JUDGMENT : K.Vinod Chandran, J. The applicant, a Private Limited Company, is the appellant herein who is aggrieved with the rejection of an application filed under S.8 of the Kerala Private Forest (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1979 (for brevity 'the Vesting Act'). The applicant claimed that the scheduled properties having an extent of 164.540 hectares was purchased by the applicant from one M.A Jan & children. The predecessors-in-interest acquired right over a larger extent measuring 1004.24 acres of land purchased from one Madhura Plantations. The devolution of the said land to M.A Jan, his wife & children is proved by Exts.A1 to A3. Exts.A4 to A6 are the sale deeds executed by M.A Jan & others to the applicant. Previously, the State had notified an extent of 523 acres out of the total extent of lands existing in Sy.Nos.88/A1, 88/2 88/1E1, 88/1,2,88/1C1, 88/1C2 and 88/D of Thavinjal Amsam. M.A Jan filed O.A No.364/1976 before the Forest Tribunal under S.8 of the Vesting Act. The Tribunal by order dt 20.06.1978 allowed the OA in part finding certain extents to be exempted as plantation of either cardamom or coffee and a further extent around the perennial stream, from which water was used for irrigating the plantation. The State & the applicant filed appeals in which the order of the Tribunal was affirmed. In the present proceedings which arises from a notification of the year 2001, the major contention of the applicant is that in the earlier proceedings the forest department had admitted that the land vested under the Vesting Act was that notified and the balance properties were exempted since they were developed areas planted with cardamom and coffee, prior to the appointed day under the Vesting Act. The respondents also relied on the report of local inspection conducted by the Forest Tribunal which categorically found the balance properties to be a plantation. 2. The DFO North Wayanad contested the applicant's title interest and possession over the properties scheduled. It was asserted that the title deeds does not pertain to the scheduled properties and they were neither genuine nor legally valid. It was pointed out that an extent of 222.43 hectares in Sy.Nos.88/1B1,1A5 and 2/1 had been notified as vested by an earlier notification dt 13.07.1978. In OA 364/76 filed by M.A Jan only 27 acres was allowed to be restored which falls in Sy. No 88/1A and 88/2. It was pointed out that an extent of 222.43 hectares in Sy.Nos.88/1B1,1A5 and 2/1 had been notified as vested by an earlier notification dt 13.07.1978. In OA 364/76 filed by M.A Jan only 27 acres was allowed to be restored which falls in Sy. No 88/1A and 88/2. In the year 2001 the Government had notified 164.540 hectares left out to be notified earlier. The said area also lies contiguous to forest land and in appearance it lies thickly wooded with forest species vegetation. The assertion of cardamom and coffee plantation was stoutly refuted, the nature of the land was stated to be semi evergreen with lush undergrowth supporting saplings of forest species. The department also filed additional statement specifically pointing out that the properties notified as vested is comprised in Sy.Nos.88/1A, 2,1E, E2, 1C1, 1C2 of Thavinjal Village in Mananthavadi Taluk, Wayand District. As per the erratum notification issued by the Custodian of vested forest dt.12.5.2008 the earlier extent was modified and the same was stated to be only 160.1330 hectares as against the earlier notified 164.400 hectares. 3. Before the Tribunal PW1, examined on the side of the applicant, marked Exts.A1 to A20 and RW1 examined on the side of respondents, marked Exts.B1 to B6 series. The Tribunal raised three issues; as to whether the application scheduled property is a vested forest, whether it is liable to be exempted under s.3(2) and (3) of the Vesting Act and whether the applicant is entitled to the declaration prayed for. The Tribunal first noticed decisions of a Full Bench and Division Bench of this Court in State of Kerala v. Chandraleka [ 1995 (2) KLT 152 (FB)] and State of Kerala v. Kunhiraman [ 1990 (1) KLT 382 ] to hold that the burden to prove that the scheduled property is not a vested forest rests squarely on the shoulders of the applicant who prefers the claim. The definition of private forest under the Vesting Act was looked at to find that under S.2f(1)(i) any land would be included if it is located in the Malabar District and governed by the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949 (for brevity 'the MPPF Act') and not excluded under clauses (A) to (D) of the definition clause. The definition of private forest under the Vesting Act was looked at to find that under S.2f(1)(i) any land would be included if it is located in the Malabar District and governed by the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949 (for brevity 'the MPPF Act') and not excluded under clauses (A) to (D) of the definition clause. As far as the application of MPPF Act, it was found that a Full Bench of this Court in State of Kerala v. Moosa Haji [ 1984 KLT 494 (FB)] held that every private forest which existed without cultivation as on 14.12.1949 would be governed by the MPPF Act, even if any cultivation is commenced and continued after the said enactment. The Tribunal categorically found that in the earlier O.A filed by the predecessor-in-interest only 27.50 acres out of 523 acres was exempted under the Vesting Act. The predecessor-in-interest also filed an appeal before the High Court which too was rejected along with the appeal filed by the State. It is thereafter that M.A Jan & children assigned 507.92 acres out of the total 1004.24 acres to the applicant. 4. The Tribunal noticed that despite the applicant having contended that the entire 507.92 acres purchased through Exts.A4 to A6 is a plantation, the same was not established before the Tribunal; but for relying on the admissions by the State in the earlier application filed under the Vesting Act, by M.A Jan. The reliance placed on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Basanth Singh v. Janaki Sen [ AIR 1967 SC 341 ] was distinguished. It was found that the decision was an authority for the proposition that the admission made by a party in one suit, though could be brought in evidence in another suit; it is not conclusive and could also be established to be false. The alleged admission in the earlier proceedings made by the DFO in the objection filed was noticed, to find the same to be a general statement of fact regarding exemption of developed lands from vesting; not specifically with respect to the dispute arising before the Tribunal. It was also found that as per the Vesting Act only the Custodian is entitled to concede a factual aspect before the Tribunal. It was also found that as per the Vesting Act only the Custodian is entitled to concede a factual aspect before the Tribunal. State of Kerala v. Popular Estates [ (2004) 12 SCC 434 ] was relied on to find that an admission by the forest authorities would not absolve the applicant from establishing before the Tribunal that the property disputed is not a private forest. 5. As far as the report of local inspection conducted by the Tribunal it was held that the same has relevance only to the specific dispute involved in the lis and not to the balance properties held by the applicant. It was found that the applicant, despite having taken out a commission did not ensure the identification of the properties, especially since the extent now notified was a part of a larger extent; a major portion of which had already vested under the earlier notification. The commission report also found only a small area to be a plantation of cardamom and coffee; the age of which was also not specified. As far as the contention regarding the notification being grossly delayed and hopelessly time barred, the Tribunal found the vesting to be statutory and automatic, which does not depend upon the notification. Rangasesha Hills (P) ltd v State of Kerala 1991 (2) KLT 49 was relied on to further buttress the proposition of statutory vesting. Popular Estates (supra) was again relied on to find statutory vesting of private forests under the Vesting Act, not dependant on a notification. Joji Jacob v. State of Kerala 2011 (1) KLT 79 was relied on to find that the delay in bringing out a notification; could as well be by reason of official negligence or mistake, which cannot absolve the property from the statutory vesting. It was found that the earlier notification was with respect to 523 acres and what was left was 481.24 acres, out of which 405.24 acres was first notified as per Ext.B1 in 2001 and corrected as 395.70 acres as per Ext.B3 notification in 2008. Hence out of the total land, 85. 54 acres is even now excluded as a plantation. The Tribunal examined whether an exclusion under the definition clause S.2f(1)(i) of the Vesting Act can be applied to the scheduled land. Hence out of the total land, 85. 54 acres is even now excluded as a plantation. The Tribunal examined whether an exclusion under the definition clause S.2f(1)(i) of the Vesting Act can be applied to the scheduled land. Clauses (A), (C) & (E) were found to be inapplicable since the scheduled land was neither garden land or nilam, nor cultivated with fruit bearing trees, nor a building site. As far as Clause (B) is concerned it was held that only a portion of the larger property was cultivated with cardamom and coffee, which extent stood excluded. There was no claim for exemption under s.3(2) or (3); pleaded or proved and the mandate of the provision for exemption is not satisfied. It was in the totality of the above circumstances that the prayer for declaration of exclusion and exemption under the Vesting Act was rejected by the Tribunal. We heard learned Senior Counsel Sri.S. Sreekumar instructed by Adv. K.B Gangesh appearing for the appellant. The thrust of the argument on behalf of the appellant was the findings recorded in the earlier proceedings. The counter statements filed by the respondent in O.A No.364/1976 produced along with the paper book was specifically referred, to point out the statement that every developed area planted with cardamom and coffee prior to 10.05.1971 are excluded from the survey of vested forest which was specifically quoted by the Tribunal, in the inspection report and in its order. The judgment of this Court in the MFAs filed by the State and the applicant as also the Special Leave Petition filed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was specifically referred to. Even the commission report in the present case, though not marked, but available in the records, clearly indicate the entire lands to be a planted area. Reference is also made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.4233/1986 dt. 27.03.1990 arising from the order in Civil Revision No.2813/1983 wherein the proceedings of the Taluk Land Board (for brevity “the TLB') was considered. This Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court specifically found the lands to be entitled for exemption under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, as a plantation also relying on the earlier order of the Forest Tribunal. 27.03.1990 arising from the order in Civil Revision No.2813/1983 wherein the proceedings of the Taluk Land Board (for brevity “the TLB') was considered. This Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court specifically found the lands to be entitled for exemption under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, as a plantation also relying on the earlier order of the Forest Tribunal. It is pointed out that earlier, the notification was issued after survey and there could not be a further survey carried out to include lands which were initially excluded. The learned Senior Counsel would urge this Court to allow the appeal by reversing the impugned order and granting the relief as sought for in the application before the Tribunal of exclusion from vesting. 6. The learned Special Government Pleader (Forest) Sri. Nagaraj Narayanan heavily relied on Popular Estates (supra) to refute the contention raised; of the Forest Department being estopped from issuing a subsequent notification. The very same decision held that the findings of the TLB under the Kerala Land Reforms Act are not conclusive under the Vesting Act and there cannot be raised any plea of resjudicata. The vesting under the Vesting Act occurs statutorily and the notification is only an intimation. The applicant has failed miserably to establish that there was cultivation existing in the land now notified as vested, as on the appointed day under the Vesting Act, ie, 10.05.1971. 7. Rangasesha Hills (P) Ltd.(supra) authoritatively held that vesting takes place by operation of law and that the provisions of the Vesting Act does not postpone the vesting to any subsequent day to the appointed day and not at all to the date of a notification issued. The aforesaid declaration received recognition in Popular Estates (supra), a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. We extract paragraph 12 of Popular Estates : 12. Learned counsel for the respondents produced before us copies of registered deeds and contended that these formed the title deeds by which the respondents' predecessor-in-title had purchased the land, way back, in the year 1963. He attempted to support the reasoning of the High Court in its judgment that there was an admission on the part of the State Government and its officers that only 155.90 acres was forest. We are unable to accept these contentions urged by the learned counsel for the respondents. He attempted to support the reasoning of the High Court in its judgment that there was an admission on the part of the State Government and its officers that only 155.90 acres was forest. We are unable to accept these contentions urged by the learned counsel for the respondents. The scheme of the Act is that upon the Act coming into force, all private forests would vest in the State Government. The demarcation of the forests under Section 6 of the Act is merely a consequential act and the vesting is not postponed depending on the said act. If anyone claims that his land had not vested in the State Government, Section 8 of the Act gives remedy of moving the Forest Tribunal with full details. The Forest Tribunal would then adjudicate the dispute and decide as to how much of the land claimed by the applicant was not vested forest. It is only upon such determination that the State would be divested of the vested forest. In the instant case, the burden of establishing that certain disputed land was not vested forest rested squarely upon the respondents before the Forest Tribunal. The respondents would succeed or fail on the merits of their own case of showing that the land fell within the exempted category.” [underlining by us for emphasis] Joji Jacob (supra) was a later Division Bench decision of this Court which observed that delay in publication of notification occurs by reason either of official inadvertence, negligence or mistake, delay in carrying out survey, demarcation of boundaries and so on and so forth; none of which would invalidate the statutory vesting which takes place as on the appointed day under the Vesting Act. 8. With this principle in mind we would look at the statements and observations pointed out from the various documents produced in the paper book handed over to us separately at the time of hearing. The admission on the part of the respondents is specifically pointed out from the counter statement dt 31.10.1976 filed in OA 364/96. Therein it was asserted that the area surveyed and taken as vested forest from R.S 88/1A and 88/2 are naturally wooded forest, with some grass patches, which area was not developed prior to 10.05.1971. It was then stated: 'All developed area planted with cardamom and coffee prior to 10.05.1971 are excluded from the survey of vested forest'(sic). Therein it was asserted that the area surveyed and taken as vested forest from R.S 88/1A and 88/2 are naturally wooded forest, with some grass patches, which area was not developed prior to 10.05.1971. It was then stated: 'All developed area planted with cardamom and coffee prior to 10.05.1971 are excluded from the survey of vested forest'(sic). We agree with the Tribunal that this is a general opinion or statement made by the DFO Special Division, Thalassery who signed the aforesaid statement. The statement is also very much in consonance with the letter and spirit of the provisions of the Vesting Act. Further, as was rightly noticed by the Tribunal, as per the Kerala Private Forest (Tribunal) Rules 1972, specifically R.8(3) enables the DFO to file a counter affidavit on behalf of the Government and the Custodian, except in case where the genuineness of a petitioners contention is admitted; in which event the Custodian himself shall sign the counter affidavit. By the said rule any concession would have to be made by the Custodian himself. 9. We also notice the constitution of the Tribunal made by the Vesting Act which empowers such Tribunal to settle disputes as arising under S.8. The specific dispute which the Tribunal is empowered to settle is as to whether, any land is a private forest or not and whether any private forest or portion thereof has vested in the Government or not. The definition clause defines private forests; out of which those which are covered under the MPPF Act, 1949 are enabled an exclusion as provided under clauses (A) to (D) of S.2(f)(1)(i) of the Vesting Act. Those lands covered under the MPPF Act and other private forests, within the Malabar area and in the other parts of the State are also enabled exemption from vesting under S.3(2) and (3) of the Vesting Act. The dispute which is agitated by the Tribunal in the earlier application was only with respect to the properties scheduled at that point of time which we see, even from the order of the Tribunal in OA No.364/1976 was about 500 acres of property. The alleged admission as available in the statement was recorded by the Tribunal only as the case set up by the respondent in their counter statement and not as a finding of the Tribunal. 10. The alleged admission as available in the statement was recorded by the Tribunal only as the case set up by the respondent in their counter statement and not as a finding of the Tribunal. 10. The Tribunal in OA 364/1976 was concerned with the claim of exclusion of about 150 acres, from the total extent notified as vested under the Vesting Act. The plots claimed for exemption was separately shown as plots 1,2, 3 and 4; having respective extents of 110 acres, 21 acres, 2 acres and 4.50 acres. The claim for exemption of 110 acres for purposes ancillary to the cultivation of the plantation crops and for preparation of the same for the market, was declined. However in plot 1, the claim for the lands around the streams existing in the property which irrigate the plantation was allowed to a limited extent; an area of five chains all around the source (spring) of water and one chain on both sides of the existing stream. This was the only exclusion granted in plot 1. Plot 2 having an extent of 21 acres was admitted to be existing with cardamom plants and the same was excluded. Plot No.3, a small hillock projecting into the cardamom planted area which was not existing as a forest was also excluded. Plot No.4 contained a road and also plantations, which too stood excluded. A total of 27.5 acres alone was excluded. In the MFAs filed, both by the State and applicant, the order of the Tribunal was affirmed and there is no reference to the so called admission or finding regarding the nature of the balance lands held by the applicant; which applies equally to the order in the Civil Appeal filed against the order in MFA. We see that a remand was made in the Civil Appeal insofar as the ancillary purpose claimed by the applicant; which admittedly was not pursued before the concerned Forest Tribunal. 11. The order in the CRP filed before this Court from the proceedings in the TLB is made available to us in the paper book . CRP No. 2813/1983 and two connected OPs filed by the predecessor-in-interest of the applicant and a public interest litigation dealt with the ceiling case against the owners as adjudicated by the TLB Mananthawadi. 11. The order in the CRP filed before this Court from the proceedings in the TLB is made available to us in the paper book . CRP No. 2813/1983 and two connected OPs filed by the predecessor-in-interest of the applicant and a public interest litigation dealt with the ceiling case against the owners as adjudicated by the TLB Mananthawadi. The TLB directed an extent of 345.69 acres to be surrendered finding that, to be in excess of the ceiling limits under the Land Reforms Act. The decision was subsequent to the decision of the Forest Tribunal in OA 364/1976. Therein the land owners had contended that in the course of enquiry by the TLB the various reports filed in the course of enquiry and also other evidence clearly point to the fact that the entire area was forest land, which had been converted into plantation before 01.04.1964 and therefore there is no basis for classifying the land as other dry lands. The Division Bench noticed the decision of the Forest Tribunal to observe that 523.89 acres out of the total 1004.24 acres described as estates is forest area as on 10.05.1971 and the same has been since taken over by the Government as vested forest. Their Lordships also assumed that what is excluded from the survey was developed area planted with cardamom and coffee prior to 1971 as conceded before the Tribunal; which concession we have found, is not available. In fact the report of the authorised officer before the TLB after inspection of the land was that 932.98 acres of land are liable to be exempted as coffee and cardamom plantation and private forest. The interference caused to the order of the TLB directing surrender of lands was on the premise that even if the land was originally private forest and had not been planted, it would still fall under the exemption. Kerala Land Reforms Act excludes both plantations and private forests from the ceiling limit. 12. On an identical premise the Hon'ble Supreme Court also affirmed the order in CRP. We extract the following from the order in the Civil Appeal: “There is no dispute that the entire extent 1004.24 acre was originally treated as forest under the Madras Preservation of Private Forest Act, 1949, which is applicable to the Malabar area in which the forest now in question is situated. We extract the following from the order in the Civil Appeal: “There is no dispute that the entire extent 1004.24 acre was originally treated as forest under the Madras Preservation of Private Forest Act, 1949, which is applicable to the Malabar area in which the forest now in question is situated. Under the Vesting Act probably on the ground that on the day when the property was acquired only 523 acres remained as forest, that alone was acquired and the remaining was treated as plantation. That is evident from the decision of the Forest Tribunal dated 20.06.1978 in which only 523 acres remained as forest. It is, therefore, clear from the findings of the Land Board and the findings of the Forest Tribunal that some time between 01.04.1964 and 10.05.1971 the excess land now declared surplus was converted into plantation. That makes no difference to the position because whether it is forest or plantation, both categories of land are exempted under Section 81 of the Act. It is in these circumstances, the High Court held that: “When the materials on record clearly establish the character of the land as either forest or plantation the entire extent is liable to be exempted under Section 81 of the Land Reforms Act.” We are in entire agreement with this finding of the High Court. But the learned Counsel for the appellants contends that in the return filed under Section 85, the respondent had not claimed any exemption of any land on the ground that it is forest and the entire contention was that the total area was a plantation. This may not be quite accurate. Though they claimed certain areas as plantation they have also claimed in the return that rest of the area was forest. The order of the Forest Tribunal found that the area other than 523.89 acres was a plantation as on 10.05.1971. The Land Board was of the view that an extent of 345.69 acres was forest on the date when the Act came into force. It makes no difference, therefore, whether it was converted into plantation or whether it remained as forest subsequently. In both the cases since the respondent was entitled to exemption under Section 81, we do not find any ground to interfere with the order of the Division Bench. It makes no difference, therefore, whether it was converted into plantation or whether it remained as forest subsequently. In both the cases since the respondent was entitled to exemption under Section 81, we do not find any ground to interfere with the order of the Division Bench. In fact, the findings of the High Court had been largely supported by the reports of the various officers submitted during the proceedings before the Land Board. In the result, therefore there are no grounds to interfere and accordingly this appeal is dismissed. But there will be no order as to costs.” [Undelining by us for emphasis] 13. Basanth Singh (supra) declared that an admission by a party in a prior suit, is an admission within the meaning of Section 17 of the Indian Evidence Act and may be proved against him in other litigation. But, such admission, it was categorically held cannot be regarded as conclusive and it is open to the party to show that it is not true. In the present case we have found that there is no admission as such regarding the balance properties, over which there was no dispute under Section 8 of the Vesting Act, at the time of the earlier notification, which triggered O.A.No. 364/1976 before the Forest Tribunal. We notice that as per S.17 of the Evidence Act, an admission is a statement which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact. Therefore a statement propounded as an admission made with respect to a matter, which was not a fact in issue or relevant fact, in the earlier lis is no admission at all. We have already noticed that the statement made was a general statement regarding the vesting under the enactment and there can be no finding regarding the balance property held by the applicant. We have also noticed the specific rule requiring any concession to be made before the Tribunal, by the Custodian himself. It cannot also be assumed that at the time of the earlier notification there was a survey conducted of the balance properties also and the same consciously excluded from being notified. Neither the Tribunal nor this Court made any declaration regarding the balance lands in the earlier proceeding. It cannot also be assumed that at the time of the earlier notification there was a survey conducted of the balance properties also and the same consciously excluded from being notified. Neither the Tribunal nor this Court made any declaration regarding the balance lands in the earlier proceeding. Even in the proceedings arising from the order of the TLB, a Division Bench of this Court and the Hon’ble Supreme Court made an observation regarding the non inclusion of the balance lands; but however interfered with the surrender directed by the TLB only on the trite law as emanating from the Land Reforms Act that, both plantations and private forests are excluded from the ceiling limit prescribed under that Act. There cannot be any estoppel found in the present case especially since the vesting occurs statutorily and automatically as on the appointed day and the notification is irrelevant and immaterial insofar as the actual vesting. 14. There is also no issue of resjudicata since the presently notified properties, on which exclusion is claimed in the instant O.A, was not the subject matter of the dispute in the earlier O.A nor was the claim of existence of a plantation relevant in the ceiling proceedings. 15. We have also perused the report of the local inspection conducted by the Tribunal in O.A.No.364/1976, which is dated 14.12.1977. Therein the Tribunal has only recorded the version of the respondents that all the developed areas planted with cardamom and coffee prior to 10.05.1971 are excluded from survey of vested forest; which we have already found is a general statement. We also have looked at the power conferred on the Tribunal to conduct local inspection which flows from Section 12(e) of the Vesting Act, which is also a reflection of the power conferred by the Civil Procedure Code by Order XVIII Rule 18. The power to carry out such local inspection and the effect of the same has been considered by a Division Bench in Kunjiraman (supra). It has been categorically held that the purpose of local inspection is only to enable the Court to understand the evidence in the case and never intended as a creation or collection of evidence. The power to carry out such local inspection and the effect of the same has been considered by a Division Bench in Kunjiraman (supra). It has been categorically held that the purpose of local inspection is only to enable the Court to understand the evidence in the case and never intended as a creation or collection of evidence. It was also declared that the observations made during local inspection cannot be used as evidence for any purpose, especially since it is well settled that local inspection is not intended to substitute the enquiry envisaged in law. The Presiding Officer who makes the local inspection cannot substitute his own view in the matter for the evidence in the case. 16. A later Division Bench in State of Kerala v. Nanu [1991(2)KLT 251]followed the aforesaid judgment, which was also in tune with the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ugam Singh v. Kesarimal [ AIR 1971 SC 2540 ]. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while referring to the observations in the impugned order, with respect to the Presiding Officer’s inspection, held “the judgment in our view is not based solely on the result of personal inspection made by the trial judge, which inspection was for the purposes of understanding the evidence in the case and has been so used by the trial judge” (sic). Expressing concern over a situation where the inspection reveals facts existing in reality, contrary to the testimony of a witness; as in a case where the witness deposes total absence of trees in his property, whereas the local inspection reveals a number of standing trees in existence, then there would be absolutely no rationale or justification in requiring the trial judge, to not rely on the real facts. However, the Division Bench did not digress from the dictum laid down earlier by another coordinate Bench and also the Hon’ble Supreme Court; but merely highlighted the necessity to define more clearly the effect of a local inspection, by statutory intervention. 17. We are also bound by the dictum of the coordinate Bench and also the Hon’ble Supreme Court and we find no reason to digress from the same based merely on extraordinary situations that may arise which would have to be dealt with, appropriately through extraordinary measures. 17. We are also bound by the dictum of the coordinate Bench and also the Hon’ble Supreme Court and we find no reason to digress from the same based merely on extraordinary situations that may arise which would have to be dealt with, appropriately through extraordinary measures. In fact, in Kunjiraman (supra) the Division Bench had noticed Order XXVI Rule 10 of the CPC, where the parties to a lis can collect evidence through inspection by taking out a Commission. We are also not convinced that the local inspection conducted in O.A.No.364/1976 pertains to the land which is now sought for exclusion on the ground of existence of plantation crops. Therein, more than 500 acres was treated as vested and the applicant himself chose to seek exclusion for only plot Nos.1, 2, 3 and 4 having a total extent of 150 acres. The report clearly specifies the nature of the land covered under specified plot Nos. 1 to 4. The exemption granted was only to 27.5 acres of which 21 acres alone was found, even on local inspection to be planted with cardamom and the balance exclusion was as an appurtenant land for maintenance of the plantation. It is puerile to assume that the Tribunal at that stage inspected the balance properties in the possession of the applicant which is again about 500 acres and convinced himself about the exclusion as a planted area. Such was not the purpose of the local inspection and the Tribunal at that stage was also not concerned with and hence not competent to make any observations with respect to the balance properties. We cannot but give short shrift to the reliance placed by the appellant, on the local inspection report. 18. Now we look at the Commission Report in the present case, which is based on an inspection conducted on various days in the months of December 2002 and January & February 2003. The Commissioner specifically referred to the documents by which the properties were purchased by the applicant-Company. Ext.A4 Deed No.2522 was a sale made by M.A. Jan to the petitioner Company of the properties scheduled as B and C in Sy.No.88/1A, the extents of which were respectively 268.39 acres and 7.50 acres. Ext.A5, bearing Deed No.2523 of 1995 conveyed 110 acres in B schedule and 27.5 acres in C schedule, the last of which was that exempted in O.A.No.364 of 1976. Ext.A5, bearing Deed No.2523 of 1995 conveyed 110 acres in B schedule and 27.5 acres in C schedule, the last of which was that exempted in O.A.No.364 of 1976. Ext.A6, bearing Deed No.2524 of 1995 conveyed 101.95 acres. According to the Commissioner, one Watchman informed her that he was supervising the plantation for 25 years and that there were sprinklers used from 1950 onward, some of which were robbed about 9 months back. The 25 years computed backwards from the year of inspection will not take us to the appointed day. The Commissioner reported that she could not see the 266 pipes claimed by the said Watchmen but she did notice some of the sprinkler lines. The only observation regarding cultivation was that she could see yielding cardamom plants intermittently planted and it was accessible for the agricultural labourers. It is also reported that she saw 40 acres of coffee plantations where silveroak and orange trees aged 40 years were also found. In fact, in the concluding portion it was stated that ‘In toto, the entire areas covering 411.35 acres are not fully cultivated and the majority of the area apart from the above mentioned planted areas is covered with varieties of trees, plants and shrubs’(sic). Here we again notice that the Tribunal specifically computed 85 acres of cultivated plantation to have been excluded from vesting, which remains with the applicant as cultivated lands. It is to be emphasized that the cultivation of plantation crops which enables exclusion under the definition of private forest in Section 2(f)(1)(i) of the Vesting Act is a principal cultivation of plantation crops. If the 411 acres were cultivated as on the appointed day definitely there would be material to indicate such cultivation; by way of remittance of plantation tax and the statutory registers to be maintained under the Plantation Labour Act. The applicant admittedly purchased the land in 1995 and as on the appointed day, the said lands were held by M.A Jan & his children. None of the predecessors-in-interest who executed the sale deeds were examined before the Tribunal. Even the Commission Report does not speak of the entire properties being principally cultivated with plantation crops as on 2002-2003. The reference to sprinklers being available for the last 25 years does not lead to an inference that they were available as on the appointed day which was even further away. Even the Commission Report does not speak of the entire properties being principally cultivated with plantation crops as on 2002-2003. The reference to sprinklers being available for the last 25 years does not lead to an inference that they were available as on the appointed day which was even further away. We find absolutely no reason to upset the reasoned order of the Tribunal. We reject the appeal and leave the parties to suffer their respective costs.