JUDGMENT (Prayer: Writ Petition is filed Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to issue a Writ ofCertiorari, calling for the records of the First Respondent in issuance of communication dated 19.05.2023 in Ref. Na.Ka.No.18901/2023/Ku.tha 1 and the consequential letter of the 2nd Respondent in Ref.Na.Ka. No.28748/2022/H1 dated 30.05.2023 and quash the same. W.P. No. 21408 of 2023: Writ Petition is filed Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to issue a Writ ofCertiorari, calling for the records of the 1st Respondent in issuance of order in Ref. Na.Ka.No.18901/2023/Ku.tha 1 dated 19.05.2023 and quash the same.) 1. These two writ petitions are filed challenging the communication issued by the 1st respondent dated 19.05.2023 stating that in respect of the Primary Co-operative Societies for which Administrators are appointed, the tenure of delegates elected from that Primary Co-operative Societies to Apex Society will come to an end. 2. The petitioners in both the writ petitions are elected as President of their respective Primary Co-operative Societies. They were elected so on 7th April, 2018. Their tenure of Office in the Primary Co-operative Societies is for 5 years from 07.04.2018. The petitioners were elected by their respective Co-operative Societies as delegate to the Apex Societies. The Apex Societies is arrayed as 3rd respondent in both the writ petitions. The petitioner in W.P.No.17736 of 2023 was elected as delegate to the 3rd respondent/Apex Society on 06.03.2019. The petitioner in W.P.No.21408 of 2023 was elected as delegate to the 3rd respondent/Apex Society on 26.08.2019. 3. It is stated that in respect of both the writ petitioners, their Membership in Primary Co-operative Societies came to an end by efflux of time and no elections had been conducted for electing New Members and therefore, an Administrator had been appointed to administer the Primary Co-operative Societies. It is the precise case of the petitioners that even though their five years term as a Member of Primary Co-operative Societies came to an end by efflux of time, by virtue of Proviso 1 to Rule 56 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Rules, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as ''TNCS Rules'' for brevity) they can continue as delegate in the Apex Co-operative Society/3rd respondent, till their successors are elected or until expiry of five years period as delegate. 4. 4. In other words, it is the case notwithstanding the fact their tenure as President or Member of the Society has come to an end, they can continue as delegate to the Apex Society till their successors to be elected or their five years tenure as delegate comes to an end. In the case on hand, the five years tenure of petitioner in W.P.No.17736 of 2023 as delegate in Apex Society commenced on 06.03.2019, the date on which he was elected as delegate and therefore, his tenure will be over only on 05.03.2024. 5. In the case of petitioner in W.P.No.21408 of 2023, his tenure as delegate of Apex Co-operative Society commenced on 26.08.2019, the date on which he was elected as delegate and the same will come to an end on 25.08.2024. 6. Mr.S.R.Rajagopal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner in W.P.No.17736 of 2023 by taking this Court to Rule 56 of TNCS Rules submitted that the petitioners are entitled to continue as delegate in the Apex Co-operative Society by taking shelter under First Proviso to Rule 56 of TNCS Rules, notwithstanding the fact the expiry of five years term as Member of Primary Society. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the First Proviso to Rule 56 of TNCS Rules, was incorporated with an object to give full five years term to the delegate in the Apex Society. Normally, the election to Apex Society will be held after few months from the date of election to the Primary Society. Therefore, if expiry of the tenure of delegate is linked to the date of election to Primary Society, the time taken for conducting election to elect delegate will be lost. Having the said factor in mind, the delegates are allowed to continue till a new delegate is elected by newly elected Members or completion of their five years term as delegate. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the Second Proviso to Rule 56 shall be harmoniously interpreted so as to advance the object of the First Proviso. 7. Having the said factor in mind, the delegates are allowed to continue till a new delegate is elected by newly elected Members or completion of their five years term as delegate. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the Second Proviso to Rule 56 shall be harmoniously interpreted so as to advance the object of the First Proviso. 7. It is also submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that Second Proviso would come into picture only in cases where an Administrator is appointed under Section 88 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Activities Act, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as ''TNCS Act'' for brevity) due to any default committed by the Board in the Primary Society as mentioned in Section 88 of the TNCS Act. In the case on hand, the 1st respondent failed to conduct election for Primary Cooperative Societies and therefore, the election of incoming Members got delayed. In such circumstances, an Administrator to the Primary Societies was appointed by invoking Section 89 of the TNCSA. 8. In the case on hand, the Administrator is not appointed due to any default on the part of elected Board of the Primary Society and the same is only due to the inability of the 1st respondent to conduct election and consequently, the impugned order passed by 1st respondent cannot curtail the tenure of delegates as provided under first proviso to Rule 56 of the Rules. 9. In support of the contention, the learned Senior Counsel relied on following judgements:- (i) Barium Chemicals Ltd., vs. Company Law Board reported in AIR 1967 SC 295 . (ii) Mohinder Singh Gill vs. The Chief Election Commissioner reported in (1978) 1 SCC 405 . (iii) Sultana Begum vs. Prem Chand Jain reported in (1997) 1 SCC 373 . (iv) Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Hindustan Bulk Carriers reported in (2003) 3 SCC 57. (v) Union of India vs. Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving and others reported in (2001) 4 SCC 139 . (vi) Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh vs. L.V.A.Dixitulu reported in (1979) 2 SCC 34 . (vii) State of Tamil Nadu vs. Hotel Mount Heera reported in 2017 SCC Online Mad 37314. 10. (v) Union of India vs. Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving and others reported in (2001) 4 SCC 139 . (vi) Chief Justice of Andhra Pradesh vs. L.V.A.Dixitulu reported in (1979) 2 SCC 34 . (vii) State of Tamil Nadu vs. Hotel Mount Heera reported in 2017 SCC Online Mad 37314. 10. Per contra, Mr.R.Shanmuga Sundaram, learned Advocate General appearing for the respondents by taking this Court to Rule 56 of TNCSR, submitted that in cases where an Administrator is appointed to a Primary Cooperative Society either under Section 88 or under 89 of the TNCSA, the delegate elected from that Society ceased to hold office as delegate of that Society. 11. The learned Advocate General elaborated it by saying that once Administrator is appointed, he becomes the delegate of the Society for which the Administrator was appointed and therefore, the Administrator becomes delegate of the Society to the General Body of another Society in which the Primary Society is Member. It is also submitted by the learned Advocate General that Rule 56 of TNCSR have been in existence from 1988 and the Second Proviso to that Rule has been enforced in so many times in the past. 12. As per the admitted facts the writ petitioners were elected Presidents of Primary Cooperative Societies. By virtue of Section 26 of TNCSA, they become delegate of the Apex Society in which the Primary Cooperative Society is a Member. It is also admitted that the term of office of the writ petitioners as President/Member of Primary Cooperative Society came to an end by efflux of time. So far, the succeeding Presidents/Members have not been elected as no elections were conducted. Since the succeeding Members are not elected and new Board could not enter office due to failure to conduct the elections, by invoking power under Section 89 Administrators were appointed to Primary Societies in both the writ petitions. Now, the main question that has to be decided in these cases is, whether the petitioners are entitled to continue as delegate of the Primary Societies to the General Body of the Apex Society in which the Primary Societies are Members. 13. Section 26 (2) of the TNCS Act reads as follows:- “26. Now, the main question that has to be decided in these cases is, whether the petitioners are entitled to continue as delegate of the Primary Societies to the General Body of the Apex Society in which the Primary Societies are Members. 13. Section 26 (2) of the TNCS Act reads as follows:- “26. (2) Where a registered society has invested any part of its funds in the shares of or is a member of, another registered society (which latter society hereafter in this sub-section referred to as such other society) - (a) in the case of a registered society of the same class or category, of such other society, the President of the first mentioned society, and (b) in the case of any other registered society, one of the members of the board of that society not disqualified for such election under the rules or the by-laws of such other society elected from among themselves in such manner as may be prescribed, shall be the delegate of such registered society entitled to vote in the affairs of such other society.” 14. Rule 53(A) of the TNCS Rules reads as follows:- “53-A. Manner of election of delegate.- For the purpose of clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 26, the delegate of a society to the general body of another society shall be elected by the members of the board in the former society from among themselves by a resolution passed at a meeting of the board by a majority of the members of the board present and voting at the meeting.” 15. Rules 56 of the TNCS Rules reads as follows:- “56. Rules 56 of the TNCS Rules reads as follows:- “56. Term of office of delegate.- The term of office of delegate shall be the same as the term of his office as President or Chairperson or as a member of the board which elected him, as the case may be: Provided that a delegate shall, notwithstanding the expiration of his term of office as President or Chairperson or as a member of the board which elected him, as the case may be, continue to be the delegate until his successor is elected, so however, his term of office shall not exceed five years: Provided further that the delegate shall cease to be as such where- (a) an administrator is appointed under section 88 or 89 to the society, which he represents; or (b) a liquidator is appointed under section 138 to the society, which he represents.” 16. A combined reading of the above said provisions would make it clear that a delegate of a Primary Society elected to the Apex Society shall continue as delegate so long as he remains as President or Chairman or Member of Board, which elected him. This is clear from reading of first limb of Rule 56 of TNCSR. The first proviso to Rule 56 of the TNCSR is an exception. As per the first proviso a delegate whose term as President or Chairman or Member of the Board of Primary Society got expired can continue as delegate until his successor is elected or until expiry of his tenure of five years as delegate. 17. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner in W.P.No.17736 of 2023 by relying on First Proviso to Rule 56, mainly contended that notwithstanding expiry of petitioners'' term as Presidents of Primary Co-operative Societies, they are entitled to continue as delegate of the Society till his successors are elected or till expiry of the term of five years as delegate. However, the First Proviso to Rule 56 of TNCS Rules cannot be read in isolation and it has to be read along with second Proviso which make it clear that the status of delegate ceases to exist as soon as an Administrator is appointed to the society under Section 88 or 89 of TNCS Act. However, the First Proviso to Rule 56 of TNCS Rules cannot be read in isolation and it has to be read along with second Proviso which make it clear that the status of delegate ceases to exist as soon as an Administrator is appointed to the society under Section 88 or 89 of TNCS Act. In the present case, the term of elected board has already expired and therefore, in order to administer the society, an Administrator is appointed by invoking power under Section 89 of TNCS Act. 18. The Second Proviso referred above is in the nature of an exception to the first limb of the Rule 56 and also the First Proviso. When administrator is appointed under Section 88 of TNCS Act, the 2nd Proviso acts as an exception to first limb of the Rule 56. When administrator is appointed under Section 89 of TNCS Act, the 2nd Proviso acts as an exception to first proviso to Rule 56. A literal reading of Second Proviso to Rule 56 make it manifestly clear that once an Administrator is appointed by invoking Power under Section 89 of TNCS Act (we are not concerned with appointment under Section 88 in this case) automatically the status of delegate available to the Writ Petitioners ceased to exist. This is by virtue of operation of statutory rules. The petitioners cannot impute any mala fides to the impugned order passed by the 1st respondent, because the impugned order is only clarificatory in nature. The moment Administrator is appointed to the Primary Co-operative Societies by virtue of operation of Second Proviso to Rule 56 of TNCS Rules, the status of the petitioners as delegate of Primary Co-operative Societies ceased to exist. The same is merely declared by impugned order. 19. It is not as if, by impugned order the status of the petitioners are taken away. Therefore, allegations made in the writ affidavit imputing mala fides against 1st respondent will not help the petitioners to challenge the order. The 1st respondent in his capacity as the Registrar of Cooperative Societies only passed the impugned order just to see that the statutory rules are properly implemented in its literal meaning. 20. It is settled law when statute or statutory rules are clear in its literal sense and free from any ambiguity, there is no room for the Court to interpret and give a different meaning. 20. It is settled law when statute or statutory rules are clear in its literal sense and free from any ambiguity, there is no room for the Court to interpret and give a different meaning. In this regard, it would be appropriate to refer to the judgment of the Hon''ble Apex Court in B.Premanand vs. Mohan Koikal reported in AIR 2011 SC 1925 : MANU/SC/0249/2011. The relevant observations of the Hon''ble Apex Court reads as follows:- “13. In our opinion, Rule 27(c) of the Rules is plain and clear. Hence, the literal rule of interpretation will apply to it. No doubt, equity may be in favour of the respondents because they were selected earlier, but as observed earlier, if there is a conflict between equity and the law, it is the law which must prevail. The law, which CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2684 OF 2007 is contained in Rule 27(c), is clearly in favour of the Appellants. 14. Hence, we cannot accept the submission of the learned senior counsel for the private Respondents. The language of Rule 27(c) of the Rules is clear and hence we have to follow that language. 15. In M/s. Hiralal Ratanlal vs. STO MANU/SC/0553/1972 : AIR 1973 SC 1034 , this Court observed: "In construing a statutory provision the first and foremost rule of construction is the literally construction. All that the Court has to see at the very outset is what does the provision say. If the provision is unambiguous and if from the provision the legislative intent is clear, the Court need not call into aid the other rules of construction of statutes. The other rules of construction are called into aid only when the legislative intent is not clear." (emphasis supplied) 16. It may be mentioned in this connection that the first and foremost principle of interpretation of a statute in every system of interpretation is the literal rule of interpretation. The other rules of interpretation e.g. the mischief rule, purposive interpretation etc. can only be resorted to when the plain words of a statute are ambiguous or lead to no intelligible results or if read literally would nullify the very object of the statute. The other rules of interpretation e.g. the mischief rule, purposive interpretation etc. can only be resorted to when the plain words of a statute are ambiguous or lead to no intelligible results or if read literally would nullify the very object of the statute. Where the words of a statute are absolutely clear and unambiguous, recourse cannot be had to the principles of interpretation other than the literal rule, vide Swedish Match AB vs. Securities and Exchange Board, India MANU/SC/0693/2004 : AIR 2004 SC 4219 . As held in Prakash Nath Khanna vs. C.I.T. MANU/SC/0134/2004 : 2004 (9) SCC 686 , the language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of the legislative intent. The legislature is presumed to have made no mistake. The presumption is that it intended to say what it has said. Assuming there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the Court cannot correct or make up the deficiency, vide Delhi Financial Corporation vs. Rajiv Anand MANU/SC/1104/2004 : 2004 (11) SCC 625 . Where the legislative intent is clear from the language, the Court should give effect to it, vide Government of Andhra Pradesh vs. Road Rollers Owners Welfare Association MANU/SC/0653/2004 : 2004(6) SCC 210, and the Court should not seek to amend the law in the garb of interpretation.” 21. In the light of the above said golden rule of interpretation, I do not see any conflict between Proviso 1 and 2 of Rule 56 of TNCS Rules. If the rule making authority wanted to extend benefit of first proviso to circumstances where administrator is appointed owing to default of election commission to conduct election, it would not have included “Section 89” in the second proviso. It could have stopped with inclusion of “Section 88” alone. The very fact “Section 89” is included in second proviso make it clear rule making authority wanted to make second proviso as an exception to main rule as well as first proviso. 22. A close reading of Rule 56 of TNCS Rules would make it clear that the Second Proviso acts as an exception to the main rule as well as First Proviso. Therefore, this Court is unable to accept the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners. 22. A close reading of Rule 56 of TNCS Rules would make it clear that the Second Proviso acts as an exception to the main rule as well as First Proviso. Therefore, this Court is unable to accept the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners. The judgments relied on by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners in Barium Chemicals and Mohinder Singh Gill cases cited supra in support of his contention on the question of mala fides and failure to give reason in the order will not advance the case of the petitioners as the impugned order is only clarificatory in nature declaring the status of various delegates like that of the petitioners in the light of operation of Second Proviso to Rule 56 of the TNCS Rules. 23. It is not as if, by virtue of impugned order the petitioners are ceased to function as delegate. Their status as a delegate of Primary Co-operative Societies ceased to exist already by virtue of Second Proviso to Rule 56 of the TNCS Rules and the impugned order is merely clarifying that position. 24. In view of the discussions made above, I do not find any valid ground to allow the writ petitions and consequently, both the writ petitions are dismissed. No costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.