ORDER : This petition is directed against the impugned order dated 10.05.2022 passed by the first respondent-Deputy Commissioner whereby the petitioner was disqualified from the membership of the second respondent-City Municipal Council (CMC), Gangavathi under Section 4 of the Karnataka Local Authorities (Prohibition of Defection) Act, 1987 (for short ‘the said Act of 1987’) pursuant to a complaint filed by the third respondent. 2. Heard Sri Jayakumar S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and Sri S.S. Yadrami, learned Senior Counsel for the third respondent as well as the learned HCGP for first respondent-State and learned counsel for second respondent-CMC and perused the material on record. 3. In addition to reiterating the various contentions as urged in the memorandum of writ petition, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to the document at Ex.P.6 marked on behalf of the third respondent in the proceedings before the first respondent in order to point out that the said communication at Ex.P.6 dated 24.10.2020 authorizes the third respondent herein only to issue the whip but does not authorize him to file a complaint under Section 4 of the said Act of 1987. In this context, it is submitted that the third respondent was neither a member of the second respondent-CMC nor was he a Councillor of the second respondent-CMC and in the absence of a specific authorization by the Bharatiya Janata Party authorizing him to file the instant complaint, the same was impermissible in law as per Sec. 4 and consequently, since the complaint filed by the third respondent itself was not maintainable and the same was liable to be dismissed in limine and failure to appreciate this by the first respondent-Deputy Commissioner in the instant proceedings has resulted in erroneous conclusion and consequently the impugned order disqualifying the petitioner deserves to be set aside. It is also submitted that so long as the third respondent-complainant sought to file the instant complaint on behalf of the political party, it was essential that the complainant should be the political party itself represented by its authorized representative and not the third respondent and on this ground also, the impugned order deserves to be set aside. In support of his contention, learned Senior Counsel places reliance upon a judgment of the co-ordinate bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Kittur Yasmin Riyaz Vs. Deputy Commissioner (ILR 2009 KAR 47). 4. In support of his contention, learned Senior Counsel places reliance upon a judgment of the co-ordinate bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Kittur Yasmin Riyaz Vs. Deputy Commissioner (ILR 2009 KAR 47). 4. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel for respondent No.3 submits that the document at Ex.P.6 dated 24.10.2020 issued by the National President of the Bharatiya Janata Party authorizes the third respondent not only to issue a whip but also to file a complaint and as such, it cannot be said that there was no authorization for the third respondent to file the instant complaint. Secondly, it is contended that mere technicalities or procedural irregularities should not be relied upon to set aside orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner. Thirdly it is contended that the judgment in Kittur Yasmin Riyaz’s case supra relied upon by the petitioner is distinguished in a subsequent judgment of this Court in Smt. Bhagyamma Vs. Govt. of Karnataka (W.P. No. 14171/2021 dated 08.09.2021) and as such the said judgment cannot be relied upon by the petitioner. It is therefore contended that the impugned order passed by the first respondent-Deputy Commissioner does not warrant interference by this Court in the present writ petition. In support of his contentions, reliance is placed on the following decisions : (i) Smt. Bhagyamma G.N. Vs. Govt. of Karnataka (W.P. No. 14171/2021 dated 08.09.2022); (ii) H.S. Devaraj Vs. State Election Commissioner (ILR 2000 KAR 1493); (iii) Bhimabai Vs. Deputy Commissioner (W.A. No. 10115/2011 dated 10.08.2011); and (iv) Makandar Zakir Hussain Vs. Deputy Commissioner (2011 SCC Online KAR 4530). 5. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival submissions and perused the material on record. 6. The material on record discloses that it is not in dispute that pursuant to the elections conducted on 02.11.2020 to the post of President and Vice President of the second respondent-CMC, third respondent filed a complaint before the first respondent –Deputy Commissioner dated 01.12.2020 u/S 3(1)(b) and 4 of the said Act of 1987 seeking disqualification of the petitioner from membership of the second respondent-CMC. The petitioner contested the said proceedings and filed his statement of objections putting forth various contentions including specifically contending that the complaint filed by the third respondent was not maintainable since he was neither a member nor a Councillor or a political party who would be entitled to file a complaint under Section 4 of the said Act of 1987. Petitioner also contended that there was no express or specific authorization in favour of the third respondent by the BJP which authorized him to file the complaint and on this ground also, the complaint was liable to be dismissed. 7. In this context, a perusal of the complaint filed by the third respondent will indicate that the same is filed by the third respondent in his own name by describing himself as the District President of the Bharatiya Janata Party; in other words, the complainant is the third respondent himself and not the BJP – political party who alone would be entitled to file a complaint as contemplated under Section 4(1) of the said Act of 1987, which reads as under : “4. Decision on the question as to disqualification on the ground of defection.-(1) A complaint that a member or Councillor has become subject to the disqualification u/S 3 may be made by a member, Councillor or a political party to the Chief Executive Officer of the concerned local authority- (a) Xxxxxx” 8. A reading of the aforesaid provision clearly indicates that a complaint regarding disqualification can be made by the following persons. (a) Member (defined as a member of a Zilla Panchayat or Taluk Panchayat elected under Karnataka Panchayatraj Act, 1993 under Section 2(iii) of the said Act of 1987). (b) Councillor (defined as a Councillor of a Municipal Corporation or Municipal Council or a Town Panchayat as per the relevant provisions under Section 2(i) of the said Act of 1987). (c) Political party (defined as a recognized political party under Section 2(vi) of the said Act of 1987). Sec. 4 came up for interpretation before this Court in Kittur Yasmin Riyaz’s case wherein it was held as under : “1. This writ petition is filed by the two Municipal councillors of Dandeli City Municipal Council challenging the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Karwar disqualifying them under Section 3(1)(b) of the Anti Defection Act, Karnataka Local Authorities (Prohibition of Defection) Act, 1987. 2. This writ petition is filed by the two Municipal councillors of Dandeli City Municipal Council challenging the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Karwar disqualifying them under Section 3(1)(b) of the Anti Defection Act, Karnataka Local Authorities (Prohibition of Defection) Act, 1987. 2. The petitioners are councillors elected to the Dandeli City Municipal Council. They belong to the political party JD(S). There are total 31 councilors, JD(S)had got l6 councilors, Congress had got 6 councilors, BJP had got 4 councillors and 4 councillors are independent. The second respondent claims to be the President of Dandeli Block Janata Dal (S) party. He filed a complaint before the first respondent under Section 4 of the Act, alleging that petitioners herein, in the election held to the post of Adyaksha and Upadyaksha of the Dandeli City Municipal Council, on 29.02.2008, have not voted in favour of the official candidate of the JD(S) party, in spite of the issuance of a whip by the party President directing the councillors of JD(S) party to vote in favour of candidates setup by the party. Thereby they have incurred disqualification on the ground of defection under Section 3 of the Act. Annexure-B is the copy of the complaint. 3. After service of notice, the petitioners entered appearance and filed detailed statement of objections. They also filed an application to decide maintainability of the petition first. When the first respondent did not consider the application regarding maintainability, the petitioner was constrained to file a writ petition before this Court in W.P. No. 6940/08. In the meanwhile the enquiry was conducted and evidence of the parties was recorded. The said writ petition, after contest, was allowed by the order dated 26th May 2008. The first respondent was directed to consider the application of the petitioners regarding the maintainability of the application. Thereafter, on 27th May 2008 the impugned order came to be passed disqualifying the petitioner. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioners are before this Court. 4. The learned Counsel for the petitioners assailing the impugned order, contends that the first respondent has not considered the question of maintainability as a preliminary point, though he was directed to do so by this Court and therefore the impugned order is liable to be quashed on that short ground. 4. The learned Counsel for the petitioners assailing the impugned order, contends that the first respondent has not considered the question of maintainability as a preliminary point, though he was directed to do so by this Court and therefore the impugned order is liable to be quashed on that short ground. Per contra, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents contended that the Deputy Commissioner has considered the application regarding maintainability and by giving cogent reasons has held that application is maintainable and thereafter he has proceeded to decide the case on merits, as such no case for interference is made out. 5. The Karnataka Local Authorities (Prohibition of Defection) Act, 1987 for short hereinafter referred to as "the Act" was enacted by the Karnataka State Legislature providing for prohibition of defection by members of Zilla Parishads, Mandal Panchayats and councillors of Municipal Corporations and the City and Town Municipal Councils from the political parties by which they were set up as candidates. In order to provide healthy politics in the local bodies it is considered necessary to disqualify such councillors subject to certain conditions in the case of merger or split. Section 2 of the Act defines various words used in the Act, namely, councilors, member, political party, Municipal Corporation, Taluk Panchayath, Zilla Panchayath and Town Panchayath. Section 3 of the Act deals with disqualification on the ground of defection. Section 3A provides that disqualification on the ground of defection would not apply in case of split in the political party. Similarly, Section 3B declares disqualification on the ground of defection not to apply in case of merger of political parties. Section 4 of the Act empowers the Chief Executive Officer of the concerned local authority to enquire into the complaints filed under Section 3 in respect of disqualification on the ground of defection. Section 4 provides who are the persons who can lodge complaint with the Chief Executive Officer and set the process of disqualification under the Act. The said Section reads as under: Section 4 -Decision on the question as to disqualification on the ground of defection.-(1) A complaint that a member or a councillor has become subject to the disqualification under Section 3 may be made by a member, councillor or a political party to the Chief Executive Officer of the concerned local authority. 6. The said Section reads as under: Section 4 -Decision on the question as to disqualification on the ground of defection.-(1) A complaint that a member or a councillor has become subject to the disqualification under Section 3 may be made by a member, councillor or a political party to the Chief Executive Officer of the concerned local authority. 6. Therefore, from the language employed in the aforesaid Section the legislature has not kept anybody in doubt about the persons who are competent to lodge a complaint before the Chief Executive Officer. Only three persons are empowered to lodge such complaint. They are: (a) a member, (b) councillor and (c) a political party. All these words are defined under the Act as under: Section 2(1) -"councilors " means a councillor of a Municipal Corporation or a Municipal Council or a Town Panchayat elected under the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 or the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 as the case may be. Section 2(iii) -" "member " means a member of a Zilla Panchayath or a Taluk panchayath elected under the Karnataka Panchayath Raj Act, 1993. Section 2(vi) -"political party" in relation to a councillor or member means a political party recognised by the Election Commission of India as a National party or a State party in the State of Karnataka under the Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968 and to which he belongs for the purpose of Sub-section (1) of Section 3. 7. From the aforesaid section and the definition clause it is clear that only a member, councillors or political party can make a complaint to the Chief Executive Officer complaining of disobedience of whip and consequent disqualification of a member or a councillor. If the complaint is by a member or a councillor, then they should file the complaint in their individual name. If the complaint is by the political party, the complaint should be by the political party in its own name. As the political party is a legal person, such a complaint has to be in its name represented by a duly authorised agent. It cannot be filed in the name of any individual person, as no person is empowered under statute to file any such complaint on behalf of the political party. As the political party is a legal person, such a complaint has to be in its name represented by a duly authorised agent. It cannot be filed in the name of any individual person, as no person is empowered under statute to file any such complaint on behalf of the political party. It cannot also be filed by any person or authority authorised by the political party such as the President, Secretary or other office bearers of such political party. This is clear from the way Sections 3 and 4 of the Act are worded. Section 3 deals with disqualification on the ground of defection. It reads as under: 3. Disqualification on the ground of defection.-(1) Subject to the [provisions of Sections 3A, 3B and 4 a councillor or a member, belonging to any political party, shall be disqualified for being such councillor or member,: (a) If he has voluntarily given up his membership of such political party; or [(b) If he votes or abstains from voting in, or intentionally remains absent from any meeting of the Municipal Corporation, Municipal Council, Town Panchayat, Zilla Panchayat or Taluk Panchayat, contrary to any direction issued by the political party to which he belong or by any person or authority authorised by it in this behalf without obtaining the prior permission of such party, person or authority and such voting, abstention or absence has not been condoned by such political party, person or authority within fifteen days from the date of voting or such abstention or absence;] (Underlining by me) A councillor or a member belonging to any political party incurs disqualification under Section 3(a) if he has voluntarily given up his membership of such political party. Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 3 provides for disqualification if such a councillor or member votes or abstains from voting in, or intentionally remains absent from any meeting of the local authority contrary to any directions issued by the political party to which he belongs or by any person or authority authorized by it in this behalf without obtaining the prior permission of such authority, person or authority and such voting, abstention or absence has not been condoned by such political party, person or authority within 15 days from the date of voting or such abstention or absence. Therefore, the said provision expressly provides for issue of a direction which is popularly known as "Whip" by the political party or by any person or authority authorized by such political party. It also confers powers on the political party or by any person or authority authorised by the party who has issued the whip to condone the voting, abstention or absence contrary to the whip issued. Having so expressly and meticulously providing for the persons who are authorised to issue the Whip in Section 3, when it came to the lodging of a complaint complaining of such act which justifies disqualification, the legislature in its wisdom has confined such a right to lodge a complaint only to a member, councillor or a political party. The words "by any person or authority authorised by it in this behalf is conspicuously missing in Section 4. Therefore, it is clear the legislature had no intention of conferring the right to lodge a complaint under Section 4 on any person or authority representing the political party. What has to be borne in mind is what has been said in the statute as also what has not been said. The legislature has made its intention clear that such a complaint should be by the political party and political parry alone. Therefore, the legislature in its wisdom has consciously in Section 4 of the Act confined this right to file a complaint only to a political party and not to any person or authority authorised by it. Therefore, the intention is manifest, clear and unambiguous. The complaint has to be by the political party only and not by his authorised agents. 8. The right to vote, contest the election, to raise a election dispute and to file a complaint seeking disqualification being purely a statutory right, the maintainability of such application is to be examined on the basis of the provisions of the Act. It is not permissible to travel outside those provisions to find out whether an application filed under the Act is maintainable or not. The jurisdiction and power of the authority to consider such a complaint under the provisions of the Act and to determine the validity or legality of such an application, also has to be seen under the relevant provisions of the Act. The jurisdiction and power of the authority to consider such a complaint under the provisions of the Act and to determine the validity or legality of such an application, also has to be seen under the relevant provisions of the Act. When Section 4 of the Act clearly sets out who are the persons who are entitled to file such complaint, no other person other than the persons mentioned in the said provision can be said to maintain such an application. These provisions require to be interpreted strictly. Under the guise of interpreting the aforesaid provision Court cannot confer rights on persons other than the persons mentioned in the aforesaid provision. If the Court does so it amounts to Court legislating which is impermissible in law. 9. This Court in the case of K. Thimmegowda v. B.S. Nagaraj Rao and Ors. MANU/KA/0124/2008 : ILR 2008 KAR 2753 has held as under: The statute being an edict of the Legislature, it is necessary that it is expressed in a clear and unambiguous language. The duty of the Court is to find the natural meaning of the words in the context in which they occur. These words must take their colour from the context in which they appear. The Court, ought to give a literal meaning to the language used by the Legislature unless the language is ambiguous or its literal sense gives rise to an anomaly or results in something which would defeat the purpose of the Act. Where the words are clear, there is no absurdity, there is no ambiguity and the intention of the Legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the Court to innovate to take upon itself the task of amending or altering the statutory provisions. When the words used in a statutory provision are defined in the statute itself or the meaning of the said word is clear and there is no ambiguity, then there is no scope for interpretation of the said words by the Court. The Court shall give effect to the meaning ascribed to the said words. They have to remember that there is a line, though thin, which separates adjudication from legislation. That line should not be crossed. Where, therefore, the language is clear, the intention of the Legislature is to be gathered from the language used. The Court shall give effect to the meaning ascribed to the said words. They have to remember that there is a line, though thin, which separates adjudication from legislation. That line should not be crossed. Where, therefore, the language is clear, the intention of the Legislature is to be gathered from the language used. What is to be borne in mind is what has been said in the statute as also what has not been said. A construction which requires for its support, addition or substitution of words, or which results in rejection of words, has to be avoided, unless it is covered by the rule of exception, including that of necessity. Under the guise of interpretation the Court cannot give its own meaning or a different meaning contrary to the real meaning of the words. The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Devoki Nandan Aggarwal MANU/SC/0013/1992 : AIR 1992 SC 96 , dealing with the power of the Court to legislate held as under: It is not the duty of the Court either to enlarge the scope of the legislation or the intention of the Legislature when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. The Court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the Legislation for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate. The power to legislate has not been conferred on the Courts. The Court cannot add words to a statute or read words into it, which are not there. Assuming there is defect or an omission in the words used by the Legislature, the Court could not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. Courts shall decide what the law is and not what should be. The Court, of course, adopts a construction, which will carry out the obvious intention of the Legislature but could not legislate itself. But to invoke judicial activism to set at naught legislative judgment, is subversive of the constitutional harmony and comity of instrumentalities. 10. Therefore, the Court has to give a literal meaning to the language used by the legislature in Section 4 of the said Act. The provision makes it clear only three persons namely, a member, councillor or the political party are empowered to lodge a complaint seeking for disqualification. No other person is given that right. 11. 10. Therefore, the Court has to give a literal meaning to the language used by the legislature in Section 4 of the said Act. The provision makes it clear only three persons namely, a member, councillor or the political party are empowered to lodge a complaint seeking for disqualification. No other person is given that right. 11. In the background of these statutory provisions a look at the complaint in the instant case, shows that the complaint is lodged by one T.R. Chandrashekar. The said T.R. Chandrashekar is not a councillor of Dandeli City Municipal Council. He is also not a member. He is the president of the Dandeli Block JD(S) party. The third respondent, State President of JD (S) has issued a whip to the councillors of Dandeli City Municipal Council to vote in the elections in a particular manner to the post of Adyaksha and Upadyaksha. The said whip has been served on the councillors through the complainant, i.e., President, Dandeli Block JD(S) party. He is also authorised to take such action which becomes necessary in pursuance of the said election. Therefore he is the duly authorised person representing JD(S). The complainant in his cross examination has stated as under: I have read my complaint given to the Court of Deputy Commissioner and it is a fact that is filed in my own name and verified in my individual name. Even vakalathnama I have appointed advocate in my own name. It is a fact -that in concerned letter I am only given authority to issue whip. 12. In the light of the aforesaid material when the complaint is not lodged by a political party, in law, under Section 4 of the Act, there is no complaint which requires investigation or adjudication by the authorities under the Act, Therefore, the said application was not maintainable. 13. In those circumstances, the impugned order passed on an application which is not maintainable is void. Therefore, it requires to be quashed. Hence, I pass the following: ORDER (a) Writ petition is allowed. (b) Impugned order is quashed. (c) However, liberty is reserved to the political party to pursue remedy which is available to them under Section 4 of the Act, subject to the law of limitation, if they are so advised. (d) No costs. --- 9. Hence, I pass the following: ORDER (a) Writ petition is allowed. (b) Impugned order is quashed. (c) However, liberty is reserved to the political party to pursue remedy which is available to them under Section 4 of the Act, subject to the law of limitation, if they are so advised. (d) No costs. --- 9. As held in the aforesaid judgment, it is only the political party who can file a complaint through its authorized representative or a Councillor or a member who can file a complaint and no one else. In the instant case, as stated supra, the third respondent-complainant who is neither a member nor a Councillor has filed the instant complaint in his individual name and as the District President of the BJP; in other words, the complainant is not the political party represented by its authorized representative, the third respondent herein but it is the third respondent who has filed a complaint in his capacity as the District President of the political party. Under these circumstances, in the light of the undisputed fact that the complainant was the third respondent himself and not the BJP-political party through its authorized representative, I am of the considered opinion that the complaint itself was not maintainable and the same was liable to be dismissed and the impugned order passed by the first respondent without considering this aspect of the matter deserves to be set aside. 10. It is also relevant to state that Assuming that the complaint can be construed or treated as having been filed by the BJP-Political party which is the complainant itself and represented by the third respondent, as held by this Court in Kittur Yasmin Riyaz’s case supra, existence of an express / specific authorization which enables, entitles, authorizes and permits the third respondent to file a complaint on behalf of the BJP-political party is a sine qua non for filing the complaint; to put it differently, in the absence of a specific authorization which authorized the third respondent to file the instant complaint, the complaint filed by the third respondent sans such an authorization, is clearly not maintainable and deserves to be dismissed. In this context, it is significant to note that Ex.P.6 dated 24.10.2020 issued by the National President of BJP to the third respondent merely/ simply authorizes him to issue a whip only and not to issue/ file a complaint and in the light of the express language contained in Ex.P.6 which restricts/ limits the authority conferred upon the third respondent only to issue a whip and nothing more, it cannot be said that Ex.P.6 authorized the third respondent to file a complaint also and consequently, the said document cannot be made the basis to contend that the third respondent was duly authorized by the BJP-political party to file / present the instant complaint which is liable to be dismissed on this ground also. 11. Insofar as reliance placed upon the judgment of this Court in Bhagyamma’s case is concerned, it is significant to note that at paragraph no. 22, this Court has referred to Smt. Kittur Yasmin Riyaz’s case and held as under : “22. Insofar as the judgment relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in the case of Smt. Kittur Yasmin Riyaz (supra), is distinguishable without much ado. The facts obtaining in the case of Smt. Kittur Yasmin Riyaz (supra), was that the Court was considering a complaint filed by an individual and did hold that the complaint at the hands of the individual was not maintainable and any order passed on a complaint that was not maintainable was void. In the case at hand, the complaint is by the 6th respondent who is the District President of the political party to which the petitioner belongs. Therefore, the said judgment is inapplicable to the facts of the case.” 12. In the case at hand, the complaint is by the 6th respondent who is the District President of the political party to which the petitioner belongs. Therefore, the said judgment is inapplicable to the facts of the case.” 12. As can be seen from the aforesaid observation, this Court has merely distinguished the said earlier judgment of this Court in Kittur Yasmin Riyaz’s case supra,and has neither over-ruled it nor diluted the law laid down by this Court and consequently, merely because this Court has distinguished Smt. Yasmin Riyaz’s case on facts in Bhagyamma’s case, it cannot be said that Smt. Yasmin Riyaz’s case cannot be relied upon by the petitioner; on the other hand, a careful perusal of the facts in both the cases will clearly indicate that the facts in the present case are identical to the facts involved in Smt. Yasmin Riyaz’s case and as such the said contention of the respondents cannot be accepted. 13. Insofar as the contention with regard to non interference by this Court if there are mere technical or procedural irregularities is concerned, it is relevant to state that non compliance of the provisions of Sec.4(1) of the said Act of 1987 with regard to maintainability of a complaint by persons other than the persons enumerated in the said sub-section, viz., member/ councillor / political party as well as non compliance of legal and valid authorization by a political party in favour of a complainant cannot be said to be procedural or technical irregularities; on the other hand, the said requirements prescribed in Sec. 4(1) strike at the very authority / jurisdiction / power of the third respondent/ complainant to file the instant complaint and since the same goes to the root of the matter, it cannot be said that even in the absence of complaint having been filed by the BJP-political party by the third respondent-complainant without legal and valid authorization, the complaint is valid and consequently even this contention urged by the respondent cannot be accepted. 14. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that the impugned order passed by the first respondent-Deputy Commissioner, deserves to be set aside and the complaint filed by the third respondent deserves to be dismissed. 15. In the result, I pass the following order. 14. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that the impugned order passed by the first respondent-Deputy Commissioner, deserves to be set aside and the complaint filed by the third respondent deserves to be dismissed. 15. In the result, I pass the following order. ORDER (i) Petition is hereby allowed; (ii) impugned order dated 10.05.2022 passed by the first respondent-Deputy Commissioner is hereby set aside and the complaint dated 01.12.2020 filed by the third respondent is hereby dismissed.