JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with Award dated 28.11.2017, passed in Reference No. 74 of 2016 (Annexure P-2) passed by learned Presiding Judge, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, whereby reference petition under S.10 of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter, ‘Act’) filed by the petitioner, came to be dismissed, on the ground of delay and laches, the petitioner has preferred the present writ petition, seeking therein quashing of the award passed by learned Tribunal below consequently allowing the reference petition. 2. Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the record are that the petitioner was appointed as daily rated Class IV employee in 1980 with the respondents and worked as such, till 1981 and completed 240 days in each calendar year. It is claimed by the petitioner that his services were terminated in 1981 without any reason and his juniors were retained, which action of the respondents is against the provisions of Ss. 25-G and 25-H of the Act. 3. Respondents filed reply to the claim petition, thereby taking preliminary objections of maintainability, delay and laches and jurisdiction of the learned Tribunal below to adjudicate matters pertaining to the respondent-University. It is further averred in the reply that record of the Research Station for the period with effect from January 1974 to 28.10.1997 has been destroyed. On merit, it is contended by the respondent-University that the petitioner worked with it with effect from 29.1.1980 to 20.11.1980 and thereafter abandoned the job and never came back for work whereas, other persons appointed with the petitioner continued to perform their duties. Violation of Ss. 25-G and 25-H of the Act has been denied by the respondent-University. 4. Learned Tribunal below, vide impugned Award, dismissed the reference made to it by the appropriate Government under S.10 of the Act, mainly on the ground of delay and laches, resulting in petitioner approaching this Court in the instant proceedings, for quashment of the award passed by learned Tribunal below, consequently allowing the reference petition filed by him. 5. Having heard learned counsel representing the parties and perused material available on record, this Court finds that the claim petition was instituted on 8.8.2016, after an inordinate delay of 33 years. 5. Having heard learned counsel representing the parties and perused material available on record, this Court finds that the claim petition was instituted on 8.8.2016, after an inordinate delay of 33 years. Services of the petitioner were allegedly terminated in the year 1981 but he approached learned Tribunal below in the year 2016 It is evident that the petitioner raised industrial dispute after around 33 years of his alleged illegal termination. 6. Learned counsel representing the petitioner, though vehemently argued before this Court that the cause of action arose in favour of the petitioner when juniors and fresh hands were retained/engaged but aforesaid argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is without any merit and accordingly deserves outright rejection. 7. Mr. Inder Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent-University, while refuting aforesaid submissions made on behalf of learned counsel for the petitioner argued that since petitioner failed to avail the legal remedy of raising industrial dispute within time, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the learned Tribunal below, while dismissing the reference petition. Besides this, Mr. Sharma argued that the petitioner had abandoned the job without any reason and he never came back for the job, as such, there is no illegality in the termination of the services of the petitioner and the award passed by learned Tribunal below. 8. Admittedly, in the case at hand, demand was raised by the petitioner under the Act after an inordinate delay of 33 years. Though learned Tribunal below held termination of the petitioner in violation of Ss. 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act, but yet it did not direct reinstatement of the petitioner for the reason that dispute, if any, ceased to exist on account of inordinate delay. 9. Hon’ble Apex Court in Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department and Anr., AIR 2016 SC 2984 , has held that dispute, if any, raised after an inordinate delay cannot be said to exist and there is no live dispute. In the aforesaid judgment, Hon’ble Apex Court has held that if dispute is raised after a long period, it has to be seen as to whether such a dispute still exists or not? In the aforesaid judgment, Hon’ble Apex Court has held that if dispute is raised after a long period, it has to be seen as to whether such a dispute still exists or not? In such case, law of limitation does not apply, rather it is to be shown by the workman that there is a dispute in praesenti and for that purpose, he has to demonstrate that even if considerable period has elapsed and there are laches and delays, but such delay has not resulted into making such dispute ceased to exist. Hon’ble Apex Court has further held that if because of such a delay, dispute no longer remains alive and is to be treated as “dead”, then it would non-existent dispute, which cannot be referred. Most importantly, in the aforesaid judgment, Hon’ble Apex Court has held that in those cases where court finds that dispute still existed, though raised belatedly, it is always open for the Court to take the aspect of delay into consideration and mould the relief. In such cases, it is still open for the Court to either grant reinstatement without back wages or lesser back wages or grant compensation instead of reinstatement. Relevant para of the afore judgment reads as under: “40) On the basis of aforesaid discussion, we summarise the legal position as under: An industrial dispute has to be referred by the appropriate Government for adjudication and the workman cannot approach the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal directly, except in those cases which are covered by Section 2A of the Act. Reference is made under Section 10 of the Act in those cases where the appropriate Government forms an opinion that 'any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended'. The words 'industrial dispute exists' are of paramount importance unless there is an existence of an industrial dispute (or the dispute is apprehended or it is apprehended such a dispute may arise in near future), no reference is to be made. Thus, existence or apprehension of an industrial dispute is a sine qua non for making the reference. No doubt, at the time of taking a decision whether a reference is to be made or not, the appropriate Government is not to go into the merits of the dispute. Making of reference is only an administrative function. Thus, existence or apprehension of an industrial dispute is a sine qua non for making the reference. No doubt, at the time of taking a decision whether a reference is to be made or not, the appropriate Government is not to go into the merits of the dispute. Making of reference is only an administrative function. At the same time, on the basis of material on record, satisfaction of the existence of the industrial dispute or the apprehension of an industrial dispute is necessary. Such existence/apprehension of industrial dispute, thus, becomes a condition precedent, though it will be only subjective satisfaction based on material on record. Since, we are not concerned with the satisfaction dealing with cases where there is apprehended industrial dispute, discussion that follows would confine to existence of an industrial dispute. Dispute or difference arises when one party make a demand and other party rejects the same. It is held by this Court in number of cases that before raising the industrial dispute making of demand is a necessary pre-condition. In such a scenario, if the services of a workman are terminated and he does not make the demand and/or raise the issue alleging wrongful termination immediately thereafter or within reasonable time and raises the same after considerable lapse of period, whether it can be said that industrial dispute still exist. Since there is no period of limitation, it gives right to the workman to raise the dispute even belatedly. However, if the dispute is raised after a long period, it has to be seen as to whether such a dispute still exists? Thus, notwithstanding the fact that law of limitation does not apply, it is to be shown by the workman that there is a dispute in praesenti. For this purpose, he has to demonstrate that even if considerable period has lapsed and there are laches and delays, such delay has not resulted into making the industrial dispute seized to exist. Therefore, if the workman is able to give satisfactory explanation for these laches and delays and demonstrate that the circumstances discloses that issue is still alive, delay would not come in his way because of the reason that law of limitation has no application. On the other hand, if because of such delay dispute no longer remains alive and is to be treated as “dead”, then it would be non-existent dispute which cannot be referred. On the other hand, if because of such delay dispute no longer remains alive and is to be treated as “dead”, then it would be non-existent dispute which cannot be referred. Take, for example, a case where the workman issues notice after his termination, questioning the termination and demanding reinstatement. He is able to show that there were discussions from time to time and the parties were trying to sort out the matter amicably. Or he is able to show that there were assurances by the Management to the effect that he would be taken back in service and because of these reasons, he did not immediately raise the dispute by approaching the labour authorities seeking reference or did not invoke the remedy under Section 2A of the Act. In such a scenario, it can be treated that the dispute was live and existing as the workman never abandoned his right. However, in this very example, even if the notice of demand was sent but it did not evoke any positive response or there was specific rejection by the Management of his demand contained in the notice and thereafter he sleeps over the matter for number of years, it can be treated that he accepted the factum of his termination and rejection thereof by the Management and acquiesced into the said rejection. Take another example. A workman approaches the Civil Court by filing a suit against his termination which was pending for number of years and was ultimately dismissed on the ground that Civil Court did not have jurisdiction to enforce the contract of personal service and does not grant any reinstatement. At that stage, when the suit is dismissed or he withdraws that suit and then involves the machinery under the Act, it can lead to the conclusion that dispute is still alive as the workman had not accepted the termination but was agitating the same; albeit in a wrong forum. In contrast, in those cases where there was no agitation by the workman against his termination and the dispute is raised belatedly and the delay or laches remain unexplained, it would be presumed that he had waived his right or acquiesced into the act of termination and, therefore, at the time when the dispute is raised it had become stale and was not an 'existing dispute'. In such circumstances, the appropriate Government can refuse to make reference. In such circumstances, the appropriate Government can refuse to make reference. In the alternative, the Labour Court/Industrial Court can also hold that there is no “industrial dispute” within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act and, therefore, no relief can be granted.” 10. If the aforesaid judgment is perused in its entirety, Hon’ble Apex Court has categorically held that words, “at any time” used in Section 10 (1) do not admit of any limitation in making an order of reference and laws of limitation are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act ibid. however, the policy of industrial adjudication is that stale claims should not be generally encouraged or allowed unless there is a satisfactory explanation for the delay. It has been further held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that if a court finds that the dispute still exists through raised belatedly, it is always permissible for the court to take the aspect of the delay into consideration and mould the relief. In such cases, it is open for the court to either grant reinstatement with back wages or lesser back wages or grant compensation instead of reinstatement. Having taken note of the aforesaid judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Prabhakar’s case supra, Division Bench of this Court in case Vyasa Devi v. The Executive Engineer, HPPWD, passed in CWP No. 640 of 2019 decided on 24.4.2019, has already held that tribunal below having taken note of delay in referring the demand can mould the relief by granting lump sum compensation in lieu of the reinstatement and seniority, if any. Relevant para of the judgment passed in Vyasa Devi (supra) reads as under: “8.A careful perusal of the specific reference made under Section 10(1) of the Act, which has been taken note herein above, itself reveals that the question with regard to delay and laches was required to be decided by the Tribunal while considering the claim of the workman. It is not in dispute that at no point in time, dispute, if any, was ever raised by the workman qua specific reference made to the Labour Court by the Appropriate Government, rather, the workman by way of filing claim, made an attempt to justify the delay caused in making the reference, as such, there appears to be no force in the argument of Mr. Rahul Mahajan, learned counsel for the workman that the learned Tribunal could not have gone into the question of delay and laches, while ascertaining the claim of the workman. The Apex Court, in Prabhakar v. Sericulture Deptt. (2015) 15 SCC 1 , while specifically dealing with the question of delay in raising the dispute by the workman under the Act ibid, has held that since there is no period of limitation prescribed under the Industrial Disputes Act, for raising dispute but if such a dispute is raised after a long period, it is to be seen whether such a dispute still exists. In the aforesaid background, Apex Court has held that notwithstanding the fact that the law of limitation does not apply, it is to be shown by the workman that there is a dispute in praesenti and, for that purpose, he has to demonstrate that even if considerable period has elapsed and there are laches and delays, such delay has not resulted into making such dispute seized to exist. Apex Court has further held that if because of such a delay, dispute no longer remains alive and is to be treated as ‘dead’, then it would be non-existent dispute, which cannot be referred. In the aforesaid judgment, Apex Court concluded that the words, “at any time”, used in Section 10(1) do not admit of any limitation in making an order of reference and laws of limitation are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act ibid. However, the policy of industrial adjudication is that very stale claims should not be generally encouraged or allowed unless there is a satisfactory explanation for the delay. By way of aforesaid judgment, Apex Court ordered that if a Court finds that the dispute still exists though raised belatedly, it is always permissible for the Court to take the aspect of delay into consideration and mould the relief. In such cases, it is open for the Court to either grant reinstatement with back wages or lesser back wages or grant compensation instead of reinstatement. Reliance in this regard is also placed upon following judgments rendered by Apex Court, viz.; Rajasthan State Agriculture Mktg. Board v. Mohan Lal (2013) 14 SCC 543 ; U.P. SRTC v. Ram Singh (2008) 17 SCC 627 ; Dharappa v. Bijapur Coop. Milk Producers Societies Union Ltd. (2007) 9 SCC 109 ; Asstt. Reliance in this regard is also placed upon following judgments rendered by Apex Court, viz.; Rajasthan State Agriculture Mktg. Board v. Mohan Lal (2013) 14 SCC 543 ; U.P. SRTC v. Ram Singh (2008) 17 SCC 627 ; Dharappa v. Bijapur Coop. Milk Producers Societies Union Ltd. (2007) 9 SCC 109 ; Asstt. Engineer, CAD v. Dhan Kunwar (2006) 5 SCC 481 and Mahavir v. Union of India (2018) 3 SCC 588 . Similar view has been taken by this Court in Girja Nand v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Others, CWP No. 93 of 2019 decided on 13.3.2019; Smt. Sumfali Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh and another, CWP No. 2861 of 2018 decided on 2.4.2019 and; The Additional Chief Secretary (PW) & Others v. Shri Ram Gopal, LPA No. 27 of 2019 decided on 3.4.2019. The long and short of the matter is very well expressed by the maxim, vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt, that is to say, the law assists those that are vigilant with their rights, and not those that sleep thereupon.” 11. The question with regard to competence of the Labour Court to award compensation in such like cases is no more res integra. The Apex Court in Workmen Rastriya Colliery Mazdoor Sangh v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., (2016) 9 SCC 431 and Rashtriya Colliery Mazdoor Sangh v. Employers, (2017) 1 SCC 264 , has dealt with the issue at hand and has proceeded to award compensation to the tune of Rs. 4.00 Lakh to each of the workmen in the latter case, as such, argument advanced by Mr. Rahul Mahajan, Advocate that no compensation could have been awarded in lieu of reinstatement is not tenable and deserves outright rejection. 12. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled as State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava and others, 2014 AIR SCW 6519, held that relief cannot be extended to the persons, who have approached the Court after long delay, that too, who are fence-sitters. It is apt to reproduce para 24 of the judgment herein: "24. Viewed from this angle, in the present case, we find that the selection process took place in the year 1986. Appointment orders were issued in the year 1987, but were also cancelled :: vide orders dated June 22, 1987. It is apt to reproduce para 24 of the judgment herein: "24. Viewed from this angle, in the present case, we find that the selection process took place in the year 1986. Appointment orders were issued in the year 1987, but were also cancelled :: vide orders dated June 22, 1987. The respondents before us did not challenge these cancellation orders till the year 1996, i.e. for a period of 9 years. It means that they had accepted the cancellation of their appointments. They woke up in the year 1996 only after finding that some other persons whose appointment orders were also cancelled got the relief. By that time, nine years had passed. The earlier judgment had granted the relief to the parties before the Court. It would also be pertinent to highlight that these respondents have not joined the service nor working like the employees who succeeded in earlier case before the Tribunal. As of today, 27 years have passed after the issuance of cancellation orders. Therefore, not only there was unexplained delay and laches in filing the claim petition after period of 9 years, it would be totally unjust to direct the appointment to give them the appointment as of today, i.e. after a period of 27 years when most of these respondents would be almost 50 years of age or above." 13. Even Division Bench of this Court, while placing reliance upon the aforesaid judgments passed by Hon’ble Apex Court, has held in LPA No.604 of 2011, titled Karan Singh Pathania vs. State of H.P. and Others that “fencer cannot be held entitled to any relief” 14. In I. Chuba Jamir & Ors. v. State of Nagaland & Ors., reported in 2009 AIR SCW 5162, the Apex Court has held that the inordinate delay is a very valid and important consideration. It is apt to reproduce para 17 of the judgment herein: “17. On a careful consideration of the materials on record and the submissions made by Mr. Goswami we are unable to accept the claims of the appellants-writ petitioners. In our view the inordinate delay of 7 or 8 years by the appellants-writ petitioners in approaching the High Court was a very valid and important consideration. On a careful consideration of the materials on record and the submissions made by Mr. Goswami we are unable to accept the claims of the appellants-writ petitioners. In our view the inordinate delay of 7 or 8 years by the appellants-writ petitioners in approaching the High Court was a very valid and important consideration. This aspect of the matter was also brought to the notice of the Single Judge but he proceeded with the matter without saying anything on that issue, one way or the other. It was, therefore, perfectly open to the Division Bench to take into consideration the conduct of the appellants-writ petitioners and the consequences, apart from the legality and validity, of the reliefs granted to them by the learned single Judge.” 15. In Banda Development Authority, Banda v. Moti Lal Agarwl and Ors., 2011 AIR SCW 2835, similar principle has enunciated by Hon'ble Apex Court, wherein it has been held as under: “15. In our view, even if the objection of delay and laches had not been raised in the affidavits filed on behalf of the BDA and the State Government, the High Court was duty bound to take cognizance of the long time gap of 9 years between the issue of declaration under Section 6(1) and filing of the writ petition and declined relief to respondent No.1 on the ground that he was guilty of laches because the acquired land had been utilized for implementing the residential scheme and third party rights had been created. The unexplained delay of about six years between the passing of award and filing of writ petition was also sufficient for refusing to entertain the prayer made in the writ petition. xxx xxxx xxx 25. In this case, the acquired land was utilized for implementing Tulsi Nagar Residential Scheme inasmuch as after carrying out necessary development i.e. construction of roads, laying electricity, water and sewer lines etc. the BDA carved out plots, constructed flats for economically weaker sections and lower income group, invited applications for allotment of the plots and flats from general as well as reserved categories and allotted the same to eligible persons. In the process, the BDA not only incurred huge expenditure but also created third party rights. the BDA carved out plots, constructed flats for economically weaker sections and lower income group, invited applications for allotment of the plots and flats from general as well as reserved categories and allotted the same to eligible persons. In the process, the BDA not only incurred huge expenditure but also created third party rights. In this scenario, the delay of nine years from the date of publication of the declaration issued under Section 6(1) and almost six years from the date of passing of award should have been treated by the High Court as more than sufficient for denying equitable relief to respondent No.1.” 16. Recently, Hon’ble Apex Court in Union of India and others v. Chaman Lal, (2018) 5 SCC 798 , has held as under:- “9. As far back as in P.S. Sadasivaswamy vs. The State of Tamil Nadu, (1975) 1 SCC 152 , considering a claim for promotion belated by 14 years, this Court had observed that a period of six months or at the utmost a year would be reasonable time to approach a court against denial of promotion and that it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion not to entertain such claims by persons who tried to unsettle the settled matters, which only clog the work of the court impeding it in considering genuine grievances within time in the following words : “2….. A person aggrieved by an order of promoting a junior over his head should approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case here the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters. The petitioner’s petition should, therefore, have been dismissed in limine. Entertaining such petitions is a waste of time of the Court. The petitioner’s petition should, therefore, have been dismissed in limine. Entertaining such petitions is a waste of time of the Court. It clogs the work of the Court and impedes the work of the Court in considering legitimate grievances as also its normal work. We consider that the High Court was right in dismissing the appellant’s petition as well as the appeal.” 10. Mere repeated filing of representations could not be sufficient explanation for delay in approaching the Court for grant of relief, was considered in Gandhinagar Motor Transport Society vs. Kasbekar AIR 1954 Bom.202, by Chief Justice Chagla, observing as follows : (SCC Online Bom: AIR P.203, para 2). “(2)…… Now, we have had occasion to point out that the only delay which this Court will excuse in presenting a petition is the delay which is caused by the petitioner pursuing a legal remedy which is given to him. In this particular case the petitioner did not pursue a legal remedy. The remedy he pursued was extralegal or extrajudicial. Once the final decision of government is given, a representation is merely an appeal for mercy or indulgence, but it is not pursuing a remedy which the law gave to the petitioner…” 11. The appellant, in its counter affidavit before the High Court, had specifically taken the objection that the claim was highly belated, and that any direction for a retrospective consideration would have a destabilising effect in unsettling the settled position which would lead to complete chaos apart from other administrative consequences. The High Court failed to consider the objection. In Union of India vs. M.K. Sarkar, (2010) 2 SCC 59 , this Court observed as follows:(SCC p.66, para 16). “16. A court or tribunal, before directing ‘consideration’ of a claim or representation should examine whether the claim or representation is with reference to a ‘live’ issue or whether it is with reference to a ‘dead’ or ‘stale’ issue. If it is with reference to a ‘dead’ or ‘stale’ issue or dispute, the court/ tribunal should put an end to the matter and should not direct consideration or reconsideration….” 12. In Dev Dutt (supra), the DPC was held on 16.12.1994. The appellant therein, aggrieved by his supersession moved the High Court with utmost expedition leading to the pronouncement by the Single Judge on 21.08.2001 and by the Division Bench on 26.11.2001. In Dev Dutt (supra), the DPC was held on 16.12.1994. The appellant therein, aggrieved by his supersession moved the High Court with utmost expedition leading to the pronouncement by the Single Judge on 21.08.2001 and by the Division Bench on 26.11.2001. The appeal was instituted before this Court in the year 2002. If that were not sufficient to distinguish the case of the respondents, reference may also be made to the observations in paragraph 36 as follows: (SCC p.737). “36. In the present case, we are developing the principles of natural justice by holding that fairness and transparency in public administration requires that all entries (whether poor, fair, average, good or very good) in the annual confidential report of a public servant, whether in civil, judicial, police or any other State service (except the military), must be communicated to him within a reasonable period so that he can make a representation for its upgradation.” 13. The High Court erred in placing absolute reliance on Dev Dutt (supra) and Sukhdev (supra) without noticing the fact situation of the respondents. In Union of India and another vs. Bahadur Singh, (2006) (1) SCC 368, it was observed: (SCC p.373 para 9). ‘9. The court should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. Observations of the courts are neither to be read as Euclid’s theorem s nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. Judgments of the courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments….” 14. A subsequent pronouncement by this Court could not enthuse a fresh lease of life, or furnish a fresh cause of action to what was otherwise clearly a dead and stale claim. In 12 State of Uttaranchal vs. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari, SCC p.186, paraA (2013) 12 SCC 179 , it was observed that 29). “29…. Not for nothing, has it been said that everything may stop but not the time, for we are all slaves of time. In 12 State of Uttaranchal vs. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari, SCC p.186, paraA (2013) 12 SCC 179 , it was observed that 29). “29…. Not for nothing, has it been said that everything may stop but not the time, for we are all slaves of time. There may not be any provision providing for limitation but a grievance relating to promotion cannot be given a new lease of life at any point of time.” 15. The observations with regard to the modus operandi of the representation syndrome to revive what are clearly dead and stale claims as discussed in C.Jacob vs. Director of Geology and Mining, (2008) 10 SCC 115 , and the caution to be exercised by the Court are also considered apposite in the facts of the present case. 16. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, any direction to consider retrospective promotion of the respondents at such a belated passage of time of over 17 to 20 years, would virtually bring a tsunami in the service resulting in administrative chaos quite apart from the financial implications for the government. The order of the High Court is therefore held to be unsustainable and is set aside.” 17. In the case at hand, though learned Tribunal below found termination of services of the petitioner in violation of the provisions contained under Ss.25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Act, but refused to order reinstatement on account of delay in raising dispute. Since, services of the petitioner were terminated in violation of the provisions contained under the Act coupled with the fact that the petitioner had worked for 240 days in a calendar year prior to his termination, learned Tribunal below ought to have awarded some compensation in lieu of termination. 18. Consequently, in view of detailed discussion made herein above and law taken note above, though this court finds no illegality in the impugned Award inasmuch as the petitioner has been denied reinstatement, but having taken note of the fact that the petitioner before termination of his services has rendered 240 days’ service with the respondent-University, this court is of the view that learned Tribunal below ought to have granted some compensation to the petitioner, in lieu of his termination. 19. Accordingly, impugned Award is modified to the extent that the petitioner shall be entitled for compensation of Rs.15,000/- in lieu of termination. 19. Accordingly, impugned Award is modified to the extent that the petitioner shall be entitled for compensation of Rs.15,000/- in lieu of termination. Petition stands disposed of in the afore terms. Pending application(s), if any, also stands, disposed of accordingly.