JUDGMENT : SANJAY K. AGRAWAL, J. 1. This criminal appeal under Section 374(2) of the Cr.P.C. has been preferred by the appellant herein calling in question the correctness of the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 26.06.2014 passed by the learned Second Additional Sessions Judge, Manendragarh, District Korea (C.G.), in Sessions Trial No. 108/2012 by which appellant herein has been convicted for offence under Section 304-B of the IPC and sentence to undergo for imprisonment for life. 2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 30.05.2012 at 8:00 pm the appellant and three other co-accused persons (acquitted by order dated 30.09.2021) demanded dowry and harassed deceased Saraswati by which she committed suicide by pouring kerosene oil on her body and set herself ablaze and thereby, appellant committed the aforesaid offence. 3. Further case of the prosecution, in brief, is that marriage of deceased Saraswati was solemnized with appellant herein on 07.05.2008 and immediately, after marriage appellant herein and three co-accused persons started demanding dowry and soon before the death of deceased Saraswati, the appellant and other accused persons demanded one lakh rupees for purchasing four wheeler vehicle which was not given by the family member of deceased Saraswati and, therefore, she was ill-treated mentally and physically, pursuant to which, before seven years of marriage deceased Saraswati committed suicide. Appellant admitted deceased Saraswati to the hospital where she died, which was informed by Shiv Lal (PW-2) to Police Station Chirmiri by letter (Ex.P/7 & 8) written by Dr. S.K. Sinha (PW-9). Inquest proceedings were conducted vide Ex.P/4 and body was sent for postmortem. As per postmortem report [Ex.P/9 (A)] conducted by Dr. R.R. Gajbhiya (PW-11) cause of death was due to antemortem burn causing asphyxia. 4. After due investigation, appellant was charge-sheeted for the aforesaid offence and the case was committed to the Court of Sessions for trial in accordance with law. The appellant/accused abjured his guilt and entered into defence stating that he has not committed the offence. 5. In order to bring home the offence prosecution has examined as many as 14 witnesses and exhibited 16 documents, whereas the appellant in support of his defence has not examined any witness but exhibited four documents i.e. Ex.D/1 to D/4. 6. The appellant/accused abjured his guilt and entered into defence stating that he has not committed the offence. 5. In order to bring home the offence prosecution has examined as many as 14 witnesses and exhibited 16 documents, whereas the appellant in support of his defence has not examined any witness but exhibited four documents i.e. Ex.D/1 to D/4. 6. The learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record convicted the appellant for the offence as mentioned in the opening paragraph of the judgment, against which this appeal has been preferred questioning the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence. 7. Mr. Anil Gulati, learned counsel for the appellant, submits that as per the evidence of Vijay (PW-4), Hinno (PW-7) and Dr. Sanjay Kumar Sinha (PW-9), deceased has made dying declaration that she received burn injury at the time of cooking food, and as per Ex.P/7, Dr. Sanjay Kumar Sinha (PW-9) has informed the police in writing that deceased (at that time injured) informed him that she received burn injury at the time of cooking, which shows that appellant has not committed dowry death and, therefore, conviction of the appellant is not well founded. The appellant deserves to be acquitted and the appeal deserves to be allowed as the appellant is in jail since 29.07.2012. 8. On the other hand, Mr. Somya Rai, learned State counsel, supports the impugned judgment and submits that prosecution has been able to bring home the offence beyond reasonable doubt. He further submits that evidence of Meena Bahadur (PW-6), mother of the deceased, is specific and as per Para-3 of her evidence, deceased talked with her over telephone and informed that she was burnt by the appellant and, therefore, the instant appeal deserves to be dismissed. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and gone through the records with utmost circumspection. 10. 9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and gone through the records with utmost circumspection. 10. Before entering into the facts and evidence of the case, it would be appropriate to notice the charge-sheet framed by the learned Second Additional Sessions Judge, Manendragarh, District Korea (C.G.) which states as under: vkjksi i=% eSa thŒ,lŒ dqatke] f}rh; vij l= U;k;k/kh'k] eusUæxढ+ ftyk&dksfjk ¼NŒxŒ½ bl rgjhj ds tfj, vki paæcgknqj vkŒ jktcgknqj 'kekZ] mez&37 o"kZ] lkfdu&ekbZul DokVZj] Fkkuk&fpjfejh] ftyk&dksfjk NŒxŒ ij fuEukuqlkj vkjksi yxkrk gaw fd%& 1- ;g fd vki vkjksih dh 'kknh o"kZ 7-5-2008 dks Jherh ljLorh nsoh ds lkFk lkekftd jhfr&fjokt ls gqvk gS ,oa fookg ds 1 o"kZ i'pkr~ fnukad 30-5-2012 ds iwoZ rd yxkrkj ljLorh nsoh dks ek;ds ls 1 yk[k :i;s Qksj foyj okgu ysus gsrq voS/k ekax fd;k] ugha ykus ij ekjihV dj 'kkjhfjd o ekufld :i ls ÁrkfM+r fd;kA ftlls gh rax gksdj fookg ds 7 o"kZ ds vanj gh ekbZul DokVZj] fpjfejh esa vkids ?kj esa ljLorh nsoh fnukad 30-5-2012 dks feV~Vh rsy Mkydj vkx yxkdj vkRegR;k dj yh ftls fd ngst e`R;q dh Js.kh esa vkrk gS vkSj vkius ,slk d`R; fd;k tks fd Hkkjrh; n.M lafgrk dh /kkjk 304&ch ds v/khu n.Muh; vijk/k gS ftldk laKku ysus dh vf/kdkfjrk bl U;k;ky; dks ÁkIr gSA vr,o vknsf'kr fad;k tkrk gS fd vkidk fopkj.k mDr vkjksiksa ds varxZr bl U;k;ky; }kjk fd;k tkosA 11. In order to consider the plea, raised at the Bar it would be appropriate to extract relevant provisions of Section 304-B of the IPC which relates to dowry death: “304-B. Dowry death: (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death” and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation - For the purposes of this sub-section “dowry” shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). Explanation - For the purposes of this sub-section “dowry” shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.” The above provision was inserted by Act 43 of 1986 and came into force w.e.f. 19.11.1986. 12. In order to convict an accused for the offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC, the following essentials must be satisfied: (i) The death of a women should be caused by burn or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances. (ii) Such death should have occurred within seven years of the marriage. (iii) Soon before the death of deceased, she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her Husband or any relative of her Husband. (iv) Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand for dowry. Thus, if the aforesaid ingredients are established by the prosecution by leading appropriate reliable evidence, such death shall be called dowry death and the court shall presume and it shall record such fact as proved unless and until it is disproved by the accused. 13. Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 speaks about presumption as to dowry death which reads as under: “113B. Presumption as to dowry death - When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation - For the purposes of this section, “dowry death” shall have the same meaning as in section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).” The aforesaid provision shows that if the women has been subjected to cruelty as defined in Section 498-A IPC, the court may presume that such person has caused dowry death. Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 provides as under: 2. Definition of “dowry” - In this Act “dowry” means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly: (a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage. Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 provides as under: 2. Definition of “dowry” - In this Act “dowry” means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly: (a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage. (b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by a other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person; at or before or after the marriage us consideration for the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies.” 14. To attract the provisions of Section 304B, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that “soon before her death” she was subjected to cruelty or harassment “for, or in connection with the demand for dowry.” The expression “soon before her death” used in Section 304B IPC and Section 113B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. 15. As regards the principles concerning the above-referred provisions this Court wishes to refer to the decisions reported in K. Prema S. Rao vs. Yadla Srinivasa Rao, (2003) 1 SCC 217 , Kaliyaperumal vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2004) 9 SCC 157 , Devi Lal vs. State of Rajasthan, (2007) 14 SCC 176 and Ashok Kumar vs. State of Haryana, (2010) 12 SCC 350 . 16. In K. Prema S. Rao (supra) it has been held as under: “16......To attract the provisions of Section 304-B IPC, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty and harassment in connection with the demand for dowry.” 17. In Kaliyaperumal (supra) relevant portion reads as under: “5. A conjoint reading of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC shows that there must be material to show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. The prosecution has to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it within the purview of the ‘death occurring otherwise than in normal circumstances’. The expression ‘soon before’ is very relevant where Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC are pressed into service. The prosecution has to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it within the purview of the ‘death occurring otherwise than in normal circumstances’. The expression ‘soon before’ is very relevant where Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC are pressed into service. The prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the occurrence there was cruelty or harassment and only in that case presumption operates. Evidence in that regard has to be led in by the prosecution. ‘Soon before’ is a relative term and it would depend upon the circumstances of each case and no straightjacket formula can be laid down as to what would constitute a period of soon before the occurrence. It would be hazardous to indicate any fixed period, and that brings in the importance of a proximity test both for the proof of an offence of dowry death as well as for raising a presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. The expression ‘soon before her death’ used in the substantive Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. No definite period has been indicated and the expression ‘soon before’ is not defined. A reference to the expression ‘soon before’ used in Section 114 Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act is relevant. It lays down that a Court may presume that a man who is in the possession of goods soon after the theft, is either the thief who has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession. The determination of the period which can come within the term ‘soon before’ is left to be determined by the courts, depending upon facts and circumstances of each case. Suffice, however, to indicate that the expression ‘soon before’ would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the cruelty or harassment concerned and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death concerned. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the women concerned, it would be of no consequence.” 18. There must be existence of a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death concerned. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the women concerned, it would be of no consequence.” 18. In Devi Lal (supra) the ingredients of the provisions of Section 304-B as laid down in Harjit Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2006) 1 SCC 463 and Ram Badan Sharma vs. State of Bihar, (2006) 10 SCC 115 have been reiterated as under: “20. The question, as to what are the ingredients of the provisions of Section 304-B of the Penal Code is no longer res integra. They are: (1) that the death of woman was caused by any burns or bodily injury or in some circumstances which were not normal. (2) such death occurs within 7 years from the date of her marriage. (3) that the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband. (4) such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with the demand of dowry. (5) it is established that such cruelty and harassment was made soon before death.” 19. In Ashok Kumar (supra) it has been held by the Apex Court as under: “19. We have already referred to the provisions of Section 304-B of the Code and the most significant expression used in the section is ‘soon before her death’. In our view, the expression ‘soon before her death’ cannot be given a restricted or a narrower meaning. They must be understood in their plain language and with reference to their meaning in common parlance. These are the provisions relating to human behaviour and, therefore, cannot be given such a narrower meaning, which would defeat the very purpose of the provisions of the Act. Of course, these are penal provisions and must receive strict construction. But, even the rule of strict construction requires that the provisions have to be read in conjunction with other relevant provisions and scheme of the Act. Further, the interpretation given should be one which would avoid absurd results on the one hand and would further the object and cause of the law so enacted on the other.” 20. But, even the rule of strict construction requires that the provisions have to be read in conjunction with other relevant provisions and scheme of the Act. Further, the interpretation given should be one which would avoid absurd results on the one hand and would further the object and cause of the law so enacted on the other.” 20. Similar view was expressed by the Apex Court in Yashoda vs. State of M.P. (2004) 3 SCC 98 , where it is stated that determination of the period would depend on the facts and circumstances of a given case. However, the expression would normally imply that there has to be reasonable time gap between the cruelty inflicted and the death in question. If this is so, the legislature in its wisdom would have specified any period which would attract the provisions of this section. However, there must be existence of proximate link between the acts of cruelty along with the demand of dowry and the death of the victim. For want of any specific period, the concept of reasonable period would be applicable. Thus, the cruelty, harassment and demand of dowry should not be so ancient, whereafter, the couple and the family members have lived happily and that it would result in abuse of the said protection. Such demand or harassment may not strictly and squarely fall within the scope of these provisions unless definite evidence was led to show to the contrary. These matters, of course, will have to be examined on the facts and circumstances of a given case. 21. In the matter of Appasaheb and Another vs. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 9 SCC 721 it has been held by the Apex Court as under: “9. Two essential ingredients of Section 304-B IPC, apart from others, are (i) death of woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances and (ii) woman is subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for “dowry.” The explanation appended to sub section (1) of Section 304-B IPC says that “dowry” shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. 10. Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act reads as under: “2. 10. Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act reads as under: “2. Definition of “dowry” - In this Act “dowry” means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly. (a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage. (b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person, at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage of the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case of persons to whom the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies. 11. In view of the aforesaid definition of the word “dowry” any property or valuable security should be given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly at or before or any time after the marriage and in connection with the marriage of the said parties. Therefore, the giving and taking of property or valuable security must have some connection with the marriage of the parties and a correlation between the giving or taking of property or valuable security with the marriage of the parties is essential. Being a penal provision it has to be strictly construed. Dowry is a fairly well known social custom or practice in India. It is well settled principle of interpretation of statute that if the Act is passed with reference to a particular trade, business or transaction and words are used which everybody conversant with that trade, business or transaction knows or understands to have a particular meaning in it, then the words are to be construed as having that particular meaning. (See Union of India vs. Garware Nylons Ltd. and Chemical and Fibres of India Ltd. vs. Union of India). A demand for money on account of some financial stringency or for making some urgent domestic expenses or for purchasing manure cannot be termed as a demand for dowry as the said word is normally understood. The evidence adduced by the prosecution does not, therefore, show that any demand for ‘dowry’ as defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was made by the appellants as what was allegedly asked for was some money for meeting domestic expenses and for purchasing manure. Since an essential ingredient of Section 304-B IPC viz. The evidence adduced by the prosecution does not, therefore, show that any demand for ‘dowry’ as defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was made by the appellants as what was allegedly asked for was some money for meeting domestic expenses and for purchasing manure. Since an essential ingredient of Section 304-B IPC viz. demand for dowry is not established, the conviction of the appellants cannot be sustained.” 22. The word “soon before her death” no definite period has been prescribed and the expression “soon before her death” has not been defined either in IPC or Evidence Act. 23. The Supreme Court in case of Mustafa Shahadal Shaikh vs. State of Maharashtra, 2012 (11) SCC 397 while considering the word “soon before her death” it has been held that term of the period which can come within the term “soon before her death” is to be determined by the courts, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case and it would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the concerned cruelty or harassment and the death in question and there must be existence of a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the concerned death. It has been further held that if the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence. 24. Keeping these principles in mind, we shall proceed to consider the evidence led by the prosecution in the instant case. 25. Raj Bahadur (PW-1), father of the deceased, in examination in chief, has stated that four months prior to the date of incident, his son-in-law/appellant herein had demanded one lakh rupees for purchasing four wheeler out of which he has given Rs. 40,000/- as they used to harass his daughter/deceased Saraswati. He has also stated in Para 8 of his statement that at the time of marriage dowry was not fixed and according to his own wish, he had given household articles to his daughter/deceased Saraswati, however, in Para 26 of his statement, he has clearly stated that appellant has demanded one lakh rupees one year after marriage and further stated that he never demanded one lakh rupees from him and never discussed about one lakh rupees in front of him. In Para 52 of his statement he has stated that he used to assist financially to his daughter/deceased Saraswati as and when needed. Statement of Raj Bahadur (PW-1), has been recorded twice, at the time of merg inquiry (Ex.P/2) as well as under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. 26. A careful scrutiny of aforesaid statements would show that no such statement has been made by Raj Bahadur (PW-1). However, Raj Bahadur (PW-1) in his statement under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. (Ex.D/1), which was recorded on 28.07.2012, has stated that he has given Rs. 40,000/- as financial assistance to the appellant, as such, from his statement, it is quite established that demand of one lakh rupees as dowry was never made by the appellant from Raj Bahadur (PW-1), father of deceased Saraswati. 27. Next witness is Nar Badeshwar (PW-5), friend of Raj Bahadur (PW-1). He has stated in his statement that he has been informed by Raj Bahadur (PW-1) that appellant has demanded money and he has given Rs. 40,000/- but since Raj Bahadur (PW-1) has denied the fact that any such amount was demanded or given by him to appellant, the statement of Nar Badeshwar (PW-5) cannot be accepted as he is a hearsay witness. 28. Next prosecution star witness is Meena Bahadur (PW-6), mother of deceased Saraswati. In her statement, she has nowhere stated that one lakh rupees was demanded by the appellant and out of which Rs. 40,000/- has been given to him, however, she has made general statement that they wanted to give two wheeler/small vehicle to the appellant but appellant demanded big vehicle. However, surprisingly, there is no such statement that one lakh rupees was demanded immediately after one year of marriage out of which Rs. 40,000/- was given to the appellant, as such, she is totally silent about one lakh rupees having been demanded and out of which Rs. 40,000/- was given to the appellant, however, in para 15 of her statement before the Court, she has clearly stated that one day prior to the date of incident, she had conversation with deceased Saraswati on phone in which her daughter has not stated about demand of dowry and she has stated that appellant used to quarrel under the influence of liquor. 29. 29. Ganga Ram (PW-10), who is also a friend of Raj Bahadur (PW-1), in Para 8 of his statement before the Court has stated that Raj Bahadur (PW-1) has informed him that he had given Rs. 40,000/- to purchase vehicle to the appellant, however, the said fact has not been stated by Raj Bahadur (PW-1) and he has stated that one lakh rupees was never demanded from him. However, this witness has stated in Para 2 that appellant and deceased Saraswati used to live happily after their marriage. 30. Dr. S.K. Sinha (PW-9), Medical Superintendent Regional Hospital Kurasia, District Chirmiri has clearly stated that he has informed the SHO by death intimation vide Ex.P/8 that deceased Saraswati was brought to the hospital and she has suffered burn injuries and it has been stated by patient/deceased Saraswati herself that she has suffered burn injuries while cooking food. 31. Considering the statement of the appellant recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. in question No. 95, it is the defence of the appellant that he is innocent and his wife Saraswati (now deceased) died while cooking food and he has tried to extinguish the fire and tried to save her life and he has escorted her to the hospital, as such, he has not committed the offence. 32. From the aforesaid discussion, it is quite established that death of deceased Saraswati has occurred within seven years of marriage as marriage took place on 07.05.2008 and she died on 30.05.2012 and the death of deceased Saraswati was not normal as she has died unnatural death. Barring these two conditions of Section 304-B of the IPC, the other ingredients are absolutely lacking in the present case. There is absolutely no evidence to show that at any point of time the appellant herein has made any demand of dowry and harassed or subjected her to cruelty soon before her death in connection with demand of dowry. 33. Thus, for the reasons set out herein-above, we are of the opinion that prosecution has not succeeded in bringing home the ingredients of offence under Section 304-B of the IPC and the learned Additional Sessions Judge has committed serious illegality in convicting and sentencing the appellant for commission of offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. 34. 33. Thus, for the reasons set out herein-above, we are of the opinion that prosecution has not succeeded in bringing home the ingredients of offence under Section 304-B of the IPC and the learned Additional Sessions Judge has committed serious illegality in convicting and sentencing the appellant for commission of offence under Section 304-B of the IPC. 34. Consequently, we are unable to hold that the appellant is the author of the crime and he is entitled for benefit of doubt. The conviction for offence under Section 304-B of the IPC as well as sentence of life imprisonment awarded to him by the learned trial Court is hereby set aside. He is acquitted of the charge. He is reported to be in jail since 29.07.2012. Accordingly, appellant be released from jail forthwith, if not required in any other matter. 35. This criminal appeal is allowed to the extent indicated herein-above. 36. Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record be transmitted to the trial Court concerned for necessary information and action, if any.