JUDGMENT : CHITTA RANJAN DASH, J. 1. A common judgment passed by learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Kolkata Bench, Kolkata on 10th May, 2022 in four sets of applications, being OA No. 95 of 2019, OA No. 120 of 2019, OA No. 1570 of 2019 and OA No. 1385 of 2020 is under challenge in the present writ petition. 2. It is pertinent to mention here that aforesaid three original applications of 2019 were filed by one set of advocates and the fourth original application of 2020 was filed by another set of advocates. 3. In the present writ petition, 52 petitioners, whose names are there in the provisional select list for the post of Primary School Teachers (PSTs for short), are the petitioners. 4. A compendium of facts relevant for disposal of the writ petition is as follows: (a) Notification was issued on 16th July, 2018 for filling up 224 vacancies of PSTs in different medium of instructions viz. Hindi – 89 posts, English – 90 posts, Bengali – 45 posts (Total – 224 posts) showing break-up for different categories like General, OBC and ST. (b) The selection was conducted through self – assessment recorded by aspiring candidates in accordance with the Union Territory of Andaman and Nicobar Islands Administration, Primary School Teacher Recruitment (Amendment ) Rules, 2016 (2016 RR for short). (c) It is pertinent to mention here that the original Recruitment Rule was notified in 2011 and the same had suffered some peripheral amendments before the present 2016 RR came into force. Notification dated 16th July, 2018 inviting applications for filling up the posts was also published in accordance with 2016 RR. (d) After due exercise in accordance with 2016 RR, provisional select list was published on 17th December, 2018. After publication of the provisional select list, around 210 representations were received from aspiring candidates (who were not selected) to re-verify the documents as well as marks. (e) We feel persuaded to mention here that all the representations had been received from the unsuccessful candidates, after a press release by the respondents inviting representations. On the basis of the representations received, a two member committee consisting of one S.C. Rao, Head Master and a teacher namely Smt Geeta Navin Bhatt, was constituted to look into the representations received from unsuccessful candidates. On the basis of the representations received, a two member committee consisting of one S.C. Rao, Head Master and a teacher namely Smt Geeta Navin Bhatt, was constituted to look into the representations received from unsuccessful candidates. (f) Said Committee, after examination of the representations, in their report, concluded as follows: “(a) Knowledge of Hindi Recommendations: There is no separate certificate for knowledge of Hindi (as per Clause 2) may be insisted for applicants who have studied in the Islands school. But the Directorate may issue specific templates for Hindi Knowledge Certificate for students who studied in mainland. (b) Medium of Instruction Recommendations: A Press Note may be issued by the Department informing the applicants to submit their Medium of Certificate in standard format (which will be published on the department website and in the “The Daily Telegrams” for information of general public) and for knowledge of Hindi (as per Clause 2 of Essential Qualification) for those applicants who have studied in mainland as stated in, Issue No. (a). These certificates will be received at designated officers of the Department of Education within a period of 14 Says from the date of issue of the Press Note. The Scrutiny Team shall consider these certificates so being submitted and will draw a fresh provisional list based upon the new set of facts (if any). (c) Recruitment Rule Provisions Recommendations: Department may also take considered view to allow the candidates who have studied in the bilingual medium and to consider the candidature of B. Ed qualified candidates (since the current scrutiny committee has rejected B. Ed. Qualified candidates as per the extant RR) for the post of PST”. (g) After the Committee report, respondents vide press note dated 11th January, 2019 (Annexure P-3 to the original application), cancelled the provisional select list obliging the petitioners to approach the Tribunal by filing original application. (h) The Central Administrative Tribunal clubbed two cases together filed by some of the selected candidates, whose names were there in the select list and disposed of the application in admission stage directing the respondents to give appointment order in favour of the applicants before the Tribunal. (i) Said order of the Single Bench of the Tribunal was challenged before this Court in WPCT No. 146 of 2020 and WPCT No. 147 of 2020. (i) Said order of the Single Bench of the Tribunal was challenged before this Court in WPCT No. 146 of 2020 and WPCT No. 147 of 2020. This Court by a common order passed in both the writ petitions, set aside the order of the Tribunal and remitted the matter directing the parties to file their respective affidavits before the Tribunal, but stayed the hands of the respondents so far as the re-advertisement for the post is concerned. (j) After remand, affidavits were filed by the respective parties and matters were taken up by the Tribunal on completion of pleadings. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, the impugned judgment came to be passed. 5. The present petitioners had approached the Tribunal alleging that when the selection process had been conducted in accordance with the 2016 RR framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India, which has statutory force and in terms of the notice inviting applications published in accordance with 2016 RR, the cancellation of the provisional select list vide Annexure P-3 to the original application on 11th January, 2019 is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 6. The respondents justified their action before the Tribunal on the ground that as no standard template was annexed in the notification to certify the proficiency and knowledge of the concerned medium of instruction, a large number of ambiguities and inconsistencies arose as there was no standard process of screening. Further, as there were no objective guidelines to scrutinize the claim made on proficiency of medium of instruction, the process of screening lacked objectivity and standardization. In addition, respondents also submitted that the notification also did not allow receipt of additional documents from candidates and hence, the screening procedure was rendered largely incomplete. 6.1 In view of such inconsistencies and incongruities in the screening process and with the stated purpose to conduct a fair and transparent recruitment process, decision was taken to cancel the recruitment process for the post of PSTs notified on 16th July, 2018 and accordingly, press note dated 11th January, 2019, was issued and the recruitment process for PSTs was declared as cancelled. 7. Further it is found from the paragraph 11 of the impugned judgment that the respondents relied on the following points to justify their action for re-notification of the vacancies for the post of PST: “(a) NCTE, Govt. 7. Further it is found from the paragraph 11 of the impugned judgment that the respondents relied on the following points to justify their action for re-notification of the vacancies for the post of PST: “(a) NCTE, Govt. of India vide Gazette of India Notification NO. 246 dated 29/06/2018 has made the qualification of B.Ed as one of the eligible qualification for appointment to the post of Primary School Teacher (PST). However, the prevalent Recruitment Rules for the post of PST does not have any provision for the same and hence there is a requirement for amendment of the RR in compliance with the communication of the NCTE. (b) The Govt. of India has promulgated the 103rd Constitutional Amendment providing 10% of the vacancies in the Civil Posts for the Economically Weaker Section (EWS) vide Office Memorandum No. 36089/1/2019-Estt (Res) dated 19/01/2019 which becomes operational from 1.2.2019 and hence there is a requirement to re-classify the number of vacancies for the post of PST in compliance to the constitution amendment. (c) That, candidates lower in merit surpassed those higher in order of merit on account of misinterpretation of medium disclosures. (d) That, on account of such inadvertent misinterpretation, Tamil and Telegu medium candidates were allowed to apply for the post of PST (English Medium).” 8. Learned Tribunal has found out some fault in the Recruitment Rules of 2011 (though the selection was held in accordance with 2016 RR) and held that the Recruitment Rules of 2011 need to spell out clearly as to what are the interpretation of “concerned medium upto secondary level”. The authority ought to have issued standard template as an Annexure to the recruitment notification so that self-assessment on “concerned medium” ought to have followed a uniform pattern and not resulted in varied responses rendering any realistic comparison of the merit of the candidates, difficult, if not impossible. 8.1 The Tribunal has proceeded to examine the meaning of secondary level according to NCTE and abruptly came to a conclusion that Courts and Tribunals, not being experts, should not intervene and impose their view in prescribing essential qualification for recruitment. Thereafter, the Tribunal has passed order for constitution of committee etc and has disposed of the original application without giving any relief as sought for by the present petitioners. Thereafter, the Tribunal has passed order for constitution of committee etc and has disposed of the original application without giving any relief as sought for by the present petitioners. 8.2 It is found from the impugned judgment that the Tribunal has accepted the justification provided by the respondents to support the cancellation process vide their notification dated 11th January, 2019 and has found flaws in the Recruitment Rules as suggested by the respondents. The Tribunal has refused to exercise it’s jurisdiction on a misconceived notion of facts and law, on the ground that Courts and Tribunals, not being experts, should not intervene and impose their views on prescribing essential qualification for recruitment, though it was neither the case by the petitioners nor the case by the respondents. 9. Mr. Bharat Bhushan, learned counsel for the petitioners relies on the notification issued for recruitment of PSTs, 2016 RR and submits that there being no breach of the Rule in selecting the candidates and publishing the provisional select list, the action of the respondents in cancelling the select list, on the basis of the representations of unsuccessful candidates, is arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 9.1 Mr. Shatadru Chakraborty, learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand supports the impugned judgment justifying the cancellation of the select list and relied on the case Union of India and Others vs. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 to remind us that this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has got no much scope to interfere in the impugned judgment, unless the finding arrived at is perverse and that the power of this Court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is not akin to appellate power. 9.2 Mr. Tulsi Lal, learned counsel appearing for the Union of India submits that the Union of India was not heard by the Tribunal and without hearing them, the Tribunal has saddled responsibilities on some of the authorities of Union of India unnecessarily to suggest means, methods and mechanism for amendment of 2016 RR. He further submits that by such action of the Tribunal, the Union of India is aggrieved. 10. He further submits that by such action of the Tribunal, the Union of India is aggrieved. 10. It is an admitted fact that advertisement/notification was issued on 16th July, 2018 for filling up the post of the PSTs in accordance with 2016 RR, which is a Rule enacted under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. It is also admitted that “Daily Telegrams” is the official News daily of the Andaman and Nicobar Administration and in the press release dated 19.12.2018 published in the “Daily Telegrams”, it has been clearly mentioned that “The process of recruitment has been conducted in a free, fair, transparent and objective manner” (Page 149 of the writ petition). 11. We have to find out what is the effect of a Rule framed under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India on executive action. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of A.K. Bhatnagar and Others vs. Union of India and Others and T. Kannan and Others vs. S. K. Nayyar and Others (1991) 1 SCC 544 (relied on by learned counsel for the petitioners), in paragraph No. 13 has held thus: “13. On more than one occasion this Court has indicated to the Union and the State Governments that once they frame rules, their action in respect of matters covered by rules should be regulated by the rules. The rules framed in exercise of powers conferred under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution are solemn rules having binding effect. Acting in a manner contrary to the rules does create problem and dislocation. Very often government themselves get trapped on account of their own mistakes or actions in excess of what is provided in the rules. We take serious view of these lapses and hope and trust that the government both at the Centre and in the States would take note of this position and refrain from acting in manner not contemplated by their own rules.” 11.2 In K. Kuppusamy and Another vs. State of T.N. and Others, (1998) 8 SCC 469 (relied on by learned counsel for the petitioners), in paragraph No. 3 Hon’ble Supreme Court has held thus: “3. The short point on which these appeals must succeed is that the Tribunal fell into an error in taking the view that since the Government had indicated its intention to amend the relevant rules, its action in proceeding on the assumption of such amendment could not be said to be irrational or arbitrary and, therefore, the consequential orders passed have to be upheld. We are afraid this line of approach cannot be countenanced. The relevant rules, it is admitted, were framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. They are statutory rules. Statutory rules cannot be overridden by executive orders or executive practice. Merely because the Government had taken a decision to amend the rules does not mean that the rule stood obliterated. Till the rule is amended, the rule applies. Even today the amendment has not been effected. As and when it is effected ordinarily it would be prospective in nature unless expressly or by necessary implication found to be retrospective. The Tribunal was, therefore, wrong in ignoring the rule.” 12. From the dictum of Hon’ble Supreme Court, it is manifestly clear that the rules framed in exercise of power conferred under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India are solemn rules having binding effect and acting in a manner contrary to the rules does create problem and dislocation. Further it is clear that such statutory rules cannot be overridden by executive orders or executive practice. Merely because the Government had taken a decision to amend the rules does not mean that the rules stood obliterated. The State or it’s authorities are bound to act within the binds and extent of such Rules. 13. Now we have to see who are the representationists and how they came to find fault with the provisional select list prepared by the appropriate authority which according to the appropriate authority was prepared after undertaking a free, fair, transparent and objective manner of recruitment process. In the press release dated 18th December, 2018 in Daily Telegrams (at pages 147 and 148 of the writ petition), the selected candidates were asked to attend for verification with their original certificates. In a press release dated 19th December, 2018 in “Daily Telegrams” (at page 149 of the writ petition), it was directed thus: “…. In the press release dated 18th December, 2018 in Daily Telegrams (at pages 147 and 148 of the writ petition), the selected candidates were asked to attend for verification with their original certificates. In a press release dated 19th December, 2018 in “Daily Telegrams” (at page 149 of the writ petition), it was directed thus: “…. If any candidate wishes to submit any representation with regard to the selection process, he or she may lodge his or her grievances or representation ….” 13.1 In the said press release the authority before whom the representations should be submitted were also notified. In pursuance of the aforesaid press release, 210 representations are stated to have been received. Admittedly, all the representationists are unsuccessful candidates. Here we pause, to find out what is the status or locus standi (in law), of an unsuccessful candidate who had participated in the selection process to put forth their grievances or representations relating to the selfsame selection process. 14. In this regard decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dhananjay Malik and Others vs. State of Uttaranchal and Others, (2008) 4 SCC 171 (relied on by learned counsel for the petitioners), is very pertinent. Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph Nos. 8, 9 and 10 of the judgment has held thus: “8. In Madan Lal vs. State of J&K, this Court pointed out that when the petitioners appeared at the oral interview conducted by the Members concerned of the Commission who interviewed the petitioners as well as the contesting respondents concerned, the petitioners took a chance to get themselves selected at the said oral interview. Therefore, only because they did not find themselves to have emerged successful as a result of their combined performance both at written test and oral interview, they have filed writ petitions. This Court further pointed out that if a candidate takes a calculated chance and appears at the interview, then, only because the result of the interview is not palatable to him, he cannot turn around and subsequently contend that the process of interview was unfair or the Selection Committee was not properly constituted. 9. In the present case, as already pointed out, the writ petitioners-respondents herein participated in the selection process without any demur; they are estopped from complaining that the selection process was not in accordance with the Rules. 9. In the present case, as already pointed out, the writ petitioners-respondents herein participated in the selection process without any demur; they are estopped from complaining that the selection process was not in accordance with the Rules. If they think that the advertisement and selection process were not in accordance with the Rules they could have challenged the advertisement and selection process without participating in the selection process. This has not been done. 10. In a recent judgment in the case of Marripati Nagaraja vs. The Government of A.P. SCR at p. 516, this Court has succinctly held that the appellants had appeared at the examination without any demur. They did not question the validity of fixing the said date before the appropriate authority. They are, therefore, estopped and precluded from questioning the selection process.” 15. In the present case, it is clear that the representations have been made by unsuccessful candidates, who had participated in the selection process and in their representations they have questioned the very method of self assessment as the criteria of selection as per the advertisement for appointment issued in consonance with 2016 RR. Knowing fully well, the problems that may be faced by them so far as “self assessment” is concerned, the represenationists had participated in the recruitment process, which was undertaken in accordance with the extant Rule i.e. 2016 RR. If they were aware of the problems, they could have brought such facts to the notice of the appropriate authority at right time before the selection process, which is stated to be “free, fair, transparent and objective manner” by the authorities themselves. They, having participated in the selection process and they having taken a chance, though unsuccessfully, are now estopped from raising questions regarding the selection process. Any action, contrary to extant Rules by the appropriate authority, at this stage, on the basis of representations called/invited from the unsuccessful candidates, becomes also vulnerable. 16. At this stage, a very pertinent question hunts our ingenuity. That question is whether 2016 RR authorises the appropriate authority to invite objections/representations from the unsuccessful candidates, after publication of the provisional select list on the basis of merit on due evaluation, which was admittedly “free, fair, transparent and objective manner” as discussed supra. 16. At this stage, a very pertinent question hunts our ingenuity. That question is whether 2016 RR authorises the appropriate authority to invite objections/representations from the unsuccessful candidates, after publication of the provisional select list on the basis of merit on due evaluation, which was admittedly “free, fair, transparent and objective manner” as discussed supra. 16.1 In answer to the aforesaid question, it is clearly submitted at bar that the extant rules does not authorise such action by the appropriate authority, after publication of provisional selection list. 16.2 If that be the answer, then, all actions from the stage of inviting objections/grievances/representations from unsuccessful candidates, constitution of committee, report of the committee till the cancellation of the provisional select list vide the impugned notification dated 11.01.2019 become vulnerable being ultra vires the 2016 RR. 17. In Sanjay K. Dixit and Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2019) 17 SCC 373 (relied on by learned counsel for the petitioners), Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that all appointments to public office have to be made in conformity with Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The aforesaid observation was made by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the context of giving due publicity to any relaxation made in the relevant rules or in the notification to enable all candidates to get level playing field so far as the process of selection is concerned. 18. In the case of Dinesh Kumar Kashyap and Others vs. South Central Railway and Others, (2019) 12 SCC 798 (relied on by learned counsel for the petitioners) in paragraph 5 and 6 Hon’ble Supreme Court has held thus: “5. The main issue which arises before us is whether the SECR could have ignored the 20 per cent extra panel despite the letter dated 2-7-2008 without giving any cogent reason for the same. No doubt, it is true, that mere selection does not give any vested right to the selected candidate to be appointed. At the same time when a large number of posts are lying vacant and selection process has been followed then the employer must satisfy the court as to why it did not resort to and appoint the selected candidates, even if they are from the replacement panel. Just because discretion is vested in the authority, it does not mean that this discretion can be exercised arbitrarily. Just because discretion is vested in the authority, it does not mean that this discretion can be exercised arbitrarily. No doubt, it is not incumbent upon the employer to fill all the posts but it must give reasons and satisfy the court that it had some grounds for not appointing the candidates who found place in the replacement panel. In this behalf we may make reference to the judgment of this Court in R.S. Mittal vs. Union of India, wherein it was held as follows: 10. ….. It is no doubt correct that a person on the select panel has no vested right to be appointed to the post for which he has been selected. He has a right to be considered for appointment. But at the same time, the appointing authority cannot ignore the select panel or decline to make the appointment on its whims. When a person has been selected by the Selection Board and there is a vacancy which can be offered to him, keeping in view his merit position, then, ordinarily, there is no justification to ignore him for appointment. There has to be a justifiable reason to decline to appoint a person who is on the select panel. In the present case, there has been a mere inaction on the part of the Government. No reason whatsoever, not to talk of a justifiable reason, was given as to why the appointments were not offered to the candidates expeditiously and in accordance with law. The appointment should have been offered to Mr. Murgad within a reasonable time of availability of the vacancy and thereafter to the next candidate. The Central Government’s approach in this case was wholly unjustified.” 6. Our country is governed by the rule of law. Arbitrariness is an anathema to the rule of law. When an employer invites applications for filling up a large number of posts, a large number of unemployed youth apply for the same. They spend time in filling the form and pay the application fees. Thereafter, they spend time to prepare for the examination. They spend time and money to travel to the place where written test is held. If they qualify the written test they have to again travel to appear for the interview and medical examination etc. Those who are successful and declared to be passed have a reasonable expectation that they will be appointed. They spend time and money to travel to the place where written test is held. If they qualify the written test they have to again travel to appear for the interview and medical examination etc. Those who are successful and declared to be passed have a reasonable expectation that they will be appointed. No doubt, as pointed out above, this is not a vested right. However, the State must give some justifiable, non-arbitrary reason for not filling up the post. When the employer is the State it is bound to act according to Article 14 of the Constitution. It cannot without any rhyme or reason decide not to fill up the post. It must give some plausible reason for not filling up the posts. The courts would normally not question the justification but the justification must be reasonable and should not be an arbitrary, capricious or whimsical exercise of discretion vested in the State. It is in the light of these principles that we need to examine the contentions of the SECR.” (Emphasis supplied by us) 19. Despite our discussions in the preceding paragraphs to the effect that in absence of support of the extant Rules, the action of the respondents from the stage of inviting objections/representations from the unsuccessful candidates is vulnerable being ultra vires the 2016 RR, we propose to proceed further to test the action of the respondents on the touch-stone of reasonableness. The dictum of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the preceding paragraphs (which is majority view in the aforesaid judgments) is a guiding light to us in that regard. 20. So far as impugned notification dated 11th January, 2019 is concerned. There is no reason in that notification as to why the respondents have taken steps to cancel the select list. The justification for the said notification has been set out in the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondents before the learned Tribunal and learned Tribunal in paragraph 11 of the impugned judgment has enumerated those justifications culling the same from the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondents. 21. One of the justification is letter dated 29th June, 2018 issued by the NCTE, Government of India making B.Ed as one of the qualification for appointment in the post of PSTs. Said letter of the NCTE was published in the Gazette of India on 29th June, 2018. 21. One of the justification is letter dated 29th June, 2018 issued by the NCTE, Government of India making B.Ed as one of the qualification for appointment in the post of PSTs. Said letter of the NCTE was published in the Gazette of India on 29th June, 2018. Such a fact presupposes that by the date of publication of notification on 16th July, 2018, the respondents were in know of the fact that the NCTE desired that B. Ed should be one of the eligible qualification for appointment in the post of PST. Despite such fact, they haing issued the notification for appointment, the respondents cannot justify their action to be reasonable in the guise of Gazette of India notification No. 246 dated 29th June, 2018. 22. Second ground of justification is that 103rd Constitutional Amendment provides 10 per cent quota in the vacancy of the civil posts for the Economically Weaker Sections (EWS). The amendment having become operational with effect from 01st February, 2019, the respondents cannot justify their action on the ground of providing EWS quota in the post for PSTs while cancelling the select list on 11th January, 2019. 23. Third justification supplied by the respondents is that candidate lower in merit surpassed those higher in order of merit on account of misinterpretation of medium disclosures. This ground also does not justify the action of the respondents inasmuch as in other recruitment process also there may be instances where candidates with lesser merit academically, surpass the candidates with higher merits. The selection having been conducted in accordance with 2016 RR and the selection process being labelled as “free, fair, transparent and objective manner” by the authorities themselves in their press release as discussed supra, such justification cannot be provided on the basis of post mortem done at the behest of unsuccessful candidates who were provided chance by the respondents going beyond the scope of 2016 RR to file objections/ representations so far as the selection process is concerned. 24. The next point urged by the respondents to justify their action is that Tamil and Telugu medium candidates were allowed to apply for the post of PST (English Medium). 24. The next point urged by the respondents to justify their action is that Tamil and Telugu medium candidates were allowed to apply for the post of PST (English Medium). So far as this justification is concerned, we are constrained to say that irrespective of the fact as to whether a person is Tamil or Telugu, if he fulfils the eligibility and educational qualification prescribed for PST (English Medium) as per the extant Rules and has been selected, the selection cannot be questioned on the ground that he is Tamil or Telugu medium candidate. 25. It is further found from the affidavit-in-opposition of the respondents that as no standard template was annexed in the notification to certify the proficiency and knowledge of the concerned medium of instruction, a large number of ambiguities and inconsistencies arose as there was no standard process of screening. 25.1 In course of hearing, we are told that, after enactment of 2011 RR which has suffered peripheral amendments subsequently till coming into force of 2016 RR, selection tests in the manner provided in the extant Rules, then have been conducted but on no occasion, this difficulty, as shown now, has been faced by the respondents. If in 2016 RR, there is no provision for annexing standard template in the notification, that could have been done by executive instruction to fill up the gap before the advertisement or that could have been done after the advertisement by giving due and wide publication to such addition of standard template as annexure but such objection cannot be raised so far as the selection test is concerned, after the entire process is over having been undertaken in accordance with 2016 RR. 26. It is also submitted by learned counsel for the respondent that as there were no objective guidelines to scrutinize the claim made on proficiency of medium of instruction, the process of screening lacked objectivity and standardization. 26.1 To this submission, our answer is same as we have narrated in the preceding paragraph. Further we are provoked to say here that the authorities of the respondents, who were in the helm of selection process themselves have certified the selection process as “free, fair, transparent and objective manner” in their press release as discussed supra. Learned counsel for the respondents cannot take a contrary stand now to justify cancellation of the provisional select list by the impugned notification dated 11.01.2019. Learned counsel for the respondents cannot take a contrary stand now to justify cancellation of the provisional select list by the impugned notification dated 11.01.2019. The respondents cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate at the same time. When however, 2016 RR has been followed sacrosanctly, the difficulty in recruitment process, if found, should be reserved for future use by amending the extant rule or by replacing the extant rule by a new one, which is within the domain of the executive. 27. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that the notification for appointing PSTs also did not allow to receive any additional documents from the candidates and therefore the screening procedure was rendered largely incomplete. 27.1 Perusal of the extant rule i.e. 2016 RR shows that rule 8 specifically provides that once application is submitted, no additional documents/certificates will be further received from the candidates thereafter. This being a provision in the 2016 RR itself, it has automatically come to be reflected in the advertisement and this being a part of the rule, should not be an headache for the respondents, after the provisional select list was published. 28. It is submitted by learned counsel for the respondents that in view of such inconsistencies and incongruities as raised supra, and for the stated purpose to conduct a fair and transparent recruitment process, decision was taken to issue the impugned notification dated 11th January, 2019 to cancel the select list. 29. We have discussed in details the justifications advanced by learned counsel for the respondents to bring the impugned notification dated 11th January, 2019 in sync with reasonableness. We feel persuaded to observe here that the two member committee recommendations (narrated in paragraph 4(f) supra) and the justifications as raised by learned counsel for the respondents are matters beyond the scope of the 2016 RR. The respondents, in future therefore, may bring amendment in the 2016 RR embodying all these matters. If the respondents find any difficulty in amending the 2016 RR, they, being the appropriate authorities, can replace or substitute 2016 RR by a new Rules, which may be prospective or retrospective as that Rule may provide. The respondents, in future therefore, may bring amendment in the 2016 RR embodying all these matters. If the respondents find any difficulty in amending the 2016 RR, they, being the appropriate authorities, can replace or substitute 2016 RR by a new Rules, which may be prospective or retrospective as that Rule may provide. But the provisional select list having been prepared after conducting selection process in accordance with 2016 RR, the aforesaid justification supplied by the learned counsel for the respondents does not command to us to hold the action of the respondents to be reasonable, nor it is in the interest of justice to allow the cancellation of the provisional select list on the presupposition that the extant Rules shall be amended or replaced by a new one. 29.1 We are therefore, constrained to hold that the notification dated 11th January, 2019 is arbitrary, lacks reasonableness and contravene Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 30. Mr. Shatadru Charkaborty, learned counsel for the respondent reminded us about our power and scope of interference under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 30.1 We feel persuaded to say here that, no Court be it higher, be it lower has got any power, it has only got certain jurisdiction under the Constitution or relevant law governing the field. 31. Mr. Bharat Bushan, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that though he has filed the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, it is basically a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. 32. Be that as it may, we do not propose to go deep into the history of enacting Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution, as it has been discussed in detail in the case of Waryam Singh and Another vs. Amarnath and Another, AIR 1954 SC 215 by Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court and in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty and Another vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329 by two Judge Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court. 33. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Waryam Singh (supra) in paragraph 14 at page 217 has neatly formulated the ambit of High Courts’ power under Article 227 in the following words: “14. 33. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Waryam Singh (supra) in paragraph 14 at page 217 has neatly formulated the ambit of High Courts’ power under Article 227 in the following words: “14. This power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee, to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors.” (Emphasis supplied by us) 34. We do not feel it apposite to quote here the view of Justice Harries C.J in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee, AIR 1951 Cal 193 to avoid burdening our judgment. 34.1 Suffice it to say that the principle set by Justice Harries C.J. was formulated by George Rankin, C.J. in Manmatha Nath Biswas vs. Emperor, AIR 1933 Cal 132. 34.2 Subsequently, in Nagendra Nath Bora vs. Commr. of Hills Division and Appeals, AIR 1958 SC 398 Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court followed the ratio of the earlier Constitution Bench in Waryam Singh (supra) about the ambit of High Court’s power of superintendence. 34.3 The Constitution Bench in Nagendra Nath Bora (supra) unanimously speaking through Justice B.P. Sinha (as his Lordship then was) pointed out that High Court’s power of interference under Article 227 is not greater then its power under Article 226 and the power of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited to ensure that the Tribunals functions within limits of its authority. (Emphasis supplied by us) 34.4 Subsequently, another Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Gujarat vs. Vakhatsinghji Vajesinghji Vaghela AIR 1968 SC 1481 expressed identical views. Hon’ble Justice Bachawat speaking for the unanimous Constitution Bench opined that the power under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot be fettered by the State Legislature but the supervisory jurisdiction is meant to keep the subordinate tribunal within the limits of their authority and to ensure that they obey law . (Emphasis supplied by us) 34.5 It is seen that the same expression, namely to keep the Courts and Tribunals subordinate to the High Court within the bounds of their authority used in Manmatha Nath Biswas (supra), to indicate the ambit of High Court's power of superintendence has been repeated over again and again by Hon’ble Supreme Court in its Constitution Bench decisions. 34.6 Same principles have been followed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mani Nariman Daruwala and Others vs. Phiroz N. Bhatena and Others, (1991) 3 SCC 141 , wherein it has been held that in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court can set aside or reverse finding of an inferior Court or Tribunal only in a case where there is no evidence or where no reasonable person could possibly have come to the conclusion which the Court or tribunal has come to. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case made it clear that except to the aforesaid “limited extent”, the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact. In coming to the above finding, Hon’ble Supreme Court relied on its earlier decision rendered in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao vs. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447 . The decision in Chandavarkar (supra) is based on the principle of the Constitution Bench judgments in Waryam Singh and Nagendra Nath (supra). 34.7 To the same effect is the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani and Another vs. Pratapsingh Mohansingh Pardeshi, (1995) 6 SCC 576 . In the aforesaid decision Hon’ble Supreme Court clearly reminded the High Court that under Article 227, it cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. Its exercise must be restricted to grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principle of law and justice. 34.8 The Constitution Bench ratio in Waryam Singh (supra) has been followed in Lonand Grampanchayat vs. Ramgiri Gosavi, AIR 1968 SC 222 , Jijabai Vithalrao Gajre vs. Pathankhan, (1970) 2 SCC 717 and Ahmedabad Manufacturing & Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd. vs. Ram Tahel Ramnand, (1972) 1 SCC 898 . 34.9 Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675 (a two Judge Bench) discussed the principles of interference by High Court under Article 227. In the aforesaid case Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a writ of Certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable against the order of a civil Court, subordinate to the High Court. The correctness of that ratio was doubted by another two Judge Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Radhey Shyam vs. Chhabi Nath, (2009) 5 SCC 616 , and the matter was referred to a larger Bench. The correctness of that ratio was doubted by another two Judge Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Radhey Shyam vs. Chhabi Nath, (2009) 5 SCC 616 , and the matter was referred to a larger Bench. A three Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Justice H.L. Dattu, Hon’ble Justice A.K. Sikri and Hon’ble Justice Adarsh Kumar Goel has disposed of the aforesaid reference on 26.02.2015 over ruling the said ratio in Surya Dev Rai. 34.10 But so far as the formulation of principle on the scope of interference by the High Court under Article 227 is concerned as formulated in Surya Dev Rai (supra), there is no divergence of views. In paragraph 38 of the judgment in Surya Dev Rai (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court has framed following principle pertaining to Article 227 of the Constitution of India: “38 (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.” Sub para (5) (7) and (8) of para 38 in Surya Dev Rai (supra) are also in the same line which runs thus: “(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not covert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character.” (Emphasis supplied by us) 35. From the aforesaid decision, we find the following distinction between the jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution which is relevant in the present writ petition: (i) Articles 226 and 227 stand on substantially different footing. The jurisdiction under Article 227 is basically a original jurisdiction save and accept the Chattered High Courts where both Original and Appellate jurisdiction exits. In such High Courts a petition under Article 226 can be dealt in Original Side or in Appellate Side, according to the relevant rule of that High Court. On the other hand the jurisdiction under Article 227 is neither original nor is it appellate. This jurisdiction of superintendence is for both administrative and judicial superintendence. (ii) The powers conferred under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution are separate and distinct and operate in different fields. On the other hand the jurisdiction under Article 227 is neither original nor is it appellate. This jurisdiction of superintendence is for both administrative and judicial superintendence. (ii) The powers conferred under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution are separate and distinct and operate in different fields. Another distinction between this two jurisdiction is that under Article 226, the High Court normally annuls, quashes an order of proceeding and proceed no further but in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court apart from annulling the proceeding, can also substitute the impugned order by the order which the inferior tribunal should have made (see Surya Dev Rai, supra) and also the Constitution Bench decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque, AIR 1955 SC 233 . (iii) The jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution normally is exercised where a party is affected, but power under Article 227 can be exercised by the High Court suo motu as a custodian of justice. The power under Article 226 is exercised in favour of persons or citizens for vindication of their fundamental rights or other statutory rights but the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised by the High Court for vindication of its position as the highest judicial authority in the State. In certain cases where there is infringement of fundamental right, the relief under Article 226 of the Constitution can be claimed ex-debito justicia or as a matter of right. But in cases where the High Court exercises its jurisdiction under Article 227, such exercise is entirely discretionary and no person can claim it as a matter of right. 36. Having cleared our mind about the limit and extent of power under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, when we proceed to examine the impugned judgment, we find that learned Tribunal has completely failed to proceed in the matter by observing fundamental procedure of judicial inquiry. 37. Learned Tribunal has not at all taken into consideration the pleadings of the parties in their respective petitions and affidavits, has not at all addressed the issues arising therefrom and has rather found a third case to stay its hands so far as exercise of jurisdiction vested in it, is concerned. We have discussed finding of the learned Tribunal in detail in preceding paragraphs. 38. We have discussed finding of the learned Tribunal in detail in preceding paragraphs. 38. It is submitted by Mr. Bharat Bushan, learned counsel for the petitioner that he was appearing for the applicants in three sets of cases and had argued all the points before the Tribunal, which points he raised here in this writ petition and also supplied written submission annexing all the judgments cited before this Court. Learned Tribunal however, failed to address his submissions placed and rather relied on the notes of submissions filed by another sets of Advocates, who were appearing in another case, which had been clubbed together with the case of his clients for passing the common judgment. 39. We find the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner to be persuasive inasmuch as in paragraph 12 of the judgment, learned Tribunal has painstakingly taken into consideration catena of decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court regarding the methods to be adopted by the employer, where there has been malpractices in the recruitment test. Learned Tribunal throughout the discussion thereafter has painstakingly discussed the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the respondents and the stands taken by them to justify the issuance of impugned notification on 11.01.2019 and ultimately accepted such suggestions without addressing the issue whether those suggestions by the respondents pass the test of reasonableness or not or whether those are arbitrary and violative of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution or not. 39.1 Leaving the discussion there, in paragraph 15 of the judgment, learned Tribunal relying on some decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court has come to finding that the Courts and Tribunals, not being expert should not intervene and impose their views in prescribing essential qualifications for recruitment. “Essential qualification” for recruitment was never ever the issue before the Tribunal as the extant rules had prescribed such qualification. 40. Mr. Shatadru Chakraborty, learned counsel for the respondents in the alternative prayed that if this Court finds that the Tribunal has committed an error, the matter should be remitted back to the Tribunal. 41. The provisional select list has already been published since 17.12.2018. The provisional select list was cancelled on 11.01.2019. Thereafter the petitioners have been subjected to one round of litigation from Tribunal to this Court. This impugned order has been passed after remand by the High Court. 41. The provisional select list has already been published since 17.12.2018. The provisional select list was cancelled on 11.01.2019. Thereafter the petitioners have been subjected to one round of litigation from Tribunal to this Court. This impugned order has been passed after remand by the High Court. We, therefore, do not think it just and proper to remand the matter again to further harass the petitioners to suffer another round of litigation. 42. Forgetting about law, when we try to understand the duty of a supervisory authority in common parlance, we find that a supervisory authority has to instruct his subordinate to do a thing in a particular manner or not to do a thing at all. When the supervisory authority finds that in spite of his instruction, the things are not done as per his instruction, the supervisory authority steps in to take to himself the work to do it himself for the subordinate. Same is the situation here. On two occasions the Tribunal having failed to address the grievances of the petitioners, we on the basis of the ratio in Surya Dev Rai (supra) and the Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath (supra) would prefer to substitute the impugned judgment by our judgment which the Tribunal should have passed. 43. We have come to such a conclusion inasmuch as a grave injustice and gross failure of justice has occasioned in passing the impugned judgment. 44. In fine, therefore, we set aside the impugned judgment dated 10.05.2022 and also quash the impugned notification dated 11.01.2019 (annexure P-3 to the original application) issued by the appropriate authority of the respondents. As a result the provisional select list published on 17.12.2018 is restored. 45. Before parting with the judgment, we feel persuaded to make it clear that we are conscious of the position of law that the provisional select list does not vest any right on any candidate to claim appointment. At the same time, when there are large number of vacancies and provisional select list, according to the press release of the respondents (as discussed supra) has been prepared in “free, fair, transparent and objective manner”, a legitimate expectation arise in each candidate who has found place in the provisional select list to be appointed. At the same time, when there are large number of vacancies and provisional select list, according to the press release of the respondents (as discussed supra) has been prepared in “free, fair, transparent and objective manner”, a legitimate expectation arise in each candidate who has found place in the provisional select list to be appointed. Merely because the word “provisional” is there before the “select list”, it is not actually provisional so far as the selection is concerned. It is provisional only to the extent that the candidates whose names are there in the provisional select list, are entitled to be appointed or posted, after they are found to be genuine and suitable, on verification of their documents etc., within the parameter of the extant rules. 46. It was submitted at the bar that, after the publication of the provisional select list, the verification process has also been completed. In that view of the matter the respondents are directed to give appointment letter to each of the selected candidate, who is found to have come successful, after verification of his/her records and documents etc. in accordance with the extant rules. Such appointment letters be issued within a period of thirty days hence and posting be given within seven days of issuance of appointment letter. 47. WPCT No. 26/2022 is accordingly disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. I agree - Md. Nizamuddin, J.