cannot be readily invoked to the facts in present case. 44. A reading of the judgment of Land Grabbing Court shows that the findings were given that the respondents therein, who are plaintiff Nos.1 to 6 in the suit, are not land grabbers. In this regard, it is apt to refer to the following provisions of the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 as then and they read as under: “Section 2: Definitions:- (a) to (c)…… (d) "land grabber" means a person or a group of persons who commits land grabbing and includes any person who gives financial aid to any person for taking illegal possession of lands or for construction of unauthorised structures thereon, or who collects or attempts to collect from any occupiers of such lands rent, compensation and other charges by criminal intimidation, or who abets the doing of any of the above mentioned acts, and also includes the successors-in-interest; (e) "land grabbing" means every activity of grabbing of any land (whether belonging to the Government, a local authority, a religious or charitable institution or endowment, including a wakf, or any other private person) by a person or group of persons, without any lawful entitlement and with a view to illegally taking possession of such lands, or enter into or create illegal tenancies or lease and licence agreements or any other illegal agreements in respect of such lands, or to construct unauthorised structures thereon for sale or hire, or give such lands to any person on rental or lease and licence basis for construction, or use and occupation, of land. Section 3: Land grabbing to be unlawful:- Land grabbing in any form is hereby declared unlawful; and any activity connected with or arising out of land grabbing shall be an offence punishable under this Act. Section 4: Prohibition of land grabbing:- (1) No person shall commit or cause to be committed land grabbing. (2) Any person who, on or after the commencement of this Act, continues to be in occupation, otherwise than as a lawful tenant, of a grabbed land belonging to the Government, local authority, religious or charitable institution or endowment including a wakf, or other private person, shall be guilty of an offence under this Act. (2) Any person who, on or after the commencement of this Act, continues to be in occupation, otherwise than as a lawful tenant, of a grabbed land belonging to the Government, local authority, religious or charitable institution or endowment including a wakf, or other private person, shall be guilty of an offence under this Act. (3) Whoever contravenes the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub section (2) shall on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to five years, and with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees. Section 7: Constitution of Special Courts:- (1) The Government may, for the purpose of providing speedy enquiry into any alleged act of land grabbing, and trial of cases in respect of the ownership and title to, or lawful possession of, the land grabbed, by notification, constitute a Special Court. (2) A Special Court shall consist of a Chairman and four other members, to be appointed by the Government. (3) to (5) … (5A) The Special Court may, by notification, make regulations not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder relating to the procedure to be followed for the conduct of the cases and for regulating the manner of taking decisions. (5B) The Special Court may cause a public notice of the substance of such regulations for the information of the general public. (5C) Every regulation made under this section shall, immediately after it is made, be laid before the Legislative Assembly of the State if it is in session, and if it is not in session in the session immediately following for a total period of fourteen days which may be comprised in one session or in two successive sessions and if before the expiration of the session in which it is so laid or the session immediately following the Legislative Assembly agrees in making any modifications in the regulation or in the annulment of the regulation, the regulation shall from the date on which the modification or annulment is notified, have effect only in such modified form or shall stand annulled, as the case may be, so however that any such modification or annulments shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under that regulation. (5D) (i)Notwithstanding anything in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) the Special Court may follow its own procedure which shall not be inconsistent with the principles of natural justice and fair play and subject to the other provisions of this Act and of any rules made thereunder while deciding the Civil liability. (ii) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 260 or Section 262 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) every offence punishable under this Act shall be tried in a summary way and the provisions of Sections 263 to 265 (both inclusive) of the said Code shall, as far as may be, apply to such trial. (iii) When a person is convicted of an offence of land grabbing attended by criminal force or show of force or by criminal intimidation, and it appears to the Special Court that, by such force or show of force or intimidation the land of any person has been grabbed, the Special Court may if it thinks fit, order that possession of the same be restored to that person after evicting by force, if necessary, any other person who may be in possession of the property. (6) No act or proceeding of [the Special Court] shall be deemed to be invalid by reason only of the existence of any vacancy among its members or any defect in the Constitution or re-constitution thereof. Section 8: Procedure and powers of the Special Courts:- (1) The Special Court may, either suo motu or on application made by any person, officer or authority take cognizance of and try every case arising out of any alleged act of land grabbing or with respect to the ownership and title to, or lawful possession of, the land grabbed, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, and pass such orders (including orders by way of interim directions) as it deems fit; (1-A) The Special Court shall, for the purpose of taking cognizance of the case, consider the location, or extent or value of the land alleged to have been grabbed or of the substantial nature of the evil involved or in the interest of justice required or any other relevant matter : Provided that the Special Court shall not take cognizance of any such case without hearing the petitioner. (2) Notwithstanding anything in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or in the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972, any case in respect of an alleged act of land grabbing or the determination of question of title and ownership to, or lawful possession of any land grabbed under this Act, shall be triable only in a Special Court constituted for the area in which the land grabbed is situated; and the decision of the Special Court shall be final. (2-A) If the Special Court is of the opinion that any case brought before it, is not a fit case to be taken cognizance of, it may return the same for presentation before the Special Tribunal: Provided that if, in the opinion of the Special Court, any application filed before it is prima facie frivolous or vexatious, it shall reject the same without any further enquiry : Provided further that if on an application from an interested person to withdraw and try a case pending before any Special Tribunal the Special Court is of the opinion that it is a fit case to be withdrawn and tried by it, it may for reasons to be recorded in writing withdraw any such case from such Special Tribunal and shall deal with it as if the case was originally instituted before the Special Court. (2-B) Notwithstanding anything in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, it shall be lawful for the Special Court to try all offences punishable under this Act. (2-C) The Special Court shall determine the order in which the civil and criminal liability against a land grabber be initiated. It shall be within the discretion of the Special Court whether or not to deliver its decision or order until both civil and criminal proceedings are completed. The evidence admitted during the criminal proceeding may be made use of while trying the civil liability. But additional evidence, if any, adduced in the civil proceedings shall not be considered by the Special Court while determining the criminal liability. The evidence admitted during the criminal proceeding may be made use of while trying the civil liability. But additional evidence, if any, adduced in the civil proceedings shall not be considered by the Special Court while determining the criminal liability. Any person accused of land grabbing or the abetment thereof before the Special Court shall be a competent witness for' the defence and may give evidence or oath in disproof of the charge made against him or any person charged together with him in the criminal proceeding: Provided that he shall not be called as a witness except on his own request in writing or his failure to give evidence shall be made the subject of any comment by any of the parties or the Special Court or give rise to any presumption against himself or any person charged together with him at the same proceeding. (3) [x x x] (4) Every case under sub-section (1) shall be disposed of finally by the Special Court, as far as possible, within a period of six months from the date of institution of the case before it. (5) [x x x] (6) Every finding of the Special Court with regard to any alleged act of land grabbing shall be conclusive proof of the fact of land grabbing and of the persons who committed such land grabbing, and every judgment of the Special Court with regard to the determination of title and ownership to, or lawful possession of, any land grabbed shall be binding on all persons having interest in such land. Provided that the Special Court shall, by notification, specify the fact of taking cognizance of the case under this Act. Provided that the Special Court shall, by notification, specify the fact of taking cognizance of the case under this Act. Such notification, shall state that any objection which may be received by the Special Court from any person including the custodian of evacuee property within the period specified therein will be considered by it: Provided further that where the custodian of evacuee property objects to the Special Court taking cognizance of the case, the Special Court shall not proceed further with the case in regard to such property; Provided also that the Special Court shall cause a notice of taking cognizance of the case under the Act, served on any person known or believed to be interested in the land, after a summary enquiry to satisfy itself about the persons likely to be interested in the land.] (7) It shall be lawful for the Special Court to pass such order as it may deem fit to advance the cause of justice. It may award compensation in terms of money for wrongful possession of the land grabbed which shall not be less than an amount equivalent to the market value of the land grabbed as on the date of the order and profits accrued from the land payable by the land grabber to the owner of the grabbed land and may direct re-delivery of the grabbed land to its rightful owner. The amount of compensation and profits, so awarded and costs of re-delivery, if any, shall be recovered as an arrear of land revenue in case the Government is the owner, or as a decree of a Civil Court, in any other case to be executed by the Special Court: Provided that the Special Court shall, before passing an order under this sub-section, give to the land grabber an opportunity of making his representation or of adducing evidence, if any, in this regard, and consider every such representation and evidence. (8) Any case, pending before any Court or other authority immediately before the Constitution of a Special Court, as would have been within the jurisdiction of such Special Court, shall stand transferred to the Special Court as if the cause of action on which such suit or proceeding is based and arisen after the constitution of the Special Court.” 45. (8) Any case, pending before any Court or other authority immediately before the Constitution of a Special Court, as would have been within the jurisdiction of such Special Court, shall stand transferred to the Special Court as if the cause of action on which such suit or proceeding is based and arisen after the constitution of the Special Court.” 45. The primary requirement to assume jurisdiction by the Land Grabbing Court is that there must be allegation of land grabbing by land grabbers. The land grabbing means, grabbing of any land belonging to the Government, a local authority, a religious or charitable institution or endowment, including a Wakf, or any other private person, by a person or group of persons, without any lawful entitlement and with a view to illegally taking possession of such lands. One of the primary requirements is illegally taking possession of land without lawful entitlement. If such a conclusion is arrived at, the Land Grabbing Court can assume the jurisdiction and can go into the aspect of title to the property. When the Land Grabbing Court at threshold finds that there is no illegal taking possession by the respondent in the Land Grabbing Case, it loses its jurisdiction. Once it loses the jurisdiction, it cannot go into the merits touching title to the property. 46. In the present case, the findings of the Land Grabbing Court clearly demonstrate that the respondents therein i.e., plaintiff Nos.1 to 6 herein are in permissive possession and their possession is not attributable to any act of land grabbing. Once such a finding is rendered, the Land Grabbing Court shall not go into the issue of title to the property. The reason is that it is divested with the jurisdiction which it has assumed by way of alleged act of land grabbing which is limited jurisdiction. Once the Land Grabbing Court is divested with jurisdiction, it lacks jurisdiction to give findings on merits. In spite of the same, if the Land Grabbing Court gives any findings, such findings cannot be treated as the findings given by the competent Court of jurisdiction. 47. Once the Land Grabbing Court is divested with jurisdiction, it lacks jurisdiction to give findings on merits. In spite of the same, if the Land Grabbing Court gives any findings, such findings cannot be treated as the findings given by the competent Court of jurisdiction. 47. In this regard, it is apt to refer to the decision of the Division Bench of High Court of Patna Rajesh Kumar Singh v. Rita Singh, MANU/BH/0690/1999, wherein it has been held as follows: “…Once a Court comes to the conclusion that the proceeding before it was not maintainable, it has no jurisdiction to go into its merit, but if any such decision rendered on merit, the same shall not operate as res judicata in subsequent proceeding or different stage of the said proceeding as the case may be…” 48. In the present case, once the Land Grabbing Court came to the conclusion that the respondents therein are not land grabbers, it is divested with jurisdiction to go into merits of the case, and any findings subsequent to divesting of jurisdiction on merits, would not operate res judicata in the subsequent proceedings. 49. A reading of the findings of the trial Court as well as the lower appellate Court show that the trial Court came to the conclusion that the suit is not barred by res judicata for the reason that in spite of existence of status quo order in the suit, the Government instituted the proceedings before the Land Grabbing Court, and hence, such a decision would not operate to bar of adjudication of plaintiffs suit or issue on the principles of res judicata. The findings of the trial Court also show that though the principle of res judicata is not applicable, the principle of estoppel applies. It is needless to say that the principle of estoppel would not apply against the Court and applies against party. The Court is not bound by the principle of estoppel, and at the most, the party is bound by such principle. In fact, such findings were rendered without any issue being taken up and without there being notice of such a plea to the plaintiffs therein. 50. The lower appellate Court framed the following point for consideration touching the principle of res judicata. “5. Whether the plaintiffs in O.S.No.74/78 are bound by the decree of the Land Grabbing Court?” 51. In fact, such findings were rendered without any issue being taken up and without there being notice of such a plea to the plaintiffs therein. 50. The lower appellate Court framed the following point for consideration touching the principle of res judicata. “5. Whether the plaintiffs in O.S.No.74/78 are bound by the decree of the Land Grabbing Court?” 51. The point framed does not indicate whether the principle of res judicata was pressed into service. A vague point was framed. While answering the said point, the lower appellate Court found that the judgment of the Land Grabbing Court under Ex.B-46 operates res judicata. In the said backdrop, this substantial question of law was raised in the present Second Appeal. 52. For the reasons adverting hereinbefore, this Court finds that the principle of res judicata is inapplicable so as to bar the subsequent suit or issue. The first appellate Court, without reference to established principle of law, casually held that the suit is barred by res judicata. The findings of both the Courts below in this regard suffer from perversity. Accordingly, this substantial question of law is answered in favour of the plaintiffs. Substantial Question of Law No.(iv): 53. The plaintiffs and defendant Nos.3 to 6 trace title to the suit property from Syed Akbar Hussaini. The plaintiffs relied upon Ex.A-14 and defendant Nos.3 to 6 relied upon Ex.B-6 to B-8. The evidence on record demonstrates that after the death of Syed Akbar Hussaini, disputes arose among his legal heirs. One of the wife of Syed Akar Hussaini i.e. Rasool Bee raised a succession dispute after demise of Syed Akbar Hussaini and requested H.E.H. the Nizam to place the properties of Late Syed Akbar Hussaini under the superintendence of Court of Wards. It is not in dispute that by Firman, H.E.H. the Nizam, by exercising sovereign powers under Section 13 of the Court of Wards Act, 1350 Fasli (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act of 1350 Fasli’), placed various properties left by Late Syed Akbar Hussaini, which include movable and immovable properties, under the superintendence of Court of Wards. One of such properties is Patta Raidurg land. 54. The evidence further demonstrates that Late Syed Akbar Hussaini had three sons and three daughters from Rasool Bee. Their eldest son is Syed Hassan Hussaini. They were shown as first party to the proceedings before the Court of Wards. One of such properties is Patta Raidurg land. 54. The evidence further demonstrates that Late Syed Akbar Hussaini had three sons and three daughters from Rasool Bee. Their eldest son is Syed Hassan Hussaini. They were shown as first party to the proceedings before the Court of Wards. Syed Akbar Hussaini also had three sons and four daughters from other wives of him. The names of their sons are: Syed Ahmed Hussaini, Syed Wallullah Hussaini and Syed Mohammed Hussaini and the names of their daughters are: Mehaboob Begum, Fatima Begum, Ghousia Begum and Jillani Begum. 55. The compromise entered in between two rival branches i.e., the Rasool Bee branch and other branch is under Ex.B-6. A perusal of Ex.B-6 shows that the house, and landed properties of Makta Yenkepally were given to Rasool Bee branch. Some properties at Yenkepally village, Makta Karimnagar and Patta Raidurg were allotted to sub-branches of other rival branch. The compromise deed under Exs.B-6 to B-8 shows Makta Karimnagar and house properties were allotted to sub-branch of other rival branch i.e., Ahmed Hussaini, Fatima Begum and Jeelani Begum. Further, lands in Makta Yenkepally and Patta Raidurg were allotted to Syed Ahmed Hussaini, Syed Waliullah Hussaini, Mehaboob Begum and Ghousia Begum. Exs.B-7, B-8 and A-14 would show that Syed Ahmed Hussaini sold out his share of land in favour of Syed Nizamuddin, who is the second son of Syed Waliullah Hussaini. According to the parties, he died issueless. Similarly, Mehaboob Begum sold out her share in favour of Ameenuddin Hussaini, who is the third son of Waliullah Hussaini. Ghousia Begum’s only son i.e. Ali Hyder Hussaini has also sold out his mother’s share in favour of defendant no.6. 56. Defendant Nos.3 to 5 are the children of Syed Ameenuddin Hussaini. As per the said compromise, a reference was made to the effect that the shareholders who agreed to execute conveyance deeds in the matruka property relating Patta Raidurg Village have agreed to execute registered sale deeds. Ex.B3 & 5-Sale Deeds and Ex.B4-Gift Deed are such conveyance deeds. 57. Defendant No.6 claims that he had purchased the share of Mehaboob Begum through her only son Ali Hyder Hussaini. Ex.B3 & 5-Sale Deeds and Ex.B4-Gift Deed are such conveyance deeds. 57. Defendant No.6 claims that he had purchased the share of Mehaboob Begum through her only son Ali Hyder Hussaini. De hors the dispute among the shareholders of other rival branch of Syed Akbar Hussaini, it is not in dispute among the unofficial parties to the suit that the lands in Patta Raidurg, which is subject matter of dispute in the present litigation, were allotted to two sons and two daughters of Syed Akbar Hussaini i.e., Syed Ahmed Hussaini, Syed Waliullah Hussaini, Mehaboob Begum and Ghousia Begum. The decision in this regard is relevant for the purpose of present substantial question of law. 58. The undisputed fact among the plaintiffs and defendant Nos.3 to 6 is that the properties of Syed Akbar Hussaini include Patta Raidurg lands which were kept under the superintendence of Court of Wards on the petition made by Rasool Bee, who is one of the wives of Syed Akbar Hussaini. Ex.A-14 shows that the compromise entered was recognized by the Court of Wards and such properties were ordered to release after 30 days from the date of issuance of Gazette notification. 59. The entire dispute with regard to release of property from the Court of Wards, as set up by the plaintiffs, revolves around Ex.A-14/B-8. Ex.A-14/B-8 clearly shows that in order to cease the superintendence of Court of Wards, Gazette notification is required. From 30 days of such Gazette notification, the property was ordered to be released from the custody of Court of Wards and shall vest with its owners. 60. Admittedly, no Gazette notification was produced in evidence to show that in pursuance of requirement contemplated under Ex.A-14/B-8, Gazette notification was issued terminating the superintendence of Court of Wards. This is the subject matter of dispute between the parties to the suit. 61. The contention of learned counsel for the plaintiffs is that both the Courts below have considered the conduct of the parties, Exs.B-7, B-8, Ex.A14 and B-1, the revenue entries and payment of tax by Syed Wallullah Hussaini and rightly held that such evidence clearly demonstrates the release of property from the Court of Wards and such findings are concurrent findings and no interference is required. 62. 62. The contention of learned counsel for defendant Nos.3 to 5 and legal heirs of defendant No.6 is that there cannot be any assumption and presumption of release of property without production of Gazette notification, as required under the provisions of the Act of 1350 Fasli and such notification is mandatory in order to cease the superintendence of Court of Wards over the property. They further contended that no presumption can be drawn with regard to compliance of such statutory requirement based on conduct of the parties and other collateral evidence to dispense with requirement of Gazette notification. 63. The stand of the Government with regard to custody is not clear. It neither accepts the custody of property with the Court of Wards nor disputes the same, but it simply pleads ignorance of such proceedings. Such silence amounts admission of claim of unofficial parties to the litigation. 64. To answer the above contentions raised by the parties, it is apt to refer to Sections 13, 55, 60 and 64 of the Act of 1350 Fasli: “Section 13: Superintendence of Court on application of owners:- Any owner may apply in writing to the Government to have his property placed under the superintendence of the Court, and the Government may, on such application, if it is of opinion that it is expedient in the public interest and for the benefit of the applicants family to protect his property, and that the said property is of such value that economical management by the Court is practicable, order the Court to assume the superintendence of the property and notify accordingly in the Official Gazette. Section 55: Withdrawal of superintendence of estate taken over under section 13:- If, in respect of any owner who has been made a ward under section 13, the Court is satisfied that his debts and liabilities have been discharged to an extent that he will thereafter be able to manage his estate and administer his affairs, the Court may, with the sanction of the Government, make over the management of the estate to the owner on a day to be notified. The owner shall, on the date when the management is made over, cease to be disqualified. The owner shall, on the date when the management is made over, cease to be disqualified. Section 60: Procedure where succession is disputed:- Where on the death of a ward, the succession of his property or any part thereof is disputed, the Court may retain its superintendence until a claimant has established his title to the same in a Civil Court or a Revenue Court, or institute a suit or proceedings against all the claimants for settlement of their claims. Section 64: Notification for withdrawal of superintendence.:- The fact of withdrawal of superintendence of person or property shall be notified in the Official Gazette.” 65. A reading of Section 13 of the Act of 1350 Fasli, it is clear that if any owner in writing makes an application to the Government in the public interest or for the benefit of the applicant’s family, to protect such property by placing under superintendence of Court of Wards, and if such property is economically viable for management by the Court of Wards, the Government can order the Court of Wards to assume the superintendence of the property by notifying such assumption in official Gazette. Regarding this aspect, there is no dispute between the parties in the present case. 66. Admittedly, one of the successors i.e., Rasool Bee, who is one of the wives of Syed Akbar Hussaini, made an application to sovereign, and on her application, the properties left by Syed Akbar Hussaini were placed under the superintendence of Court of Wards. 67. Section 55 of the Act of 1350 Fasli deals with withdrawal of superintendence of estate which was taken over under Section 13. It enables the Court of Wards with the sanction of Government to make over the management of such estate of ward when it is satisfied that such ward is able to manage and administer his/her own affair from the day to be notified. From such a notified date, the ward/owner ceases to be disqualified to manage such property and can assume management of properties. 68. Section 64 of the Act of 1350 Fasli mandates issuance of notification for withdrawal of superintendence of Court of Wards. Such a notification of withdrawal shall be notified in the official Gazette. It is the statutory requirement to notify the withdrawal of superintendence of property which was assumed by the Court of Wards and publication of same in Gazette. 69. Section 64 of the Act of 1350 Fasli mandates issuance of notification for withdrawal of superintendence of Court of Wards. Such a notification of withdrawal shall be notified in the official Gazette. It is the statutory requirement to notify the withdrawal of superintendence of property which was assumed by the Court of Wards and publication of same in Gazette. 69. Ex.A-14 demonstrates issuance of notification. The only requirement is notifying the same in the official Gazette. From the 31st day of such notified date, the owner/ward ceased to be disqualified. He can then assume the management and administer such property on account of cessation of superintendence of Court of Wards. 70. The findings of both the Courts below with regard to presumption of release of property without the production of Gazette notification were based on the evidence of D.Ws.2 to 5, who in their evidence, accepted that they sold away many of the properties. The Courts below also took notice of compromise under Exs.B-6 to B-8. 71. The other evidence considered is D.W.2, who in his evidence admitted that Syed Wallullah Hussaini paid revenue tax in respect of the suit property and was maintaining the possession over the suit property. The Courts below also took notice that by the date of suit, the minor children of Syed Shah Akbar Hussaini had attained majority and they could not have kept silent for all these years, if the properties were not released. The other part of the evidence is the succession certificate under Ex.B-1. The above evidence has been taken as foundation to presume that there must have been notification in the Official Gazette. 72. The question now to be considered is whether the requirement of statute can be presumed to be done by taking into consideration the external evidence in the absence of production of Gazette notification releasing the suit property from the custody of Court of Wards. 73. In this regard, it is apt to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in Uttar Pradesh Power Transmission Corporation Ltd. v. CG Power and Industrial Solutions Limited, MANU/SC/0349/2021 wherein it has been held as follows: “71. Even otherwise, the Cess Act and/or statutory Rules framed there under prescribe the mode and manner of recovery of outstanding cess under the Cess Act. Even otherwise, the Cess Act and/or statutory Rules framed there under prescribe the mode and manner of recovery of outstanding cess under the Cess Act. It is well settled that when statute requires a thing to be done in a particular manner, it is to be done in that manner alone. UPPTCL could not have taken recourse to the methods adopted by it. The impugned communications have rightly been set aside.” 74. It is also apt to refer to another judgment of the Apex Court in Shiv Kumar Chadha Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, MANU/SC/0522/1993 wherein it has been held as follows: “34. The imperative nature of the proviso has to be judged in the context of Rule 3 of Order 39 of the Code. Before the Proviso aforesaid was introduced, Rule 3 said "the Court shall in all cases, except where it appears that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay, before granting an injunction, direct notice of the application for the same to be given to the opposite party". The proviso was introduced to provide a condition, where Court proposes to grant an injunction without giving notice of the application to the opposite party, being of the opinion that the object of granting injunction itself shall be defeated by delay. The condition so introduced is that the Court "shall record the reasons" why an ex parte order of injunction was being passed in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. In this background, the requirement for recording the reasons for grant of ex parte injunction, cannot be held to be a mere formality. This requirement is consistent with the principle, that a party to a suit, who is being restrained from exercising a right which such party claims to exercise either under a statute or under the common law, must be informed why instead of following the requirement of Rule 3, the procedure prescribed under the proviso has been followed. The party who invokes the jurisdiction of the Court for grant of an order of restraint against a party, without affording an opportunity to him of being heard, must satisfy the Court about the gravity of the situation and Court has to consider briefly these factors in the ex parts order. The party who invokes the jurisdiction of the Court for grant of an order of restraint against a party, without affording an opportunity to him of being heard, must satisfy the Court about the gravity of the situation and Court has to consider briefly these factors in the ex parts order. We are quite conscious of the fact that there are other statutes which contain similar provisions requiring the Court or the authority concerned to record reasons before exercising power vested in them. In respect of some of such provisions it has been held that they are required to be complied with but noncompliance there of will not vitiate the order so passed. But same cannot be said in respect of the proviso to Rule 3 of Order 39. The Parliament has prescribed a particular procedure for passing of an order of injunction without notice to the other side, under exceptional circumstances. Such ex parte orders have far reaching effect, as such a conditions has been imposed that Court must record reasons before passing such order. If it is held that the compliance of the proviso aforesaid is optional and not obligatory, then the introduction of the proviso by the Parliament shall be a futile exercise and that part of Rule 3 will be a surplusage for all practical purpose. Proviso to Rule 3 of Order 39 of the Code, attracts the principle, that if a statute requires a thing to be done in a particular manner, it should be done in that manner or not all. This principle was approved and accepted in well-known cases of Taylor v. Taylor. (1875) 1 Ch. D. 426, Nazir Ahmed v. Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253 . This Court has also expressed the same view in respect of procedural requirement of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act in the case of Ramachandra Keshav Adke v. Govind Joti Chavare, AIR 1975 SC 915 .” 75. In the latest case, the Apex Court in State of Andhra Pradesh vs. A.P. State Wakf Board, MANU/SC/0155/2022, held as follows: “149. The argument in support of the Errata notification dated 13.03.2006 is that it is traceable to the powers conferred on the Wakf Board under Section 5 of the 1995 Act. The exercise of the publication of notification is the power conferred on the Wakf Board. The argument in support of the Errata notification dated 13.03.2006 is that it is traceable to the powers conferred on the Wakf Board under Section 5 of the 1995 Act. The exercise of the publication of notification is the power conferred on the Wakf Board. Therefore, the fact that second survey report was not submitted to the State Government was inconsequential as it was only a ministerial action. Once the Board had the power to publish notification after perusing the various documents, the same could not be said to be illegal only for the reason that the report was not submitted to the State Government as contemplated by Subsection (1) of Section 5 of the 1995 Act. The argument raised by Mr. Ahmadi that the notification is in terms of Section 5 of 1995 Act is not tenable. It is an admitted case that the second survey report was not submitted to the State Government and such report has not even been forwarded by the Government to the Wakf Board. The Wakf Board may have a right to requisition of any document in terms of power conferred Under Section 105 of the 1995 Act, but if a procedure is prescribed for issuance of a notification, it could be issued only in the manner prescribed and not in any other manner. Reference be made to judgment of this Court reported as Babu Verghese v. Bar Council of Kerala: (1999) 3 SCC 422 wherein this Court held as under: 31. It is the basic principle of law long settled that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any Statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. The origin of this Rule is traceable to the decision in Taylor v. Taylor, (1875) 1 Ch D 426 which was followed by Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor, MANU/PR/0085/1936 : 63 Ind. App 372 who stated as under: Where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all. 32. This Rule has since been approved by this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, 1954 SCR 1098 and again in Deep Chand v. State of Rajasthan, (1962) 1 SCR 662 . 32. This Rule has since been approved by this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, 1954 SCR 1098 and again in Deep Chand v. State of Rajasthan, (1962) 1 SCR 662 . These cases were considered by a Three Judge Bench of this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh AIR 1964 Supreme Court 358 and the Rule laid down in Nazir Ahmad's case (supra) was again upheld. The Rule has since been applied to the exercise of jurisdiction by Courts and has also been recognised as a salutary principle of administrative law. 150. A Constitution Bench in a judgment reported as CIT v. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala (2002) 1 SCC 633 reiterated that when a statute vests certain power in an authority to be exercised in a particular manner, then the said authority has to exercise the same only in the manner prescribed by the statute itself. It was held as under: 27. Then it is to be seen that the Act requires the Board to exercise the power Under Section 119 in a particular manner i.e. by way of issuance of orders, instructions and directions. These orders, instructions and directions are meant to be issued to other income-tax authorities for proper administration of the Act, the Commission while exercising its quasi-judicial power of arriving at a settlement Under Section 245D cannot have the administrative power of issuing directions to other income-tax authorities. It is normal Rule of construction that when a statute vests certain power in an authority to be exercised in a particular manner then the said authority has to exercise it only in the manner provided in the statute itself. If that be so since the Commission cannot exercise the power of relaxation found in Section 119(2)(a) in the manner provided therein it cannot invoke that power Under Section 119(2)(a) to exercise the same in its judicial proceedings by following a procedure contrary to that provided in Sub-section (2) of Section 119.” 76. A reading of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the above decisions, it is crystal clear that the basic principle of law is that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any Statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. A reading of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the above decisions, it is crystal clear that the basic principle of law is that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any Statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. This rule was originated and laid down in case of Taylor v. Taylor, (1875) 1 Ch.D 426 and the same was accepted by the Privy Council in case of Nazir Ahmed v. Emperor, MANU/PR/0085/1936. This means, when the statute requires publication of notification in the official Gazette with regard to withdrawal of superintendence of Court of Wards, the manner of withdrawal shall be in tune with the statutory requirement and not otherwise. Till such statutory requirement is completed, there cannot be any assumption and presumption of such compliance without production of Gazette Notification. 77. The contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs is that presumption can be drawn as per illustration (e) of Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 with regard to publication of notification in official Gazette withdrawing the superintendence of Court of Wards by considering surrounding circumstances, additional evidence and conduct of parties even without production of evidence of publication of such notification in the official Gazette. 78. The learned counsel representing defendant Nos.3 to 5 and legal heirs of defendant No.6 contended that the presumption cannot be applied to the requirement of statute and compliance of the statute must be production of relevant evidence showing the compliance of requirement and such compliance cannot be deemed or presumed even by invoking illustration (e) of Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act. 79. It is necessary to refer to illustration (e) of Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which reads as under: “Section 114. Court may presume existence of certain facts:- The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. Illustrations: The Court may presume- (a) to (d) … (e) that judicial and official acts have been regularly performed. (f) to (i) …. ” 80. Illustrations: The Court may presume- (a) to (d) … (e) that judicial and official acts have been regularly performed. (f) to (i) …. ” 80. To resolve the above contentions and issues between the parties, it is apt to refer to the decision of Kerala High Court in case of Venkataramana Udupa v. Kannan Chettiar, MANU/KE/005/1963. In the said case, the High Court of Kerala had extensively dealt with when the presumption under Section 114 (e) of the Indian Evidence Act can be invoked by referring to various judgments of various High Courts. Ultimately, it was held that illustration (e) of Section 114 authorises the presumption that a particular judicial or official act, which has been performed, has been performed regularly. But it does not authorise the presumption without any evidence that the act has been performed or that it is a valid one. The emphasis given in the illustration is that the word ‘regularly’ and not on the word ‘performed’. Thus, presumption is only with regard to regularly and not to performance. 81. In Murguappa Chettiar v. Thirumalai Nadar, AIR 1948 Mad 191, it has been held that when the dispute is whether a particular judicial or official act was performed or not, there is nothing in law which enables the Court to presume that such act was as a matter of fact performed. 82. In the present case, admittedly, there is a dispute with regard to publication of withdrawal of superintendence in the Gazette as required under Section 64 of the Act of 1350 Fasli. Admittedly, the plaintiffs have not produced any such Gazette notification. When the dispute is there and when the statute requires notification to be published in the Gazette to cease the superintendence over the property which is in the custody of Court of Wards, such gazette notification shall be produced and no resort can be made to illustration (e) of Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act. I.A.Nos.15 & 18 of 2021 and 12, 13 & 14 of 2022: 83. I.A.Nos.18 of 2021 and 12 of 2022 are filed by the Government for production of additional evidence. I.A.Nos.15 & 18 of 2021 and 12, 13 & 14 of 2022: 83. I.A.Nos.18 of 2021 and 12 of 2022 are filed by the Government for production of additional evidence. Vide I.A.No.18 of 2021, the documents sought to be produced are copy of order in C.A.No.33 of 2017 and LPA No.1 of 2018; order in SLP (C) No.24646-24647 of 2018; and order in R.P (C) No.3973/2018 in SLP (C) No.24646-24647 of 2018, which are collateral and unconnected proceedings to the present appeal. In I.A.No.12 of 2022, the documents sought to be produced are material papers filed by third parties to the suit proceeding in the above Contempt Appeal and Letter Patent Appeal which are different and unconnected proceedings to the present suit proceedings. 84. I.A.No.15 of 2021 is filed by legal heirs of deceased defendant No.6. By way of present application, the petitioners herein want to produce the communications relating to proceedings before the Courts of Wards, Gazette notification, Muntakab, counter-affidavit filed by Chief Commissioner of Land Authority in W.P.No.18983 of 2018, injunction order, counter in O.S.No.477 of 2017 filed by purchasers of the property pending the suit, and decree in O.S.No.703 of 2017. 85. I.A.Nos. 13 and 14 of 2022 are filed by appellant No.18, who is purchaser of part of the suit property pending suit from the original plaintiffs. Vide these applications, appellant No.18 wants to bring additional documents on record like report on the administration of Court of Wards, the certified copy of Gazette Notification No.35. 86. Needless to say that the parties to the proceedings have to produce their evidence during the course of trial of the suit. The trial Court will adjudicate issues basing on the evidence adduced by the parties relating to the case set up by them. The appeal is continuation of the suit proceedings. The appellate Court normally does not allow any new evidence in order to enable the party to rise a new point in the appeal. Similarly, the party on whom the burden to place the evidence lies was given fullest opportunity to lead such evidence before the trial Court but they could not do and they are not entitled to lead evidence in the appeal. Rule 27 of C.P.C is exception to such principle. Similarly, the party on whom the burden to place the evidence lies was given fullest opportunity to lead such evidence before the trial Court but they could not do and they are not entitled to lead evidence in the appeal. Rule 27 of C.P.C is exception to such principle. The counsel for appellant No.18 has relied upon various decisions of the Apex court with regard to when such powers can be exercised and at what stage such powers can be exercised, but it is enough to refer decision of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India vs. Ibrahim Uddin, MANU/SC/0561/2012, instead of referring to all such decisions and relevant portion reads as under: “Order XLI Rule 27 Code of Civil Procedure: 25. The general principle is that the Appellate Court should not travel outside the record of the lower court and cannot take any evidence in appeal. However, as an exception, Order XLI Rule 27 Code of Civil Procedure enables the Appellate Court to take additional evidence in exceptional circumstances. The Appellate Court may permit additional evidence only and only if the conditions laid down in this rule are found to exist. The parties are not entitled, as of right, to the admission of such evidence. Thus, provision does not apply, when on the basis of evidence on record, the Appellate Court can pronounce a satisfactory judgment. The matter is entirely within the discretion of the court and is to be used sparingly. Such a discretion is only a judicial discretion circumscribed by the limitation specified in the rule itself. (Vide: K. Venkataramiah v. A. Seetharama Reddy and Ors. AIR 1963 SC 1526 ; The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Lala Pancham and Ors AIR 1965 SC 1008 ; Soonda Ram and Anr. v. Rameshwaralal and Anr. AIR 1975 SC 479 ; and Syed Abdul Khader v. Rami Reddy and Ors. AIR 1979 SC 553 ). 26. The Appellate Court should not, ordinarily allow new evidence to be adduced in order to enable a party to raise a new point in appeal. v. Rameshwaralal and Anr. AIR 1975 SC 479 ; and Syed Abdul Khader v. Rami Reddy and Ors. AIR 1979 SC 553 ). 26. The Appellate Court should not, ordinarily allow new evidence to be adduced in order to enable a party to raise a new point in appeal. Similarly, where a party on whom the onus of proving a certain point lies fails to discharge the onus, he is not entitled to a fresh opportunity to produce evidence, as the Court can, in such a case, pronounce judgment against him and does not require any additional evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment. (Vide: Haji Mohammed Ishaq Wd. S.K. Mohammed and Ors. v. Mohamed Iqbal and Mohamed Ali and Company ( AIR 1978 SC 798 ). 27. Under Order XLI, Rule 27 Code of Civil Procedure, the appellate Court has the power to allow a document to be produced and a witness to be examined. But the requirement of the said Court must be limited to those cases where it found it necessary to obtain such evidence for enabling it to pronounce judgment. This provision does not entitle the appellate Court to let in fresh evidence at the appellate stage where even without such evidence it can pronounce judgment in a case. It does not entitle the appellate Court to let in fresh evidence only for the purpose of pronouncing judgment in a particular way. In other words, it is only for removing a lacuna in the evidence that the appellate Court is empowered to admit additional evidence. (Vide: Lala Pancham and Ors. (supra)). 28. It is not the business of the Appellate Court to supplement the evidence adduced by one party or the other in the lower Court. Hence, in the absence of satisfactory reasons for the non-production of the evidence in the trial court, additional evidence should not be admitted in appeal as a party guilty of remissness in the lower court is not entitled to the indulgence of being allowed to give further evidence under this rule. So a party who had ample opportunity to produce certain evidence in the lower court but failed to do so or elected not to do so, cannot have it admitted in appeal. (Vide: State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava AIR 1957 SC 912 ; and S. Rajagopal v. C.M. Armugam and Ors AIR 1969 SC 101 ). 29. So a party who had ample opportunity to produce certain evidence in the lower court but failed to do so or elected not to do so, cannot have it admitted in appeal. (Vide: State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava AIR 1957 SC 912 ; and S. Rajagopal v. C.M. Armugam and Ors AIR 1969 SC 101 ). 29. The inadvertence of the party or his inability to understand the legal issues involved or the wrong advice of a pleader or the negligence of a pleader or that the party did not realise the importance of a document does not constitute a "substantial cause" within the meaning of this rule. The mere fact that certain evidence is important, is not in itself a sufficient ground for admitting that evidence in appeal. 30. The words "for any other substantial cause" must be read with the word "requires" in the beginning of sentence, so that it is only where, for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court requires additional evidence that this rule will apply, e.g., when evidence has been taken by the lower Court so imperfectly that the Appellate Court cannot pass a satisfactory judgment. Stage of Consideration: 38. An application under Order XLI Rule 27 Code of Civil Procedure is to be considered at the time of hearing of appeal on merits so as to find whether the documents and/or the evidence sought to be adduced have any relevance/bearing on the issues involved. The admissibility of additional evidence does not depend upon the relevancy to the issue on hand, or on the fact, whether the applicant had an opportunity for adducing such evidence at an earlier stage or not, but it depends upon whether or not the Appellate Court requires the evidence sought to be adduced to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. The true test, therefore is, whether the Appellate Court is able to pronounce judgment on the materials before it without taking into consideration the additional evidence sought to be adduced. Such occasion would arise only if on examining the evidence as it stands the court comes to the conclusion that some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent to the Court. (Vide: Arjan Singh v. Kartar Singh and Ors. AIR 1951 SC 193 ; and Natha Singh and Ors. v. The Financial Commissioner, Taxation, Punjab and Ors. AIR 1976 SC 1053 ). 39. (Vide: Arjan Singh v. Kartar Singh and Ors. AIR 1951 SC 193 ; and Natha Singh and Ors. v. The Financial Commissioner, Taxation, Punjab and Ors. AIR 1976 SC 1053 ). 39. In Parsotim Thakur and Ors. v. Lal Mohar Thakur and Ors.: AIR 1931 PC 143 , it was held: The provisions of Section 107 as elucidated by Order 41, R. 27 are clearly not intended to allow a litigant who has been unsuccessful in the lower Court to patch up the weak parts of his case and fill up omissions in the Court of appeal. Under Rule 27, Cl. (1) (b) it is only where the appellate Court "requires" it (i.e. finds it needful). ...The legitimate occasion for the exercise of this discretion is not whenever before the appeal is heard a party applies to adduce fresh evidence, but "when on examining the evidence as it stands, some inherent lacuna or defect becomes apparent", it may well be that the defect may be pointed out by a party, or that a party may move the Court to apply the defect, but the requirement must be the requirement of the court upon its appreciation of evidence as it stands. Wherever the Court adopts this procedure it is bound by Rule 27(2) to record its reasons for so doing, and under R.29 must specify the points to which the evidence is to be confined and record on its proceedings the points so specified. The power so conferred upon the Court by the Code ought to be very sparingly exercised and one requirement at least of any new evidence to be adduced should be that it should have a direct and important bearing on a main issue in the case. (Emphasis added) (See also: Indirajit Pratab Sahi v. Amar Singh AIR 1928 P.C. 128 ) 40. In Arjan Singh v. Kartar Singh and Ors. (supra), this Court held: ... If the additional evidence was allowed to be adduced contrary to the principles governing the reception of such evidence, it would be a case of improper exercise of discretion, and the additional evidence so brought on the record will have to be ignored and the case decided as if it was non-existent... The order allowing the Appellant to call the additional evidence is dated 17.8.1942. The appeal was heard on 24.4.1942. The order allowing the Appellant to call the additional evidence is dated 17.8.1942. The appeal was heard on 24.4.1942. There was thus no examination of the evidence on the record and a decision reached that the evidence as it stood disclosed a lacuna which the court required to be filled up for pronouncing the judgment (Emphasis added) 41. Thus, from the above, it is crystal clear that application for taking additional evidence on record at an appellate stage, even if filed during the pendency of the appeal, is to be heard at the time of final hearing of the appeal at a stage when after appreciating the evidence on record, the court reaches the conclusion that additional evidence was required to be taken on record in order to pronounce the judgment or for any other substantial cause. In case, application for taking additional evidence on record has been considered and allowed prior to the hearing of the appeal, the order being a product of total and complete non-application of mind, as to whether such evidence is required to be taken on record to pronounce the judgment or not, remains inconsequential/in executable and is liable to be ignored.” 87. The additional evidence sought to be adduced is particularly relating to release of property from the Court of Wards and some documents relating to source of title either to the Government or to the original plaintiffs. The original plaintiffs have not produced evidence relating to the Gazette Notification as required under Section 64 of the Act of 1350 Fasli, which requires notification for withdrawal of superintendence in the form of Gazette. 88. The petitioner herein/appellant No.18 has produced report relating to administration of Court of Wards to contend that in the said report, there is no reference of administration of suit property. He has also produced a Gazette Notification claiming that the suit property was Gazetted in pursuance of Court of Wards. Similarly, the legal representatives of defendant No.6 have produced certain communications of Chief Commissioner of Land Administration (CCLA) and the Director of Telangana State Archives Department and also counter affidavit filed by the CCLA in W.P.No.18983 of 2018 and the counter in the suit proceedings which were instituted by the subsequent proceedings from the party to the suit proceedings against the Government including the CCLA. In the said report as well as the counter affidavit, the CCLA took a stand that suit property was still in the custody of Court of Wards. Such documents of Administration and Gazette notification were brought to light at the fag-end of the present second appeal claiming that they obtained certified copies from the Department of State Archives. 89. On the other hand, the Government also produced certain documents relating to issuance of forged certificates by the officials of CCLA, confirming the land as patta land. The stand of rival parties to the application to receive documents is that reports and Gazette Notification were forged stating that they themselves placed such documents in the Archives and obtained certified copies of such documents. 90. The trial Court addressed the issue of release of property on the basis of documents available on record and one of the documents filed by them was that suit property would be released on publication of notification in Gazette. The Gazette now sought to be introduced is a single paper of extract, but entire Gazette Notification is not produced. The said single paper of extract is notification only. A clear reading of such notification produced by appellant No.18 shows that its contents match with the contents of Ex.A-14, which reflects only documents sought to be produced. The full Gazette was not produced and the Gazette produced if tested with the Counter Affidavit of CCLA, who took over the Court of Wards after formation of State of Hyderabad after Nizam Rule, shows that the property is still in the custody of Court of Wards. Such claim creates cloud over truthfulness of documents. The extracts of administration register which is obtained from the State Archives Department produced by the party to claim that the suit property was not shown to be in the administration of Court of Wards. The Government is not supporting that such documents are genuine documents. 91. The documents are sought to be introduced by the purchasers, who purchased the property pending suit proceedings. They did not try to implead themselves and produce such evidence before the trial Court or in first appeal. In the second appeal also they did not take such steps at the earliest. Their vendors were given fullest opportunity to produce evidence with regard to Gazette Notification, but they did not utilize the same. They did not try to implead themselves and produce such evidence before the trial Court or in first appeal. In the second appeal also they did not take such steps at the earliest. Their vendors were given fullest opportunity to produce evidence with regard to Gazette Notification, but they did not utilize the same. Further, there is dispute with regard to genuineness of such documents. The scope of second appeal is very limited. The appellate Court normally would allow the additional documents if the Court is not in a position pronounce the judgment without such documents. When the Court is able to pronounce the judgment without such documents, such claim to produce fresh evidence in the appeal cannot be allowed. Other situation, the appellant court will not allow introduction of new evidence, when the party has given fullest opportunity. In this case, the original plaintiffs were given fullest opportunity to lead evidence and present petitioner who wants to produce new evidence is purchaser pending suit and he cannot claim right to introduce new evidence, when his vendors have no such right to seek on account of fullest opportunity given to them. 92. The words any other substantial cause referred in Order XLI Rule 27 of C.P.C must be preceded by requirements. If the Court is able to pronounce the judgment based on available record, there is no requirement of production of additional evidence. Therefore, such evidence cannot be allowed to receive, which would tantamount to fresh trial in respect of suit instituted in the year 1978. Thus, all these applications filed to receive above documents are liable to be dismissed. 93. I.A.No.1 of 2021 was filed seeking direction to the official respondents to produce various correspondences in respect of the suit property when the property was in the custody of Court of Wards, succession certificate, Muntakab and Hibanamas executed by Syed Ali Hyder Hussaini. On 20.09.2021, though this petition was allowed, no compliance was done and enforcement of such order was not sought. It is not known whether the official respondents to whom the direction was given are in custody of such documents. The custodian of such documents can only produce such documents. Most of such documents are already exhibited. Since the appeal itself is taken up for hearing based on available evidence, this Court is not inclined to go into the aspect of compliance of order dated 20.09.2021. 94. The custodian of such documents can only produce such documents. Most of such documents are already exhibited. Since the appeal itself is taken up for hearing based on available evidence, this Court is not inclined to go into the aspect of compliance of order dated 20.09.2021. 94. The Courts below have committed illegality and error in presuming the publication of notification in the Gazette by wrong interpretation of law and the same is contrary to law laid down by the Apex Court and other High Courts, as referred supra. These findings were casually dealt with by both the Courts below without adverting to the established law on this aspect. Therefore, such findings of the Courts below suffer from perversity and require interference. I hold that the suit property is still under superintendence of court of wards and not released. Accordingly, substantial question of law No.(iv) is decided against plaintiff. Substantial Question of Law Nos.(ii & iii): 95. These two substantial questions of law are inter-related and they are taken together for disposal. The initial case of the plaintiffs is that Jagirdar assigned suit property to Syed Akbar Hussaini. Subsequently, the evidence reflects that Syed Akbar Hussaini was the owner of Patta Raidurg apart from various moveable and immovable properties including the lands in Makta Yenkepally and Makta Karimnagar villages. Later, the evidence let in by contesting parties shows that the land in Patta Raidurg village was kept under the superintendence of Court of Wards along with other moveable and immovable properties of late Syed Shah Akbar Hussaini. This was done by way of Firman issued by H.E.H. the Nizam. Exs.B-6 to B-8, Ex.A-14 and the list of properties under Ex.B-9 are obtained from the Court of Wards and they show that the Patta Raidurg land was included under the superintendence of Court of Wards. These properties were put under the custody of the Court of Wards on the application made by Rasool Bee, one of the wives of late Syed Shah Akbar Hussaini. Exs.B-6 to B-8 and Ex.A-14 clearly demonstrate that the properties were under the superintendence of Court of Wards including the Patta Raidurg land. 96. The Government is not seriously challenging the claim of the plaintiffs and defendant Nos.3 to 6 with regard to custody of Patta Raidurg land with Court of Wards. The Government claims ignorance of the same. Exs.B-6 to B-8 and Ex.A-14 clearly demonstrate that the properties were under the superintendence of Court of Wards including the Patta Raidurg land. 96. The Government is not seriously challenging the claim of the plaintiffs and defendant Nos.3 to 6 with regard to custody of Patta Raidurg land with Court of Wards. The Government claims ignorance of the same. The Government is neither disputed nor admitted the said claim. No evidence has been let in by the Government in this regard, though the plaintiffs and unofficial defendants have let in ample evidence in the form of Ex.B6 to B-8 and Ex.A-14. Admittedly, the entire documents produced from the Court of Wards do not indicate any survey number and extent of land except reference of Patta Raidurg land. 97. Now, the question is whether the land situated at Patta Raidurg, as referred in the Court of Wards proceedings, is the suit property? 98. The Government has been asserting that the suit property is Khariz Khata land. To prove the same, it has mainly relied upon Ex.B-62 - Sethwar for the year 1953, Ex.B-60 - Khasra Pahani for the year 1954-55 and Exs.B-63 and 64 - pahanis for the years 1952-53 and 1953-54. 99. As seen from Exs.B-62, which is Sethwar of 1953, the land is classified as ‘poramboke’. It means, the land is unoccupied, unassessed and uncultivable which vested with government. Curiously, in Ex.B-60 – Khasra Pahani for the year 1954-55, the suit property is classified as ‘Kharij Khata’. In the pahanis for the years 1958-59 to 1963-64 under Exs.B-65 to 1970, the name of Wallullah Hussaini was recorded as pattedar. As per Faisal Patti for the year 1966 under Ex.B-61, in Jamabandi the name of Wallullah Hussaini was deleted and the suit property was reclassified as ‘Kharij Khata’, based on the order of Board of Revenue dated 05.05.1957. Both the Courts below have not adverted to the source of title set up by the plaintiffs as well as the Government. The evidence of D.Ws.1 and 2 clearly shows that Kharij Khata pre-supposes existence of private ownership. As per the revenue interpretation, ‘Kharij Khata’ is the land which is assessed, cultivated and took over from registered holder by the Government for various reasons, including acquisition of ownership under Land Acquisition Act, resumption of private land for arrears of land revenue and relinquishment of land by recorded pattedar. 100. As per the revenue interpretation, ‘Kharij Khata’ is the land which is assessed, cultivated and took over from registered holder by the Government for various reasons, including acquisition of ownership under Land Acquisition Act, resumption of private land for arrears of land revenue and relinquishment of land by recorded pattedar. 100. In this regard, it is apt to refer to Rules 16 to 24 of the Telangana Area Land Revenue Rules, 1951 which were framed by exercising power under Section 172 of the Telangana Area Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fasli and they read as under: “16. Relinquishment of land:- A registered holder may relinquish his land by submitting an unconditional razinama in writing to the Tahsildar of Naib Tahsildar before the end of April in any year. Such razinama need not be stamped but shall be in Form C and the declaration therein shall be attested by two respectable witnesses. The Patwari shall, if requested to do so by the registered holder, write the razinama himself without charging any fees for the same. If the razinama is prepared by the Patwari, he shall affix his signature beneath the words written on the lower left hand corner of such razinama. The Tahsildar or Naib Tahsildar, as the case may be, who receives such razinama shall certify it in his own hand according to the certificate prescribed in Form C. He shall exercise due care in ascertaining the identity of the person who has signed the same, notwithstanding that such notice has been duly endorsed as hereinbefore required. The relinquishment shall have effect from the close of the current year. 17. Procedure when razinama is sanctioned:- After the razinama has been certified, the certifying officer shall give a written intimation to the applicant that his razinama has been sanctioned and shall also inform the village officers of the same. The village officers shall make an entry regarding the relinquishment in the village register. 18. Certification of razinama:-A registered holder may get his razinama certified by appearing before any revenue officer not lower in rank than a Naib Tahsildar. 19. Certification of razinama on commission:- Where a registered holder cannot appear in person and present his razinama for certification on account of the old age, sickness, or other infirmity or because the registered holder is a purdha nashin woman or for any other reasonable ground the razinama may be certified on commission. 20. 19. Certification of razinama on commission:- Where a registered holder cannot appear in person and present his razinama for certification on account of the old age, sickness, or other infirmity or because the registered holder is a purdha nashin woman or for any other reasonable ground the razinama may be certified on commission. 20. Certification of razinama by Jail Superintendent:- If a registered holder is in prison the certificate of the Jail Superintendent shall be deemed to be sufficient for the purposes of sanctioning the relinquishment. 21. Razinama by minor:- In the case of razinama by a minor registered holder, the attestation of his guardian shall be deemed sufficient. 22. Razinama to be refused for arrears:- A razinama shall not be accepted if there are any arrears due on the land which is proposed to be relinquished. 23. Procedure when razinama is withdrawn:- A registered holder whose razinama has been certified may withdraw the same at any time before the order for excluding his name from the land records has been passed in Jamabandi, by submitting an application in writing to the Tahsildar withdrawing his razinama. On receipt of such application, the Tahsildar shall not take any further action on the razinama and shall pass orders that the patta of the land shall continue in the name of the applicant. 24. List of lands relinquished:- The Village Officers shall affix to the Chavidi of the village, a list of all lands relinquished in the month of April for information of persons who may apply for the grant of the relinquished lands. The list shall be kept affixed to the Chavidi till the 15 of May when a copy thereof shall be sent to the Tahsildar with a certificate of five respectable persons to the effect that the list was kept affixed to the Chavidi.” 101. Rules 16 to 24 of the Land Revenue Rules, 1951 prescribe mode of relinquishment of patta lands by the recorded pattedar. The rules also provide a right to withdraw such relinquishment before the order for executing his name deleted from the land records has been passed in Jamabandi. Such relinquished lands shall be affixed in the Chavidi of the village. Such lands are recorded as “Kharij Khata”. The Government can also resume the patta lands for default in payment of arrears of land. Such relinquished lands shall be affixed in the Chavidi of the village. Such lands are recorded as “Kharij Khata”. The Government can also resume the patta lands for default in payment of arrears of land. In those circumstances, the assessed, occupied and cultivable lands are referred to as ‘Kharij Khata’. 102. The Government has come up with two different versions. First version is that as per Sethwar of 1953, the suit property is classified as ‘Poramboke’ land and second version is that as per Khasra Pahanis and other pahanis, the suit property is classified as ‘Kharij Khata’. Both claims are mutually exclusive and they cannot fit in one another. These conflicting stands require a close and deeper appreciation of records produced by both the parties. 103. It is a fact that the plaintiffs could able to produce the Faisal Patti under Ex.A-34 which is of 1955. For the first time, a correlation is found with Patta Raidurg with Sy.No.46 of Raidurg Village. All the revenue receipts produced are subsequent to recording the name of Waliullah Hussaini in the pahani for the year 1955-56 onwards. Till then, no evidence is on record correlating Patta Raidurg with Sy.No.46 of Raidurg Village. The Government is not disclosing clearly whether any other survey number is given to Patta Raidurg other than Sy.No.46 of Raidurg Village except claiming that suit land is Kharij Khata. 104. The Government is the custodian of old records pertaining to prior to formation of Hyderabad State. It is duty bound to produce all such evidence in its possession even though there is no burden of proof on it. If such evidence is not produced, an adverse inference can be drawn against the Government. Ex.A-34, which is the first document found on record, correlate Patta Raidurg with Sy.No.46 of Raidurg Village. There were much correspondence among the offices of Tahsildar, Collector and Managing Committee of Paigah. In such correspondences, they only refer Patta Raidurg. Thus, the entries recorded in Ex.A-34 require close scrutiny since it is the only document at the earliest to correlate Patta Raidurg and Sy.No.46 of Raidurg Village. 105. A close scrutiny of Jamabandi done under Faisal Patti (Ex.A-34), it shows that the basis for mutation is the order dated 15.10.1954 of the Collector, Hyderabad in File No.91, whereby patta was granted to Waliullah Hussaini. 105. A close scrutiny of Jamabandi done under Faisal Patti (Ex.A-34), it shows that the basis for mutation is the order dated 15.10.1954 of the Collector, Hyderabad in File No.91, whereby patta was granted to Waliullah Hussaini. Ex.A-16 is also an important letter which would helpful in correlating Patta Raidurg with Sy.No.46 of Raidurg Village, which is the suit survey number. Ex.A-16 is the letter from Tahsildar, Shamshabad, dated 19.09.1939, in File No.14/11/1 1347 Fasli (1937) addressed to Patwari to effect mutation. Such letter was addressed basing on the communication received from Secretariat of Collector of Paigah in letter No.14304 dated 19th Aban 1348 Fasli (1938) for mutation of patta in the name of Waliullah Hussaini in Jamabandi relating to Patta Raidurg. These two letters demonstrate that the revenue authorities know the fact that Patta Raidurg is Sy.No.46 of Raidurg Village only and that is why they have treated the communications received with reference to Patta Raidurg as the communications relating to Sy.No.46 of Raidurg Village. 106. The Government has not explained when the initial survey was done and what was the survey number assigned for Patta Raidurg land of Syed Akbari Hussaini. Though mutations do not confer any right to Waliullah Hussaini, one aspect is clear from such mutations that Patta Raidurg claims were identified with reference to Sy.No.46 of Raidurg Village. If the Government’s claim of “Kharij Khata” is unaccepted, necessarily this Court has to hold that the lands in Sy.No.46 of Raidurg Village must be Rayudurg patta lands of Syed Shah Akbar Hussaini since the Patta Raidurg land is under the superintendence of Court of Wards. 107. The entire claim set up by the Government was accepted by both the Courts below basing on Ex.B-72 – order of Board of Revenue. Admittedly, the Government has not produced the details of original order which is impugned in the final order passed by the Board of Revenue under Ex.B-72. 108. A reading of the final order under Ex.B-72 shows that patta was confirmed in favour of Waliullah Hussaini by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Hyderabad West, while deciding the appeal filed by Bansilal of Laxmi Bagh Temple. The said order was passed on 04.07.1953. The said order shows that long standing possession of Waliullah Hussaini made the Revenue Divisional Officer to conclude Waliullah Hussaini as deemed pattedar of Sy.No.46 of Raidurg Village. The said order was passed on 04.07.1953. The said order shows that long standing possession of Waliullah Hussaini made the Revenue Divisional Officer to conclude Waliullah Hussaini as deemed pattedar of Sy.No.46 of Raidurg Village. The RDO has also held that it was not an inam land which has attained finality. This means the suit land is either patta land as claimed by plaintiffs or government land as claimed by government. 109. The order under Ex.B-72 also shows that the Revenue Divisional Officer, by order dated 04.08.1954 cancelled his own orders holding that the land is “Kharij Khata”. This order has also not been produced by the Government. It is not explained by the Government how the same authority could revoke its previous order without any power of review. Unfortunately, this was not at all considered by the Courts below in relying on Ex.B-72 to uphold the title of the Government. The order of the Revenue Divisional Officer, dated 04.08.1954, was challenged before the Additional Collector, who initially set aside the order of Revenue Divisional Officer and confirmed the previous order of Revenue Divisional Officer who declared title in favour of Waliullah Hussaini. Ex.B-72 order also reflects that ayacutdars of land who were irrigating their lands by drawing water from tank located in Sy.No.46 appears to have filed an appeal to the Board of Revenue against the order of Additional Collector. The Board of Revenue, by order dated 05.05.1957, set aside the order of Additional Collector and remanded the matter for fresh enquiry by giving notice to all the parties. The Joint Collector, on remand, passed order dated 12.03.1968 in File No.F3/2486/56 confirming order of Revenue Divisional Officer dated 04.08.1954 by relying upon the entries in pahanis for the years 1950-51 and 1953-54 to 1955-56 and declared the suit land as “Kharij Khata”. This order was again challenged by Waliullah Hussaini before the Board of Revenue which confirmed the order of Joint Collector holding that the land is “Kharij Khata”. 110. It is needless to observe that the Government cannot itself decide its title to the disputed property in its favour. It is the civil Court which alone is competent to decide title to the property when there is a bona fide dispute touching the title to the property. 110. It is needless to observe that the Government cannot itself decide its title to the disputed property in its favour. It is the civil Court which alone is competent to decide title to the property when there is a bona fide dispute touching the title to the property. It is also needless to observe that entries in the revenue records do not confer any title, but they are relavent only for fiscal purpose and no ownership is confirmed on the basis thereon. This preposition was held by the Apex Court in various judgments. 111. The Allahabad High Court in Kalawati v. The Board of Revenue, MANU/UP/0982/2022 held as under: “20. The settled legal position that an entry in revenue records does not confer title on a person whose name appears in record-of-rights and that such entries are only for "fiscal purpose" and no ownership is conferred on the basis thereof and further that the question of title of a property can only be decided by a competent civil court has again been restated in a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Jitendra Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others wherein after referring to the previous authorities on the point in Suraj Bhan Vs. Financial Commissioner, Suman Verma Vs. Union of India, Faqruddin Vs. Tajuddin, Rajinder Singh Vs. State of J & K, Municipal Corporation, Aurangabad Vs. State of Maharashtra, T Ravi Vs. B. Chinna Narasimha, Bhimabai Mahadeo Kambekar Vs. Arthur Import & Export Co. Prahlad Pradhar Vs. Sonu Kumhar and Ajit Kaur Vs. Darshan Singh, it was observed thus :- 8. In the case of Suraj Bhan v. Financial Commissioner, (2007) 6 SCC 186 , it is observed and held by this Court that an entry in revenue records does not confer title on a person whose name appears in record-of-rights. Entries in the revenue records or jamabandi have only "fiscal purpose", i.e., payment of land revenue, and no ownership is conferred on the basis of such entries. It is further observed that so far as the title of the property is concerned, it can only be decided by a competent civil court. Entries in the revenue records or jamabandi have only "fiscal purpose", i.e., payment of land revenue, and no ownership is conferred on the basis of such entries. It is further observed that so far as the title of the property is concerned, it can only be decided by a competent civil court. Similar view has been expressed in the cases of Suman Verma v. Union of India, (2004) 12 SCC 58 ; Faqruddin v. Tajuddin, (2008) 8 SCC 12 ; Rajinder Singh v. State of J&K, (2008) 9 SCC 368 ; Municipal Corporation, Aurangabad v. State of Maharashtra, (2015) 16 SCC 689 ; T. Ravi v. B. Chinna Narasimha, (2017) 7 SCC 342 ; Bhimabai Mahadeo Kambekar v. Arthur Import & Export Co., (2019) 3 SCC 191 ; Prahlad Pradhan v. Sonu Kumhar, (2019) 10 SCC 259 ; and Ajit Kaur v. Darshan Singh, (2019) 13 SCC 70 .” 112. In Suraj Bhan v. Financial Commissioner, (2007) 6 SCC 186 , the Apex Court held that the title of the property can be decided only by the competent civil Court, but not by the Government. The mutation proceedings are summary in nature and issued on the basis of some possession and they will not confer/decide the title. Therefore, the order passed in such proceedings does not come in the way of person getting his rights adjudicated in a regular suit. The Courts below, instead of deciding the title of the plaintiffs over the suit property, denied the same based on Ex.B-72 document only. A close reading of Ex.B-72 shows that the proceedings thereunder emanated out of an order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer, while exercising jurisdiction, cancelled the patta previously granted by the same authority in favour of Wallullah Hussaini. 113. It is to be noted that under the provisions of Telangana Revenue Act, the same authority cannot revoke its previous order. It has to be revised by way of appeal or by way of revision which is not done in the present case. In fact, original order was not produced by the Government. Such original order of cancellation of patta was result of inherent lack of jurisdiction. The judgment of Collector under Exs.A-11 and A-12 in file No.9/54 confirmed the title previously granted by the Revenue Divisional Officer, West Hyderabad, dated 18.11.1951, 25.10.1951 and letter dated 14.07.1953. In fact, original order was not produced by the Government. Such original order of cancellation of patta was result of inherent lack of jurisdiction. The judgment of Collector under Exs.A-11 and A-12 in file No.9/54 confirmed the title previously granted by the Revenue Divisional Officer, West Hyderabad, dated 18.11.1951, 25.10.1951 and letter dated 14.07.1953. It is not known whether this is the order which is impugned in Ex.B-72 order. The order under Ex.B-72 is of vague in nature. 114. If these documents do not confer any title to the Government, Ex.A-16 and Faisal Patti (Ex.A-34) clearly go to show that land which is with the Court of Wards is described as Raidurg Patta is the land, which is identified as land in Sy.No.46 by the Revenue Authorities. This conclusion is also corroborated by the admissions of D.W.1 and 6 that the Kharij Khata presupposes land previously owned as private land. This can also be true for the reason that Kharij Khata lands are previously cultivable, assessed and occupied lands. The Government could not able to come with the evidence how these lands were recorded as Kharij Khata, which is paramount requirement to place reliance on entries in Khasra Pahani. 115. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Government has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Union of India v. Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society Limited, MANU/SC/0001/2014 to contend that khasra and sethwar are valuable title documents in the absence of any other title documents. This Court would have accepted such proposition, had there been consistency in between khasra and sethwar. The entries in both the records are conflicting and contrary to each other and mutually exclusive. Therefore, reliance cannot be placed on such entries, when there is unimpeached evidence on record clearly shows that Patta Raidurg is private land of Syed Akbar Hussaini which is kept under the superintendence of Government and compromise was accepted by court of wards among the legal heirs of Syed Akbar Hussaini. The suit land was allotted to Syed Ahmedi Hussain, Walliullah Hussain, Mahaboob Bee and Gousia Bee. Thus, khasra and revenue entries cannot be foundation for the Government to set up its title to the suit property. This Court is of the view that Sy.No.46 correlates to Patta Raidurg. 116. The some documents relating to source of title are sought to be introduced by defendant No.6 and the Government as additional evidence. Thus, khasra and revenue entries cannot be foundation for the Government to set up its title to the suit property. This Court is of the view that Sy.No.46 correlates to Patta Raidurg. 116. The some documents relating to source of title are sought to be introduced by defendant No.6 and the Government as additional evidence. They related to Court of Ward. There is ample evidence to show that Patta Raidurg was kept under Court of Ward. Other additional documents like Sethwar relating to 1951 was sought to be introduced by the Government as well as defendant No.6, which show that land in Sy. No.46 is recorded as “Jere Khalsa” (dictionary meaning of “Jere/Zere” is under care, under, and “Khalsa” means land revenue directly payable to government). Exs.B-60 and 62 documents brought on record by the Government show that the suit land is “Poramboke” and another document shows that the land is “Kharij Khata”. Ultimately, the stand taken by the Government is that the land is “Kharij Khata”. From the evidence on record, this Court could able to arrive to the conclusion without requirement of additional evidence. These documents are produced now without giving any reasons for nonproduction of such documents when fullest opportunity was given to both parties. Therefore, such documents cannot be received in this appeal, that too at this belated stage of second appeal. 117. The Government also seeks to produce bunch of documents relied by Lingamaiah Goud in other proceedings based on assignment of decree in C.S.No.7 of 1958 and the Contempt Appeal and LPS, which arise out of decree in C.S.No.7 of 1958. Those are all unconcerned to the present suit proceedings since the parties to the present proceedings are not parties to such proceedings. 118. The Government based on such collateral proceedings contend that by such orders the Government was declared as owner. This contention does not stand to scrutiny for the reasons that in present suit the title issue is between the private parties and the Government. Further, the government claim on merit is not considered in partition suit in C.S.No.7/1958 as noted from the judgment rendered therein. The proceedings in Contempt Appeal and SLP also clearly demonstrate that the Government was not given opportunity to establish their title in the said proceedings. In the light of the said proceedings which are irrelevant to the suit proceedings, it is unnecessary to receive such documents. The proceedings in Contempt Appeal and SLP also clearly demonstrate that the Government was not given opportunity to establish their title in the said proceedings. In the light of the said proceedings which are irrelevant to the suit proceedings, it is unnecessary to receive such documents. Therefore, all these applications filed to receive above documents are liable to be dismissed. 119. I.A.No.3 of 2021 was filed to receive three Firmans i.e., first is directing the Court of Wards to take over the custody of the property of Syed Akbar Hussaini, second is approving the note of Prime Minister and the third is order to implement the compromise. Unfortunately, such application was allowed on 20.09.2021 in utter disregard of law laid down by the Apex Court. In fact, the stage had not come to allow such application, when it was allowed. 120. Exs.A-14 and B-6 to B-8 would suffice to supplement the relevancy of Firmans. These documents though received cannot be read in evidence without giving opportunity to the other side. Such attempt is not made. Therefore, though the application i.e., I.A.No.3 of 2021 was allowed, those documents are ignored in considering the appeal since without such documents, this Court can pronounce judgment. 121. The next question is whether the sale deeds of the plaintiffs under Exs.A-1 to A-5, A-7 and A-10 and permission under Sections 47 and 48 of the Telangana Area Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1950, confer any title to the plaintiffs. 122. As per the findings of this Court dealing with other substantial questions of law, this Court found that the private properties of Syed Akbar Hussaini which were kept under the superintendence of Court of Wards are not released and still they are in the custody of Court of Wards. The effect of such findings on the sale deeds has to be considered. 123. The effect of such findings on the sale deeds has to be considered. 123. In this regard, it is apt to refer to Section 29 of the Act of 1350 Fasli, which reads as under: “Section 29: Acts which ward cannot do:- A ward shall not,- (a) transfer any part of his property under the superintendence of the Court; or create any charge thereon or interest therein other than the interest created therein under clause (e); or to enter into any contract or to make any acknowledgement involving him or his property in pecuniary liability; (b) marry without obtaining sanction of Government through the Court; (c) grant receipts for the rents and profits arising from the property or for debts or moneys which the Court is entitled to collect; (d) adopt or give permission to adopt, without obtaining sanction of the Government through the Court; (e) dispose of his property by will without obtaining sanction of the Government through the Court; (2) The Government shall not refuse sanction under clauses (d) and (e) of sub-section (1): Provided that the will or adoption is not contrary to the personal or special law applicable to the ward: or the property is not likely to be encumbered by the will or adoption or the will or adoption is not likely to lower the influence and respectability of the ward?s family. (3) The Government may give its assent to the will or an adoption made or may confirm it. (4) The provisions of clauses (d) and (e) of sub-section (1) shall not apply to an owner whose property has been placed under the superintendence of the Court under section 13.” 124. A reading of the above provision makes it clear that as long as the properties are under the custody of Court of Wards, no ward is entitled to alienate property in favour of third parties and such alienation is prohibited. The Apex Court had an occasion to consider effect of alienation in violation of statutory prohibition in Murugan and Ors. v. Kesava Gounder (Dead) thr. L.Rs., MANU/SC/0265/2019 and held as follows: “30. We may notice a judgment of this Court reported in Madhegowda (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Ankegowda (Dead) by L.Rs. and Ors. (2002) 1 SCC 178 . This Court in the above case had occasion to consider Section 11 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. v. Kesava Gounder (Dead) thr. L.Rs., MANU/SC/0265/2019 and held as follows: “30. We may notice a judgment of this Court reported in Madhegowda (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Ankegowda (Dead) by L.Rs. and Ors. (2002) 1 SCC 178 . This Court in the above case had occasion to consider Section 11 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. In the above case sister of a minor acting as guardian sold immovable property by registered sale deed. In the above reference this Court had made following observations: 25. ...Undoubtedly Smt. Madamma, sister of the minor, is not a "guardian" as defined in Section 4(b) of the Act. Therefore, she can only be taken to be a "de facto guardian" or more appropriately "de facto manager". To a transfer in such a case Section 11 of the Act squarely applies. Therefore, there is little scope for doubt that the transfer of the minor's interest by a defacto guardian/manager having been made in violation of the express bar provided under the Section is per se invalid. The existence or otherwise of legal necessity is not relevant in the case of such invalid transfer. A transferee of such an alienation does not acquire any interest in the property. Such an invalid transaction is not required to be set aside by filing a suit or judicial proceeding. The minor, on attaining majority, can repudiate the transfer in any manner as and when occasion for it arises. After attaining majority if he/she transfers his/her interest in the property in a lawful manner asserting his/her title to the same that is sufficient to show that the minor has repudiated the transfer made by the "de facto guardian/manager". 31. The above observations were made by this Court in the context of Section 11 of the Act, 1956. Section 11 of the Act contains a statutory prohibition on "de facto guardian" of the minor from disposing of the property of the minor. The transfer made by de facto guardian is, thus, void and can be repudiated in any manner. It is well settled that it is not necessary for a minor or any person claiming under him to file a suit for setting aside a void deed. A void deed can be ignored. The above observations cannot be held to be applicable to transfer made by a natural guardian Under Section 8(3) of the Act.” 125. It is well settled that it is not necessary for a minor or any person claiming under him to file a suit for setting aside a void deed. A void deed can be ignored. The above observations cannot be held to be applicable to transfer made by a natural guardian Under Section 8(3) of the Act.” 125. In the light of above ratio, any the alienation in violation of statutory prohibition are void transactions. The sale deeds executed by Syed Waliullah Hussaini in favour of plaintiffs are void-ab-initio and contrary to Section 29 of the Act of 1350 Fasli and law laid down by apex court. Thus, all the sale deeds executed by Syed Wallullah Hussaini under Exs.A-1 to A-5, A-7 and A-10 are void sale deeds. The permissions granted by the Tahsildar under Section 47 and 48 of the Telangana Area Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1950, do not validate invalid and void sale transactions. 126. It is also apt to refer Section 60 of the Act of 1350 Fasli, which reads as under: “Section 60: Procedure where succession is disputed:- Where on the death of a ward, the succession of his property or any part thereof is disputed, the Court may retain its superintendence until a claimant has established his title to the same in a Civil Court or a Revenue Court, or institute a suit or proceedings against all the claimants for settlement of their claims.” 127. A reading of the above provision makes it clear that any dispute arising with regard to succession on account of death of ward with regard to title of the property, the same shall be adjudicated by Civil Court or a Revenue Court or by way of instituting a suit or proceedings against all the claimants for settlement of their claims. This situation had not arisen on account of amicable settlement of succession disputes. 128. In the present case, the compromise entered into between the parties shows that there is a claim of alienation by some of the shareholders in favour of other shareholders. Other shareholders, who claimed to have alienated lands, are not made parties to the present proceedings. Ex.B3 & 5 Sale Deeds and Ex.B4 Gift Deed are such conveyance deeds. They are also void transactions since they were executed before properties are released from Court of Wards and no title is passed thereunder also. Other shareholders, who claimed to have alienated lands, are not made parties to the present proceedings. Ex.B3 & 5 Sale Deeds and Ex.B4 Gift Deed are such conveyance deeds. They are also void transactions since they were executed before properties are released from Court of Wards and no title is passed thereunder also. Further fact is that the compromise entered under Exs.B-6 to B-8 does not reflect consent from the parties, who claimed to have relinquished their share. The compromise deed clearly shows that Syed Ahmed Hussaini, who is eldest son of Syed Akbar Hussaini, Ghousia Begum and Mehaboob Begum along with Waliulla Hussain were allotted Patta Raidurg but other three were not made parties to this suit. 129. In conclusion, I hold that the plaintiffs’ sale deeds and sale deeds of successor-in-interest from the plaintiffs are void-ab-initio and similarly, the Sale Deeds (Exs.B3 & B5) and Gift Deed (Ex.B4) and any other conveyance deeds executed by Syed Ahmed Hussaini, Ghousia Begum and Mehaboob Begum or their successors-in-interest are also void documents. The Vendees and Donee thereunder derive no title under such documents. 130. The Courts below have not properly appreciated the evidence on record and the legal principles which resulted in perversity, so as to interfere the findings touching the title to the suit property. I hold that suit is patta land of late Syed Akbar Hussaini and after his death such land was allotted to his two sons and two daughters i.e., Syed Ahmed Hussaini, Waliullah Hussaini, Mahaboob Begum and Gousia Begum under compromise. The plaintiffs and their successors-in-interest have no valid title as there was no valid flow of title under their sale deeds since they were declared as void ab initio. 131. The Courts below were wrong in declaring the title of government which is the defendant. Normally, the courts are required to adjudicate the title of plaintiffs. While adjudicating the title of plaintiffs, the Court can examine the title of defendant. If ultimately, title of plaintiff is proved, plaintiffs’ title to the suit lands would be declared and if not proved, plaintiffs’ suit must be dismissed. But, while dismissing the title suit of the plaintiff, the Courts are not right in declaring the title of defendant. In this regard, both the Courts below have committed error and such findings suffer from perversity and they are set aside. But, while dismissing the title suit of the plaintiff, the Courts are not right in declaring the title of defendant. In this regard, both the Courts below have committed error and such findings suffer from perversity and they are set aside. Accordingly, these substantial questions are answered against the Government. Substantial question of law No.(v):- 132. This substantial question is also found on the principle of res judicata. The contention of the private parties i.e., defendant Nos.3 to 5 and legal heirs of defendant No.6 is that originally, the plaintiffs in the present suit filed O.S.No.74 of 1978. Subsequently, defendant No.3 to 5 in the said suit, have filed O.S.No.47 of 1985. Both the suits were dismissed by common judgment of trial Court. The plaintiffs in O.S.No.74 of 1978 have preferred A.S.No.62 of 1997 and the plaintiffs in O.S.No.47 of 1985 have preferred A.S.No.22 of 1999 before the lower appellate Court. The lower appellate Court by way of common judgment dated 06.12.1999 dismissed both the appeals confirming the findings of the trial Court in both suits. The plaintiffs in O.S.No.74 of 1978 have preferred the present Second Appeal and defendant Nos.3 to 5, who are plaintiffs in O.S.No.47 of 1985, have preferred Second Appeal No.324 of 2001 before this Court. While both the second appeals were pending for consideration, defendant Nos.3 to 5 entered into compromise with third parties in their second appeal. In pursuance of such compromise, they withdrew Second Appeal No.324 of 2001 on 05.03.2004. 133. In the above factual background, learned counsel representing the plaintiffs and their successors-in-interest have contended that the second appeal filed by defendant Nos.3 to 5 is withdrawn. The findings on common issues in the suit instituted by defendant Nos.3 to 5 and the suit instituted by the plaintiffs attained finality due to withdrawal of Second Appeal No.324 of 2001. As a consequence of withdrawal of Second Appeal No.324 of 2001, the findings of the trial Court on merits touching the release of property from the Court of Wards attained finality and such findings cannot be re-opened in the present appeal at the instance of defendant Nos. 3 to 5 and legal heirs of defendant No.6. Such judgment of withdrawal operates res judicata in the present second appeal. 134. 3 to 5 and legal heirs of defendant No.6. Such judgment of withdrawal operates res judicata in the present second appeal. 134. The contention of defendant Nos.3 to 5 and legal heirs of defendant No.6 is that the said second appeal was withdrawn, but not decided on merits. Dismissal of appeal as withdrawn does not operate bar of adjudication of this appeal on the principle of res judicata. It is also their contention that pure question of law which is wrongly decided in the previous judgment does not operate res judicata in deciding such a pure question of law in the subsequent proceedings. 135. In the background of such contentions, it is apt to refer to the issues in both the suits in which the Courts below adverted issue of release of property from court wards. “O.S.No.74 of 1978:- “1… 2. Whether the defendant No.3 to 6 can claim any right over the suit schedule property? O.S.No.47 of 1985:- 1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for declaration as prayed for? 2. Whether the suit lands are patta lands of plaintiffs and D.15? 4. Whether the suit is within limitation? 5… 6. Whether the D.15 is entitled to Ac.31-21 Gts. in Sy.No.46 of Raidurg Paiga?” 136. It is also relevant to refer to the points which are framed by the first appellate Court which are as follows: “1. Whether the suit land is a Government land or a patta land belonging to Syed Shah Akber Hussaini and his heirs? 2. Whether the plaintiffs in O.S.No.74/78 are entitled for declaration of title to the entire extent of the land? 3. Whether the plaintiffs in O.S.No.47/85 are entitled for the declaration of their rights and recovery of possession of the property? 4. Whether the claim of the plaintiffs in O.S.No.47/85 is barred by limitation? 5. Whether the plaintiffs in O.S.No.74/78 are bound by the decree of the Land Grabbing Court? 6. Whether the judgment and decree passed by the learned Prl. Junior Civil Judge is legal and sustainable? 7. To what relief?” 137. A perusal of the judgment of the trial Court touching the findings on the aspect of release of property from the Court of Wards, it is clear that the trial Court dealt with the same under issue No.2 in O.S.No.74 of 1978 and in issue Nos.1, 2, 4 and 6 in O.S.No.47 of 1985. 7. To what relief?” 137. A perusal of the judgment of the trial Court touching the findings on the aspect of release of property from the Court of Wards, it is clear that the trial Court dealt with the same under issue No.2 in O.S.No.74 of 1978 and in issue Nos.1, 2, 4 and 6 in O.S.No.47 of 1985. The lower appellate Court had given a finding on the aspect of release of property from Court of Wards by adverting to all the points which are framed in the common judgment in both the suits. The common issues in both the suits were assertion of claim of title over the suit property by defendant Nos.3 to 6 along with the plaintiffs. In fact, the finding on release of property has bearing on determination of title of the plaintiffs and defendant Nos.3 to 6. 138. In this regard, it is apt to refer to the decision of Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court in Sheodan Singh v. Smt. Daryao Kunwar, MANU/SC/0624/1966 wherein it has been held as under: “16. This brings us to the main point that has been urged in these appeals, namely, that the High Court had not heard and finally decided the appeals arising out suits Nos. 77 and 91. One of the appeals was dismissed on the ground that it was filed beyond the period of limitation while the other appeal was dismissed on the ground that the appellant therein had not taken steps to print the records. It therefore urged that the two appeals arising out of suits Nos. 77 and 91 had not been heard and finally decided by the High Court, and so the condition that the former suit must have been heard and finally decided was not satisfied in the present case. Reliance in the connection is placed on the well-settled principle that in order that a matter may be said to have been heard and finally decided, the decision in the former suit must have been on the merits. Reliance in the connection is placed on the well-settled principle that in order that a matter may be said to have been heard and finally decided, the decision in the former suit must have been on the merits. Where, for example, the former suit was dismissed by the trial court for want of jurisdiction, or for default of plaintiff's appearance, or on the ground of non-joinder of parties or misjoinder of parties or multifariousness, or on the ground that the suit was badly framed, or on the ground of a technical mistake, or for failure on the part of the plaintiff to produce probate or letters of administration or succession certificate when the same is "required by low to entitle the plaintiff to a decree, or for failure to furnish security for costs, or on the ground of improper valuation or for failure to pay additional court fee on a plaint which was undervalued or for want of cause of action or on the ground that it is premature and the dismissal is confirmed in appeal (if any), the decision not being on the merits would not be res judicata in a subsequent suit. But none of these considerations apply in the present case, for the Additional Civil Judge decided all the four suits on the merits and decided the issue as to title on merits against the appellant and his father. It is true that the High Court dismissed the appeals arising out of suits Nos. 77 and 91 either on the ground that it was barred by limitation or on the ground that steps had not been taken for printing the records. Even so the fact remains that the result of the dismissal of the two appeals arising from suits Nos. 77 and 91 by the High Court on these grounds was that the decrees of the Additional Civil Judge who decided the issue as to title on merits stood confirmed by the order of the High Court. Even so the fact remains that the result of the dismissal of the two appeals arising from suits Nos. 77 and 91 by the High Court on these grounds was that the decrees of the Additional Civil Judge who decided the issue as to title on merits stood confirmed by the order of the High Court. In such a case, even though the order of the High Court may itself not be on the merit the result of High Court's decision is to confirm the decision on the issue of title which had been given on the merits by the Additional Civil Judge and thus it effect the High Court confirmed the decree of the trial court on the merits, whatever may be the reason for the dismissal of the appeals arising from suits Nos. 77 and 91. In these circumstances though the order of the High Court itself may not be on the merits, the decision of the High Court dismissing the appeals arising out of suits Nos. 77 and 91 was to uphold the decision on the merits as to issue of title and therefore it must be held that by dismissing the appeals arising out of suits Nos. 77 and 91 the High Court heard and finally decided the matter of it confirmed the judgment of the trial court on the issue of title arising between the parties and decision of the trial court being on the merits the High Court's decision confirming that decision must also be deemed to be on the merits. To hold otherwise would make res judicata impossible in cases where the trial court decides the matter on merits but the appeal court dismisses the appeal on some preliminary ground thus confirming the decision of the trial court on the merits. It is well-settled that where a decree on the merits is appealed from, the decision of the trial court loses its character of finality and what was once res judicata again becomes res sub judice and it is the decree of appeal court which will then be res judicata. It is well-settled that where a decree on the merits is appealed from, the decision of the trial court loses its character of finality and what was once res judicata again becomes res sub judice and it is the decree of appeal court which will then be res judicata. But if the contention of the appellant were to be accepted and it is held that if the appeal court dismisses the appeal on any preliminary ground, like limitation or default in printing, thus confirming in toto the trial court's decision on merits, the appeal court's decree cannot be res judicata, the result would be that even though the decision of the trial court given on the merits is confirmed by the dismissal of the appeal on a preliminary ground there can never be res judicata. We cannot therefore accept the contention that even though the trial court may have decided the matter on the merits there can be no res judicata if the appeal court dismisses the appeal on the preliminary ground without going into the merits, even though the result of the dismissal of the appeal by the appeal court is confirmation of the decision of the trial court given on the merits. Acceptance of such a proposition will mean that all that the losing party has to do to destroy the effect of a decision given by the trial court on the merits is to file an appeal and let that appeal be dismissed on some preliminary ground, with the result that the decision given on the merits also becomes useless as between the parties. We are therefore of opinion that where a decision is given on the merits by the trial court and the matter is taken in appeal and the appeal is dismissed on some preliminary ground, like limitation or default in printing, it must be held that such dismissal when it confirms the decision to the trial court on the merits itself amounts to the appeal being heard and finally decided on the merits whatever may be the ground for dismissal of the appeal. 24. A consideration of the cases cited on behalf of the appellant therefore shows that most of them are not exactly in point so far as the facts of the present case are concerned. Our conclusion on the question of res judicata raised in the present appeals is this. 24. A consideration of the cases cited on behalf of the appellant therefore shows that most of them are not exactly in point so far as the facts of the present case are concerned. Our conclusion on the question of res judicata raised in the present appeals is this. (Where the trial court has decided two suits having common issues on the merit and there are two appeals therefrom and one of them is dismissed on some preliminary ground, like limitation or default in printing, with the result that the trial court's decision stands confirmed, the decision of the appeal court will be res judicata and the appeal court must be deemed to have heard and finally decided the matter. In such a case result of the decision of the appeal court is to confirm the decision of the trial court given on merits, and if that is so, the decision of the appeal court will be res judicata whatever may be the reason for the dismissal. It would be a different matter, however, where the decision of the appeal court does not result in the confirmation of the decision of the trial court given on the merit, as for example, where the appeal court holds that the trial court had no jurisdiction and dismisses the appeal even though the trial court might have dismissed the suit on the merits.) In this view of the matter, the appeals must fail, for the trial court had in the present case decided all the four suits on the merits including the decision on the common issues as to title. The result of the dismissal on a preliminary ground of the two appeals arising out of suits Nos. 77 and 91 was that the decision of the trial court was confirmed with respect to the common issues as to title by the High Court. In consequence the decision on those issues became res judicata so far as appeals Nos. 365 and 366 are concerned and s. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure would bar the hearing of those common issues over again. It is not in dispute that if the decision on the common issues in suits Nos. 77 and 91 has become res judicata, appeals Nos. 365 and 366 must fail.” 139. 365 and 366 are concerned and s. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure would bar the hearing of those common issues over again. It is not in dispute that if the decision on the common issues in suits Nos. 77 and 91 has become res judicata, appeals Nos. 365 and 366 must fail.” 139. A reading of the above judgment, it is clear that when there are common issues in two suits and said issues were determined on merits and two appeals are preferred and one of them is dismissed on preliminary ground like limitation, default or in non-compliance of order result in confirmation of findings of trial Court’s decision. Such decision of appellate Court will operate as res judicata in considering other appeal preferred against other suit in which similar and common issue was present and answered by the trial Court dealing with both the suits. 140. In the present case, the finding touching the release of property by Court of Wards was dealt with while dealing with the defence set by defendant Nos.3 to 6 in O.S.No.74 of 1978 and the case set up by defendant Nos.3 to 5 in O.S.No.47 of 1985. Incidentally, it also touches the title of the plaintiffs also. The plaintiffs would get title if the Court of Wards releases the property from its custody. If findings are rendered on issues of facts on merits, definitely it operates res judicata whether or not such a decision of appellate Court is on merits or result of default or by withdrawal. 141. Now the question is whether the decision rendered by the Courts below on wrong interpretation of law and not on facts in issue operates res judicata in the subsequent appeal. 142. In this regard, it is apt to refer the decision of Apex Court in Satyendra Kumar v. Raj Nath Dubey, MANU/SC/0529/2016, wherein it has been held as follows: “14. However, as explained and held by this Court in the case of Mathura Prasad Sarjoo Jaiswal (supra), where the decision is on a pure question of law then a Court cannot be precluded from deciding such question of law differently. Such bar cannot be invoked either on principle of equity or estoppel. However, as explained and held by this Court in the case of Mathura Prasad Sarjoo Jaiswal (supra), where the decision is on a pure question of law then a Court cannot be precluded from deciding such question of law differently. Such bar cannot be invoked either on principle of equity or estoppel. No equitable principle or estoppel can impede powers of the Court to determine an issue of law correctly in a subsequent suit which relates to another property founded upon a different cause of action though parties may be same. As explained earlier, in such a situation the principle of res judicata is, strictly speaking, not applicable at all. So far as principle of estoppel is concerned, it operates against the party and not the Court and hence nothing comes in the way of a competent court in such a situation to decide a pure question of law differently if it is so warranted. The issues of facts once finally determined will however, stare at the parties and bind them on account of earlier judgments or for any other good reason where equitable principles of estoppel are attracted.” 143. A reading of the above decision, it is clear that when the previous decision is rendered on pure question of law, the Court cannot be precluded from deciding such question of law differently in the subsequent proceedings. However, the issues of fact once finally determined, it stares at parties and bars them on account of previous judgment or for any other good reason applying equitable principle of estoppel. 144. The other thing to be noted is that defendant No.6 is not the appellant in the second appeal which was withdrawn and he is one of the respondents. The plea set up by him in the said second appeal is similar to the plea in the present second appeal. He has not preferred any independent appeal touching the findings on release of property by the Court of Wards. 145. From the above discussions made hereinabove, this Court holds that withdrawal of Second Appeal No.324 of 2001 would operate res judicata in the subsequent appeal touching common issues of facts. Any findings are given on such issues of facts bars adjudication by application of principles of res judicata. However, such a judgment cannot be pressed into service to prevent the Court from adjudicating any pure question of law differently. Any findings are given on such issues of facts bars adjudication by application of principles of res judicata. However, such a judgment cannot be pressed into service to prevent the Court from adjudicating any pure question of law differently. The meaning thereby is that withdrawal of second appeal would operate res judicata touching common issues of facts in both suits between the parties thereto and such res judicata applies only to the findings of fact and not to pure question of law. As per my findings on substantial question of law No.(iv), the findings of the Courts below are set aside based on pure question of law. This Court is entitled to take differently on pure question of law. Therefore, withdrawal of second appeal does not operate res judicata to decide pure question of law in this appeal dealing with release of property from the Court of Wards. I hold that withdrawal of second appeal by defendant Nos.3 to 5 do not bar adjudication of this appeal. Accordingly, this substantial question of law is answered. Substantial question of law No.(vi):- 146. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Government has contended that the suit filed for declaration of title by the plaintiffs is hopelessly barred by limitation. Though no issue has been framed in that regard, it is duty of the Court to see that whether the suit filed by the plaintiffs is within time or not, even in the absence of pleadings from the defendants. According to him, a serious threat to infringe the right of plaintiffs’ vendor i.e., Syed Wallullah Hussaini to the suit property was created as early as in the year 1954 by virtue of order of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Hyderabad West dated 04.08.1954, whereby the patta granted previously was cancelled and it attained finality by the order in Ex.B-72 proceedings from Board of Revenue. Such order confirmed the order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer as early as in the year 1954. The plaintiffs have purchased the property pending such litigation and therefore, they cannot ignore the commencement of limitation against their vendor and lay the suit based on fresh cause of action, which is impermissible under the law. 147. Such order confirmed the order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer as early as in the year 1954. The plaintiffs have purchased the property pending such litigation and therefore, they cannot ignore the commencement of limitation against their vendor and lay the suit based on fresh cause of action, which is impermissible under the law. 147. The contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs is that there is no pleading from the Government with regard to bar of suit by limitation and the bar of limitation is mixed question of fact and law. Necessary pleadings should be there from the party, who claims bar of suit by limitation. In the absence of such pleadings, no issue could be framed and not dealt by the trial Court as well as lower appellate Court. In the second appeal, such a plea cannot be canvassed. 148. To advert, to the above contentions it is pat to refer to Article 58 of Limitation Act, 1963, which reads as under: Article Description of Suit Period Limitation of Time from which period beings to run 58 To obtain any other declaration Three years When the right to sue first accrues. 149. A reading of the above Article shows that to obtain relief of declaration, the limitation prescribed is three years. The said limitation commences when right to sue first accrues. There is a great amount of debate before the Apex Court with regard to when the right to sue first accrues. 150. In this regard, it is also apt to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in Board of Trustees of Port of Kandla v. Hargovind Jasraj, MANU/SC/0080/2013, wherein it has been held as under: “18. The expression right to sue has not been defined. But the same has on numerous occasions fallen for interpretation before the Courts. In State of Punjab and Ors. v. Gurdev Singh MANU/SC/0612/1991 : (1991) 4 SCC 1 , the expression was explained as under: …The words "right to sue" ordinarily mean the right to seek relief by means of legal proceedings. Generally, the right to sue accrues only when the cause of action arises, that is, the right to prosecute to obtain relief by legal means. v. Gurdev Singh MANU/SC/0612/1991 : (1991) 4 SCC 1 , the expression was explained as under: …The words "right to sue" ordinarily mean the right to seek relief by means of legal proceedings. Generally, the right to sue accrues only when the cause of action arises, that is, the right to prosecute to obtain relief by legal means. The suit must be instituted when the right asserted in the suit is infringed or when there is a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right by the Defendant against whom the suit is instituted. 19. Similarly in Daya Singh and Anr v. Gurdev Singh (dead) by L.Rs. and Ors. MANU/SC/0012/2010 : (2010) 2 SCC 194 the position was re-stated as follows: 13. Let us, therefore, consider whether the suit was barred by limitation in view of Article 58 of the Act in the background of the facts stated in the plaint itself. Part III of the Schedule which has prescribed the period of limitation relates to suits concerning declarations. Article58 of the Act clearly says that to obtain any other declaration, the limitation would be three years from the date when the right to sue first accrues. 14. In support of the contention that the suit was filed within the period of limitation, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellant-Plaintiffs before us submitted that there could be no right to sue until there is an accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement or at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right by the Defendant against whom the suit is instituted. In support of this contention the learned Senior Counsel strongly relied on a decision of the Privy Council in reported in MANU/PR/0054/1930 : AIR 1930 PC 270 Bolo v. Koklan. In this decision Their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as follows: ... There can be no 'right to sue' until there is an accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement, or at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right, by the Defendant against whom the suit is instituted. 15. A similar view was reiterated in C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa MANU/SC/0359/1961 : AIR 1961 SC 808 in which this Court observed (AIR p.810, para 7) ... 15. A similar view was reiterated in C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa MANU/SC/0359/1961 : AIR 1961 SC 808 in which this Court observed (AIR p.810, para 7) ... The period of six years prescribed by Article has to be computed from the date when the right to sue accrues and there could be no right to sue until there is an accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement or at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right. In C. Mohammad Yunus, this Court held that the cause of action for the purposes of Article of the Act accrues only when the right asserted in the suit is infringed or there is at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right. Therefore, the mere existence of an adverse entry in the revenue records cannot give rise to cause of action. ...Accordingly, we are of the view that the right to sue accrued when a clear and unequivocal threat to Infringe that right by the Defendants.... 20. References may be made to the decisions of this Court in Khatri Hotels Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India and Anr. MANU/SC/1054/2011 : (2011) 9 SCC 126 where this Court observed: While enacting Article 58of the 1963 Act, the legislature has designedly made a departure from the language of Article 58 of the 1908 Act. The word "first" has been used between the words "sue'' and "accrued". This would mean that if a suit is based on multiple causes of action, the period of limitation will begin to run from the date when the right to sue first accrues. To put it differently, successive violation of the right will not give rise to fresh cause and the suit will be liable to be dismissed if it is beyond the period of limitation counted from the day when the right to sue first accrued.” (Emphasis supplied) 151. The right to sue accrues when there is an accrual of right asserted in the suit and its infringement or at least a clear and un-equivocal threat to infringe that right by the defendants against whom the suit is instituted. The mere existence of some adverse entries in the revenue records cannot give rise to the cause of action. The right to sue accrues when there is an accrual of right asserted in the suit and its infringement or at least a clear and un-equivocal threat to infringe that right by the defendants against whom the suit is instituted. The mere existence of some adverse entries in the revenue records cannot give rise to the cause of action. When there is successive violation of right, the latest violation do not give rise to fresh cause of action. The suit would be liable to be dismissed, if it is beyond the period of limitation counted from the day, when the right to sue first accrued. 152. In the present case, the plaintiffs claim title and possession from Late Syed Wallullah Hussaini by virtue of sale deeds executed under Exs.A-1 to A-5 and A-7 to A-10. They claim title to the suit property to an extent of Ac.84-30 guntas. The evidence on record reflects that initially, in the year 1951, patta was granted in favour of Syed Wallullah Hussaini based on the various correspondences of Paigah office, Tahsildar office and the office of Collector. This patta was not implemented till 1955. For the first time, jamabandi was effected in the year 1955 under Ex.A-34 Faisal Patti for the year 1955. Thereafter, his name was recorded as pattedar in the subsequent pahanis till changes were made in faisal patti in the year 1966 by virtue of order dated 05.05.1957 passed by Board of Revenue, whereby the case was remanded to Additional Collector for fresh enquiry. Subsequently, the suit land was re-classified as Kharij Khata. 153. The Government claims that suit property is classified as Kharij Khata and it belongs to Government. They asserted this claim way back in the year 1954 by setting aside previous orders of the Revenue Divisional Officer granting patta to Syed Wallullah Hussaini and fresh orders have been passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Hyderabad West on 04.08.1954 holding that the suit property is Government land. Syed Wallullah Hussaini preferred an appeal before the Additional Collector, who set aside the orders dated 04.08.1954 passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer and confirmed the title of the Syed Wallullah Hussaini. Aggrieved by the same, ayacutdars of land who were irrigating the land from the tank which was located in Sy.No.46 preferred an appeal to the Board of Revenue. Syed Wallullah Hussaini preferred an appeal before the Additional Collector, who set aside the orders dated 04.08.1954 passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer and confirmed the title of the Syed Wallullah Hussaini. Aggrieved by the same, ayacutdars of land who were irrigating the land from the tank which was located in Sy.No.46 preferred an appeal to the Board of Revenue. The Board of Revenue by order dated 05.05.1957 had set aside the order of the Additional Collector and remanded the matter for fresh enquiry. The Joint Collector, on remand, confirmed the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer dated 04.08.1954 through his order dated 12.03.1968 in File No.F3/2486/1956. The said order was challenged by Syed Wallullah Hussaini before the Board of Revenue in File No.U3/587/1968. The Board of Revenue by order dated 11.02.1971 confirmed the order of the Joint Collector. 154. Para No.11 of the plaint shows that the order of Board of Revenue dated 11.02.1971 is taken as one of the cause of actions for instituting the suit. The second cause of action was shown as 04.06.1978 when the patwari threatened to attach the property for non-payment of Sivai Jamabandi. The limitation prescribed for declaration of title is three years and it commences when the right to sue first accrues. The right to sue first accrued in the present case to Syed Wallullah Hussaini on 04.08.1954 when the Revenue Divisional Officer has set aside his patta and held that suit property was Government Kharij Khata. These proceedings culminated into final order of Board of Revenue dated 11.02.1971. Even going by the plaintiffs own cause of action, the first cause of action commences for them on 11.02.1971 and the suit was filed in the year 1978 i.e., after nearly eight years. The suit is hopelessly barred by limitation. In fact, the limitation commenced against Syed Waliullah Hussaini, who is vendor of plaintiffs as early as in the year 1954. By virtue of purchase by the plaintiffs, there may be successive cause of actions including the cause of action dated 11.02.1971 and 1978 but for filing suit, fresh cause of action cannot be taken into consideration. It is first cause of action which gives right to sue has to be taken into consideration for commencement of limitation. Seeing from any angle, the suit is barred by limitation. 155. It is first cause of action which gives right to sue has to be taken into consideration for commencement of limitation. Seeing from any angle, the suit is barred by limitation. 155. Learned counsels for the plaintiffs and their successors-in-interest have relied upon the judgment of High Court of Bombay in the case of Eknath Daval Thete v. Ganpat Dagdu Thete, 2016 LawSuit (Bom) 2, wherein it has been held as follows: “42. In my view, learned counsel for the respondent No.1 (original plaintiff) is right in his submission that the issue of limitation is a mixed question of fact and law. If the appellant would have raised this issue before the learned trial Judge in the written statement, the learned trial Judge would have framed that issue on which both the parties would have led oral as well as documentary evidence. There is no dispute that Article 97 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to the suit filed by the plaintiff.” 156. They have also relied upon various other decisions touching the limitation which are relating to consideration of the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 of C.P.C, which are irrelevant for the purpose of main issue in the final disposal. No doubt, when the limitation is a mixed question of fact and law, the person claiming that the suit is not within time has to specifically plead in his pleadings, so that other party will have opportunity to rebut such claim and establish that his suit is within time. If the facts admitted and proved in the evidence demonstrate that suit is hopelessly barred by limitation, it is a pure question of law and it can be raised at any stage including in second appeal. 157. In this regard, it is apt to refer to Section 3 (1) of the Limitation Act, 1963 which reads as under: “Section 3: Bar of limitation:- (1) Subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence.” 158. A reading of Section 3 (1) of the Limitation Act, it clearly shows that it is the duty of the Court to see that whether the suit is within limitation or not irrespective of any such pleadings from defendants’ side. 159. A reading of Section 3 (1) of the Limitation Act, it clearly shows that it is the duty of the Court to see that whether the suit is within limitation or not irrespective of any such pleadings from defendants’ side. 159. The Apex Court in Nazir Mohd. Vs. J. Kamala, AIR 2020 SC 4321 had an occasion to deal with similar contention. It is held that it is the duty of the court to decide whether suit is within time or not even without such pleadings from the defendants. The pure question of law can be raised at any stage of proceedings including before appellant courts. When there is a clear bar of limitation based on the admitted and proved facts and does not involve mixed question of fact and law, such question of question of law can be raised and decided by the appellate Courts. 160. Therefore, I am of the view that the suit filed by the plaintiffs seeking declaration of title is hopelessly barred by limitation and the same is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, this substantial question of law is answered. Other IAs filed to Receive Additional Evidence: 161. I.A.No.9 of 2022 is filed by appellant No.18, who is the purchaser of part of suit land from original plaintiffs, to bring certified copy of sale deeds under which it has purchased the part of suit property. 162. I.A.No.19 of 2021 is filed by one of the legal heirs of defendant No.6 to bring Will Deed executed by defendant No.6 on record. 163. I.A.No.20 of 2021 is filed by defendant Nos.9 and 10, who are the subsequent purchasers from the original plaintiffs, to bring the sale deeds under which they purchased part of the suit property from the original plaintiffs, on record. 164. At the outset, the documents under I.A.No.9 of 2022, 19 of 2021 and 20 of 2021 are intended to prove acquisition of their title by virtue of sale deeds by appellant No.18, Will deed by legal heirs of defendant No.6 and sale deeds of defendants Nos.9 and 10. They were executed pending suit from the original plaintiffs. These documents are irrelevant to decide the question involved in the present appeal. Therefore, those documents cannot be received in the present appeal and they have no bearing on the decision of this Court based on the evidence on record. They were executed pending suit from the original plaintiffs. These documents are irrelevant to decide the question involved in the present appeal. Therefore, those documents cannot be received in the present appeal and they have no bearing on the decision of this Court based on the evidence on record. Hence, these applications are liable to be rejected at the threshold. Implead petitions: I.A.No.2 of 2016: 165. The present application is filed by the legal heirs of Waliullah Hussaini seeking their impleadment in the present appeal. 166. All the petitioners herein are grandchildren of Waliullah Hussaini. They claim that they are the proper and necessary parties to the present proceedings since they have share in the suit land. The legal heirs of Waliullah Hussaini who are already on record are seriously contesting the present proceedings. It is not their case that the suit is not being properly prosecuted by them. Sufficient evidence was let in by the parties who are prosecuting the case and such evidence is foundation for the judgment which is impugned in the present appeal. The petitioners herein assert share in suit land; they can take out independent proceedings for their claim if really existed. At this fag-end of the litigation, this Court is not inclined to allow the petitioners to come on record and to prosecute the case. The application is devoid of merits and it is dismissed. I.A.No.7 of 2022: 167. The present application is filed by the son of Fathima Yawar Unnisa, who is the daughter of late Qutub Unnisa Begum, the granddaughter of late Waliullah Hussaini and the great granddaughter of Syed Akber Hussaini, for impleadment claiming share in the suit property as per Sheriyat Law. 168. The relief sought in the present suit is only declaration of title and consequential injunction as against the Government. The petitioner herein is claiming share in the suit property by way of inheritance through Waliullah Hussaini as per Sheriyat Law. Already legal heirs of Waliullah Hussaini are on record and they are contesting the matter. She can take out independent proceedings for her claim. Therefore, at this stage, this Court is not inclined to allow the present application and it is accordingly dismissed. I.A.No.11 of 2022: 169. This application is filed by appellant No.18, who was subsequently impleaded as appellant on the basis of purchase made by it from the original plaintiffs. She can take out independent proceedings for her claim. Therefore, at this stage, this Court is not inclined to allow the present application and it is accordingly dismissed. I.A.No.11 of 2022: 169. This application is filed by appellant No.18, who was subsequently impleaded as appellant on the basis of purchase made by it from the original plaintiffs. Vide the present application, appellant No.18 is seeking impleadment of respondent Nos.20 to 39 herein as respondent Nos.59 to 78 in the main appeal. 170. The persons who are sought to be impleaded are third parties to the suit proceedings. The proposed respondents are claiming right over the suit property on the basis of assignment of decree and sales by virtue of decree passed in C.S.No.7 of 1958 on the file of this Court. They are separate proceedings instituted by them. They raised a claim basing on assignment deed dated 01.10.2002. This means, while pending the present appeal, such claim was raised collaterally. 171. The present suit instituted by the original plaintiffs is a comprehensive one for declaration of title against the Government. Cause of action pleaded in the suit is against the Government, but not against third parties. Therefore, the proposed parties are not necessary and proper parties to the present appeal. At the stage of second appeal, if they are impleaded, de novo trial is required. Therefore, I do not find any merits in the present application and it is accordingly dismissed. Amendment of Plaint: I.A.No.8 of 2022: 172. The present application is filed by appellant No.18 seeking amendment of the plaint. The petitioner herein is the subsequent purchaser from the original plaintiffs during the pendency of the suit proceedings. The amendment sought in the present application is that in addition to the declaration of title of the original plaintiffs to the suit property, they shall also be declared as owners of part of the suit property by virtue of registered sale deeds. The relief sought in the present petition is unwanted, as they are the persons who purchased the land pending the suit. As the plaintiffs sought declaration, if the plaintiffs succeeded in getting title declared in their favour over the suit property, automatically the petitioner will also get title. Therefore, there is no need for the petitioner/appellant No.18 to seek amendment of the prayer in the suit. The petition is devoid of merits and it is dismissed. As the plaintiffs sought declaration, if the plaintiffs succeeded in getting title declared in their favour over the suit property, automatically the petitioner will also get title. Therefore, there is no need for the petitioner/appellant No.18 to seek amendment of the prayer in the suit. The petition is devoid of merits and it is dismissed. Stay of second appeal proceedings: I.A.No.10 of 2022: 173. This application is filed to grant stay of proceedings in the present appeal for four weeks to enable the petitioner to file some certified copies of orders of Apex Court. This application was filed on 16.06.2022 during the course of hearing the appeal. Since the appeal itself was heard and reserved, the relief in the present application has become infructuous. Accordingly, this application is dismissed as infructuous. Final Conclusion: 174. In the result, the appeal is dismissed confirming the dismissal of suit by the trial Court as confirmed by the lower appellate Court but on different grounds and not on the grounds on which the trial Court dismissed the suit which was confirmed by the lower appellate Court. I.A.Nos.2 of 2016; 15, 18, 19 & 20 of 2021 and 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 & 14 of 2022 are also dismissed. There shall be no order as costs. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending, shall stand closed.