JUDGMENT Saurabh Shyam Shamshery, J. The counsel for rival parties are in agreement that these writ petitions could be decided without exchange of pleadings since entire pleadings are on record and that matter involve mainly legal issues. 2. Both these writ petitions are arising out of a dispute amongst family members with regard to a registered adoption deed, an unregistered Will as well as compromise entered between parties before Consolidation Authorities. 3. It is not in dispute that land in dispute belongs to Brij Nandan, who had two daughters, namely, Triveni and Rama Devi. Triveni has four sons including Tek Chand, whereas Rama Devi has three sons. An adoption deed was registered to the effect that Brij Nandan has adopted Tek Chand, i.e., his daughter's (Triveni's) i.e. his grand son. 4. During consolidation proceedings rival objections were filed which were decided by the Consolidation Officer by an order dated 19.03.2014 whereby adoption deed as well as Will were held to be not proved and on basis of a compromise between parties shares were allotted that Rama Devi has relinquished her rights. 4. During consolidation proceedings rival objections were filed which were decided by the Consolidation Officer by an order dated 19.03.2014 whereby adoption deed as well as Will were held to be not proved and on basis of a compromise between parties shares were allotted that Rama Devi has relinquished her rights. Relevant part of order is mentioned hereinafter:- ^^loZizFke Jh fouksn dqekj }kjk izLrqr olh;rukek dks ns[krs gSa i=koyh dk voyksdu djus ls ;g Kkr gks jgk gS fd Jh fouksn dqekj ds firk Jh }kfjdk izlkn rFkk o`tuanu ds e/; ,d eqdnek xzke vejsgh esa fuxjkuh la0 1592@79 py jgh Fkh ftlesa o`tuanu ds e`rd gksus ij muds izfrLFkkiu gsrq VsdpUnz] Jherh jkensoh rFkk Jherh f=os.kh ,oa fouksn dqekj iq= }kfjdk izlkn dh rjQ ls nkok fd;k x;k ;gka ,d rF; le> ls ijs gS fd ftl }kfjdk izlkn dh rjQ ls nkok fd;k x;k ;gka ,d rF; le> ls ijs gS fd ftl }kfjdk izlkn ds lkFk c`tuanu dk eqdnek py jgk gks mlds iq= ds uke os olh;r dSls djsaxsA ;g lansg mRiUu dj jgk gS rFkk olh;r dh oS/krk ij iz'ufpag mBk jgk gSA vc olh;r dks ns[krs gSa olh;r viathd`r gS rFkk mlesa ys[kd dk gLrk{kj olh;rdrkZ ds ckn gS lkFk gh olh;r esa mfYyf[kr rF; Hkh ;g gS fd olh;rdrkZ VsdpUnz tks fd lu 1980 esa ek= 7 o"kZ dk gksxk mlls ukjkt gksdj vius vU; ukfr;ksa dks NksM+dj ,d ckgjh O;fDr dks ftlds firk ds lkFk mldk eqdnek py jgk gks mls olh;r djs ;g fLFkfr loZFkk lansg ds ?ksjs esa gS rFkk olh;r dks xyr fl) dj jgh gS 2011&vkj,yVh&33 esa ikfjr O;oLFkk esa ;g dgk x;k gS fd ;fn olh;r esa fof.kd okfjlksa dks ldkj.k vf/kdkj ls oafpr ugha fd;k x;k gks rks olh;r lansgtud gSA 2004&vkjMh&245 rFkk 2003 & ,vkbZlh ¼8½ esa Hkh ;gh O;oLFkk ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; iatkc@gfj;k.kk us nh gSA bl rjg olh;r vius vki esa lansgkRed gS vr% olh;r ds vk/kkj ij fouksn dqekj dh vkifRr Lohdkj dj mUgsa okfjl ugha ekuk tk ldrk gS vr% fouksn dh vkifRr fujLr dh tkrh gSA vc o`tuanu ds ojklr ds laca/k esa VsdpUnz dh vkifRr dks ns[krs gSa tks fd iathd`r xksnukek ds vk/kkj ij gS mYys[kuh; gS fd jkeknsoh us viuk gd VsdpUnz ds lkFk le>kSrk dj bl i=koyh esa NksM+ fn;k gS vr% i=koyh esa nks i{k cprs gSaA vc iathd`r xksnukek ij utj Mkyrs gS ;g xksnukek rhu i`"Bksa esa gS rFkk LVSai dh [kjhn 26-04-1977 dks fd;k x;k ,oa fnukad 27-04-1977 dks xksnukek fy[kk x;k ,oa i`"B 16 ij fnukad 28-04-1977 dks iathd`r fd;k x;kA xksnukek esa ;g fy[kk x;k gS fd xksnukek dh jLe fnukad 29-03-1977 dks iwjh dh x;h rFkk blesa VsdpUnz ds firk ckcwjke rFkk mudh ekrk f=os.kh dh lgefr ls xksn fy;k fn;k x;k bl xksnukesa ij o`tuanu ckcwjke rFkk xokgksa lkfyxjke ,oa nqxkZizlkn ds gLrk{kj gSa f=os.kh nsoh ¼ekrk½ dk gLrk{kj xksnukesa ij ugha gSA vc lkfyxjke ¼xokg½ ,oa iz/kku ds c;ku dks i<+rs gSa lkfyxjke us vius c;ku esa ;g dgk gS fd xksnukesa ds jLe esa ckcw yky rFkk f=os.kh nksuksa cSBs Fks rFkk jLe vnk;xh ¼xksnukesa dk ysuk rFkk nsuk½ dh x;h ,oa mlds ckn xksnukek fy[kk x;k ,oa ogh i<+dj lquk;k x;k ftlesa lgefr gksus ij i{kksa us rFkk xokgksa us glrk{kj fd;k tc lHkh us gLrk{kj fd;k rks f=os.kh us ogka jgus ds ckn Hkh mldk gLrk{kj xksnukesa ij D;ksa ugha gS ;g rF; dgh u dgh f=os.kh ds xksnukesa ds gd esa vlgefr fn[kkrk gS vFkkZr VsdpUnz dh eka pawfd VsdpUnz xksn ds le; ek= 4 o"kZ dk Fkk xksnukesa ds i{k esa ugha Fkh D;ksafd ;fn oks i{k esa gksrh rks xksnukesa ij vo'; gLrk{kj djrhA lkfyxjke ds c;ku rFkk xksnukesa ds LVSai ds voyksdu ls lkfyxjke dk c;ku lansg ds ?ksjs esa vk jgk gS xksnukek dk LVSai fnukad 26-04-1977 dks [kjhnk x;k tcfd lkfyxjke vius c;ku esa ;g dg jgs gSa fd xksnukesa ds ckn fy[kki<+h dh x;h lcdks i<+dj lquk;k x;k rFkk gLrk{kj fd;k x;kA ogak LVSai 26-04-1977 dks [kjhnk x;k rks mls jLe ds fnu dSls fy[kk tk ldrk gS xksnukek vius vki ;g b'kkjk dj jgk gS fd xksnukek fy[kh rks x;h ijarq jLe vnk;xh dks fnukad 29-03-1977 ds fn[kk;h tk jgh gS og uk gqbZ gks D;ksafd bl xksnukesa esa ekrk f=os.kh dh lgefr dgha Hkh fn[k ugha jgh gS bl rjg jLe vnk;xh dk gksuk bl xksnukesa esa lansg ds ?ksjs esa vk jgk gS blesa rhu dkj.k ns[k jgs gSa& igyk jLe vkn;kxh ds yxHkx 1 ekg ds ckn xksnukek iathd`r djk;k tk jgk gS mDr xksnukek ij ekrk f=os.kh iRuh ckcwjke dk gLrk{kj u gksuk vFkkZr xksnukesa ls vlgefr rhljk xksnukesa dk eq[; xokg lkfyxjke dk ;g dguk fd xksnukek ds ckn ogh fy[kk i<+h dh x;h rFkk bls i<+dj lquk;k x;k tcfd ;g lR; ugha gSA vc fganw nRrd ,oa Hkj.k iks"k.k vf/kfu;e 1956 ds /kkjk&16 dks ns[krs gSa blesa ;g Li"V gS fd xksnukek ij nRrd ysus ,oa nsus okyk O;fDr;ksa dk gLrk{kj gksuk pkfg, orZeku xksnukekxsZ nsus okys O;fDr;ksa esa jLe fn[kk;h x;h f=os.kh nsoh ¼ekrk½ us gLrk{kj ugha fd, gS vFkkZr ekrk dh vlgefr gS bl rjg ,oa xksnukesa dks Hkys gh ;g iathd`r gS oS/k ugha ekuk tk ldrkA blds vykok bl xksnukek esa yM+dh ds yM+ds dks xksn fy;k x;k gSA gkykafd tSu lekt esa ,slh izFkk g ijarq czkã.k lekt ;k cqansy[k.M esa ,slh fdlh izFkk dk ftdz i=koyh esa ugha fd;k x;k gS nhokuh U;k;ky; ds mDr ikfjr vkns'k esa Hkh bl rF; dk mYys[k fd;k x;k gS rFkk flfoy tt ¼tq0fM0½ tkykSus vius vkns'k fnukad 10-04-98 esa foLr`r mYys[k fd;k gS fd iq=h ds iq= dks nRrd iq= ugha fy;k tk ldrk gS rFkk blh xksnukes dks ekrk ¼f=os.kh½ dh lgefr u gksus ds dkj.k fof/kd vkSj mldk xksnukek ugha ekuk gSA bl rjg xksnukesa ds vk/kkj ij VsdpUnz ¼e`rd½ rFkk muds ckn esa mRre pUnz /;ku pUnz ,oa xhrk nsoh dh vkifRr Lohdk;Z ugha dh tk ldrh gSA vc cprs gS f=os.kh ds yM+ds vk'kkjke] jkeujs'k] ujk;unkl rFkk orZeku eqdnesa esa xksnukesa ij yM+ jgs xhrk nsoh o iRuh VsdpUnz] /;kupanz] mRre pUnz iq=x.k VsdpUnzA pawfd fouksn dqekj dh olh;r rFkk VsdpUnz dk xksnukek nksuksa gh bl i=koyh esa lafnX/k fl) gks jgs gSa vr% ojklr ds vk/kkj ij f=os.kh iq=h o`tuanu gh okfjl fl) gks jgh gS ,oa f=os.kh ¼e`rd½ iRuh ckcwjke ds ckn muds rhu yM+ds rFkk iq=o/kw ukrhx.k okfjl fl) gks jgs gSaA** (Emphasis Supplied) 5. The matter went to Appellate Authority where Will as well as adoption deed was disproved as well as a subsequent compromise entered between parties was also disputed. Order passed by Consolidation Officer was interfered to the extent that shares were allotted between two daughters and their legal heir though Rama Devi (other daughter) has not filed an appeal but she was also granted share on basis of inheritance and being daughter of Brij Nandan. Order passed by Consolidation Officer was interfered to the extent that shares were allotted between two daughters and their legal heir though Rama Devi (other daughter) has not filed an appeal but she was also granted share on basis of inheritance and being daughter of Brij Nandan. Relevant part of order dated 31.08.2019 is reproduced hereinafter:- ^^voj U;k;ky; dh i=koyh ij miyC/k lk{; ds ijh{k.k ls fofnr gS fd olh;r x`ghrk fouksn dqekj ds firk }kjdk izlkn o c`tuanu ds e/; xzke txjsgh vOoy dh Hkwfe ds ckcr eqdnekokth pyhA blls ;g rF; Li"V gS fd olh;rdrkZ o`tuanu vius gh foi{kh }kjdk izlkn ds iq= dks D;ksa olh;r djsxkA nwljs olh;r esa mldh iq=h tks tk;t okfjl gS dk fojklr ls D;ksa oafpr fd;k tk jgk gS bl rF; dk dksbZ mYys[k ugha gS bl izdkj dfFkr olh;rukek lansgkRed gksus ds dkj.k voj U;k;ky; }kjk olh;r lafnX/k ik;s tkus esa fdlh izdkj dh voS/kkfudrk ugha dh gS olh;rukek lansgkRed gksus ds dkj.k vihykaV dh vksj ls izLrqr dh x;h uthjksa ls mls dksbZ ykHk izkIr ugha gksrk gS vr% vihy fouksn dqekj cyghu ik;h tkrh gSA tgka rd VsdpUnz iq= ckcwyky ds i{k esa fd;s x;s xksnukek ds vk/kkj ij fojklr ntZ fd;k tkus dk iz'u gS i=koyh ij miyC/k lk{; ijh{k.k ls fofnr gS fd xksnukek ds fy;s LVkai fnukad 26-04-77 dks dz; fd;s x;s rFkk xksnukek fnukad 27-04-77 dks fy[kk x;k ,oa fnukad 28-04-77 dks iathd`r djk;k x;k tcfd xksnh dh jLe fnukad 29-04-77 dks gqbZ gSA fgUnw nRrd ,oa Hkj.k iks"k.k vf/kfu;e 1956 dh /kkjk 16 ds varxZr xksn fn;s tkus ,oa xksn fy;s tkus dh jLeiw.kZ gksuk vfuok;Z gS ftlds fy;s xksn nsus okys ekrk firk dh lgefr gksuk vfuok;Z gS tcfd i=koyh ij miyC/k lk{; ds ijh{k.k ls fofnr gS fd dfFkr xksnhukek dks VsdpUnz dh eka f=os.kh nsoh }kjk vLohdkj fd;k x;k gS rFkk nhokuh ;kn esa Hkh ekrk vius iq= dks nRrd iq= ds :i esa xksn fn;s tkus dh lgefr u fn;s tkus ij flfoy U;k;ky; }kjk xksnukek ugha ekuk x;k esjh fopkj ls xksnukek fof/kd :i ls lR;kfir u gksus ds dkj.k voj U;k;ky; }kjk xksnukek ds vk/kkj ij fojklr ntZ fd;s tkus dh vkifRr djus esa fdlh izdkj dh voS/kkfudrk ugha dh x;h gSA vr% vihy mRre pUnz cuke vkKkjke vkfn fujk/kkj ik;h tkrh gS voj U;k;ky; ds vkns'k ds ijh{k.k ls fofnr gS fd voj U;k;ky; }kjk xksnukek o olh;rukek dks voS/k djkj nsrs gq;s c`tuanu dh fojklr /kkjk 171 ds vUrZr fu.khZr dh x;h gS rFkk e`rd dh iq=h f=os.kh nsoh dk uke ntZ djrs gq;s muds okfjlku vkKkjke jke ujs'k ukjk;unkl iq=x.k ckcwyky Jherh xhrk nsoh iRuh VsdpUnz /;kupanz mRre pUnz iq=x.k VsdpUnz dk uke crkSj okfjl ntZ fd;k x;k gS fdUrq ojklr ds vk/kkj ij tks voj U;k;ky; }kjk vkns'k ikfjr fd;k x;k gS og =qfViw.kZ gS pawfd c`tuanu dh iqf=;ksa f=os.kh nosh o jke nsoh gSaA oknxzLr vkjkth ds vk/ks dh okfjl jkensoh dks NksM+ fn;k x;kA blh ojklr vkns'k ds vk/kkj ij mHk;i{kksa }kjk vihy Lrj ij xzke lqYrkuiqjk tejsgh vOoy fupkoM+h dh Hkwfe ds laca/k esa vkilh cVokjk ds vk/kkj ij lqygukek fnukad 29-06-2019 izLrqr fd;k x;k gS i=koyh ij miyC/k lk{; ds ijh{k.k ls fofnr gS fd e`rd c`tuanu iq= QqUnh ds iqf=;ksa Jherh f=os.kh nsoh o jkek nsoh gS ;g rF; lHkh i{kksa dks Lohdkj Hkh gS fdarq pdcanh vf/kdkjh vius fu.kZ; esa ek= ,d iq=h f=os.kh nsoh iRuh ckcwyky ds Ik{k esa fojklr ntZ dh gS tcfd nwljh iq=h Jherh jkeknsoh iq=h c`tuanu iRuh jk/ks';ke dks fojklr ls oafpr j[kk x;k gSA bl izdkj voj U;k;ky; dk vkns'k fof/kfo:) ik;k tkr gS vihy Lrj ij izLrqr fd;s x;s lqygukek fnukad 29-06-19 ds ijh{k.k ls Hkh fofnr gksrk gS fd ;g pdcanh vf/kdkjh }kjk fojklru ntZ fd;s vkns'k ds vk/kkj ij dfFkr lqygukek is'k fd;k gS vDr lqygukek ds vk/kkj ij i{k fookfnr vkjkth esa viuk uke ntZ djkuk pkgrs gSa tcfd e`rd o`tuanu dh fojklr ds laca/k esa mDr U;k;ky; dk vkns'k =qfViw.kZ o voS/kkfud gksus ds dkj.k vihy Lrj ij izLrqr fd;k x;kA lqygukek Hkh voS/kkfud gLrkarj.k ik;k tkrk gS tks Lohdkj fd;s tkus ;ksX; ugha gS e`rd c`tuanu iq= QwUnh dh nwljh iq=h jkek nsoh dks fojklr ls oafpr j[kk x;k gS vr% pdcanh vf/kdkjh dk vkns'k gLr{ksi gS rFkk oknxzLr vkjkth ds vk/ks Hkkx ij jkeknsoh iq=h c`tuanu dk uke Hkh crkSj okfjl ntZ fd;k tkuk mfpr izrhr gksrk gSA** (Emphasis Supplied) 6. Matter thereafter went to Revisional Authority, who upheld the findings returned by Settlement Officer of Consolidation by an order dated 25.07.2023. Matter thereafter went to Revisional Authority, who upheld the findings returned by Settlement Officer of Consolidation by an order dated 25.07.2023. Relevant part thereof is mentioned hereinafter:- ^^fuxjkuh lquokbZ dh izfdz;k esa bl U;k;ky; dks v/khuLFk U;k;ky;ksa dh dk;Zokgh esa gqbZ fdlh Hkh vfu;ferrk ds vfrfjDr] vkns'k dh 'kq)rk] oS/krk ,oa vkSfpR; ds fo"k; esa Hkh viuk lek/kku djus ,oa U;k;ksfpr vkns'k ikfjr djus dh vf/kdkfjrk izkIr gSA rRdze esa izLrqr izdj.k esa ;g fopkj.kh; iz'u gS fd e`rd [kkrsnkj dh oknkLin laifr ds mRrjkf/kdkj r; djus esa tc lHkh i{kksa }kjk ;g Lohdkj fd;k x;k gS fd e`rd c`tuanu ds dksbZ iq= ugha Fks ,oa iRuh Hkh muls igys e`rd gks pqdh Fkh rFkk mudh nks iqf=;ka& f=os.kh nsoh ,oa jkeknsoh gh fof/kd mRrjkf/kdkjh Fkha rks dfFkr xksnukek ,oa olh;rukek ds vfl) gks tkus ds ckn vc ek= fof/kd okfjlksa ds gh mRrjkf/kdkj dks ekuk tkus dk vkSfPkR; 'ks"k jg x;k Fkk] rks fdlh Hkh n'kk esa oS/k mRrjkf/kdkjh dks mlds gd ls oafpr fd;s tkus dk dksbZ vkSfpR; izrhr ugha gksrk gS] D;ksafd e`rd dh ,d iq=h f=os.kh ds i{k es aviuk mRrjkf/kdkj ,oa ojklr dk gd nwljh iq=h jkeknsoh }kjk ljsaMj fd;k tkuk fof/kr% fl) ugha fd;k x;k gS vkSj og gd fdlh vU; okfjl ds i{k esa fof/kr% ljsaMj fd;k Hkh ugha tk ldrk gSA bl izdkj pdcanh vf/kdkjh ds vkns'k fnukad 19-3-2014 esa vfu;ferrk gksuk fl) gksrh gS ftlesa mUgksaus nwljh iq=h jkeknsoh dks mlds ojklr ds vf/kdkj ls oafpr dj ek= ,d gh iq=h f=os.kh ¼e`rd½ okngw f=os.kh ds okjlku ds i{k esa ojklr dk vkns'k ikfjr fd;k FkkA ;gka ij mDr vkns'k dks la'kksf/kr fd;s tkus dk iw.kZr% vkSfpR; ;g curk gS fd pdcanh vf/kdkjh }kjk gd ls oafpr dh x;h nwljh iq=h jkeknsoh ds i{k esa Hkh mlds oS/k va'k ij mldk uke ojklru ntZ fd;s tkus dk la'kksf/kr vkns'k vihyh; U;k;ky; }kjk] i{kksa dh lE;d lquokbZ ds ckn] ikfjr fd;k tk;s rFkk vihyh; U;k;ky; }kjk mi;qZDrkuqlkj lquokbZ djds pdcanh vf/kdkjh ds vkns'k fnukad 19-03-2014 dks la'kksf/kr djrs gq, e`rd [kkrsnkj dh okfjl nksuksa iqf=;ksa dze'k% f=os.kh okngw mlds okfjlku ,oa jkeknsoh ds i{k esa ojklr dk vkns'k ikfjr fd;k gS tks fu;er%] 'qk) ,oa oS/k gS vkSj bl izdj.k esa rF;ksa ds vk/kkj ij ,slk vkns'k ikfjr fd;s tkus dk fof/kr% vkSfpR; Hkh curk gSA bl izdkj mDr rF;ksa dh foospuksijkar lHkh rhuksa fuxjkfu;ksa dks fujLr fd;s tkus ,oa vihyh; U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr la'kksf/kr vkns'k fnukad 31-08-2019 dks ;Fkkor j[ks tkus dk fof/kr% vkSfpR; curk gSA** (Emphasis Supplied) 7. Sri Vivek Shandilya, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Vaibhav Shandilya, Advocate appearing for petitioners in Writ-B No. 3822 of 2023, has submitted that process of adoption was conducted in accordance with law and all requisite process was followed, therefore, only on a ground that deed was subsequently registered as well as that it was not signed by natural mother, the adoption could not be doubted. He placed reliance on relevant provisions of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1956"). It is also submitted that findings returned that there was no custom to adopt daughter's son in Bundelkhand region was not based on any documentary evidence either placed before Revisional Authority or before this Court. 8. Sri W.H. Khan, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Gulrez Khan, Advocate for petitioners in Writ-B No. 3867 of 2023, has submitted that since adoption deed was disbelieved and Triveni biological mother of Tekchand herself challenged the adoption deed in a Civil Court as well as that other sister has not approached the Appellate Authority, therefore, Appellate Authority under U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1953") within its limited jurisdiction could not grant a relief which was not sought. It has no power to mould the relief. Therefore, share granted in favour of other sister, Rama Devi was beyond jurisdiction as well as that compromise which was signed by parties was wrongly rejected. 9. Above submissions of learned Senior Advocates were vehemently opposed by Sri Awadhesh Kumar Singh and Sri Sandeep Kumar, Advocates for contesting-respondents in both writ petitions. They submitted that process of adoption was defective and since the deed was not signed by biological mother, therefore, only on basis of consent as recorded by biological father and signature of only biological father on adoption deed, adoption was rightly rejected by all three authorities. They placed reliance on Section 11(vi) of Act, 1956. They further submitted that Rama Devi was admittedly a daughter of Brij Nandan and, therefore, under law of inheritance she is entitled for her share even she has not filed any appeal. Learned counsels have read out certain portions of impugned order. Counsel for respondents have placed reliance on judgments passed by Supreme Court in Ghisalal v. Dhapubai (Dead) by L.Rs. Learned counsels have read out certain portions of impugned order. Counsel for respondents have placed reliance on judgments passed by Supreme Court in Ghisalal v. Dhapubai (Dead) by L.Rs. and others, 2011 (2) SCC 298 and M. Vanaja v. M. Sarla Devi (Dead), Civil Appeal No. 8814 of 2010, decided on 06.03.2020. 10. Sri Vivek Shandilya, learned Senior Advocate, in rejoinder, has submitted that Section 11(vi) of Act, 1956 is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of present case since it is with regard to parents and guardians. 11. Sri W.H. Khan, learned Senior Advocate, in rejoinder, has submitted that Rama Devi has already relinquished her right by way of written compromise in 1981 and for almost two decades she has never tried to disown the compromise. Learned Senior Advocate has placed reliance on a judgment passed by this Court in Brij Kishore and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Banda and others, 2017 (135) RD 151. 12. Heard learned counsel for parties and perused the material available on record. Re: Adoption :- 13. In order to consider the rival submission, it would be relevant to refer two recent judgments passed by Supreme Court, first being, M. Vanaja v. M. Sarla Devi(Dead), (2020) 5 SCC 307 and second being, Moturu Nalini Kanth v. Gainedi Kaliprasad (Dead, Through Lrs.), (2023) SCC Online SC 1488 and relevant paragraphs thereof are mentioned hereinafter:- M. Vanaja (supra) :- "13. Section 6 of the 1956 Act, prescribes the prerequisites for a valid adoption, which are: "6. Requisites of a valid adoption.- No adoption shall be valid unless- (i) the person adopting has the capacity, and also the right, to take in adoption; (ii) the person giving in adoption has the capacity to do so; (iii) the person adopted is capable of being taken in adoption; and (iv) the adoption is made in compliance with the other conditions mentioned in this Chapter." 14. Section 7 provides that the male Hindu who is of sound mind and is not a minor has the capacity to take a son or a daughter in adoption. The consent of his wife has been made mandatory by the proviso to Section 7. Section 9 deals with persons who are capable of giving a child in adoption. The other conditions for a valid adoption are stipulated in Section 11 of the 1956 Act. The consent of his wife has been made mandatory by the proviso to Section 7. Section 9 deals with persons who are capable of giving a child in adoption. The other conditions for a valid adoption are stipulated in Section 11 of the 1956 Act. One such condition is Section 11(vi) which is as under: "11. Other conditions for a valid adoption.-.... *** (vi) the child to be adopted must be actually given and taken in adoption by the parents or guardian concerned or under their authority with intent to transfer the child from the family of its birth (or in the case of an abandoned child or a child whose parentage is not known, from the place or family where it has been brought up) to the family of its adoption: Provided that the performance of datta homan shall not be essential to the validity of an adoption." 15. A plain reading of the above provisions would make it clear that compliance of the conditions in Chapter I of the 1956 Act is mandatory for an adoption to be treated as valid. The two important conditions as mentioned in Sections 7 and 11 of the 1956 Act are the consent of the wife before a male Hindu adopts a child and proof of the ceremony of actual giving and taking in adoption. The appellant admitted in her evidence that she does not have the proof of the ceremony of giving and taking of her in adoption. Admittedly, there is no pleading in the plaint regarding the adoption being in accordance with the provisions of the Act. That apart, the respondent who is the adoptive mother has categorically stated in her evidence that the appellant was never adopted though she was merely brought up by her and her husband. Even the grandmother of the appellant who appeared before the Court as PW 3 deposed that the appellant who lost her parents in her childhood was given to the respondent and her husband to be brought up. PW 3 also stated in her evidence that the appellant was not adopted by the respondent and her husband. Therefore, the appellant had failed to prove that she had been adopted by the respondent and her husband Narasimhulu Naidu. 16. PW 3 also stated in her evidence that the appellant was not adopted by the respondent and her husband. Therefore, the appellant had failed to prove that she had been adopted by the respondent and her husband Narasimhulu Naidu. 16. The appellant relied upon a judgment of this Court in L. Debi Prasad [L. Debi Prasad v. Tribeni Devi, (1970) 1 SCC 677 ] to submit that abundant evidence submitted by her before the Court would point to the fact that she was brought up as the daughter of the respondent and her husband (Late) Narasimhulu Naidu. Such evidence can be taken into account to draw inference that she was adopted by them. The facts in L. Debi Prasad [L. Debi Prasad v. Tribeni Devi, (1970) 1 SCC 677 ] are similar to those in the instant case. In that case, Shyam Behari Lal was adopted by Gopal Das in the year 1892 when he was an infant. Shyam Behari Lal was unable to establish the actual adoption but has produced considerable documentary evidence to show that he was treated as the son of Gopal Das for a quarter of century. This Court accepted the submission of Shyam Behari Lal and held that there was sufficient evidence on record to infer a valid adoption. Though the facts are similar, we are unable to apply the law laid down in L. Debi Prasad [L. Debi Prasad v. Tribeni Devi, (1970) 1 SCC 677 ] to the instant case. L. Debi Prasad [L. Debi Prasad v. Tribeni Devi, (1970) 1 SCC 677 ] case pertains to adoption that took place in the year 1892 and we are concerned with an adoption that has taken place after the 1956 Act has come into force. Though the appellant has produced evidence to show that she was treated as a daughter by (Late) Narasimhulu Naidu and the defendant, she has not been able to establish her adoption. The mandate of the 1956 Act is that no adoption shall be valid unless it has been made in compliance with the conditions mentioned in Chapter I of the 1956 Act. The two essential conditions i.e. the consent of the wife and the actual ceremony of adoption have not been established. The mandate of the 1956 Act is that no adoption shall be valid unless it has been made in compliance with the conditions mentioned in Chapter I of the 1956 Act. The two essential conditions i.e. the consent of the wife and the actual ceremony of adoption have not been established. This Court by its judgment in Ghisalal v. Dhapubai [Ghisalal v. Dhapubai, (2011) 2 SCC 298 : (2011) 1 SCC (Civ) 411] held that the consent of the wife is mandatory for proving adoption. Moturu Nalini Kanth ( supra): - "36. The presumption, as is clear from the provision itself, is rebuttable. In G. Vasu v. Syed Yaseen Sifuddin Quadri, AIR 1987 AP 139 , a Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court pointed out that presumptions are of two kinds-presumptions of fact and of law. It was noted that a presumption of fact is an inference logically drawn from one fact as to the existence of other facts and such presumptions of fact are rebuttable by evidence to the contrary. It was also held that presumptions of law may be either irrebuttable, so that no evidence to a contrary may be given, or rebuttable, and a rebuttable presumption of law is a legal rule to be applied by the Courts in the absence of conflicting evidence. This view was affirmed by this Court in Bharat Barrel & Drum Manufacturing Company v. Amin Chand Payrelal, (1999) 3 SCC 35 , and it was held that in order to disprove a presumption, such facts and circumstances have to be brought on record, upon consideration of which, the Court may either believe that the consideration did not exist or its non-existence was so probable that a prudent man would, under the circumstances of the case, act upon the plea that it did not exist. 37. In this regard, we may also note that Section 11 of the Act of 1956 stipulates the conditions to be complied with to constitute a valid adoption and, to the extent relevant, it reads as under: '11. Other conditions for a valid adoption. 37. In this regard, we may also note that Section 11 of the Act of 1956 stipulates the conditions to be complied with to constitute a valid adoption and, to the extent relevant, it reads as under: '11. Other conditions for a valid adoption. - In every adoption, the following conditions must be complied with:" (i) to (v) .....; (vi) the child to be adopted must be actually given and taken in adoption by the parents or guardian concerned or under their authority with intent to transfer the child from the family of its birth or in the case of an abandoned child or a child whose parentage is not known, from the place or family where it has been brought up to the family of its adoption: Provided that the performance of datta homam shall not be essential to the validity of adoption' 38. We may now take note of relevant case law. In Laxmibai (Dead) through LRs. v. Bhagwantbuva (Dead) through Lrs., (2013) 4 SCC 97 , this Court held that the mere signature or thumb impression on a document is not adequate to prove the contents thereof but, in a case where a person who has given his son in adoption appears in the witness box and proves the validity of the said document, the Court ought to accept the same taking into consideration the presumption under Section 16 of the Act of 1956. Ergo, the proving of the validity of the document is a must. 39. Much earlier, in Kishori Lal v. Mst. Chaltibai, AIR 1959 SC 504 , a 3-Judge Bench of this Court held that, as an adoption results in changing the course of succession, it is necessary that the evidence to support it should be such that it is free from all suspicions of fraud and so consistent and probable as to leave no occasion for doubting its truth. On facts, the Bench found that no invitations were sent to the brotherhood, friends or relations and no publicity was given to the adoption, rendering it difficult to believe. 40. In Govinda v. Chimabai, AIR 1968 Mysore 309, a Division Bench of the Mysore High Court observed that the mere fact that a deed of adoption has been registered cannot be taken as evidence of proof of adoption, as an adoption deed never proves an adoption. 40. In Govinda v. Chimabai, AIR 1968 Mysore 309, a Division Bench of the Mysore High Court observed that the mere fact that a deed of adoption has been registered cannot be taken as evidence of proof of adoption, as an adoption deed never proves an adoption. It was rightly held that the factum of adoption has to be proved by oral evidence of giving or taking of the child and that the necessary ceremonies, where they are necessary to be performed, were carried out in accordance with shastras. 41. In Padmalav Achariya v. Srimatyia Fakira Debya, AIR 1931 PC 81, the Privy Council found that a cloud of suspicion rested upon an alleged second adoption and the factum of the second adoption was sought to be proved on the basis of evidence of near relatives who were also partisan, which made it unsafe to act upon their testimonies. The Privy Council held that both the adoptions were most improbable in themselves and were not supported by contemporaneous evidence. 42. In Jai Singh v. Shakuntala, (2002) 3 SCC 634 , this Court noted the statutory presumption envisaged by Section 16 of the Act of 1956 and observed that though the legislature had used 'shall' instead of any other word of lesser significance, the inclusion of the words 'unless and until it is disproved' appearing at the end of the statutory provision makes the situation not that rigid but flexible enough to depend upon the evidence available on record in support of the adoption. This Court further noted that it is a matter of grave significance by reason of the factum of adoption and displacement of the person adopted from the natural succession-thus onus of proof is rather heavy. This Court held that the statute allowed some amount of flexibility, lest it turns out to be solely dependent on a registered adoption deed. The reason for inclusion of the words 'unless and until it is disproved', per this Court, have to be ascertained in proper perspective and as such, the presumption cannot but be said to be a rebuttable presumption. This Court further held that the registered instrument of adoption presumably stands out to be taken to be correct but the Court is not precluded from looking into it upon production of some evidence contra the adoption and the Court can always look into such evidence. This Court further held that the registered instrument of adoption presumably stands out to be taken to be correct but the Court is not precluded from looking into it upon production of some evidence contra the adoption and the Court can always look into such evidence. This Court further noted the mandate of Section 11 (vi) of the Act of 1956 and held that the 'give and take in adoption' is a requirement which stands as a sine qua non for a valid adoption. 43. In Mst. Deu v. Laxmi Narayan, (1998) 8 SCC 701 , this Court observed that in view of Section 16 of the Act of 1956, whenever any document registered under law is produced before the Court purporting to record an adoption made and is signed by the persons mentioned therein, the Court should presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of the said statute, unless and until it is disproved. It was further held that in view of Section 16 of the Act of 1956, it is open to the persons who challenge the registered deed of adoption to disprove the same by taking independent proceedings. 44. In Lakshman Singh Kothari v. Rup Kanwar (Smt) alias Rup Kanwar Bai, AIR 1961 SC 1378 , having referred to texts on Hindu Law, this Court observed: '10. The law may be briefly stated thus : Under the Hindu law, whether among the regenerate caste or among Sudras, there cannot be a valid adoption unless the adoptive boy is transferred from one family to another and that can be done only by the ceremony of giving and taking. The object of the corporeal giving and receiving in adoption is obviously to secure due publicity. To achieve this object, it is essential to have a formal ceremony. No particular form is prescribed for the ceremony, but the law requires that the natural parent shall hand over the adoptive boy and the adoptive parent shall receive him. The nature of the ceremony may vary depending upon the circumstances of each case. But a ceremony there shall be, and giving and taking shall be part of it. No particular form is prescribed for the ceremony, but the law requires that the natural parent shall hand over the adoptive boy and the adoptive parent shall receive him. The nature of the ceremony may vary depending upon the circumstances of each case. But a ceremony there shall be, and giving and taking shall be part of it. The exigencies of the situation arising out of diverse circumstances necessitated the introduction of the doctrine of delegation; and, therefore, the parents, after exercising their volition to give and take the boy in adoption, may both or either of them delegate the physical act of handing over the boy or receiving him, as the case may be, to a third party.' 45. In M. Vanaja v. M. Sarla Devi (Dead), (2020) 5 SCC 307 , this Court took note of the relevant provisions of the Act of 1956 and held that a plain reading of the said provisions made it clear that compliance with the conditions in Chapter 1 of the Act of 1956 is mandatory for an adoption to be treated as valid and that the two important conditions mentioned in Sections 7 and 11 of the Act of 1956 are the consent of the wife before a male Hindu adopts a child and the proof of the ceremony of actual giving and taking in adoption. 46. In Dhanno wd/o Balbir Singh v. Tuhi Ram (Died) represented by his Lrs., AIR 1996 P&H 203 , a learned Judge of the Punjab & Haryana High Court, faced with the argument that Section 16 of the Act of 1956 required a registered adoption deed to be believed, held that the presumption thereunder, if any, is rebuttable and by merely placing the document on record without proving the ceremony of due adoption, it could not be said that there was a valid adoption. The learned Judge rightly noted that the factum of adoption must be proved in the same way as any other fact and such evidence in support of the adoption must be sufficient to satisfy the heavy burden that rests upon any person who seeks to displace the natural succession by alleging an adoption." (Emphasis Supplied) 14. The learned Judge rightly noted that the factum of adoption must be proved in the same way as any other fact and such evidence in support of the adoption must be sufficient to satisfy the heavy burden that rests upon any person who seeks to displace the natural succession by alleging an adoption." (Emphasis Supplied) 14. From the above legal position, it would be clearly evident that in respect of a registered adoption deed, there is a presumption that adoption has been made in compliance with provision of Act, 1956 but the presumption provided thereunder, if any, would be rebuttable, by merely placing document on record, without proving ceremony of due adoption, it could not be said that there was a valid adoption as well as that consent of wife is also required to be established. 15. In aforesaid circumstances, in order to consider the rival submissions, I have carefully perused the adoption deed which is placed on record. This adoption deed was scribed on 27.04.1977 stating that adoption ceremony was conducted on 29.03.1977 i.e. a month prior to it. 16. According to said adoption deed even the presence of biological mother during ceremony is doubtful since it has been stated therein that ^^Jh ckcwjke us viuh iRuh dh jtkeanh ls mijksDr Jh VsdpUnz dks eq>s xksn ns fn;k gS**] , therefore, it only indicates the presence of biological father and that consent of biological mother was obtained by him (implied consent) while she herself was neither present nor signed the said document. 17. At this junction, it would be relevant to refer that it is also brought on record that mother has challenged the adoption in civil proceedings, therefore, condition prescribed for valid adoption as provided under Act, 1956 as referred in preceding paragraph of this judgment has not been complied with. 18. The outcome of aforesaid discussion is that implied consent of mother with father would not be sufficient to prove that mandatory conditions of adoption were complied with in present case. In adoption deed, reason for absence of mother was not mentioned. There is no testimony which proves that mother has given consent or asked father to conduct the adoption procedure on her behalf. The ceremony of adoption would itself become doubtful, which is further proved that adoption deed was not signed by biological mother. 19. In adoption deed, reason for absence of mother was not mentioned. There is no testimony which proves that mother has given consent or asked father to conduct the adoption procedure on her behalf. The ceremony of adoption would itself become doubtful, which is further proved that adoption deed was not signed by biological mother. 19. In the aforesaid circumstances, the adoption deed and delay in registration thereof would be considered as an adverse factor and that entire adoption was not conducted under prescribed manner and even it appears that adoption ceremony/proceedings were never undertaken, therefore, the adoption deed was legally disbelieved by all three authorities. Essential conditions of adoption such as consent of mother was not complied with. (See M. Vanaja (supra)). No circumstance exists to interfere with the concurrent findings. In Re: Will 20. The Will was held to be disputed by all authorities since it was held to be surrounded by suspicious circumstances. The Will was a unregistered document and no reason was shown that Will could be executed in favour of a person despite families were not in good relation, therefore, the Will was surrounded by suspicious circumstance, and no circumstance exists to interfere with concurrent findings. (See Raj Kumari and Others v. Surinder Pal Sharma, (2021) 14 SCC 500 ) In Re: Compromise Deed :- 21. The petitioner tried to make out a case on two grounds, on one hand, writ petitioners were relying adoption deed and on other hand, in alternatively they placed reliance on compromise. The compromise was not held to be proved and was even disputed by its signatories. A compromise which clearly absolve a right of parties without any reason and since it was disputed also, therefore, it would be considered to be a creation of fraud and was rightly rejected by Appellate Authority as well as Revisional Authority, therefore, I do not find any reason to interfere in impugned order, in this regard. In Re: Entitlement of Daughter :- 22. One of writ petitioners is real sister of respondent. It is not under dispute that in case, the adoption and Will was disbelieved, therefore, both sisters would have equal right in accordance with law of inheritance, as applicable. In Re: Entitlement of Daughter :- 22. One of writ petitioners is real sister of respondent. It is not under dispute that in case, the adoption and Will was disbelieved, therefore, both sisters would have equal right in accordance with law of inheritance, as applicable. Only on ground that respondent sister has not filed any appeal would not make the order passed by Appellate Authority illegal whereby both sisters were given equal share in accordance with law of succession. 23. The Appellate Authority cannot act as a post-office. It has to look at all the circumstances that exists on record as well as likelihood prejudice that could be caused to any party, therefore, Appellate Court has not committed any error in granting share to respondent though she has not filed any appeal. The Revisional Authority has rightly upheld aforesaid finding in revision. 24. The outcome of above discussion is that adoption deed was rightly disbelieved since not only mandatory procedure was not undertaken but consent of mother was also remained absent as well as that the compromise were rightly disbelieved, being disputed by its signatory therefore, the respondent i.e. other sister who was legally entitled for her respective share as per law of succession, therefore, the Appellate Court has committed no error in granting such relief to her. The Revisional Authority has rightly upheld it. 25. In view of above, the writ petitions being sans merit are accordingly, dismissed. 26. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.