JUDGMENT : Satyen Vaidya, J. By way of instant petition, petitioner has assailed office order Annexure P-6, whereby the appropriate authority has declined to refer the dispute under Section 10 of Industrial Disputes Act 1947 (for short ‘the Act’) on the ground that the claim of the petitioner was stale. 2. The case of the petitioner in nutshell is that he was engaged by respondent No.1 as daily waged worker in the year 1992 and his services were terminated in 1993. The petitioner for the first time had challenged his termination by approaching this Court in the year 2012 by filing CWP No. 7323 of 2012. A Division Bench of this Court disposed of the petition filed by the petitioner on 31.8.2012, in following terms:- “The petitioners seek re-engagement on the ground that principle of ‘last come first go’ has not been followed. At this distance of time, it is not proper and possible to go into those aspects. However, in case the petitioners have actually worked under the 2nd respondent, in case the 2nd respondent requires additional man-power on account of availability of 3 work, the petitioners will be engaged in preference to new recruits, as fresh hand. 2. With these observations, writ petitions stand disposed of, so also the pending application(s), if any.” 3. Having failed to secure employment from respondent No.1, petitioner again approached this Court by way of CWP No. 8301 of 2014 and a Division Bench of this Court disposed of the petition filed by petitioner along with other connected matters vide order dated 11.4.2016, in following terms:- “After hearing for a while, learned Counsel for the petitioner's stated at the Bar that they may be permitted to withdraw these writ petitions with liberty to seek appropriate remedy, in view of the ratio laid down by the apex Court in Raghubir Singh versus General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Hissar, reported in 2014 AIR SCW 5515 AIR SCW 5515 and also to seek relief(s) sought in these writ petitions, at appropriate stage. Their statements are taken on record. 2. Accordingly, these writ petitions are disposed of, with liberty, as prayed for, alongwith all pending applications. The interim directions, if any, shall stand vacated”. 4. Thereafter, the petitioner served a demand notice under Section 2-A of the Act, which finally culminated in impugned order Annexure P-6. 5. Their statements are taken on record. 2. Accordingly, these writ petitions are disposed of, with liberty, as prayed for, alongwith all pending applications. The interim directions, if any, shall stand vacated”. 4. Thereafter, the petitioner served a demand notice under Section 2-A of the Act, which finally culminated in impugned order Annexure P-6. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the petitioner had filed CWP No. 8301 of 2014, when he had acquired knowledge that his juniors were continued in employment by respondent No.1 and the action of respondents in terminating the service of petitioner in 1993 was in violation of the principle of ‘last come first go’. 6. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Additional Advocate General for respondent No. 3 and have also gone through the record carefully. 7. The impugned office order Annexure P-6 reveals that the appropriate authority had duly considered the factum of delay on part of the petitioner as reason to deny the reference of alleged dispute for adjudication to Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal. It was clearly noticed in the impugned order that the petitioner had worked with respondent No.1 w.e.f. 22.1.1992 to 25.3.1992. He remained silent for twenty years and thereafter had approached this Court for the first time in the year 2012. 8. While expounding the scope of powers of appropriate authority under section 10 of the Act, a Full Bench of this Court in CWP No. 2190 of 2020 titled as Jai Singh vs. State of H.P. & another along with connected matters decided on 30.3.2022, has held as under:- “28. Following principles of law can, therefore be culled out from series of the precedents discussed above, as to the effect of delay in demanding /making reference of the industrial dispute to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal under Section 10(1) of the Act:- (i) That the function of the appropriate Government while dealing with question of making reference of industrial dispute under Section 10(1) of the Act, is an administrative function and not a judicial or quasi judicial function. (ii) That the Government before taking a decision on the question of making reference of the industrial dispute has to form a definite opinion whether or not such dispute exits or is apprehended. (ii) That the Government before taking a decision on the question of making reference of the industrial dispute has to form a definite opinion whether or not such dispute exits or is apprehended. (iii) That whether or not the industrial dispute exists or is apprehended in the meaning of Section 10(1) of the Act can be decided by the appropriate Government alone and not by any other higher authority including by this Court. (iv) That the appropriate Government in discharging the administrative function of taking a decision to make or refuse to make, reference of the industrial dispute under Section 10(1) of the Act, has to apply its mind on relevant considerations and has not to act mechanically as a post office. (v) That while forming an opinion as to whether the industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, the appropriate Government is not entitled to adjudicate the dispute itself on merits. (vi) That the delay by itself does not denude the appropriate Government of its power to examine advisability of making reference of the industrial dispute but the delay would certainly be relevant for deciding the basic question whether or not the industrial dispute “exists” which also includes the decision to find out whether on account of delay the dispute has ceased to exist or has ceased to be alive or has become stale or has faded away. (vii) That whether or not a dispute is alive or has become stale or non-existent, would always depend on the facts of each case and no rule of universal application can be laid down for the same. (viii) That even if Section 10(1) of the Act empowers the appropriate Government to form an opinion “at any time” on the question whether any “industrial dispute” “exists or is apprehended”, and there is no time limit prescribed for taking such a decision, yet such power has to be exercised by the appropriate Government within a reasonable time. (ix) That the period for making reference of industrial dispute is co-extensive with the existence of dispute because the factum of the “existence” or “apprehension of the dispute” is conditioned by the effect of the delay on the liveliness of the dispute. (ix) That the period for making reference of industrial dispute is co-extensive with the existence of dispute because the factum of the “existence” or “apprehension of the dispute” is conditioned by the effect of the delay on the liveliness of the dispute. (x) That the appropriate Government in arriving at the decision to make a reference of industrial dispute or otherwise, in the context of delay, may examine whether the workman or the Union has been agitating the matter before the appropriate fora so as to keep the dispute alive, which however, does not necessarily mean that in a case where such action has not been initiated, the dispute has ceased to exist. (xi) That the appropriate Government can, as per Section 10(1) of the Act, take a decision on the question of making reference “at any time”, thus implying that there is no limitation in taking such decision and the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to such proceedings. (xii) That the appropriate Government while taking a decision on the question of making reference, need not provide an elaborate opportunity of hearing to the workman but it is under an obligation to consider his explanation for delay in making the demand. (xiii) That in cases where the appropriate Government while examining the question of making a reference of industrial dispute arrives at a decision that the question that on account of delay the dispute has ceased to exist or alive, would require elaborate examination of the evidence, it may while making a reference of the industrial dispute, additionally formulate question on this aspect to be decided as preliminary issue while simultaneously also making a reference on the industrial dispute to be decided as secondary issue. (xiv) That even in a case where reference has been made to the Industrial Court after prolonged delay, such Court would be entitled to mould the relief by declining whole or part of the back wages. (xv) That even when a reference is made by appropriate Government in a case after huge and enormous unexplained delay, 50 the industrial Court would be entitled to return the reference since such Court judiciously exercises its wide jurisdiction under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act and is under obligation to consider whether in such like situation any relief at all could be granted to the workman.” 9. Thus, the appropriate authority under the Act is not bound to refer every dispute for adjudication to Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal notwithstanding existence of delay and laches. What is required of appropriate authority is the consideration on reasons for the delay that too for ascertaining whether the dispute still subsisted or had worn away? 10. After examining the impugned office order Annexure P-6 against legal position summarized above, I am of the considered view that no illegality can be found in the said order. 11. The plea regarding violation of rights of petitioner under the Act and more particularly of the principle of ‘last come first go’ had been considered by a Division Bench of this Court while deciding CWP No. 7323 of 2012. Such plea had been impliedly rejected by this court by showing its inability to go into said aspect at such a belated stage. In this view of the matter, petitioner could not have raised same plea again by raising an industrial dispute. Even the demand notice served upon respondent No.1 by petitioner reveals reiteration of same plea. Once such plea was rejected by a Division Bench of this Court, the appropriate authority was fully justified in refusing to refer the dispute after considering the aspect of unexplained and inordinate delay on part of the petitioner. 12. In view of above discussion, I find no merit in the petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.