JUDGMENT : C. Praveen Kumar, J. Accused 1 to 5 in Sessions Case No.322 of 2006 on the file of the Court of IV Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Tanuku, were tried for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 304-B, 498-A of Indian Penal Code, 1860 [for short, ‘I.P.C.”] and Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. Vide judgment, dated 19.03.2008, the learned Sessions Judge acquitted all the accused for the offences levelled against them. Challenging the same, the present appeal came to be filed by the appellant/State. 2. The case of the prosecution, as per the evidence adduced by the prosecution witnesses, is as under : (i) The deceased is the wife of A1, while A2 and A3 are the parents of A1, A4 and A5. P.W.2 is the mother of the deceased, P.W.3 is the younger sister, while P.W.4 is the elder sister of the deceased. The marriage of the accused with the deceased took place in the year 2002 at Palakol. At the time of marriage, A1 was working as an Electrician at Duvva. It is said that at the time of marriage, the parents of P.W.1 presented an amount of Rs.3,00,000/-, 21 sovereigns of gold as dowry and also Rs.60,000/- towards ‘Saare Samons’. After the marriage, the deceased joined her in-laws house to lead a marital life. The deceased used to come to the house of her parents occasionally and during such visits, she used to inform about the demands made for additional dowry by A1. (ii) After the marriage of the deceased with the accused, the marriage of the elder sister of the deceased was also performed, but the deceased and A1 did not attend the same. It is said that the accused refused to send the deceased to the marriage of her elder sister. (iii) About five or six months prior to the incident, Vakada Atcharao, who is the father of deceased, P.W.2, P.W.5 and others went to the house of A1 for mediation in view of the demand made by the accused for money and talked with A1 to A3. The demand of money was for establishing Cell Phone business by A1. The father of the deceased requested some time for payment of money, but A1 to A3 seems to have stated that if no money is given, they can as well take away their daughter to their house. The demand of money was for establishing Cell Phone business by A1. The father of the deceased requested some time for payment of money, but A1 to A3 seems to have stated that if no money is given, they can as well take away their daughter to their house. Mediations took place for two hours, but did not materialize and accordingly, they left the house of A1 without taking the deceased. (iv) While things stood thus, on 23.04.2006, A4 informed the father of deceased on phone that the deceased fell in bathroom due to heart pain and that she was being shifted to hospital. Ten minutes later, again a phone call came to the father of the deceased, informing the death of the deceased and also requested him to take the body of the deceased. On receipt of the said information, the father of the deceased fell unconscious. Thereafter, the other family members went to the house of the accused. The father of the deceased gained conscious at later point of time and suspecting foul play behind the incident, lodged a report after taking advice of an advocate in drafting the report. Ex.P1 is the said report. (v) Basing on the said report, a case in Crime No.44 of 2006 of Tanuku Rural Police Station was registered against the accused. After registering the crime, P.W.14 investigated into the matter, proceeded to the scene of offence and in the presence of P.W.13, prepared scene observation report, which is marked as Ex.P4. At the scene, he seized M.O.1. (vi) On the next day i.e., on 24.04.2006 at about 7.30 A.M., P.W.14 conducted inquest over the dead body in the presence of P.W.13. Ex.P5 is the Inquest Report. After completing the inquest, the body was sent to Post Mortem Examination. P.W.10-doctor conducted autopsy over the dead body of the deceased and issued Ex.P3 Post Mortem Certificate. According to him, the cause of death was ‘due to asphyxia due to hanging.’ (vii) P.W.14, who continued with the investigation, arrested A1 to A4 on 24.04.2006 at about 10.30 A.M., and A5 on 28.04.2006 at 12.00 Noon. After collecting all the necessary documents, a charge sheet came to be filed, which was taken on file as P.R.C.No.22 of 2006 on the file of the Court of II Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Tanuku. 3. After collecting all the necessary documents, a charge sheet came to be filed, which was taken on file as P.R.C.No.22 of 2006 on the file of the Court of II Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Tanuku. 3. On appearance of the accused, copies of the documents as required under Section 207 Cr.P.C. were supplied to them. As the case is triable by a Court of Sessions, the case was committed to the Court of the Sessions under Section 209 Cr.P.C. Accordingly, the same was made over to the Court of the learned IV Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Tanuku for trial and disposal in accordance with law. 4. Basing on the material available on record, charges came to be framed, read over and explained to the accused in Telugu, to which, they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 5. To substantiate its case, the prosecution examined P.Ws.1 to 14 and got marked Exs.P1 to P13 & M.Os.1 and 2. 6. After closure of Prosecution evidence, the accused were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C with reference to the incriminating circumstances appearing against them in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, to which, they denied. Though no evidence was adduced in support of the defence, but got marked Exs.D1 to D12 during the course of trial. 7. Since the evidence on record does not establish that there was any demand for dowry by the accused for his business or any harassment which lead to deceased committing suicide, coupled with the fact that there is no evidence to show A1 was present in the house at the time of incident, the learned Sessions Judge acquitted all the accused. Challenging the same, the State preferred the present appeal. 8. Sri S. Dushyanth Reddy, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the appellant/State, mainly submits that a reading of the evidence of the witnesses would clearly show that there was harassment soon before her death and as such, the finding of the trial Court warrants interference. In other words, his arguments appears to be that ingredients supporting the offences under Sections 302 and 304-B are made out and the as the incident took place within seven years of the marriage, pleads that the order of acquittal by the trial Court has to be reversed. 9. Ms. In other words, his arguments appears to be that ingredients supporting the offences under Sections 302 and 304-B are made out and the as the incident took place within seven years of the marriage, pleads that the order of acquittal by the trial Court has to be reversed. 9. Ms. G. Sindhu, learned counsel, filed appearance for the respondents, but there is no representation on behalf of the respondents. However, we perused the entire record. 10. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in Murugesan and 16 others v. State Through Inspector of Police, (2012) 10 SCC 383 , while dealing with scope of acquittal in a case arising out of an appeal filed against an order of acquittal observed as under:- “18. Before proceeding any further it will be useful to recall the broad principles of law governing the power of the High Court under Section 378 CrPC, while hearing an appeal against an order of acquittal passed by a trial Judge. 19. An early but exhaustive consideration of the law in this regard is to be found in the decision of Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor [(1933-34) 61 IA 398 : AIR 1934 PC 227 (2)] wherein it was held that the power of the High Court extends to a review of the entire evidence on the basis of which the order of acquittal had been passed by the trial court and thereafter to reach the necessary conclusion as to whether order of acquittal is required to be maintained or not. In the opinion of the Privy Council no limitation on the exercise of power of the High Court in this regard has been imposed by the Code though certain principles are required to be kept in mind by the High Court while exercising jurisdiction in an appeal against an order of acquittal. In the opinion of the Privy Council no limitation on the exercise of power of the High Court in this regard has been imposed by the Code though certain principles are required to be kept in mind by the High Court while exercising jurisdiction in an appeal against an order of acquittal. The following two passages from the report in Sheo Swarup [(1933-34) 61 IA 398 : AIR 1934 PC 227 (2)] adequately sum up the situation : (IA p. 404) “There is, in their opinion, no foundation for the view, apparently supported by the judgments of some courts in India, that the High Court has no power or jurisdiction to reverse an order of acquittal on a matter of fact, except in cases in which the lower court has ‘obstinately blundered’, or has ‘through incompetence, stupidity or perversity’ reached such ‘distorted conclusions as to produce a positive miscarriage of justice,’ or has in some other way so conducted itself as to produce a glaring miscarriage of justice, or has been tricked by the defence so as to produce a similar result. Sections 417, 418 and 423 of the Code give to the High Court full power to review at large the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, and to reach the conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed. No limitation should be placed upon that power, unless it be found expressly stated in the Code. But in exercising the power conferred by the Code and before reaching its conclusions upon fact, the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. To state this, however, is only to say that the High Court in its conduct of the appeal should and will act in accordance with rules and principles well known and recognised in the administration of justice.” (AIR pp. 229-30) 20. To state this, however, is only to say that the High Court in its conduct of the appeal should and will act in accordance with rules and principles well known and recognised in the administration of justice.” (AIR pp. 229-30) 20. The principles of law laid down by the Privy Council in Sheo Swarup [(1933-34) 61 IA 398 : AIR 1934 PC 227 (2)] have been consistently followed by this Court in a series of subsequent pronouncements of which reference may be illustratively made to the following : Tulsiram Kanu v. State [ AIR 1954 SC 1 : 1954 Cri LJ 225], Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab [ AIR 1957 SC 216 : 1957 Cri LJ 481], M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra [ AIR 1963 SC 200 : (1963) 1 Cri LJ 235], Khedu Mohton v. State of Bihar [ (1970) 2 SCC 450 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 479], Sambasivan v. State of Kerala [ (1998) 5 SCC 412 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1320], Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P. [ (2002) 4 SCC 85 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 736] and State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran [ (2007) 3 SCC 755 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 162]. 21. A concise statement of the law on the issue that had emerged after over half a century of evolution since Sheo Swarup [(1933-34) 61 IA 398 : AIR 1934 PC 227 (2)] is to be found in para 42 of the Report in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka [ (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325]. The same may, therefore, be usefully noticed below: (SCC p. 432) “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, ‘substantial and compelling reasons’, ‘good and sufficient grounds’, ‘very strong circumstances’, ‘distorted conclusions’, ‘glaring mistakes’, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. (3) Various expressions, such as, ‘substantial and compelling reasons’, ‘good and sufficient grounds’, ‘very strong circumstances’, ‘distorted conclusions’, ‘glaring mistakes’, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of ‘flourishes of language’ to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” (emphasis supplied) x x x x x 32. In the above facts can it be said that the view taken by the trial court is not a possible view? If the answer is in the affirmative, the jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with the acquittal of the appellant-accused, on the principles of law referred to earlier, ought not to have been exercised. In other words, the reversal of the acquittal could have been made by the High Court only if the conclusions recorded by the learned trial court did not reflect a possible view. It must be emphasised that the inhibition to interfere must be perceived only in a situation where the view taken by the trial court is not a possible view. The use of the expression “possible view” is conscious and not without good reasons. The said expression is in contradistinction to expressions such as “erroneous view” or “wrong view” which, at first blush, may seem to convey a similar meaning though a fine and subtle difference would be clearly discernible. 33. The expressions “erroneous”, “wrong” and “possible” are defined in Oxford English Dictionary in the following terms: “erroneous.— wrong; incorrect. wrong.—(1) not correct or true, mistaken. (2) unjust, dishonest, or immoral. 33. The expressions “erroneous”, “wrong” and “possible” are defined in Oxford English Dictionary in the following terms: “erroneous.— wrong; incorrect. wrong.—(1) not correct or true, mistaken. (2) unjust, dishonest, or immoral. possible.—(1) capable of existing, happening, or being achieved. (2) that may exist or happen, but that is not certain or probable.” Keeping in view the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgment referred to above, it is now to be seen whether the case on hand warrants interference? 11. The evidence of P.W.10, who conducted Post Mortem over the body of the deceased, show that there was one external injury over the body i.e., Brown wound ligature mark of 1 cm width, situated on the upper part of neck. According to her, the cause of death was ‘due to asphyxia due to hanging’. From the evidence of the doctor, it stands established that the deceased committed suicide by hanging. 12. Coming to the evidence on record with regard to the reason for committing suicide by the deceased, it would be appropriate to extract paragraph 12 of the Judgment, wherein the learned Sessions Judge, after discussing the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 9 categorically held that the reason for deceased committing suicide was not because of demand for money, but because of suspicion that A1 was having illicit intimacy with other lady, which fact of course was not proved. “12. He further contended that P.W.1 in his chief examination itself stated that “my third elder sister committed suicide by hanging as she was harassed by the accused for additional dowry”. In her cross examination she deposed that “It is true the deceased suspected the character of A1 and it is sole cause for this incident.” P.W.2 in her chief examination admitted that “after observing the injury on neck, I found that my daughter committed suicide by hanging and she opined that the accused killed the deceased as A1 has intention to marry another woman”. In her cross examination she admitted that “my daughter committed suicide as she suspected A1 moving with another lady” P.W.3 did not say about the reason for the death of the deceased or her suspicion or opinion, but in her chief examination she admitted that “the deceased never made any complaint against A1 to us and stated that she is very happy with the company of A1” P.W.4 in her chief examination stated that “I opined that the deceased committed suicide as the accused harassed for money. In her cross examination she admitted that “the main dispute between A1 and the deceased is that A1 used to stay at Tadepalligudem and visited his house at Duvva occasionally.” P.W.5 in his chief examination stated that “To my knowledge the accused might have been killed the deceased as the parents of the deceased did not adjust the amount to the accused.” In his cross examination she admitted that “It is my suspicion”. P.W.6 in her chief examination stated that “Later I did not made further enquiry with regard to the details of death of the deceased as I was perturbed on hearing the death of Naga Someswari…I came to know that the deceased committed suicide by hanging.” P.W.7 in his chief examination stated that “I do not know the cause of death of the deceased.” P.W.8 in his chief examination stated that “ I came to know that the deceased committed suicide by hanging herself as she was harassed by A1 for money and the same was told by one of the daughters of Vakada Atcha Rao”. In his cross examination he admitted that “I have no personal knowledge about the death of the deceased.” P.W.9 in his chief examination stated that “To my knowledge the accused might have killed the deceased and created that the deceased committed suicide by hanging…. The accused killed the deceased as A1 has intention to marry the niece and they require money”. In his cross examination he admitted that “It is only a suspicion that “the accused might have been killed the deceased and gave a colour that the deceased committed by hanging. My suspicion is that the accused killed the deceased with a rope and created that the deceased committed suicide by hanging” As the evidence on record does not establish any harassment for money etc., the findings on this aspect warrants no interference. 13. My suspicion is that the accused killed the deceased with a rope and created that the deceased committed suicide by hanging” As the evidence on record does not establish any harassment for money etc., the findings on this aspect warrants no interference. 13. Coming to the next aspect i.e., whether A1 was present in the house on the date of incident, the evidence of P.W.1, 2 & 9 and more particularly, their admissions in the cross examinations establish that A1 was living separately at Tadepalligudem and his presence in the house at Duvva on the relevant date is doubtful. It would be appropriate to extract the findings of the learned Sessions Judge in that aspect. “There is no evidence, the presence of the accused A1 at Duvva on the date of incident is there. P.W.1 in her cross examination admitted that “I do not know whether A1 present in their house at Duvva on the date of incident or not or stayed at Tadepalligudem.” P.W.2 in her cross examination admitted that “I cannot say whether A1 came to his house at Duvva from Tadepalligudem on the prior day night of the incident.” When it is admitted by the prosecution that A1 is staying at Tadepalligudem, there is every kind of burden on the prosecution to establish that A1 is present on the preceding night with the deceased to allege that he caused the death of the deceased. Admittedly L.W.1 and P.W.9 had a talk with the deceased on the preceding night and did not say the truth. The presence of the A1 with the deceased on the preceding night is not established by the prosecution.” In fact, we have also perused the entire evidence on record and found no illegality or perversity in the findings given by the learned Sessions Judge in so far as the above two aspects are concerned. 14. Coming to the ingredients of offence punishable under Section 304-B, the fact that the incident took place within seven years of the marriage is not in dispute. In so far as the second ingredient namely cause of death, the death was otherwise than under normal circumstances is concerned, as seen from the record, the deceased committed suicide by hanging. The evidence of P.W.10 and the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 4, 6 and 8 establish that it was not a natural death. In so far as the second ingredient namely cause of death, the death was otherwise than under normal circumstances is concerned, as seen from the record, the deceased committed suicide by hanging. The evidence of P.W.10 and the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 4, 6 and 8 establish that it was not a natural death. Now, the question is whether there was any harassment for dowry by the accused soon before the death of the deceased. 15. The entire case is based on the information alleged to have been furnished by the deceased to P.Ws.1 to 4. A perusal of the evidence of P.W.1 would show that the deceased committed suicide due to the harassment by accused for additional dowry. It is her evidence that four months prior to the death of deceased, her parents along with elders went to the house of accused for mediation, but she is not aware about the details of mediation. But however, admits in cross examination that even after mediation, the deceased stayed in the house of her husband. She did not state any act of beating by the accused. Though P.W.1 in her evidence speaks about the demand for dowry, but the documents which are placed on record i.e., Ex.P1, Exs.D2, D3 and D10 prove otherwise. The material on record would show that A1 was working as Electrician at Duvva on 06.04.2002. From August to till end of 2004, the deceased used to reside at Duvva with a view to assist A1 at Tadepalligudem in view of the business. From 02.05.2005 to 17.06.2005, P.W.1 stayed in the house of A1. The deceased, P.W.1 and A1 attended a marriage on 02.06.2005, the invitation card of which was marked as Ex.D10. In January 2006, P.W.1 invited A1 for college function, which is evident from Ex.D2 Greeting, with a letter. In the month of March, 2006, A1 accompanied P.W.1 up to the examination hall from her house, which indicates that even in the year 2006, the terms between the two families are very cordial. It would be appropriate to extract the same hereunder : “1. As per Ex.P1 and P.W.1, A1 was Electrician at Duvva on 06-04-2002. 2. From August to year end of 2004, Madhavi used to reside at Duvva with a view to assist A1 at Tadepalliguem in business. 3. From 02.05.2005 to 17.06.2005 P.W.1 stayed in the house of A1. 4. It would be appropriate to extract the same hereunder : “1. As per Ex.P1 and P.W.1, A1 was Electrician at Duvva on 06-04-2002. 2. From August to year end of 2004, Madhavi used to reside at Duvva with a view to assist A1 at Tadepalliguem in business. 3. From 02.05.2005 to 17.06.2005 P.W.1 stayed in the house of A1. 4. The deceased, P.W.1 and A1 attended to the marriage on 02.06.2005. The invitation of the marriage, is marked under Ex.D10. 5. January 2006 Ex.D2 (Greeting with Letter) …It shows “invitation to A1 by P.W.1 for her college function and shows that the students of A1 or her friends and also asked P.W.1 to tear the letter after reading”…If really the alleged mediation is true, this kind of letter is not possible and as such proves the alleged mediation is false. 6. In the month of March 2006 II Year B.Com, Exams of P.W.1 are started. P.W.1 studied B.Com 2004 to 2007. A1 accompanied P.W.1 up to the examination hall from her house. The cordial terms in between the families will be well established by this evidence. 7. Few months prior to the marriage Madhavi taken by A1 to NIMS, Hyderabad. 8. On 23.04.2006, the deceased talked with her father (LW-1) and stated that she will come to the marriage of Madhavi along with her husband (A1) and it was stated by P.Ws.1, 2 and 9. D-3 containing the hand writing of Madhavi (2 pages), which contains the following : (a) Madhavi is very Good Girl. Somi is very Bad Girl, waste candidate from Duvva. (b) Rekha is my best friend and sister Rekha, I am sorry and very sorry.” 16. The above documents establish that there were cordial terms between the two families. If really there was any harassment or demand as alleged, the question of they being so close and living in a house; A1 accompanying to P.W.1 to the college or other functions along with deceased; P.W.1 staying in the house of A1 from 02.05.2005 to 17.06.2005 etc., would not have taken place. So, the question of harassment appears to be doubtful and all the family members of the deceased never complained about any harassment by the accused towards the deceased. 17. So, the question of harassment appears to be doubtful and all the family members of the deceased never complained about any harassment by the accused towards the deceased. 17. At this stage, it would be appropriate to refer to the evidence of P.W.3, who in her evidence, categorically deposed that the deceased never made any complaint against A1 at any point of time and she was very happy in the company of A1. At this stage, learned Additional Public Prosecutor contends that the evidence of P.W.5 may clinch the issue, but though P.W.5 in his evidence deposed about mediation and demand of money at the time of mediation, but he did not mention all these aspects in his earlier statement i.e., in the statement made before the police during investigation. The findings given by the learned Sessions Judge on these aspects are as under : “P.W.5 in his evidence stated that the parents of the deceased informed him that the accused A1 to A3 demanded for additional money and they used to give some amounts to them and they used to give Rs.2,000/-, Rs.5,000/- and Rs.25,000/- on different occasions. The accused used to demand money in thousands only but not in lakhs. The said fact is hearsay evidence. He did not state the same in his 161 Cr.P.C statement. P.W.5 further stated that he was present at the time of mediation in the house of A1, as the accused demanded money. A2 and A3 came to the house of A1 and A1 and A3 demanded money for establishment of cell phone business by A1. The father of the deceased requested for some time. Then A1 to A3 stated to the father of the deceased that “you did not give money, you can take away your daughter to your house. The mediation is failed. Then they left the house of A1. The father of the deceased never took away the deceased from the house of A1. A1 to A3 demanded an amount of Rs.2,00,000/- at the time of mediation. In his cross examination he admitted that they went to the mediation while the deceased is living with A1 at Duvva. The alleged demand by A1 is for his investment on his business. A1 to A3 demanded an amount of Rs.2,00,000/- at the time of mediation. In his cross examination he admitted that they went to the mediation while the deceased is living with A1 at Duvva. The alleged demand by A1 is for his investment on his business. Prior to the mediation, he observed Banner near the house of Vakada Atcha Rao (father of the deceased) and he came to know that A1 started cell phone repairing center in the house of Vakada Atcha Rao. He never stated to the police that father of the deceased paid Rs.5,000/-, 10,000/- and 25,000/- on different occasions. Either in his chief examination or his cross examination he did not state that the accused A1 harassed the deceased for additional dowry and that A1 beat the deceased for additional dowry.” 18. Similarly, the prosecution also relied upon the evidence of P.W.6-mother of deceased to prove the demand of Rs.2,00,000/- for family expenses and discharge of debts. She in her evidence deposed that A1 asked the parents of the deceased to take away the deceased, if they do not intend to pay the amount. The said aspects were not mentioned by P.W.6 in her earlier statement recorded by the police under Section 161 Cr.P.C. The same was elicited through the evidence of P.W.14. So also the version of P.W.7, who, while giving evidence in Court, speaks about the accused demanding an amount of Rs.2,00,000/- for discharging the debts. But the said fact was also not mentioned by P.W.7 in his earlier statement. P.W.8 also did not state in his earlier statement that A1 to A5 harass the deceased for additional dowry. 19. From the evidence of these witnesses, it appears that all the eye witnesses, who were examined by the prosecution to speak about the demand for dowry, did not mention in their earlier statements and for the first time in Court they deposed about harassment and demand of dowry by the accused. 20. For the aforesaid reasons, we held that the finding of the learned Sessions Judge in acquitting the accused for the alleged offences, cannot be found faulted. 21. In the result, the appeal fails and it is accordingly dismissed, confirming the judgment, dated 19.03.2008 in Sessions Case No.322 of 2006 on the file of learned IV Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Tanuku. Consequently, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending shall stand closed.