JUDGMENT (Prayer: Criminal Revision Petition has been filed under Section 397 r/w 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to call for the records and set aside the judgment dated 07.01.2019, passed in C.A.No.64 of 2017, on the file of III Additional Sessions Court, Tirunelveli and the order dated 06.09.2017, passed in M.C.No.11 of 2016, on the file of the Judicial Magistrate Court No.I, Tirunelveli.) 1. This Criminal Revision is directed against the order passed in C.A.No.64 of 2017, dated 07.01.2019, on the file of III Additional District Court, Tirunelveli, modifying the order passed in M.C.No.11 of 2016, dated 06.09.2017, on the file of the Court of Judicial Magistrate No.I, Tirunelveli. 2. For the sake of convenience and brevity, the parties will be referred as per their status and ranking in the trial Court. 3. It is not in dispute that the petitioner is the daughter of the first respondent, that the first respondent and her deceased husband – Vethamuthu Victor had two daughters M.Merlin – petitioner herein and Golta and a son – Antony Asir Daniel – second respondent herein and that the third respondent is the wife of the second respondent. The petitioner, by alleging domestic violence against her own mother, brother and brother''s wife, has filed the case in M.C.No. 11 of 2016 claiming protection orders under Section 18, residence order under Section 19, compensation under Section 22 and monthly maintenance under Section 20 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act. 4. The first respondent on her behalf and on behalf of the other respondents, have filed a counter statement raising serious objections. During enquiry, the petitioner has examined herself as P.W.1 and exhibited 10 documents as Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.10. The respondents have examined the first respondent as R.W.1 and one Chellathurai as R.W.2 and exhibited 7 documents as Exs.R.1 to R.7. 5. During enquiry, the petitioner has examined herself as P.W.1 and exhibited 10 documents as Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.10. The respondents have examined the first respondent as R.W.1 and one Chellathurai as R.W.2 and exhibited 7 documents as Exs.R.1 to R.7. 5. The learned Judicial Magistrate, upon considering the evidence, both oral and documentary and on hearing the arguments of both sides, has passed an order dated 06.09.2017 partly allowing the application and thereby granting protection orders directing the respondents not to harass the petitioner by evicting her from the shared household till her marriage, residence order directing the respondents not to oust the petitioner from the shared household; directing the respondents not to make alienation or encumbrance over the property situated in Door No.35/2, St.Pauls Road, Palayamkottai, Tirunelveli without permission of the Court; directed the first respondent to pay Rs.5,000/- as monthly rent to the petitioner and directing the first respondent to pay compensation of Rs.5,00,000/- and to pay monthly maintenance of Rs.10,000/- from the date of petition till her marriage. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner as well as the first respondent have preferred appeals in C.A.No.64 of 2017 and C.A.No.74 of 2018 respectively. The learned Additional District Judge, Tirunelveli, upon considering the evidence available on record and on hearing the arguments of both sides, has passed the impugned common judgment dated 07.01.2019, partly allowing the appeal in C.A.No.64 of 2017 and thereby modified the order of the trial Court, by reducing the compensatin to Rs.3,00,000/- and enhanced the monthly maintenance to Rs.12,000/-. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment passed in C.A.No.64 of 2017, the first respondent has preferred the present Criminal Revision Case. 6. Admittedly, the first respondent has not preferred any revision with regard to C.A.No.74 of 2018. The revision petitioner/first respondent has taken a stand that the first respondent – mother cannot be considered as a respondent as found in the provision of Section 2(q) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act and that the Courts below had misconstrued the definition of the “respondent” and wrongly passed the impugned order and judgment against the petitioner, But when the revision was taken up for hearing, the learned Counsel for the petitioner would fairly concede that the above defence has already been dealt with by the Courts below and rightly decided against the petitioner. 7. 7. The Hon''ble Supreme Court in Hiral P. Harsora and others vs Kusum Narottamdas Harsora and others reported in (2016)10 SCC 165 , has declared that the words “adult male” in Section 2(q) of the Act 2015, will stand deleted since these words do not square with Article 14 of the Constitution of India and that consequently, the proviso to Section 2(q) being rendered otiose, also stands deleted. 8. Considering the above, a compliant can be lodged under the provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act even against a female member and hence, the above contention of the revision petitioner is liable to be rejected. 9. At this juncture, it is pertinent to refer the definition for “aggrieved person” and “domestic relationship” given under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act: “2(a): “aggrieved person” means any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent. 2(f): “domestic relationship” means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family. “ 10. It is also necessary to refer the definition of domestic violence under Section 3 of the said Act: “3. Definition of domestic violence.—For the purposes of this Act, any act, omission or commission or conduct of the respondent shall constitute domestic violence in case it— (a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life, limb or well-being, whether mental or physical, of the aggrieved person or tends to do so and includes causing physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse and economic abuse; or (b) harasses, harms, injures or endangers the aggrieved person with a view to coerce her or any other person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any dowry or other property or valuable security; or (c) has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or any person related to her by any conduct mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b); or (d) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or mental, to the aggrieved person.” 11. Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act contemplates that an aggrieved person can present an application to the Magistrate seeking one or more reliefs under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act. The term “aggrieved person” as defined under Section 2(a) of the Act means any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent. The expression “domestic relationship” as defined in Section 2(f) of the Act means, a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family. 12. The Hon''ble Supreme Court in Prabha Tyagi Vs. Kamlesh Devi reported in (2022)8 SCC 90 , has expressed its view that the D.V. Act is a piece of Civil Code which is applicable to every woman in India irrespective of her religious affiliation and/or social background for a more effective protection of her rights guaranteed under the Constitution and in order to protect women victims of domestic violence occurring in a domestic relationship, that therefore, the expression ‘joint family’ cannot mean as understood in Hindu Law and that the expression ‘family members living together as a joint family’, means the members living jointly as a family. 13. Section 20 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act deals with monetary relief. Section 20 (1) of the said Act states that an aggrieved person is entitled to monetary relief. Monetary relief has been defined under Section 2(k) of the said Act, which reads as follows: “2(k) “monetary relief” means the compensation which the Magistrate may order the respondent to pay to the aggrieved person, at any stage during the hearing of an application seeking any relief under this Act, to meet the expenses incurred and the losses suffered by the aggrieved person as a result of the domestic violence” 14. Section 22 of the said Act deals with the compensation orders which contemplates that in addition to other reliefs as may be granted under the Act, the Magistrate can pass an order directing the respondent to pay compensation and damages for the injuries, including mental torture and emotional distress, caused by the acts of domestic violence committed by the respondent. 15. In the case on hand, the learned Magistrate, considering the evidence adduced, has come to a decision that the petitioner is an aggrieved person and for the acts of domestic violence committed on her, has granted compensation of Rs.5,00,000/- under Section 22 of the said Act. 16. The learned Magistrate as well as the learned appellate Judge, after recording the finding that the petitioner was subjected to domestic violence, has proceeded to grant the various orders under the said Act. As already pointed out, since the revision petitioner has not challenged the granting of other reliefs, on the basis that domestic violence was committed on the petitioner and since the order granting other reliefs had attained finality, this Court in the revision cannot go into the validity or legality of the basic finding of the Courts below, that the petitioner being the aggrieved person was subjected to domestic violence. As already pointed out, though the trial Court has granted Rs.5,00,000/- as compensation, the learned Appellate Court has reduced the same to Rs.3,00,000/- and further directed that the said amount should be deposited in a Nationalised Bank in the name of the petitioner for a period of three years and permitted the petitioner to receive the matured amount after the expiry of the period. Admittedly, the petitioner has not challenged the order of the appellate Court reducing the compensation amount. Considering the above facts and circumstances of the case and also the quantum of compensation, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the order passed by the appellate Court with regard to the compensation under Section 22 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act. 17. Now turning to the main contention and objection of the revision petitioner/first respondent that the petitioner is not entitled to claim any maintenance from the first respondent for the reasons that she had attained majority, that she had already been married and possessing good educational qualifications and has been in a position to maintain herself. 17. Now turning to the main contention and objection of the revision petitioner/first respondent that the petitioner is not entitled to claim any maintenance from the first respondent for the reasons that she had attained majority, that she had already been married and possessing good educational qualifications and has been in a position to maintain herself. It is pertinent to note that at the time of filing the case, she had already completed Post Graduate in Computer applications (M.C.A.,) and during the pendency of the above proceedings, she has completed her B.L., course and even according to her, she has already been enrolled as an Advocate in the Bar Council of Tamil Nadu and Puducherry. 18. Though the petitioner has earlier engaged a Counsel to defend the present Criminal Revision Case, subsequently, she has conducted the case as party-in-person. Admittedly, the first respondent is a retired pensioner, aged about 69 years. As already pointed out, the monetary relief to be ordered under Section 20 of the said Act should be only to meet the expenses incurred and the losses suffered by the aggrieved person as a result of domestic violence. 19. A learned Judge of this Court in B.Prakash vs Deepa reported in 2016 ALL MR(Crl.J), 168, has observed that the loss suffered as per Section 20 of the Act, is nothing but the loss of financial resources to be paid by the husband towards wife''s maintenance. In the present case, as already pointed out, for the domestic violence suffered, the Courts below have granted compensation for the injury caused by the acts of domestic violence committed on her. The petitioner has not shown that her mother is duty bound to maintain her. As per Section 20(1)(d) of the said Act, a Magistrate can direct the respondents to pay monetary relief towards the expenses incurred and the losses suffered by the aggrieved person and any child / children of the aggrieved person and such relief may include but, is not limited to maintenance for the aggrieved person as well as her children if any, including an order under or in addition to an order of maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C., or any other law for the time being in force. 20. 20. Generally, the wife and the children can claim maintenance under the provisions of various Act, (i) Section 125 Cr.P.C; (ii) Sections 18 and 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1960 and (iii) under Section 20 r/w 23 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act. No doubt, a wife can claim interim alimony under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Admittedly, in the present case, the parties to the lis are Christians. The Kerala High Court in Joy Vs. Usha reported in AIR 1996 KER 191 , has observed that there is no specific statutory provision mandating Christians, a Christian father or a Christian husband to maintain his children and wife and referred another Kerala High Court decision in Scariah Varghese Vs. Mary Kutty reported in 1991(2) Ker.LT 71, wherein it has been observed that the matters not governed by a statute or where there is no accepted customary law, the Judge should be guided by the great principle of justice, equity and good conscience to the effect that with the Indian tradition, a citizen is bound to maintain his children which is the tradition of the Society in accordance with justice, equity and good conscience, irrespective of the position in English law which are peculiar to the said system. 21. It is pertinent to note that as per Section 2(b) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, the definition of “child” would mean, any person below the age of eighteen years and includes any adopted, step or foster child. The Kerala High Court referring to an earlier decision by another Single Judge of that High Court in Muhammed V. Kunhayisha reported in 2003 KHC 1076, wherein it has been held that Section 125 Cr.P.C., does not permit an unmarried major daughter to claim maintenance and the relevant passage is extracted hereunder: “13. It is clear that the child as defined in the Domestic violence Act specifically refers to any person below the age of 18 years. These scope of the terms is clear, categoric and unambiguous. There is no scope for any other interpretation. It is clear that the child as defined in the Domestic violence Act specifically refers to any person below the age of 18 years. These scope of the terms is clear, categoric and unambiguous. There is no scope for any other interpretation. This seems to be clear from the decision reported in (Muhammed v. Kunhayisha 2003 KHC 1076), in which the learned Single Judge of this Court while invoking section 125 Cr.P.C , 1973held that the language of section 125 Cr.P.C , 1973does not permit a construction that the status of a major daughter as an unmarried person can by itself be construed as physical or mental abnormality or injury sufficient to bring her care within the sweep of Section 125(c) beyond for the statute for meant. It was categorically held that whatever be the religion of the parties, the language of the statute did not permit an unmarried major daughter to be brought in the purview of section 125 Cr.P.C, 1973 on the mere ground that she was unmarried. This equally applies to a case under section 2 (b) of the Domestic violence Act also. This view was later affirmed by a Division Bench of this court in (Cholamarakkar and Another v. Pathummamma @ Pathumma and Another 2008(3) KHC 973 ). Hence I am inclined to hold that the term child used in section 2 (b) clearly refers to any person below the age of 18 years, whether married or unmarried.” 22. Considering the above, it can easily be inferred that the first respondent -mother who is a senior citizen has no moral or legal duty to maintain her major daughter. 23. As per Section 125 Cr.P.C., major children who are not suffering from any disability or ailment, can not claim maintenance from their parents. As per Section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, a daughter can claim maintenance from her father till she gets married. It is not the case of the petitioner, that there is some other provision which mandates her old mother to maintain her, after attaining majority. 24. It is not in dispute that one Gokulnath has filed a petition in O.P.No. 2630 of 2011 against the petitioner to declare his marriage dated 09.06.2011 with the petitioner as null and void, which was registered on the same day at Registrar of Marriages, Royapuram. 24. It is not in dispute that one Gokulnath has filed a petition in O.P.No. 2630 of 2011 against the petitioner to declare his marriage dated 09.06.2011 with the petitioner as null and void, which was registered on the same day at Registrar of Marriages, Royapuram. The petitioner, on the other hand, has filed a petition in O.P.No.3635 of 2011, on the file of the Family Court, Chennai claiming restitution of conjugal rights. In the petition filed by the said Gokulnath, he has alleged that he was forcibly taken to Royapuram Sub Registrar office by the petitioner and her men under the guidance of police, was forced to sign in the application form as if their marriage was solemnized on 09.06.2011 at A.J.Colony, Royapuram, Chennai. But the petitioner has filed a counter statement stating that they were in love, that the said Gokulnath had married her on 09.06.2011 in the presence of common friends and the same was registered at the Sub-Registrar of Royapuram, Chennai, that even before their marriage, they went to Kalahasthi and stayed there and at that time, they had sexual intercourse and that since the said Gokulnath has been neglecting her, she was forced to give a complaint and that therefore, the petition filed by the said Gokulnath is liable to be dismissed. 25. It is evident from the copy of the order passed in O.P.No.2630 of 2011, dated 04.12.2015 that both the petitioner and the said Gokulnath have filed a compromise memo and on the basis of the said compromise entered into between the parties, the marriage allegedly held between them was declared as null and void. Whether such a decree can be passed in terms of the compromise between the parties is a million dollar question and this Court refrains from stepping into it. The fact which remains is, the petitioner had specifically admitted her marriage with the said Gokulnath and claimed restitution of conjugal rights and that subsequently on the basis of the alleged compromise entered between them, those petitions were disposed of. It is also not in dispute that the petitioner has lodged some complaints against the said Gokulnath and his parents and charge sheets were laid in some of the cases and the same were pending. It is also not in dispute that the petitioner has lodged some complaints against the said Gokulnath and his parents and charge sheets were laid in some of the cases and the same were pending. Subsequently, the petitioner has also lodged a maintenance claim against the said Gokulnath and at that time, they have entered into a compromise and the petitioner, after receiving a sum of Rs.5,50,000/-, has agreed to withdraw the cases pending against the said Gokulnath. 26. As rightly pointed out by the learned Counsel for the first respondent, after receiving a lumpsum amount of Rs.5,50,000/- from the said Gokulnath, she has now filed the above case, claiming compensation and maintenance from her mother, brother and sister-in-law. Even assuming for arguments sake, that the petitioner is entitled to get maintenance for the expenses incurred and losses suffered, the same cannot be claimed indefinitely. Even according to the petitioner, she is aged about 39 years. After attaining majority, after entering into a marriage, after receiving the lumpsum amount towards all her claims against the alleged former husband, she has now claimed the maintenance from her aged mother and that too till her marriage ie., second marriage. As rightly contended by the learned Counsel for the first respondent, since the petitioner herself has admitted her marriage with the said Gokulnath, even though the same was declared as null and void on the basis of the alleged compromise, she cannot claim maintenance till her next marriage. 27. It is also not in dispute that the petitioner has filed a suit for partition in respect of her father''s property against her mother, sister and brother and already obtained a preliminary decree in her favour and that her final decree petition is pending. Considering the above and the educational qualifications and her enrolment before the Bar Council, she cannot be considered as a woman, who is unable to maintain herself and is without means or not having any wherewithal to earn for her livelihood. As already pointed out, the petitioner being a MCA holder and now an Advocate by profession, has absolutely no locus standi to claim maintenance from her aged mother, who is depending on her pension. The petitioner has neither pleaded nor adduced any materials to show that she has been suffering loss continuously so as to enable her to claim maintenance continuously. 28. The petitioner has neither pleaded nor adduced any materials to show that she has been suffering loss continuously so as to enable her to claim maintenance continuously. 28. It is evident from the records that the respondent-mother has levelled so many allegations against her daughter-petitioner. Even according to the petitioner, she had lodged police complaints against her mother and brother. Considering the way in which, the petitioner has conducted herself before this Court and her behaviour with the staffs of the Registry, this Court is constrained to observe that the petitioner is in the habit of making issues out of even thin air and seems to be a trouble monger. 29. Recently, the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Ajay kumar Rathee Vs. Seema Rathee in Civil Appeal No;5141 of 2011, dated 10.03.2022, has specifically observed that a daughter who is not willing to maintain any relationship with her father, is not entitled to any money either for education or marriage. In the case on hand, considering the nature of allegations levelled against the petitioner and lodging of complaints by the petitioner against her mother and the cases instituted against her mother, it can easily be inferred from her approach that she does not want to maintain any relationship with the respondent-mother. The petitioner being 39 years old woman, she is entitled to choose her own path, but at the same time, cannot demand any maintenance and that too from her aged mother. On considering the entire facts and circumstances, this Court is of the clear view that the Courts below, without considering the above aspects in proper perspective, have mechanically granted the maintenance to the petitioner. 30. Considering the above this Court concludes that the very order granting maintenance to the petitioner is not in accordance with law and the same is liable to be interfered with. 31. In the result, the Criminal Revision Case is partly allowed. The order granting compensation of Rs.3,00,000/- by the appellate Court stands confirmed and the order granting maintenance to the respondent/petitioner is set aside. It is clarified that the respondent/petitioner is not entitled to maintenance, but compensation alone. 31. In the result, the Criminal Revision Case is partly allowed. The order granting compensation of Rs.3,00,000/- by the appellate Court stands confirmed and the order granting maintenance to the respondent/petitioner is set aside. It is clarified that the respondent/petitioner is not entitled to maintenance, but compensation alone. In the interest of justice, this Court orders that the respondent/petitioner is entitled to retain the amount already received towards maintenance pursuant to the orders of the Court below, as the compensation amount to be paid by the petitioner/ the respondent, if not paid in full be equalled to the compensation to be paid and anything in excess be retained by the respondent/ the petitioner. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.