JUDGMENT : 1. Brief factual matrix of the case is that petitioner, while working in Special Task Force, Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), Unit NAPP, Narora, District Bulandshahar, was suffered with a complaint and after preliminary inquiry following “Articles of Charge” alongwith “Statement of Allegations” were framed and served upon alongwith list of documentary evidence and witnesses : “Articles of Charge framed against No. 874480683 SI/Exe D.K. Singh, Spl. Task Force, CISF, NAPP, Narora- Gross indiscipline and misconduct in that he, on 2.10.1991, between 2130 hrs and 2300 hrs. misbehaved and threatened Inspr (Exe) A.K. Pradhan, Shift Incharge, Plant Gate, employee of 66 KV Sub Station and Service Buildings, by pointing his Service 9 mm SAP Carbin-o while, deployed on duty, and created disturbance and commotion at the Plant Site, NAPP Narora, resulting in the employee assembling and protesting a Main Gate, and Service Buildings, NAPP Plant Site.” “Statement of Allegations in support of Articles of charge framed against No. 874480683 SI/Exe D.K. Singh, Special Task Force, CISF Unit, NAPP Narora No. 874480683 SI/Exe D.K. Singh, Special Task Force, CISF Unit, NAPP Narora. He was deployed on ‘C’ Shift Area Incharge of STF Patrolling with 9 mm Carbine on 2.10.1991. 2135 hrs. when …. Shift, Incharge, Plant Site Main Gate, met SI D.K. Singh, casually inquired from him and conveyed his greeting the SI had returned to the Unit after completing Promotion Cadre Course, after two months. At that time, it is reported that SI whipped his 9 mm Service SAF Carbine and pointed the same at the Inspector with a treat to shoot him. After this, he left the Main Gate Area and the Inspector followed him with some Int. Staff, after checking his state of health and condition from another STF SI S.K. Gularia, who expressed ignorance. The Inspr. later met the SI again at Watch Power No. 3 Area, inside the Plant Site. The SI again misbehaved with the Inspector, by pointing his weapon at him. Inspector A.K. Pradhan told him that such misbehavious and misconduct would lead to serious consequences and persuaded him to certain extent. After the persuasion by the Inspector, SI D.K. Singh left the place in a hurry. Subsequently Inspector A.K. Pradhan, informed the matter to Assistant Comdt B.K. Sharma, AC(P). Inspector A.K. Pradhan told him that such misbehavious and misconduct would lead to serious consequences and persuaded him to certain extent. After the persuasion by the Inspector, SI D.K. Singh left the place in a hurry. Subsequently Inspector A.K. Pradhan, informed the matter to Assistant Comdt B.K. Sharma, AC(P). The employees of 66 KV Sub Station also reported about the misbehaviour of the SI-SI D.K. Singh, with them there, by threatening to shoot them all. On getting information Shri B.K. Sharma, Asst. Comdt. (Plant) directed Inspectors -OPS Chauhan, Coy Comdr ‘A’ Coy and G.P. Bartwal, Incharge STF to such to the spot. The Inspectors also rushed to the main gate. By this time, SI D.K. Singh left the Sub Station Area. Subsequently, Shift Incharge, Inspector A.K. Pradhan, along with Inspectors OPS Chauhan and Bartwal searched the area SI D.K. Singh and later located him at Service Buildings. In the meanwhile, they were informed that SI D.K. Singh, was creating disturbance at Service Buildings. When they reached at service buildings, they found SI D.K. Singh pointing his 9 mm SAF Barbine at a civilian boy, who was sitting inside the counter at Service Buildings. He has also threatened to shoot down the employees of the outgoing shift, who have gathered at the spot and who attempted to intervene to find out the reasons. At about 2315 hrs. Asst. Comdts B.K. Sharma and B.K. Bhattacharya also reached the Gate; by that time, the SI was also brought down under control and taken to the Main Gate. In the meanwhile, the employees of the Plant have assembled at the Main Gate and also at Service Buildings, protesting against the serious misconduct and unruly behaviour of SI D.K. Singh. The agitated employees were however, subsequently pacified.” 2. Petitioner submitted a detailed reply to above referred charge and memorandum of allegations denying all allegations. Thereafter inquiry was conducted and as many as 13 witnesses were examined, who were cross-examined also and thereafter by inquiry report dated 22.01.1992, petitioner held guilty of charge framed. 3. Petitioner was served with above referred inquiry report. Thereafter he filed objection which was dismissed vide order dated 19.02.1992 and vide order dated 31.03.1992 he was inflicted with penalty of ‘removal’ from service. Appeal thereof was also dismissed vide order dated 24.09.1992. These orders are under challenge before this Court in present writ petition. 4. 3. Petitioner was served with above referred inquiry report. Thereafter he filed objection which was dismissed vide order dated 19.02.1992 and vide order dated 31.03.1992 he was inflicted with penalty of ‘removal’ from service. Appeal thereof was also dismissed vide order dated 24.09.1992. These orders are under challenge before this Court in present writ petition. 4. Sri Anoop Trivedi, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Namit Srivastava and Sri Rajendra Kumar Pandey, Advocates appearing for petitioner, submitted that there was not an iota of evidence against petitioner. Out of 13 witnesses most of the witnesses have not supported contents of charge. There was no evidence that petitioner was in drunken stage as he was not medically examined. Inquiry Officer has picked and choose some averments from witnesses to prove charge against petitioner which was against the principle of preponderance of probability. Alternatively, learned Senior Advocate submitted that even if the charges are considered to be proved, punishment of removal from service awarded is shockingly disproportionate. 5. Above submissions are opposed by Sri Arvind Kumar Goswami, learned Advocate appearing for respondents. He submitted that there was sufficient evidence against petitioner and while considering the orders passed in disciplinary proceedings this Court has limited power to interfere. He placed reliance on judgments passed by Supreme Court in The Commandant, 22 Battalion, CRPF Srinagar and others vs. Surinder Kumar, 2011 (7) SCC 315 and Union of India and others vs. Diler Singh, (2016) 13 SCC 71 as well as a Coordinate Bench judgment of this Court in Brijesh Singh vs. Union of India and others (Writ-A No. 41361 of 2004), decided on 05.10.2018. 6. Heard learned counsel for parties and perused the material available on record. 7. Before dealing with rival submissions, few paragraphs of a judgment passed by Supreme Court, which deals with issue of power of High Court to review the orders passed in departmental proceedings, in Union of India and others vs. Dalbir Singh (2021) 11 SCC 321 are relevant, which are mentioned hereinafter : “22. In another Judgment reported as B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India & Ors., it was held that the power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. In another Judgment reported as B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India & Ors., it was held that the power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. The Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. The Court is to examine as to whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. This Court held as under:- “12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. 13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued.” 23. This Court in Management of Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (Coimbatore) Limited v. M. Chandrasekaran held that in exercise of power of judicial review, the Labour Commissioner exceeded his jurisdiction in reappreciating the evidence adduced before the enquiry officer and in substituting his own judgment to that of the disciplinary authority. It was not a case of no legal evidence. The question as to decision of the disciplinary authority of dismissing the respondent is just and proper could be assailed by the respondent in appropriate proceedings. Considering the fact that there was adequate material produced in the departmental enquiry evidencing that fatal accident was caused by the respondent while driving the vehicle on duty, the burden to prove that the accident happened due to some other cause than his own negligence was on the respondent. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur squarely applies to the fact situation. The Court held as under: “11. The respondent on the other hand contends that the Commissioner has applied the well-settled legal position that there can be no presumption of misconduct by the employees. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur squarely applies to the fact situation. The Court held as under: “11. The respondent on the other hand contends that the Commissioner has applied the well-settled legal position that there can be no presumption of misconduct by the employees. That, charge must be proved by the Department during the inquiry. Non-examination of the material witnesses such as eyewitnesses present on the spot, conductor and passengers, travelling on the same bus was fatal. For, it entails in not substantiating the charges against the respondent and failure to discharge the initial onus resting on the Department to prove the charge as framed. According to the respondent, no fault can be found with the tangible reasons recorded by the Commissioner as noticed by the Single Judge (reproduced above); and resultantly, the conclusion of the Commissioner of not according approval to the order of dismissal is just and proper. It is submitted that the Single Judge was justified in allowing the writ petition preferred by the respondent and issuing direction to the appellant to reinstate him with back wages and continuity of service and all attendant benefits accrued to him.” 24. This Court in Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., Haldia & Ors. held that the degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused “beyond reasonable doubt”, he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of “preponderance of probability”. It was held as under: “11. As far as acquittal of the appellant by a criminal court is concerned, in our opinion, the said order does not preclude the Corporation from taking an action if it is otherwise permissible. In our judgment, the law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. In our judgment, the law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on the offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with the service rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused “beyond reasonable doubt”, he cannot be convicted by a court of law.In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of “preponderance of probability”. Acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does not ipso facto absolve him from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention of the appellant that since he was acquitted by a criminal court, the impugned order dismissing him from service deserves to be quashed and set aside.” 26. This Court in Depot Manager, A.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya & Ors. held that in the disciplinary proceedings, the question is whether the respondent is guilty of such conduct as would merit his removal from service or a lesser punishment. It was held as under: “7. …There is yet another reason. The approach and the objective in the criminal proceedings and the disciplinary proceedings is altogether distinct and different. held that in the disciplinary proceedings, the question is whether the respondent is guilty of such conduct as would merit his removal from service or a lesser punishment. It was held as under: “7. …There is yet another reason. The approach and the objective in the criminal proceedings and the disciplinary proceedings is altogether distinct and different. In the disciplinary proceedings, the question is whether the respondent is guilty of such conduct as would merit his removal from service or a lesser punishment, as the case may be, whereas in the criminal proceedings the question is whether the offences registered against him under the Prevention of Corruption Act (and the Penal Code, 1860, if any) are established and, if established, what sentence should be imposed upon him. The standard of proof, the mode of enquiry and the rules governing the enquiry and trial in both the cases are entirely distinct and different. Staying of disciplinary proceedings pending criminal proceedings, to repeat, should not be a matter of course but a considered decision. Even if stayed at one stage, the decision may require reconsideration if the criminal case gets unduly delayed.” 8. In above factual and legal background the Court proceeds to consider rival submissions, whether under limited power of review this Court can interfere with impugned orders. 9. There is no challenge to procedure adopted by respondents to pass impugned orders. There is no allegation that principles of natural justice were violated. Main argument of learned Senior Advocate is that the finding given by disciplinary authority was based on no evidence which may be a ground for interference. 10. In order to scrutinize the above argument, I have carefully perused the detailed inquiry report. During inquiry as many as 13 witnesses were examined. PW-1, A.K. Pradhan has substantially supported the allegations against petitioner. However, out of remaining 12 witnesses, only PWs-9 and 10 have substantially supported charge against petitioner and they have specifically stated that petitioner has pointed his 9 mm Carbine on one, Pradhan and when he tried to take Carbine of petitioner, he refused and both were engaged in a small scuffle. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was no evidence against petitioner. The fact that out of 13 witnesses only three witnesses have supported charge, will not make out a case in favour of petitioner. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was no evidence against petitioner. The fact that out of 13 witnesses only three witnesses have supported charge, will not make out a case in favour of petitioner. Even statement of one witness is sufficient to prove charge against petitioner. This Court while sitting under writ jurisdiction cannot act as an Appellate Authority to re-appreciate the evidence to take another view that charge was not proved in terms of principle of preponderance of probability against petitioner. There is a merit in the argument of learned Senior Advocate that it was not proved that petitioner was in drunken stage as he was not medically examined as well as statements are also not sufficient to prove that petitioner was in drunken stage but so far as other part of charge is concerned, there are sufficient evidence to hold petitioner guilty. Therefore, there is no illegality or irregularity in the order whereby charge against petitioner found proved. 11. Now the Court deals with alternative argument of learned Senior Advocate, whether in the facts and circumstances of present case, considering charge, the punishment of dismissal is shockingly disproportionate or not? 12. Petitioner is a member of disciplined force and pointing Carbine to an officer and further scuffle is a serious misconduct. So far as power of interference with quantum of punishment in disciplinary proceedings is concerned, it has been reiterated by Supreme Court in Anil Kumar Upadhayay vs. Director General, SSB and others, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 478 and in para 21 and 22 the Supreme Court held as under : “21. Therefore, the short question which is posed for the consideration of this Court is, “whether the learned Single Judge was justified in interfering with the order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority on the ground that the same was disproportionate as the female constable against whom also the disciplinary proceedings were initiated and the two charges were held to be proved against her, was inflicted with the lesser punishment?” 22. On the judicial review and interference of the courts in the matter of disciplinary proceedings and on the test of proportionality, few decisions of this Court are required to be referred to: (i) In the case of Om Kumar (supra), this Court, after considering the Wednesbury principles and the doctrine of proportionality, has observed and held that the question of quantum of punishment in disciplinary matters is primarily for the disciplinary authority and the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution or of the Administrative Tribunals is limited and is confined to the applicability of one or other of the well-known principles known as ‘Wednesbury principles’. In the Wednesbury case, (1948) 1 KB 223, it was observed that when a statute gave discretion to an administrator to take a decision, the scope of judicial review would remain limited. Lord Greene further said that interference was not permissible unless one or the other of the following conditions was satisfied, namely, the order was contrary to law, or relevant factors were not considered, or irrelevant factors were considered, or the decision was one which no reasonable person could have taken. (ii) In the case of B.C. Chaturvedi (supra), in paragraph 18, this Court observed and held as under: “18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.” (iii) In the case of Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank (supra), in paragraph 19, it is observed and held as under: “19. The principles discussed above can be summed up and summarised as follows: 19.1.When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities. 19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority. 19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court. 19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case. 19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the co-delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co-delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge-sheet in the two cases. If the co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable.” 13. In the present case petitioner was imposed penalty of dismissal from service after charges levelled against him stand proved by disciplinary authority and affirmed by Appellate Authority. Nature of allegations against petitioner are very serious. He has not only pointed Carbine to a senior officer but when he was objected, he refused to handover his Carbine and made scuffle with him. A person of such nature is unbecoming of a member of disciplined force and considering the allegations, punishment awarded is not shockingly disproportionate. 14. In view of above, I find no reason to interfere with orders impugned in this writ petition. A person of such nature is unbecoming of a member of disciplined force and considering the allegations, punishment awarded is not shockingly disproportionate. 14. In view of above, I find no reason to interfere with orders impugned in this writ petition. Dismissed accordingly. 15. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.