JUDGMENT (Prayer: Civil Revision Petition filed under Section 25 of Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1960 against the fair and decreetal order dated 15.04.2014 of the learned VII Appellate Authority, Small Causes Court, Chennai made in RCA No.27 of 2014, reversing the order dated 12.12.2013 made in M.P.No.150 of 2013 in RCOP No.2337 of 2012 on the file of XII Judge, Court of Small Causes, Chennai.) 1. This Civil Revision Petition arises against the order and decreetal order of the Rent Control Appellate Authority//VII Judge, Court of Small Causes, Chennai passed in RCA No.27 of 2014 dated 15.04.2014, reversing the order and decreetal order passed by the learned Rent Controller/XII Judge, Court of Small Causes, Chennai in MP No.150 of 2013 in RCOP No.2337 of 2012. 2. The Civil Revision Petitioner is the landlord and the respondent is the tenant. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to in the order as per their ranks in RCOP viz., landlord and tenant. 3. RCOP No.2337 of 2012 had been filed by the landlord for fixation of fair rent as against the tenant. During the pendency of RCOP, the tenant took Page 2 of 38 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.R.P.No.2135 of 2014 out an application in MP No.150 of 2013 to reject the RCOP and the same was dismissed on 12.12.2013. Seemingly, aggrieved by the same, R.C.A.No.27 of 2014 was filed before the appellate authority. The appeal was allowed on 15.04.2014, rejecting the RCOP No.2337 of 2012. 4. I have heard Mr.Sandeep S.Shah, learned counsel for the landlord and Mr.K.G.Raghavan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Mr.R.Amizhdhu, learned counsel for tenant. 5. Mr.Sandeep S.Shah, learned counsel submits as follows:- (i) The tenant is not a person aggrieved within the meaning of Section 23(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”) and therefore, the appeal filed by him before the Rent Control Appellate Authority challenging the order in MP No.150 of 2013 is not maintainable. (ii) He submits that considering the nature of the order passed by the Rent Controller, the appeal itself is not maintainable. (iii) He would point out that the contradictions in the order passed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority deserves to be set aside. (iv) He would further submit that the Rent Control Appellate Authority has not given any reason in his order. (iii) He would point out that the contradictions in the order passed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority deserves to be set aside. (iv) He would further submit that the Rent Control Appellate Authority has not given any reason in his order. (v) He would further add that for the purpose of jural relationship of landlord and tenant, the parties necessarily will have to go to trial and the same cannot be disposed of in an interlocutory manner. (vi) He would state that under Rule 12(2) of Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Rules, (hereinafter referred to as “ the Rules”) the manner of the disposal of the application has been set forth and this has not been seen by the Rent Control Appellate Authority. (vii) He would further add that Ex.P.1 which had been marked in the interlocutory proceeding in MP No.150 of 2013 is not in dispute. (viii) He would also add that the extent of property under Tenancy covered by the Act alone is disputed and this cannot be interpreted in an interlocutory stage. (ix) Finally, he would state that an Order under Section 23 of the Act means an “ order” affecting the rights and liabilities of a party and does not speak about “ any order” under the Act. 6. Torpedoing this argument Mr.K.G.Raghhavan, learned Senior Counsel submits as follows:- (i) That the Rent Controller failed to exercise his jurisdiction vested in him. (ii) The Rent Controller is empowered to decide his jurisdiction as a preliminary issue and by virtue of his order dated 12.12.2013, the said issue had not been decided. (iii) He would argue that it is inherent in every Rent Controller to decide his jurisdiction and it does not require a specific provision like Order 14 of Civil Procedure Code for the said purpose. (iv) He would add that the nature of order passed by the Rent Controller pushes his clients to trial which itself causes prejudice and hence, an appeal is maintainable. (v) He would state that the Rent Controller would have to decide the jurisdictional fact of landlord and tenant first and only thereafter go into the merits of the case. (vi) He would state that the order passed in M.P.No.150 of 2013 is not an interlocutory order and therefore, the appeal is maintainable. 7. (v) He would state that the Rent Controller would have to decide the jurisdictional fact of landlord and tenant first and only thereafter go into the merits of the case. (vi) He would state that the order passed in M.P.No.150 of 2013 is not an interlocutory order and therefore, the appeal is maintainable. 7. The undisputed facts leading to the case are that the landlord has a property situate at Old No.151, New No.306, Purasawalkam High Road, Chennai-10. The Act is concerned only with the tenancy with respect to buildings and not with the lands. This property has two sets of building, viz., one set of building put up by landlord himself to an extent of 36,550 sq.ft and another set of building put up by the tenant. In this case, the total extent of the land available is about 15 grounds. 8. Both sides admit that in the 15 grounds of land, the landlord has put up building which has been let out by the tenant and the tenant has independently put up a building to the tune of Rs.100 lakhs. 9. RCOP No.2337 of 2012 was filed for fixation of fair rent with respect to the building put up by the landlord. Notice was ordered to the respondent. Soon after service of notice in the RCOP, M.P.No.150 of 2013 had been filed. The plea in MP No.150 of 2013 is that, as per the lease agreement entered into between the landlord and tenant and registered as document No.3776 of 2002 dated 27.08.2002, the landlord had accepted that the tenant had put up a commercial and industrial construction to the tune of Rs.100 lakhs. Consequently, according to him, there is no jural relationship of landlord and tenant as per the Act and therefore, RCOP is not maintainable. 10. Countering the same, the landlord stated that RCOP had been filed only for the land and building put up by him, which is an old superstructure consisting of ground floor, mezzanine floor, first floor and second floor in all put together 36,550 sq.ft. He would state that at no point of time, the landlord is claiming right over the new building which he is entitled to on payment of costs. It was further urged that under law, the issue has to be taken up only in the main RCOP. He would state that at no point of time, the landlord is claiming right over the new building which he is entitled to on payment of costs. It was further urged that under law, the issue has to be taken up only in the main RCOP. On the basis of this affidavit and counter, the learned trial Judge passed the following order:- “ Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, and plain reading of the lease deed, it reveals that availability of the existence of old building price prior to execution of lease deed or not and the plinth area of old building can be decided only after full trial and the exposure of recital of lease deed is the mixed question of fact and law and has to be decided at the time of full trial only and based on that, there is no sufficient reason to reject the main RCOP in limini. Hence this Court is inclined to dismiss this petition.” 11. A reading of the order shows that the Court did not decide the issue as to the maintainability, but, had only directed that it will be decided after full trial. 12. Aggrieved over the same, an appeal was filed before the Rent Control Appellate Authority. The Rent Control Appellate Authority had come to the conclusion that in summary proceedings, there is no scope for deciding a preliminary issue or maintainability or rejection of RCOP. He would then go on to state that no mistake has been committed by the Court in numbering the RCOP proceedings without perusal of the lease deed, as an RCOP is a summary proceeding. Thereafter, he would state that the burden is on the landlord to prove the existence of relationship of the landlord and tenant and that it had not been established. He would state that if any dispute arises from and out of Ex.P.1 contract (Ex.P.1 was filed only during M.P. proceedings and not in the main RCOP), the trial Court should have dismissed the RCOP. 13. When the revision came up before me, I had asked learned counsel for the tenant as to how he is maintaining an application for a preliminary issue. This is because the rent control proceedings is a summary proceeding. He submits that the Rent Controller, being a Tribunal, it is entitled to decide its own jurisdiction. 13. When the revision came up before me, I had asked learned counsel for the tenant as to how he is maintaining an application for a preliminary issue. This is because the rent control proceedings is a summary proceeding. He submits that the Rent Controller, being a Tribunal, it is entitled to decide its own jurisdiction. One cannot dispute the fact that the Tribunal is entitled to decide its own jurisdiction, but, the point remains that the Rent Control Tribunal does not have the power akin to Order 14 Rules 1 and 2 of Civil Procedure Code nor has it been empowered like a Labour Court to pass preliminary order and final award. It is a statutory Tribunal and its jurisdiction is circumscribed by the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder. 14. It is here that Rule 12(2) of the Tamil Nadu Building (Lease and Rent Control) Rules becomes relevant. It reads as follows:- “ 12. Procedure for the disposal of applications:- .... (2) The Controller or the authorised officer or an officer authorised by him, as the case may be, shall give to the parties a reasonable opportunity to state their case. He shall also record a brief note of the evidence of the parties and witnesses, if any, examined on either side; and upon the evidence so recorded and after consideration of any documentary evidence which may be produced by the parties, pass orders on the application.” 15. Under Rule 12(2), the Court need not even record detailed evidence as done in a Civil Court and all that is need to be done is a brief note of evidence of the parties and witnesses, if any. There is no provision under Section 10 or 14 for a Rent Controller to frame a preliminary issue and pass an order and on the basis of such preliminary issue, decide the fact of the main RCOP. The summary proceeding does not know of a mini trial within the trial. In fact, as pointed out above, the Rent Controller records only “ note of evidence” and not evidence itself as done by a Civil Court. 16. First we have to understand what is a summary proceeding. This issue has been decided by the judgment of this Court in S.Mani vs T.K.Jacob (1983) 96 Law Weekly 270 wherein, in paragraph No.5, it is held as follows:- “ 5. 16. First we have to understand what is a summary proceeding. This issue has been decided by the judgment of this Court in S.Mani vs T.K.Jacob (1983) 96 Law Weekly 270 wherein, in paragraph No.5, it is held as follows:- “ 5. In Stroud''s Judicial Dict'' (4th Edn.at page 2681,) under the heading '' summarily'' the following observation is extracted from English case: “ Civil matters may be disposed of in a summary manner” under R.S.C.O.59 R.8 now O.17, R.5 though the subject matter excess £50 in value (Harbottle v Roberts): See Herreon Bryont vs Reading. The word ''summarily'' in R.5(2) does not mean that the Master can determine the matter forthwith but only that he can determine it without directing an issue (Davis (P.J.B.) Manufacturing Co.v.Fahn Fahn (clalmant) In Black''s Law Dictionary, 5th Edn, at page 1287, for the word ''summarily'' the meaning is given as without ceremony or delay, short or concise. In the same dictionary the meaning for the word /summary'' in the noun form is given as an abridgment; brief, compendium; digest; also a short application to a court or judge without the formality of a full proceeding. The meaning of the word '' summary'' in the adjective form is given as short; concise; immediate; peremptory; offhand; without a jury; provisional; statutory. The term as used in connection with legal proceedings means a short, concise and immediate proceeding. The meaning of the words ''summary judgment'' in the very same dictionary is given as follows:- “ The Rules of Civil Procedure which permits any party to a civil action to move for a summary judgment on a claim, counter-claim or cross-claim when he believes that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. The motion may be directed towards all or part of a claim or defence and it may be made on the basis of the pleadings or other portions of the record in the case or it may be supported by affidavits and a variety of outside material.”. The motion may be directed towards all or part of a claim or defence and it may be made on the basis of the pleadings or other portions of the record in the case or it may be supported by affidavits and a variety of outside material.”. In the same dictionary at page 1085 the meaning of the words ''summary proceeding'' is given as follows:- “ Any proceeding by which a controversy is settled case disposed of or trial conducted, in a prompt and simple manner, without the aid of a jury, without presentment or indictment, or in other respects out of the regular course of the common law. In procedure, proceedings are said to be summary when they are short and simple in comparison with regular proceedings., e.g., conciliation or small claims, court proceedings as contrasted with usual civil trial.” Taking all these interpretations together, it can be concluded that ''summary procedure'' is meant to be a procedure resorted to in cases where there is no real issue to be decided between the parties and that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief claimed by him under the provisions of law in which case there need not be framing of any issue or taking of evidence. In such a case the matter is disposed of without the formality of an enquiry.” 17. This shows that the Rent Controller need not take pains like Civil Court for the purpose of framing preliminary issue and thereafter, going to the final issue. 18. Insofar as the present proceedings is concerned, the Rent Controller did not decide on the jural relationship of landlord and tenant. He had only stated that the same will be decided after the conclusion of a trial. What was done by the Rent Controller is only a postponement of the question of relationship of landlord and tenant to a later date. 19. The view of the Controller has been expressed by an “ order”, but, I have to see whether it is an order capable of an appeal under Section 23 of the Act. 20. I have to refer to three previous decisions of this Court which have held that as against an order refusing to decide the preliminary issue, an appeal is not maintainable. 21. 20. I have to refer to three previous decisions of this Court which have held that as against an order refusing to decide the preliminary issue, an appeal is not maintainable. 21. In Central Bank of India Ltd vs Gokal Chand, AIR 1967 SC 799 the Supreme Court was dealing with Section 38(1) of Delhi Rent Control Act. The Court was pleased to hold as follows: “The object of S. 38(1) is to give a right of appeal to a party aggrieved by some order which affects his right of liability. In the context of S. 38(1) the words ‘every order of the Controller made under this Act’, though very wide, do not include interlocutory orders, which are merely procedural and do not affect the rights or liabilities of the parties. In a pending proceeding, the Controller may pass many interlocutory orders under Ss. 36 and 37 such as orders regarding the summoning of witnesses, discovery, production and inspection of documents, issue of a commission for examination of witnesses, inspection of premises, fixing a date of hearing and the admissibility of a document or the relevancy of a question. All these interlocutory orders are steps taken towards the final adjudication and for assisting the parties in the prosecution of their case in the pending proceeding; they regulate the procedure only and do not affect any right or liability of the parties. The Legislature could not have intended that the parties would be harassed with endless expenses and delay by appeals from such procedural orders. It is open to any party to set forth the error, defect or irregularity, if any, in such an order as a ground of objection in his appeal from the final order in the main proceeding. Subject to the aforesaid limitation, an appeal lies to the Rent Control Tribunal from every order passed by the Controller under the Act. Even an interlocutory order passed under S. 37(2) is an order passed under the Act and is subject to appeal under S. 38(1) provided it affects some right or liability of any party. Thus, an order of the Rent Controller refusing to set aside an ex parte order is subject to appeal to the Rent Control Tribunal” Soon thereafter, the very same issue came up for consideration in Bant Singh Gill vs Shanti Devi AIR 1867 SC 1360. Thus, an order of the Rent Controller refusing to set aside an ex parte order is subject to appeal to the Rent Control Tribunal” Soon thereafter, the very same issue came up for consideration in Bant Singh Gill vs Shanti Devi AIR 1867 SC 1360. The Supreme Court held “ However, when this appeal came up for hearing before us, learned counsel for the respondents raised another point for challenging the competency of the appeal that was filed against the order of the trial court. It was urged that the order, rejecting the application of the appellant to record the abatement of the suit and directing continuance of the suit, was not an order of such a nature against which an appeal could be filed under S. 34 of the Act of 1952. The word ‘order’ in used in S. 34 without any limitations, with the exception that it must be an order of a court passed under the Act of 1952, but it is contended that this word cannot be interpreted so widely as to include all interlocutory orders or other similar orders passed in the course of the trial of a suit. This aspect came up for consideration before this Court when interpreting S. 38(1) of the Act of 1958, in which also a provision for appeals has been made, and the language referred is very wide in as much as it is laid down that ‘an appeal shall lie from every order of the Controller made under this Act. The extent of this right of appeal under S. 38(1) was considered by this Court in them Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Gokal Chand and it was held that that the object of S. 38(1) is to give a right of appeal to a party aggrieved by same order which affects his right or liability. In the context of S. 38(1) the words ‘every order of the Controller made under this Act,’ though very wide, do not include inter- locutory orders, which are merely procedural and do not affect the rights or liabilities of the parties. The principle was thus recognised that the word ‘order’ used in such context is not wide enough to include every order, whatever be its nature, and particularly orders which only dispose of interlocutory matters. The principle was thus recognised that the word ‘order’ used in such context is not wide enough to include every order, whatever be its nature, and particularly orders which only dispose of interlocutory matters. In the case before us also, all that was done by the application presented by the appellant on 13th March, 1961, was to raise a preliminary issue about the maintainability of the suit on the ground that the suit had abated by virtue of S. 50(2) of the Act of 1958. The Court went into that issue and decided it against the appellant. If the decision had been in favour of the appellant and the suit had been dismissed, no doubt there would have been a final order in the suit having the effect of a decree (see the decision of the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Ram Charan Das v. Hira Nand1on the other hand, if as in the present case, it is held that the suit has not abated and its trial is to continue, there is no final order deciding the rights or liabilities of the parties to the suit. The rights and liabilities have yet to be decided after full trial has been gone through. The decision by the court is only in the nature of a finding on a preliminary issue on which would depend the maintainability of the suit. Such a finding cannot be held to be an order for purposes of S. 34 of the Act of 1952, and, consequently no appeal against such an order would be maintainable. It was indicated by this Court in the case of the Central Bank of India Ltd.2 that in such a case, it is open to the appellant to canvass the error, defect, or irregularity, if any in the order in an appeal from the final order passed in the proceedings for eviction. In the present case also, therefore, it is clearly open to the appellant to raise this plea of abatement of the suit, if and when he files an appeal against a decree for eviction passed by the trial Court.” 22. Applying these judgments, in S.Mani vs T.K.Jacob, (1983) 96 Law Weekly 270 a learned Single Judge was pleased to hold that an appeal can be maintained in respect of orders which affects the right of parties 23. Applying these judgments, in S.Mani vs T.K.Jacob, (1983) 96 Law Weekly 270 a learned Single Judge was pleased to hold that an appeal can be maintained in respect of orders which affects the right of parties 23. Justice V.Ratnam, in the case of V.S.Devadoss vs S.Velu and another, 1984 3 MLJ 301, applying the aforesaid principle, held as follows:- . “ 7. A consideration of the sections of the Act as well as the Rules does not indicate that there is any provision hereunder to hold any enquiry in proceedings under the Act in the nature of a preliminary enquiry on one of the points in dispute between the parties. Therefore. The course adopted by the Appellate Authority in proceeding to deal with the question of the bona fide denial of title as a preliminary point does not have any statutory support. Even as a matter of Practice. before civil courts. a trial within a trial. as it were. has not been encouraged at all by Courts. as by adopting such a course. in the event of the superior court not agreeing with the conclusion of the trial court. the matter necessarily has to be remitted for being reconsidered. It is only with a view to obviate the proceedings being shunted from court to court. That courts have been uniformly following a very salutary Principle that all disputes arising between the Parties bold be dealt with and adjudicated upon as'' a whole and not piecemeal. It is. therefore. evident that the Procedure adopted by the Appellate Authority in having considered the bona fide denial of the respondent as a Preliminary issue has no statutory support and also '' runs counter to the Practice in vogue even before civil court. The Rent Controllers and the Appellate Authorities though they otherwise function % civil courts. are special authorities designated , under the Act for the Purpose of disposing of eviction application and appeals arising there from under the provisions of the Act and they have. been constituted with specific Powers outside which. they cannot arrogate to themselves. other or further powers. Taking into account these aspects. it is clear that the Appellate Authority erred in proceeding to deal with the bona fides of the denial of title as a Preliminary issue and in dismissing the application for eviction in limine. 8. That apart. been constituted with specific Powers outside which. they cannot arrogate to themselves. other or further powers. Taking into account these aspects. it is clear that the Appellate Authority erred in proceeding to deal with the bona fides of the denial of title as a Preliminary issue and in dismissing the application for eviction in limine. 8. That apart. there is a more vital objection to the maintainability of the appeal in R.C.A. 67 of 1082. The order appealed against declined to enquire the question of bona fides of the denial of title of the Petitioner by the respondent (as a preliminary issue. The order did not in any manner decide or even our part to affect in any manner any right of either the Petitioner or the respondent. It is now very well settled that such orders are not appealable under S. 23 of the Act. In Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Gokul Chand held that it did not include Procedural interlocutory orders not affecting the rights or liabilities of the Parties and such order cannot be appealed against. 9. To similar effect is the decision in Bant Singh Gill V. Shanti Devi, the Supreme Court referred to its earlier decision in Central ''Bank of India Ltd. v. Gokul Chand. and held that the decision rendered is only in the nature of a finding on a preliminary issue on which would defend the maintainability of the suit and the rights and liability should be decided after the full trial is gone through and further that such a finding cannot be held to be an order for the Purpose of S. 34 and no appeal against such an order would be maintainable. 10. Lakshmiammal v. Sivasubramaniam. (1981) 2 Mad LJ 206: (AIR 1981 NOC 171) dealt with a case where the question of the maintainability of an appeal filed by the legal representatives of a deceased tenant. who were impleaded in the place of the tenant after overruling their objections. came to be considered. An order on the application for bringing on record the legal representatives was held to be merely procedural in that it assisted the landlord to continue the -proceedings already initiated by him and did not in any manner adjudicate upon or affect any of the rights of the legal representatives and. therefore. came to be considered. An order on the application for bringing on record the legal representatives was held to be merely procedural in that it assisted the landlord to continue the -proceedings already initiated by him and did not in any manner adjudicate upon or affect any of the rights of the legal representatives and. therefore. the appeal filed was incompetent and a further civil revision petition would also share the same fate. In this case also. there is no question of the Rent Controller having decided any of the rights of the parties by declining to hear the objection raised by the respondent relational to the bona fides of the denial of title as a preliminary issue. No appeal. therefore. could have been preferred against that order under S . 23(1)(b) of the Act. even though it used the expression ''an order''. Consequent. it must, be held that the appeal preferred by the respondent in R.C.A. 67 of 1982 before the Appellate Authority was not maintainable. 12. .......For Purposes of the Act. it is not necessary that the landlord should be the owner of the Property in the sense of having exclusive title to it. It would suffice for the power of the Act if a Person was entitled to receive the rent from the tenant in occupation. 24. Applying the aforesaid principles, this Court has held that no appeal is maintainable against an order declining to hold preliminary enquiry regarding the bonafide denial of the landlord''s title. 25. Dealing on this issue, Justice M.Srinivasan, (as His Lordship then was) was called upon to decide the maintainability of a Rent Control Petition in the case of K.A.Syed Ali vs Saradambal reported in 1992 2 MLJ 111 . This Court has held as follows:- “ 2. At the outset, it should be said that the appeal before the Appellate Authority was not maintainable. The order of the Rent Controller dismissing I.A.No.89 of 1990 did not decide the rights of either parties. It merely said that the question raised by the petitioner could not be gone into as a preliminary issue and it could be decided in the proceedings only after trial and the recording of evidence is closed. The order not having decided any rights of parties was not appealable. It merely said that the question raised by the petitioner could not be gone into as a preliminary issue and it could be decided in the proceedings only after trial and the recording of evidence is closed. The order not having decided any rights of parties was not appealable. Learned Counsel for the petitioner places reliance on the judgment of this Court in T.N.Habib Khan, Proprietor, Hotel Impal and Impala Sweets vs Arogya Mary Shanthi Lucien (1981) 2 MLJ 298. The principles set out in that judgment are clearly against the petitioner. Ratnavel Pandian, J (as he then was) who decided that case has extracted the observations made by the Supreme Court in Central Bank of India vs Shri Gokal Chand MANU/SC/0053/1966: (1967) 1 SCR 310 . After extracting the said observation, the learned Judge pointed out that the impugned order in the case before the Supreme Court was merely a procedural one not affecting any right or liability of the appellant therein. The learned Judge observed thus:- .... The principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the above decision was reiterated and affirmed by the Supreme Court in Bank Singh Gill vs Shanti Devi and Ord.MANU/SC/0335/1967:(1967) 2 SCR 59. Following the above decision of the Supreme Court and the Judicial Pronouncements made by this Court, in particular by a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Rajamannar, C.J., and Panchapagesa Iyer, J., in Kumaraswamy Goundan, Inre MANU/TN/0236/1951: (1951) 1 M.L.J 422 and Santhhanam Iyer v S.Somasundara Vanniyar MANU/TN/0045/1958: (1958) 1 MLJ 400 , and certain other decisions, I have held in Chinnaraju Naidu vs Bavani Bai C.R.P.No.646 of 1981 order dated 24th March, 1981,that all interlocutory orders passed during the proceeding under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, cannot be said to be orders coming within the meaning of Section 23(1)(b) of the Act, but only the orders which affect the rights and liabilities of the parties, in the sense that they have become final orders though passed in an interlocutory application, are appealable... 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the question raised by him is two-fold. According to him, the main RCOP No.54 of 1989 is barred by the principles of res judicata and consequently, the Rent Controller has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for fixation of fair rent. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the question raised by him is two-fold. According to him, the main RCOP No.54 of 1989 is barred by the principles of res judicata and consequently, the Rent Controller has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for fixation of fair rent. According to the learned counsel, when the question of res judicata and the question of jurisdiction are raised, the Court is bound to decide the same and an order refusing to decide those questions is certainly appealable. I do not agree. If the Rent Controller had come to certain conclusions on those questions one way or the other, then it might have given rise to an appeal. The Rent Controller has refused to decide that question and directed the parties to go on with the trial. That will not affect the rights of either parties. Hence the order is not appealable. 6. In the present proceedings, the application for fixation of fair rent was filed on 1.8.1989, which is admittedly after the expiry of the period of lease. Hence it is the contention of the respondent that she has become the owner of the building from 21.5.1989 and the petitioner contends otherwise. This is a question which could be decided only in the main proceedings after evidence is recorded. This point cannot be decided as a preliminary one. 26. Very recently, my learned and esteemed Brother Mr.Justice R.Subramanian in the case of K.Murali vs Sathishkumar; M S Padma Rani (CRP (PD) No.229 of 2018 dated 08.09.2020) was pleased to hold as follows:- “ 3. The Rent Controller finally concluded that the existence of the Jural relationship of landlord and tenant cannot be decided as a preliminary issue as the same can be decided only after conclusion of the trial. Aggrieved by this order, the tenant sought to prefer an appeal before an appeal before the learned Appellate Authority. 4. The learned Appellate Authority rejected the appeal stating that there is no order against the petitioner and what has been done by the Rent Controller is only a postponement of the decision on the question of relationship of landlord and tenant. Aggrieved the tenant has come up with this revision.” 27. 4. The learned Appellate Authority rejected the appeal stating that there is no order against the petitioner and what has been done by the Rent Controller is only a postponement of the decision on the question of relationship of landlord and tenant. Aggrieved the tenant has come up with this revision.” 27. Applying these judgments to the facts of the case, I necessarily have to hold that the Rent Control appeal preferred by the tenant as against the order passed by the Rent Controller, deferring the issue of relationship of landlord and tenant, was not maintainable. 28. Apart from this, I have to necessarily agree with Mr.Sandeep S.Shah that the tenant was not a “ person aggrieved” within the meaning of Section 23 of the Act. 29. As to who is the person aggrieved was the subject matter of interpretation before a Constitutional Bench of Supreme Court in the case of Adi Pherozshah Gandhi vs H.M.Seervai reported in 1970 (2) SCC 484 . Chief Justice Hidayatullah, who was a part of the majority cited with the approval the judgment in In Re Sidebotham Ex p. Sidebotham 1880 14 Ch D 458 (CA). He held that in order to be a “ person aggrieved”, there should be a legal grievance. The relevant portion is extracted hereunder:- “ not really a person who is disappointed of a benefit which he might have received if some order had been made. A '' person aggrieved '' must be a man who had suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which had wronglfully deprived him of something, or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his title to something.” 30. He went on to approve the statement that a mere fact that an order is wrongly made does not by itself give a grievance to a person nor otherwise aggrieved. 31. The facts of the present case would show that the Rent Controller did not decide the issue of the jural relationship of landlord and tenant, but had only postponed the decision to be tried after the trial is over. The fact that the person has to undergo the summary procedure does not make him a “ person aggrieved”. 32. 31. The facts of the present case would show that the Rent Controller did not decide the issue of the jural relationship of landlord and tenant, but had only postponed the decision to be tried after the trial is over. The fact that the person has to undergo the summary procedure does not make him a “ person aggrieved”. 32. No doubt that Mr.K.G.Raghavan''s client would have been disappointed that the Rent Controller did not decide the issue, but, at the same time, reading of the order shows that no rights or liabilities of the parties have been decided. Hence, the tenant cannot be treated as a person aggrieved. 33. On the merits of the case also, having come to the conclusion that there is no question of preliminary issue being decided by a Rent Controller, the Rent Control Appellate Authority has allowed the appeal. The conclusion to the order does not follow the logic contained therein. In fact, no reason has been given by the Rent Control Appellate Authority for allowing the appeal. 34. Reasons, as has been repeatedly held, is a heart beat of a judgment or an order. If a judgment does not contain any reason, it does not answer the requirement of a law. Apart from that, having held that the Rent Controller does not decide the preliminary issue because it is a summary proceeding, the Court ought not to have set aside the order. The learned Judge in fact did not apply his mind to the question whether the appeal was if at all maintainable before him in the light of the three binding judgments that I have cited above. Failure to refer to the binding judgments, renders the order bad. Therefore, necessarily I have to interfere with the order. 35. I am not willing to accept the argument of Mr.K.G.Raghavan that there is inherent power to the Rent Controller to decide the jurisdiction even without a previous provision akin to Order 14 of Civil Procedure Code. I have to remind myself that the Rent Controller is a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction, dealing with summary proceedings and in a summary proceeding, there is no question of deciding the issue as a preliminary issue as if it is a civil Court. 36. I have to remind myself that the Rent Controller is a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction, dealing with summary proceedings and in a summary proceeding, there is no question of deciding the issue as a preliminary issue as if it is a civil Court. 36. Mr.K.G.Raghavan would refer to the unreported judgment of this Court in CRP (PD)No.2236 and 2237 of 2017 dated 08.09.2021 and would request me to give a direction that the Rent Controller can decide the issue of landlord and tenant as a preliminary issue. 37. I have carefully gone through the judgment. I find that none of the previous authorities have been referred to before the learned Judge. I am sure that had it been referred, the learned Judge would not have held that the Rent Controller is capable of framing a preliminary issue. I am bound by the long standing precedents of this Court in S.Mani vs T.KJacob (1983) 96 Law Weekly 270 and therefore, I am persuaded to follow that precedent. 38. In the light of the above observations and findings, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed. The order passed by Appellate Authority/VII Judge, Court of Small Causes, Chennai in RCA No.27 of 2014 dated 15.04.2014 is set aside. The order passed by XII Judge, Court of Small Causes, Chennai in M.P.No.150 of 2013 in RCOP No.2337 of 2012 dated 12.12.2013 is confirmed and RCOP No.2337 of 2012 is restored to file. 39. Four weeks time is granted to file counter to RCOP No.2337 of 2012. On receipt of the counter, the Rent Controller shall commence the trial and conclude the same on or before 31.03.2024. He shall submit a report to this Court on conclusion of the said proceedings. 40. The Rent Controller is requested to remember that the proceedings have been initiated in the year 2012 and give priority to the same and dispose of it expeditiously, in any event, within the time prescribed by this Court. No costs. Consequently connected miscellaneous petition is closed.