JUDGMENT : 1. This is an appeal preferred by the State of Gujarat under Section 378(3) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“The Code” for short) against the judgment and order of acquittal dated 28.2.2005, recorded by learned Special Judge, Fast Track Court, Valsad in Special (A.C.B.) Case No.50 of 2002 (new) (Old Case No. 3 of 2001), whereby the learned trial Judge acquitted the respondent – accused of the charges for the offences punishable under Section 7, 13(1) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (‘the Act’ for short). 2. Brief facts leading to prosecution case is that the complainant - Karsanbhai Bapujibhai Patel was residing with his two sons at Dulsad, Sindhi Faliya, Tal: District: Valsad and doing labour work. Before one week of filing of present complaint, a fall out took place between the complainant and Mohanbhai Bapujibhai regarding the hand-pump and, therefore, the complaint came to be lodged against Mohanbhai Bapujibhai at Valsad Rural Police Station. At the time of complaint, the respondent - accused was serving as head constable and investigating the complaint filed by the complainant against said Mohanbhai Bapujibhai. In view of the complaint filed by the complainant against Mohanbhai Bapujibhai, a cross complaint came to be filed against the sons of the complainant. It was case of the prosecution that the respondent - accused arrested all the concerned persons who were involved in the fall out which took place in Faliya, and demanded Rs.800 as illegal gratification for not bringing them on remand. It was case of the prosecution that the said illegal gratification demanded by respondent - accused was for his personal gain and, for that the complainant gave him Rs.200/- on that day and balance amount of Rs.600/- was to be paid to the respondent - accused on a later date. Thereafter, the accused produced all the arrested persons and they all were released on bail from the Court. It was case of the prosecution that despite bail, the accused demanded remaining Rs.600/- on 29.12.2000 at 12 hours at his office i.e., in Valsad Rural Police Station. As the complainant did not want to pay any further bribe as demanded by respondent - accused, he approached Valsad Anti-Corruption Bureau, P.I. and filed complaint on 27.12.2000. It was case of the prosecution that despite bail, the accused demanded remaining Rs.600/- on 29.12.2000 at 12 hours at his office i.e., in Valsad Rural Police Station. As the complainant did not want to pay any further bribe as demanded by respondent - accused, he approached Valsad Anti-Corruption Bureau, P.I. and filed complaint on 27.12.2000. Upon receipt of complaint from the complainant, P.I. of ACB Valsad sent a yadi to Manager of ST Depot, Valsad for sending panch witnesses and a trap was arranged and during the course of trap, the respondent - accused was caught red handed along with tainted currency note of Rs.600/- and thereby offence punishable under Sections 7, 13 (1) read with 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was registered against the respondent – accused. Necessary investigation was carried out and statements of several witnesses were recorded. During course of investigation the respondent was arrested and thereafter released on bail. Ultimately, charge-sheet was filed before the learned Special Judge, Fast Track Court, Valsad where the case was registered as Special Corruption Case No.50 of 2002. The trial was initiated against the respondent. 3. To prove the case against the present respondent - accused, the prosecution has examined in all four witnesses and also produced several documentary evidences. 4. At the end of trial, after recording the statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. and hearing arguments on behalf of prosecution and the defence, the learned trial Judge acquitted the respondent of all the charges levelled against him by the impugned judgment and order. 5. Being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the aforesaid judgment and order passed by learned trial Judge the appellant State has preferred the present appeal. 6. Heard Ms. Jirga Jhaveri, learned APP for the appellant – State and Mr. Dipak Sindhi, learned advocate for the respondent – accused. 7. Appearing for the State, learned APP Ms. Jhaveri submitted that learned Special Judge has not properly appreciated the evidence and the learned Special Judge ought to have held that the evidence of the shadow panch is sufficient to establish the demand. Dipak Sindhi, learned advocate for the respondent – accused. 7. Appearing for the State, learned APP Ms. Jhaveri submitted that learned Special Judge has not properly appreciated the evidence and the learned Special Judge ought to have held that the evidence of the shadow panch is sufficient to establish the demand. It is contended by learned APP that the judgment and order of the learned trial Court is contrary to the provisions of law and the learned trial Court has erred in not properly appreciating the evidence led by the prosecution looking to the provisions of the Act which establishes that the prosecution has proved all the ingredients of alleged charges against the present respondent. By taking this Court to various oral and documentary evidence, learned APP contended that the learned trial Court’s order of acquittal is based on inference not warranted by facts of the present case and it is based on the presumption which is not permitted by law. She further contended that appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence available on record shows that the learned trial Court has committed an error by acquitting the respondent for alleged offence under Sections 7, 13(1) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (“the Act” for short) which is required to be reversed particularly when respondent – accused was caught red handed in the trap arranged in presence of independence witnesses. Relying upon the deposition of P.W. 2 at Exh.10, she submitted that the independent panch witness had supported the case of the prosecution. 8. On the other hand, learned advocate Mr. Sindhi for the respondent – accused submitted that the prosecution failed in establishing the demand raised by leading any evidence in support of the same. Relying upon the deposition of P.W. 1 (complainant) at Exh.9, he submitted that in the cross-examination the complainant had stated that the respondent – accused had not demanded any illegal gratification as alleged in the complaint but he himself had put the said amount in his pocket. Further in the cross-examination of P.W.3 at Exh.16 - a trapping officer, had stated that at the time of complaint, nothing was pending against the complainant for which the respondent – accused was to ask for illegal gratification. Further, P.W. 3, had accepted that he had not taken any further evidence to support the case of prosecution. Further in the cross-examination of P.W.3 at Exh.16 - a trapping officer, had stated that at the time of complaint, nothing was pending against the complainant for which the respondent – accused was to ask for illegal gratification. Further, P.W. 3, had accepted that he had not taken any further evidence to support the case of prosecution. Placing strong reliance on the deposition of one Mr. Mahavirsinh Pratapsinh Ramol at Exh.19 who was the investigating officer, learned advocate submitted that the investigating officer in his cross-examination had clearly admitted that no officer in absence of any pending work would give any threat or demand any illegal gratification. Moreover, the investigating officer had admitted that nothing of such (demand and putting him to jail) came out from the investigation carried out. He, therefore submitted that the judgment and order dated 28.2.2005 of learned trial Judge is based on appreciation of correct facts and evidence on record and does not require interference by this Court. 9. This Court has minutely perused the oral as well as documentary evidence on record and gone through the impugned judgment and order passed by the trial Court as well as paper book and evidence adduced by the prosecution in its entirety and has also considered the submissions made by learned APP for the appellant – State and learned advocate for the respondent. 10. In the case of Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415 , the Hon’ble Apex Court laid down the following principles: “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: 1. An appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. 2. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of act and of law. 3. Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusion”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. 3. Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusion”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. 4. An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. 5. If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court.” 11. Similar principle has been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Veer Singh, reported in 2007 AIR SCW 5553, that while exercising the appellate power even if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Court. 12. Further in the case of M.R.Purushotham v. State of Karnataka, reported in (2015) 3 SCC 247 , it has been held as under: “7. In such type of cases the prosecution has to prove that there was a demand and there was acceptance of illegal gratification by the accused. As already seen the complainant PW1 Ramesh did not support the prosecution case insofar as demand by the accused is concerned. No other evidence was adduced by the prosecution to prove the demand made by the accused with the complainant. In this context the recent decision of a three Judge bench of this Court in B. Jayaraj vs. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in 2014(4) Scale 81 is relevant and it is held as follows : “8. No other evidence was adduced by the prosecution to prove the demand made by the accused with the complainant. In this context the recent decision of a three Judge bench of this Court in B. Jayaraj vs. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in 2014(4) Scale 81 is relevant and it is held as follows : “8. In the present case, the complainant did not support the prosecution case in so far as demand by the accused is concerned. The prosecution has not examined any other witness, present at the time when the money was allegedly handed over to the accused by the complainant, to prove that the same was pursuant to any demand made by the accused. When the complainant himself had disowned what he had stated in the initial complaint (Exbt.P- 11) before LW-9, and there is no other evidence to prove that the accused had made any demand, the evidence of PW- 1 and the contents of Exhibit P-11 cannot be relied upon to come to the conclusion that the above material furnishes proof of the demand allegedly made by the accused. We are, therefore, inclined to hold that the learned trial Court as well as the High Court was not correct in holding the demand alleged to be made by the accused as proved. The only other material available is the recovery of the tainted currency notes from the possession of the accused. In fact such possession is admitted by the accused himself. Mere possession and recovery of the currency notes from the accused without proof of demand will not bring home the offence under Section 7. The above also will be conclusive in so far as the offence under Section 13(1)(d)(i)(ii) is concerned as in the absence of any proof of demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be established.” 13. In the facts of the present case, as can be seen, the prosecution failed in establishing its case in relation to demand raised by respondent-accused. It is clear from the deposition of P.W.-1 (complainant) at Exh.-9 and deposition of P.W.-4 (investigating officer) at Exh. -19 that the accused-respondent had not demanded illegal gratification. In the facts of the present case, as can be seen, the prosecution failed in establishing its case in relation to demand raised by respondent-accused. It is clear from the deposition of P.W.-1 (complainant) at Exh.-9 and deposition of P.W.-4 (investigating officer) at Exh. -19 that the accused-respondent had not demanded illegal gratification. On the contrary it is on record that as no work was left pending of the complainant, which instigated the respondent-accused to demand for any illegal gratification. Even the independent panch witnesses had stated that they were informed about the trap and accordingly they had participated in the trap but were not aware of any demand raised by the respondent- accused. 14. Therefore, on overall analysis of the aforesaid evidence on record, once the complainant himself had disowned his complaint by stating that there was no demand raised by the respondent – accused and not supported the case of the prosecution which is being further supported by deposition of P.W-4 at Exh.19 remains no evidence as to demand on record and the same looses its evidential value as regards the demand and acceptance, the evidence of shadow panch also become meaningless as from the evidence of shadow panch, nothing concrete is revealing that the accused ever demanded any amount of illegal gratification from the complainant and in response thereto, the complainant handed over Rs.600/- to the accused. 15. In view of the aforesaid nature of evidence, learned Special Judge has rightly recorded the finding of acquittal thereby rightly acquitted the accused which calls for no interference of this Court. Even otherwise also, the case is squarely covered by the decision of M.R.Purushotham (supra) and on that count also, there appears no merit in the appeal. This Court finds that the findings recorded by the trial Court are absolutely just and proper and in recording the said findings, no illegality or infirmity has been committed by it. This Court is, therefore, in complete agreement with the findings, ultimate conclusion and the resultant order of acquittal recorded by the Court below and hence find no reasons to interfere with the same. It is also a settled legal position that in acquittal appeal, the appellate Court is not required to re-write the judgment or to give fresh reasonings when the reasons assigned by the Court below are found to be just and proper. It is also a settled legal position that in acquittal appeal, the appellate Court is not required to re-write the judgment or to give fresh reasonings when the reasons assigned by the Court below are found to be just and proper. Accordingly, present appeal is devoid of any merits and requires dismissal. 16. In the result, the present appeal is hereby dismissed. Record and proceedings to be sent back to the trial Court, forthwith.