JUDGMENT : 1. This Letters Patent Appeal has been filed by Prakash Chandra Yadav @ Mungeri Yadav against whom an order of preventive detention under section 12(1) & (2) of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 (in short, Crimes Control Act) has been passed on 8th August 2022 by the District Magistrate of the district of Sahibganj. 2. By an order dated 2nd November 2022, W.P.(Cr.) No. 405 of 2022 filed by the detenu challenging the order of detention dated 8th August 2022 has been dismissed by the writ Court holding that (i) all the constitutional safeguards have been complied, (ii) 4-principles relating to representation of the detenu as enunciated in Jayanarayan Sukul v. State of West Bengal, (1970) 1 SCC 219 have been followed, (iii) no case of mala fide has been made out, and (iv) the order of detention is based on subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. While dismissing W.P.(Cr.) No. 405 of 2022, the writ Court has gone into the contentions of the parties, the relevant laws and Judicial pronouncements and the materials on record in great details. 3. The writ Court has examined the matter in the following manner: “24. In view of above submission of the learned counsel for the parties the court has gone through the materials on record and perused the order dated 08.08.2022 contained in Annexure-10 to the writ petition which is order passed by the District Magistrate, Sahibganj by which petitioner has been asked to be detained for three months. In view of above submission of the learned counsel for the parties the court has gone through the materials on record and perused the order dated 08.08.2022 contained in Annexure-10 to the writ petition which is order passed by the District Magistrate, Sahibganj by which petitioner has been asked to be detained for three months. In the impugned order there are reference of cases pending against this petitioner which are as under: – S.I. No. P.S. Case Under Sections 1 Taljhari P.S. Case No. 99/2017 341/323/504/509/397/337/338/34 of the I.P.C. 2 Taljhari P.S. Case No. 80/2021 175/379/307 of the IPC and 4/54 J.M.M. Rules, 2004 and 21(A) 2116 of the M.M.D.A. Act, 0957 3 Taljhari P.S. Case No. 113/18 147/148/149/342/323/353/332/336/506/379 of the I.P.C. 4 Taljhari P.S. Case No. 116/2018 379/175/414 of the I.P.C. and 3/4/54 of the J.M.M. Rules, 2004 5 Muffasil P.S. Case No. 141/18 379/411/304/34 of the I.P.C. and 54 of the J.M.M. Rules, 2004 6 Taljhari P.S. Case No. 21/2019 386/387 of the I.P.C. 7 Muffasil P.S. Case No. 26/2019 280/282/379/427/34 of the I.P.C. and 20/54 of the J.M.M. Rules, 2004 8 Borio (J) P.S. Case No. 261/2020 341/393/504/506/417/420/34 of the I.P.C. 9 Muffasail P.S. Case No. 18/2021 341/323/302/201/504/506/34 of the I.P.C. 10 Muffasil P.S. Case No. 62/2021 147/148/149/384/385/504/506 of the I.P.C. and 27 of the Arms Act 11 Taljhari P.S. Case No. 76/2021 175/39/307 of the I.P.C. 4/54 of the J.M.M. Rules, 2004 and 21(A) 21(6)/22 of M.M.D.A. 1957 12 Taljhari P.S. Case No. 77/2021 MMDRA Act and 3/4/5 of the Explosive Act 13 Borio (J) P.S. Case No. 58 of 22 323/504/506/420/120(B) of the I.P.C. and section 3(1) SC/ST Act. 14 Rajmahal P.S. Case No. 67/2022 465/471 of the IRC. 14 Rajmahal P.S. Case No. 67/2022 465/471 of the IRC. and 25(1-B) A/26/35 of the Arms Act 15 Muffasil P.S. Case No. 26/22 403/420 of the I.P.C. 16 Muffasil P.S. Case No. 27/2022 147/148/149/349/120(B) of the I.P.C. and 27 of the Arms Act 17 Taljhari P.S. Case No. 10/2008 287/304A/34 of the I.P.C. 18 SC/ST Case No. 18/14 341/323/504/379/34 of the I.P.C. and under section 3/4 SC and ST Act 19 Borio (J) P.S. Case No. 242/2014 448/353/379/506/504 I.P.C. 20 Taljhari P.S. Case No. 100/2020 427/504/506/34 of the I.P.C. and under section 3/4 SC & ST Act 21 Gumla P.S. Case No. 207/2021 418/420/34 of the I.P.C., 72/72a/74 of the Information Technology (Amendment) Act, 2000, 21/24/26 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1933 and 5/6 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923 22 Muffasil P.S. Case No. 30/22 147/148/149/341/427/307/504/506 I.P.C. and 27/35 of the Arms Act 23 Kankarbag P.S. Case No. 43/14 147/148/149/323/324/337/427/307 of the I.P.C. and 25(1-B)A/26/35/27 of the Arms Act. 25. Looking into these cases, it transpires that at least 7 to 11 cases are of the year, 2021 and 2022. It cannot be ruled out that the petitioner is not having any 17 criminal antecedent. The cases are registered under sections 307 and 302 I.P.C. even under section 25 Arms Act. Admittedly, in view of Annexure-C to the counter-affidavit, the said order was communicated to the petitioner on the same day i.e. 08.08.2022 however this is admitted fact that representation was filed on 18.08.2022 contained in Annexure-11 to the writ petition and there is no endorsement of receiving in that representation. Thus, the petitioner himself has filed representation after lapses of 10 days whereas order was already confirmed on 12.08.2022. 26. Further the case relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the case of Kamla Kanyalal Khushalani (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that if constitutional safeguard has not been complied with resulting in the orders of the detention being set aside whereas in the case in hand all the constitutional safeguards have been complied and the matter has been placed before the Advisory Board where the Advisory Board affirmed the detention order thus, case is not helping the petitioner. Further the case relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the case of Smt. Icchu Devi Choraria (supra) the matter was related to the representation and detaining authority is under the constitution obligation under Article 22(5) to consider the representation of the detenue as early as possible and in the case in hand the district administration has denied of receiving the representation of the detenu and the same was filed on 18.08.2022 whereas the order was affirmed on 12.08.2022 and after considering the conduct and criminal antecedent of the detenu order was passed. The case relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the case of Smt. Gracy (supra) the detenu was arrested on the accusation of illicit cultivation of ganja plants and main issue was before the Hon'ble Supreme Court is that if representation is addressed only to the advisory board instead of the Central government, the Central Government is obliged to consider it independently whereas the case in hand detenu has approached by Annexure-11 on 18.08.2022 and receiving was denied and after evaluating the materials order has been passed and thus this case is also not helping the petitioner. The case relied by the learned counsel in the case of Jayanarayan Sukul (supra) truly the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with four principles to be followed in regard to the representation of the detenue and in the present case all the four principles have been followed and complied by the district administration in passing the impugned order thus this case is also not helping the petitioner. The case relied by the learned counsel in the case of Ram Manohar Lohia (supra) is related to the habeas corpus whereas the case in hand habeas corpus is not the issue, thus this case is also not helping the petitioner. The case relied by the learned counsel in the case of Ram Manohar Lohia (supra) is related to the habeas corpus whereas the case in hand habeas corpus is not the issue, thus this case is also not helping the petitioner. Further learned counsel has relied in the case of Moosa Husein Sanchar (supra) where the question before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was that even if representation addressed to advisory board is received by State Government before the reference to the Board, State Government is obliged to consider and dispose of the same expeditiously and even after reference to the Board, State Government should consider the representation whereas the case in hand decision to detain the petitioner for three months was passed on 08.08.2022 and same was communicated on 12.08.2022 and representation of the petitioner was filed later on which was denied by the State. 27. The ordersheet is of the Advisory Board contained in Annexure-E of the counter-affidavit of the respondent nos. 3 and 4 speaks that detenu was heard by the Advisory Board. Filing of the representation was disclosed before the Advisory Board however on that day the same was denied by the Deputy Secretary, Department of Home (Prison) & Disaster Management before the Advisory Board. This is not a case that after receiving of the order, the petitioner has immediately moved and filed representation before the concerned authority and pursuant to that representation was not considered by the authority concerned. For making out a case of malafide, respondents are required to be made under personal capacity and by name. Looking into the case in hand, this malafide is not there. The malafide must reflect from the order which is lacking in case in hand. On the point of malafide, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is not tenable. The judgments relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner are not in dispute. There is no doubt that if the liberty of any person is taken wrongfully, the Court is required to interfere with it as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in those cases relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In the case in hand the order dated 08.08.2022 is a reasoned order which speaks of indulgence of this petitioner in several other cases. 28. In the case in hand the order dated 08.08.2022 is a reasoned order which speaks of indulgence of this petitioner in several other cases. 28. The impugned orders elaborately deal with the report and material against the petitioner and the compelling situation for passing the order of his detention. The Court is not inclined to substitute the subjective satisfaction of the authorities. The authorities have passed the order on subjective satisfaction. On the point of Article 22 read with Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India the case relied in Dropti Devi (supra) is helping the respondents. There are many cases pending against the petitioner.” 4. During hearing of this Letters Patent Appeal, voluminous compilations containing 35 judgments were produced and the matter has been argued extensively on 21st and 22nd February 2023. 5. Briefly stated, Muffasil PS non-FIR Case No. 20 of 2022 dated 7th March 2022, Case No. 21 of 2022 dated 11th March 2022, Case No. 22 of 2022 dated 12th March 2022 and Case No. 23 of 2022 dated 13th March 2022 were registered under sections 107, 113 and 116 of the Penal Code, 1860, on the basis of the report submitted by the Inspector of Police, Muffasil PS, Sahibganj that there is an apprehension of breach of peace due to the dispute between the groups led by Prakash Chandra Yadav and Dahu Yadav. On 23rd May 2022, the Superintendent of Police, Sahibganj issued an advisory to the Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Inspector of Police and officer-in-charge of Muffasil PS/Jirwabari OP for keeping strict vigil in the area. The Superintendent of Police, Sahibganj expressing an apprehension of breach of public order and peace has directed the aforementioned officers also to take preventive measures against the persons who might cause disturbance of peace. On 3rd August 2022, the Sub-Divisional Police Officer, Sahibganj transmitted a report to the Superintendent of Police, Sahibganj expressing an apprehension that once the detenu is out on bail he may be again indulging in anti-social activities and would cause untoward incident out of revenge and so there is a high possibility of breach of public order and peace. Pursuant thereof, the Superintendent of Police, Sahibganj made a recommendation for an order of preventive detention under section 12 of the Crimes Control Act against the detenu. 6. Pursuant thereof, the Superintendent of Police, Sahibganj made a recommendation for an order of preventive detention under section 12 of the Crimes Control Act against the detenu. 6. Based on the aforesaid materials, the District Magistrate, Sahibganj has passed the detention order dated 8th August 2022 against the detenu. The detention order was served upon the detenu in time and he has pleaded that he made a representation against the said order on 18th August 2022 but, in the meantime, the order of detention was approved by the State Government on 12th August 2022. Thereafter, the opinion rendered by the Advisory Board dated 2nd September 2022 was accepted and the detention order has been confirmed by the State Government on 15th September 2022. The detenu has pleaded that his representation dated 18th August 2022 was duly received in the office of the Jailor but a decision thereon has been taken by the Principal Secretary of Home, Government of Jharkhand only on 10th November 2022. In the representation dated 18th August 2022, the detenu has pleaded that the detention order has been passed to wreck vengeance upon him because his son made a written complaint to the Director General of Income-Tax (Investigation) whereafter Income-Tax Department and Directorate of Enforcement conducted raids and searches in the premises of Pankaj Mishra, Dahu Yadav and their associates and seized Rs. 11.88 crores from 37 bank accounts and now Pankaj Mishra, Dahu Yadav and others have been arrested for commission of the offence of money-laundering. 7. Mr. Vimal Kirti Singh, the learned counsel for the detenu has submitted that (i) one of the grounds of detention is invalid, (ii) there was no proximate and live link between the offending acts alleged against the detenu, (iii) mere apprehension of release on bail cannot justify the order to detain the detenu preventively, and (iv) mala fide in passing the order dated 8th August 2022 is quite apparent inasmuch as the rival gang leader has been let off. It is submitted that the representation dated 18th August 2022 made by the detenu was considered after a delay of 85 days which has been sought to be justified by making a false statement before the Advisory Board, that no representation was made. 8. It is submitted that the representation dated 18th August 2022 made by the detenu was considered after a delay of 85 days which has been sought to be justified by making a false statement before the Advisory Board, that no representation was made. 8. The powers of the State Government to make an order of preventive detention are contained in section 12 of the Crimes Control Act, which provides as under: 12. Power to make order detaining certain persons. - (1) The State Government may, if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and there is reason to fear that the activities of anti-social elements cannot be prevented otherwise than by the immediate arrest of such person, make an order directing that such anti-social element be detained. (2) If, having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate, the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do, it may by an order in writing direct, that during such period as may be specified in the order, such District Magistrate may also, if satisfied as provided in sub-section (1) exercise the powers conferred upon by the said sub-section : Provided that the period specified in an order made by the State Government under this sub-section shall not, in the first instance exceed three months, but the State Government may, if satisfied as aforesaid that it is necessary so to do, amend such order to extend such period from time to time by any period not exceeding three months at any one time. (3) When any order is made by District Magistrate, he shall forthwith report, the fact to the State Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as, in his opinion, have a bearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain in force for more than 12 days after the making thereof unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the State Government : Provided that where under Section 17 the grounds of detention are communicated by the officer making the order after five days but not later than ten days from the date of detention, this sub-section shall apply subject to the modification that, for the words “twelve days”, the words “fifteen days” shall be substituted. 9. There is no doubt that it is competent to the Government of Jharkhand exercising its powers through the District Magistrate to detain a person on the ground that his detention is necessary for the maintenance of public order. However, the ground of attack against the preventive detention order is that the District Magistrate has passed the order on an apprehension of breach of (i) public order, and (ii) law and order. Referring to Prabhu Dayal Deorah v. Distt. Magistrate, Kamrup, (1974) 1 SCC 103 , the learned counsel for the detenu has submitted that the detention order dated 8th August 2022 must be held invalid because one of the grounds mentioned in the detention order is “law and order”, which definitely cannot be the basis for passing an order of detention under section 12 of the Crimes Control Act. 10. There are 13 Central and State Laws which provide for severability of the grounds on which the preventive detention order is made, as a result whereof, any order made on more than one ground is construed as separate orders of detention on each of the grounds - one of the instances is section 5-A inserted by Act 35 of 1975 in COFEPOSA. Pertinently, the validity of section 5-A of COFEPOSA has been upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Attorney General for India v. Amratlal Prajivandas, (1994) 5 SCC 54 : AIR 1994 SC 2179 , holding the said provision not invalid or void or violative of clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution of India. 11. Pertinently, the validity of section 5-A of COFEPOSA has been upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Attorney General for India v. Amratlal Prajivandas, (1994) 5 SCC 54 : AIR 1994 SC 2179 , holding the said provision not invalid or void or violative of clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution of India. 11. The Crimes Control Act under which the detention order dated 8th August 2022 has been passed also contains a similar provision in section 12-A. It reads as under: 12-A. Grounds of detention severable. - (1) Where a person has been detained in pursuance of an order of detention whether made before or after the commencement of the Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 2002 under section 12 which has been made on two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on each of such grounds and accordingly- (4) (a) such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or some of the ground(s) is or are.- (5) (i) Vague; (6) (ii) non-existent; (7) (iii) non-relevant; (8) (iv) not connected or not proximately connected with such person; or (9) (v) invalid for any other reason whatsoever. (10) and it is not therefore possible to hold that the Government or officer making such order would have been satisfied as provided in section 12 with reference to the remaining ground or grounds and made the order of detention. (11) (b) The Government or officer making the order of detention shall be deemed to have made the order of detention under the said section after being satisfied as provided in the section with reference to the remaining ground or grounds. 12. Therefore, a detention order can be sustained so long as one valid ground is found amongst the grounds mentioned in the order of detention. Section 12-A of the Crimes Control Act provides that a detention order is not void if one or some of the grounds of detention are (i) vague, (ii) non-existent, (iii) non-relevant, (iv) not connected, or (v) not proximately connected with such person, or (vi) invalid for any other reason whatsoever. Section 12-A of the Crimes Control Act provides that a detention order is not void if one or some of the grounds of detention are (i) vague, (ii) non-existent, (iii) non-relevant, (iv) not connected, or (v) not proximately connected with such person, or (vi) invalid for any other reason whatsoever. Furthermore, section 15 provides that the detention order shall not be invalid or inoperative merely for the reason that the detenu or the officer making the detention order is outside the limits of territorial jurisdiction of the State Government, or the place of detention of the detenu is outside the said limits. When such is the legislative intention to save an order of preventive detention, the Court is expected to carefully examine the materials on record and grounds of challenge and not to act on mere pretension of the detenu. 13. Even otherwise, mere mention of the expression “law and order” in the detention order shall not make the order illegal or invalid. In the process of making an order of detention, the detaining authority has recorded facts of the case, extracted the opinion of Public Prosecutor and then recorded his subjective satisfaction. In the operative portion of the order where the detaining authority has recorded his satisfaction that there are sufficient materials for making an order of detention under section 12 of the Crimes Control Act, he has recorded that the detenu is required to be preventively detained for the maintenance of public order. Furthermore, this is not a requirement in law that all internal communications or file-noting must be supplied to the detenu. What is necessary in the cases of preventive detention is that all such materials on the basis of which the detaining authority has recorded his satisfaction should be supplied to the detenu. The opinion of the Public Prosecutor has been extracted in the detention order which, in our opinion, complies with the requirements of natural justice. Having carefully gone through the contents of the detention order dated 8th August 2022, we do not find any such invalidity in the detention order as sought to have been canvassed on behalf of the detenu. The opinion of the Public Prosecutor has been extracted in the detention order which, in our opinion, complies with the requirements of natural justice. Having carefully gone through the contents of the detention order dated 8th August 2022, we do not find any such invalidity in the detention order as sought to have been canvassed on behalf of the detenu. While recording our satisfaction, we have this in our mind that a document has to be read as a whole and not in a piecemeal and when read in the manner the detention order should be read the whole attempt of the detenu to challenge the detention order having been made on an invalid ground turns out to be a failed attempt. 14. Mr. Vimal Kirti Singh, the learned counsel for the detenu has contended that unmindful of the legal requirements under section 12(1) of the Crimes Control Act the District Magistrate, Sahibganj has passed the detention order dated 8th August 2022 as there is no live link with the last reported offending act of the detenu, and the allegation of harassing Paharia tribes has no factual foundation. 15. The detenu is a habitual offender against whom several criminal cases have been lodged. The expression “anti-social element” has been defined under section 2(d) of the Crimes Control Act. It provides that “antisocial element” is the person who either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of the offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII IPC. The offences under Chapter XVI of the Penal Code, 1860 are the offences affecting the human body. Under Chapter XVI, sections 299 to 377 deal with the offences of murder, attempt to murder, hurt, grievous hurt, causing grievous hurt to extort property or to compel restoration of property, wrongful restraint, wrongful confinement, criminal forces, assault, kidnapping, abduction, kidnapping for ransom etc. Similarly, theft, extortion, robbery, dacoity, misappropriation of property, criminal breach of trust, receiving stolen property, cheating, mischief, criminal trespass etc. are dealt under Chapter XVII. 16. Similarly, theft, extortion, robbery, dacoity, misappropriation of property, criminal breach of trust, receiving stolen property, cheating, mischief, criminal trespass etc. are dealt under Chapter XVII. 16. Section 2(d) of the Crimes Control Act which defines “anti-social element” reads as under: 2(d) “Anti-social element” means a person who- (i) either by himself or as a member of or leader of a gang, habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Penal Code, 1860; or (ii) habitually commits or abets the commission of offences under the suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, 1956; (iii) who by words or otherwise promotes or attempts to promote, on grounds of religion, race, language, caste or community or other grounds whatsoever, feelings of enmity or hatred between different religions, racial or language groups or castes or communities; or (iv) has been found habitually passing indecent remarks to, or teasing women or girls; or (v) who has been convicted of an offence under sections 25, 26, 27, 28 or 29 of the Arms Act of 1959. 17. The word “habitual” finds its origin in the Latin habitualis which means habit and is generally used to signify doing of something very often. Therefore, the expression habitual connotes repetition, and a habitual offender is a person who is a criminal by habit or by disposition formed by repetition of crimes, “Dhanji Ram Sharma v. Superintendent of Police, AIR 1966 SC 1766 ”. In the preventive detention order, the District Magistrate has referred to the cases registered against the detenu between 2014 to 2022. The cases registered against the detenu pertain to the years 2008, 2014, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021 and 2022. The detenu who seems to enter the crime world in 2014 or even before that has at least 23 criminal cases to his credit, many of which relate to commission of the crimes under Chapter XVI and Chapter XVII of the Penal Code, 1860 and several others for illegal mining. Besides such crimes, the detenu has been involved in commission of the offences under Explosive Substance Act, Arms Act, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Information Technology Act, Indian Telegraph Act and Official Secrets Act. The detaining authority believed that rivalry between the two groups intensified after a tender for plying public ferry was floated. Besides such crimes, the detenu has been involved in commission of the offences under Explosive Substance Act, Arms Act, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Information Technology Act, Indian Telegraph Act and Official Secrets Act. The detaining authority believed that rivalry between the two groups intensified after a tender for plying public ferry was floated. There is a reference of the complaints filed in the Court of Sub-Divisional Magistrate and shootout between the two groups. Therefore, the challenge to the detention order on the ground that the same has been passed without any proximate cause is without any substance. In our opinion, there can definitely be a reference to past incidents which shall be a part of the chain of events on the basis of which the detaining authority forms his subjective satisfaction as regards existence of sufficient grounds to pass the order of detention. The pattern of crimes committed by the detenu over a period of time and other materials on record provide clear indication to the power and control which he wields in the area. The apprehensions of the Sub-Divisional Police Officer and Superintendent of Police that there is an imminent threat of breach of public order and law and order seem to be real and not imaginary. Even a breach of law and order in the situation portrayed by the respondents can have serious consequences on the daily life of the people. In Amanulla Khan Kudeatalla Khan Pathan v. State of Gujarat, (1999) 5 SCC 613 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that a violation of any ordinary legal provision may become a matter of public order inasmuch as it is the magnitude of the offending activity and its effect on the society at large that determine whether such activity is prejudicial to the maintenance of public order or was just a breach of law and order. 18. More significantly, the Crimes Control Act has used the expression “reason to fear”. To our mind, this expression is not synonymous to “reason to believe”. As observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in A.S. Krishnan v. State of Kerala, (2004) 11 SCC 576 , “reason to believe” is not the same thing as “suspicion” Or “doubt” and it signifies a higher level of the state of mind. To our mind, this expression is not synonymous to “reason to believe”. As observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in A.S. Krishnan v. State of Kerala, (2004) 11 SCC 576 , “reason to believe” is not the same thing as “suspicion” Or “doubt” and it signifies a higher level of the state of mind. Section 26 of the Penal Code, 1860 provides that a person is said to have “reason to believe” a thing if he has sufficient cause to believe that thing but not otherwise. So, the Court may examine the question whether the reasons for the belief have a rational connection to the formation of the belief. The law to this extent has been settled in Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. ITO, AIR 1961 SC 372 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the action of the Income Tax Officer in starting the proceedings under section 34 of the Income Tax Act is open to challenge in a Court of law. But unlike belief, the expression “fear” reflects a fluid state inasmuch as one may experience fear without there having so much of evidence which may be required to form a belief as to existence of a fact or a state of things. But this distinction between the two expressions cannot be taken too far and it must be held that the detaining authority must have some material or information before him so as to exercise the powers under section 12 of the Crimes Control Act. Therefore, the detaining authority can form an opinion on the basis of the materials before him sufficiency or insufficiency of which is not a matter to be agitated in a writ proceeding, and the detaining authority shall have “reason to fear” as the expression is understood in common parlance and not from the perspective of an individual's feelings. 19. In Amanulla Khan Kudeatalla Khan Pathan v. State of Gujarat, (1999) 5 SCC 613 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: “6….. The satisfaction of the detaining authority on consideration of the activities of the detenu and on forming an opinion that the activities are such which affect the maintenance of public order and as such it is necessary to put the detenu under detention cannot be interfered with by the court of law on mere assertion of the detenu. The satisfaction of the detaining authority on consideration of the activities of the detenu and on forming an opinion that the activities are such which affect the maintenance of public order and as such it is necessary to put the detenu under detention cannot be interfered with by the court of law on mere assertion of the detenu. It is not required to be stated in the grounds of detention as to why the detaining authority has formed the opinion that the activities in question cannot be adequately dealt with under the provisions of the Bombay Police Act…..” 20. The learned counsel for the detenu has submitted that the powers of preventive detention should not be exercised where the detenu is in custody and there is no imminent possibility of his being released on bail. But this proposition has limited application and cannot be applied in cases where the detaining authority has recorded his satisfaction that once released on bail the detenu may again indulge in prejudicial activities. The Central Legislations such as the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act etc. and the State Legislations for preventive detention are manifestations of the need to provide powers even to the extent of interfering with the citizen's most cherished rights of person and property, which are thought necessary and proper in certain circumstances. In Machinder Shivaji Mahar v. The King, 1950 FCR 827, the Federal Court has held that the responsibility for making a detention order rest on the provincial executive as they alone are entrusted with the duty of maintaining public peace, and it would be a serious derogation from that responsibility if the Court were to substitute its judgment for the satisfaction of the executive authority and, to that end, undertake an investigation of the sufficiency of the materials on which such satisfaction was grounded. Therefore, if the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is based on materials placed before him and the order of preventive detention reflects proper application of mind inasmuch as the detention order records the reason for detention with a view to prevent the detenu from abating prejudicial activity in future, it is difficult to accept the contention of the detenu that there was no compelling necessity to detain him preventively and, more so, because there are adequate measures under the general criminal laws to deal with the situation apprehended by the detaining authority. 21. The main plank of the detenu is that his representation dated 18th August 2022 has been decided after an inordinate delay of 85 days and thereby causing serious infraction of his constitutional rights guaranteed under clauses (4) and (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution of India. The learned counsel for the detenu has submitted that irrespective of enormity and gravity of the allegations made against the detenu any violation of the fundamental right of the detenu in disposal of his representation at the earliest would make the order of detention illegal. Criticizing the writ Court's order, the learned counsel for the detenu has submitted that there is no timeline for the making of representation by the detenu and, the constitutional right of the detenu that his representation must be decided with reasonable expedition does not extinguish even if he submits the representation 10 days after the detention order was passed. It is submitted that not only furnishing the grounds of detention within the statutory period but also a decision on the detenu's representation with promptitude and without any delay emanate from Article 22. The learned counsel for the detenu has heavily relied on the judgment in Aslam Ahmed Zahire Ahmed Shaik v. Union of India, (1989) 3 SCC 277 where unexplained delay of seven days on the part of the Jail Superintendent in transmitting the representation to the Central Government was held rendering the continued detention illegal and constitutionally impermissible. The learned counsel for the detenu has also referred to Kundanbhai Dulabhai Shaik v. Distt. Magistrate Ahmedabad, (1996) 3 SCC 194 , wherein it has been held that unexplained delay or unsatisfactory explanation for disposal of representation would vitiate the order of detention. 22. The history of preventive detention goes back to Bengal Regulation III of 1818 and similar enactments in Madras and Bombay. Magistrate Ahmedabad, (1996) 3 SCC 194 , wherein it has been held that unexplained delay or unsatisfactory explanation for disposal of representation would vitiate the order of detention. 22. The history of preventive detention goes back to Bengal Regulation III of 1818 and similar enactments in Madras and Bombay. The expression “preventive detention” as a measure to prevent a person from doing some act prejudicial to the public safety or defence of the realm received a definite expression in the language used by the Law Lords in England while explaining the nature of detention under Regulation 14-B of the Defence of Realm Act, 1914. On the onset of World War II, the British Parliament enacted the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939 under which the Regulations providing for preventive detention were made. The Defence (General) Regulations, 1939, a war time measure, which was upheld by the House of Lords, Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson, [1942] A.C. 206, seems to have been extended in India through the Defence of India Act, 1939. Even after World War II, large scale disturbances and subversive activities by the anti-social elements endangering normal life continued and the situation had worsened after partition of the country which saw mindless communal violence and anti-national and subversive forces threatening the national security which prompted the Law Makers to make laws for preventive detention in normal times. The notable State Legislations were U.P. Goondas Act; C.P. and Berar Goondas Act; Madhya Pradesh Public Security Act; U.P. Prevention of Crimes (Special Powers) (Temporary) Act etc. Under the Constitution of India, there is Entry 9 in List I which empowers the Central Government and Entry 3 in List III of Schedule VII which empowers the Central and State Legislatures to make laws for preventive detention in normal times. The Preventive Detention Act, 1950 which was enacted as a temporary measure for one year was extended till it expired at the end of 1969. Then came the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 which was repealed in 1977; the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985 was repealed in 1995 and; the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 was repealed in 2004. Then came the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 which was repealed in 1977; the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985 was repealed in 1995 and; the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 was repealed in 2004. Even today, the following Central laws authorizing preventive detention are in force : (i) the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, (ii) The National Security Act, 1980, (iii) Prevention of Blackmarketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980, and (iv) The Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance Act, 1988. In addition to these Central Laws, 17 States have legislated 21 enactments providing for preventive detention. The present-day preventive detention law in the State of Jharkhand has adopted the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981 which was brought on the statute book after the previous attempts such as the Bihar Maintenance of Public Order Acts of 1947 and 1949 were declared invalid. 23. The framers of the Constitution had visualized misuse of the power of preventive detention and therefore thought it necessary to make the power of preventive detention subject to certain constitutional safeguards upon the violation of which the individual can approach the Court. The intention of the Parliament to authorize the abrogation of the liberty of a person at the discretion of the Central/State Government is implicit in Article 22 of the Constitution. While moving Article 15-A, which is the present Article 22 in the Constitution, before the Constituent Assembly, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar has made the following remarks: “With regard to sub-clause (b) of clause (3) I think it has to be recognised that in the present circumstances of the country, it may be necessary for the executive to detain a person who is tampering either with public order as mentioned in the Concurrent List or with the Defence Services of the country. In such a case I do not think that the exigency of the liberty of the individual should be placed above the interests of the State. It is on that basis that sub-clause (b) has been included within the provisions of clause (3). In such a case I do not think that the exigency of the liberty of the individual should be placed above the interests of the State. It is on that basis that sub-clause (b) has been included within the provisions of clause (3). There again, those who believe in the absolute personal liberty of the individual will recognise that this power of preventive detention has been helped in by two limitations : one is that the Government shall have power to detain a person in custody under the provisions of clause (3) only for three months. If they want to detain him beyond three months, they must be in possession of a report made by an advisory board which will examine the papers submitted by the executive and will probably also give an opportunity to the accused to represent his case and come to the conclusion that the detention is justifiable. It is only under that that the executive will be able to detain him for more than three months Secondly, detention may be extended beyond three months if Parliament makes a general law laying down in what class of cases the detention may exceed three months and state the period of such detention. I think, on the whole, those who are fighting for the protection of individual freedom ought to congratulate themselves that it has been found possible to introduce this clause which, although it may not satisfy those who hold absolute views in this matter, certainly saves a great deal which had been lost by the non-introduction of the words ‘due process of law. ‘Sir, I commend this article to the House.” 24. The scheme of the Crimes Control Act which provides for externment etc. of anti-social elements and detention of any person with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order appears to be little different from some of the other preventive detention laws. Under section 12, the order of preventive detention made by the District Magistrate shall be forthwith reported to the State Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such order has to be approved by the State Government within 12 days. Under section 12, the order of preventive detention made by the District Magistrate shall be forthwith reported to the State Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such order has to be approved by the State Government within 12 days. This period of 12 days shall extend to 15 days in cases where the grounds of detention are communicated by the detaining authority after 5 days but not later than 10 days from the date of detention. Section 17 mandates that the detaining authority shall as soon as may be but ordinarily not later than 5 days and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than 10 days from the date of detention, communicate to the detenu the grounds on which the detention order has been made. The detaining authority is also under a duty to afford the detenu the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order to the State Government. The expression “shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation” which has been used in section 17 is only to reiterate that the grounds of detention must be communicated to the detenu before expiration of 10 days from the date of detention. The next step in the scheme of law is that the State Government shall place the matter before the Advisory Board, which would include the grounds on which the detention order has been made, representation of the detenu and the report by the District Magistrate as mentioned in sub-section 2 of section 12 and the report by such officer under sub-section 3. The Advisory Board is required to render its opinion within 7 weeks from the date of the detention after hearing the detenu in person if the Advisory Board considered it essential so to do or the detenu desired to be heard. The significance of the opinion rendered by the Advisory Board is to the effect that if the Advisory Board has reported that there is no sufficient cause for the detention of a person the State Government shall revoke the detention order under sub-section 2 of section 21 and cause the person concerned to be released forthwith. 25. Sections 17 and 21 of the Crimes Control Act which are relevant for the present purpose read as under: 17. 25. Sections 17 and 21 of the Crimes Control Act which are relevant for the present purpose read as under: 17. Grounds of order of detention to be disclosed to person affected by the order. - (1) When a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, but ordinarily not later than five days and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than ten days from the date of detention, communicate to him the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order to the State Government. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall require the authority to disclose facts which it considers to be against the public interest to disclose. 21. Action upon the report of the Advisory Board. - (1) In any case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is, in its opinion sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the Government may confirm the detention order and continue the detention of the person concerned for such period as it thinks fit. (2) In any case where the Advisory Board has reported that there is, in its opinion, no sufficient cause for the detention of a person, the Government shall revoke the detention order and cause the person concerned to be released forthwith. 26. The learned Advocate General has submitted that the procedure prescribed under the Crimes Control Act has been followed and there was no delay in consideration of the detenu's representation by the Home Secretary. It is submitted that the detention order dated 8th August 2022 was confirmed by the Government on 12th August 2022 and the Advisory Board rendered an opinion on 2nd September 2022 that detention of the detenu should be continued. By that time, the representation of the detenu was not received in the office of the Home Secretary, Government of Jharkhand and the same was received only on 31st October 2022 which was considered by him within 10 days. In our opinion, the guidelines in “Jayanarayan Sukul”1 have been observed in the present case. 27. In “Jayanarayan Sukul”1 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has enunciated the 4-principles relating to representation of the detenu as under: “20. Broadly stated, four principles are to be followed in regard to representation of detenus. In our opinion, the guidelines in “Jayanarayan Sukul”1 have been observed in the present case. 27. In “Jayanarayan Sukul”1 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has enunciated the 4-principles relating to representation of the detenu as under: “20. Broadly stated, four principles are to be followed in regard to representation of detenus. First, the appropriate authority is bound to give an opportunity to the detenu to make a representation and to consider the representation of the detenu as early as possible. Secondly, the consideration of the representation of the detenu by the appropriate authority is entirely independent of any action by the Advisory Board including the consideration of the representation of the detenu by the Advisory Board. Thirdly, there should not be any delay in the matter of consideration. It is true that no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to the measure of time taken by the appropriate authority for consideration but it has to be remembered that the Government has to be vigilant in the governance of the citizens. A citizen's right raises a correlative duty of the State. Fourthly, the appropriate Government is to exercise its opinion and judgment on the representation before sending the case along with the detenu's representation to the Advisory Board. If the appropriate Government will release the detenu the Government will not send the matter to the Advisory Board. If however the Government will not release the detenu the Government will send the case along with the detenu's representation to the Advisory Board. If thereafter the Advisory Board will express an opinion in favour of release of the detenu the Government will release the detenu. If the Advisory Board will express any opinion against the release of the detenu the Government may still exercise the power to release the detenu.” 28. The learned Advocate General has submitted that the most important fact which has to be considered in examining the allegation of delay in deciding the detenu's representation is that the detenu is required to make a representation against the detention order to a designated authority which is the Home Secretary, whereas the Central Acts provide a different mechanism for the making and disposal of representation of a person detained by an order of preventive detention. In plain words, the submission made at the Bar is that the judgments in “Aslam Ahmed Zahire Ahmed Shaik”9 and “Kundanbhai Dulabhai Shaik”10 where the preventive detention orders were passed in different fact-situation and under different preventive detention laws cannot be applied to challenge the order of detention dated 8th August 2022. It is further submitted that the detenu was clearly informed that he can submit his representation through the Jail Superintendent but he has produced a copy of the representation allegedly given to the Jailor. 29. Definitely, the object behind the Central Legislations is different from the object for which the Crimes Control Act has been enacted. It is also true that a legal provision is interpreted in a pragmatic rather than pedantic manner and practical and hard realities of life must not be ignored. Therefore, the object behind an enactment has to be kept in mind to discern ratio decidendi of the judgment. Lord Macmillan11 has observed that it is right so to interpret emergency legislation as to promote rather than to defeat its efficacy for the defence of the realm. The Preamble to COFEPOSA recites that this Act is to provide for preventive detention in certain cases for the purposes of conservation and augmentation of foreign exchange and prevention of smuggling activities and for matters connected therewith. There the expression used in section 8 is appropriate Government which shall be Central Government or State Government, as the case may be. Similarly, the Prevention of Black marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 has been enacted for detention in certain cases for the purpose of prevention of black marketing and maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community and for matters connected therewith. “Aslam Ahmed Zahire Ahmed Shaik”9 was detained under section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974. The representation of the detenu was left unattended for a week and the Superintendent of Central Prison had failed to offer any satisfactory and convincing explanation for not forwarding the representation to the Ministry of Finance. In the present case, the detenu has pleaded that he submitted his representation against the detention order through the Jailor but he was not made a party before the writ Court. In the present case, the detenu has pleaded that he submitted his representation against the detention order through the Jailor but he was not made a party before the writ Court. “Kundanbhai Dulabhai Shaik”10 was detained in jail under section 3(2) of the Prevention of Blackmarketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980. He was the owner of a godown where four barrels of kerosene-oil were found loaded on an auto-rickshaw. These cases had peculiar features and the detention orders were passed with different objects in mind. These judgments provide valuable insight to the High Courts in dealing with the cases of preventive detention and can be applied in a particular case having regard to the facts and circumstances of that case, but not in every case. Even in “Aslam Ahmed Zahire Ahmed Shaik”9 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that it is neither possible nor advisable to lay down any rigid period of time uniformly applicable to all cases within which period the representation of detenu has to be disposed. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that what would be the reasonable time for disposing of the representation must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. 30. On behalf of the State of Jharkhand, a controversy has been raised as regards making of the representation by the detenu on 18th August 2022. The respondents have stated in the counter-affidavit that the representation of the detenu was received in the Home Department for the first time on 31st October 2022 through e-mail at 01 : 32 PM. According to the respondents, the delay in forwarding the representation dated 18th August 2022 to the Department of Home was a handiwork of the detenu himself. The representation of the detenu sent through e-mail to the Inspector General (Prisons) was not delivered as the e-mail transmission report indicates. The respondents have suggested mischief by the detenu inasmuch as there is a mismatch of signature and other details over the representation dated 18th August 2022; the representation of the detenu was attested by Ashok Kumar Choudhary by affixing official stamp of the Jailor whereas Mr. Manoj Murmu was Jailor-In-Charge on that day and; there is endorsement on the detenu's representation by inscribing “for” by hand. Manoj Murmu was Jailor-In-Charge on that day and; there is endorsement on the detenu's representation by inscribing “for” by hand. The learned Advocate General has submitted that there was some foul play on the part of the detenu in getting an endorsement over his representation dated 18th August 2022 from a staff in the office of the Jailor, which was left unattended there at the instance of the detenu himself. The respondents have also raised serious objection to tiling of several other documents relating to ED case and W.P. (Cr.) No. 156 of 2020 - order passed in W.P.(Cr.) No. 156 of 2020 has been stayed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.L.P.(Cr.) No. 241 of 2023. Another objection taken by the respondents is that the order dated 12th August 2022 passed by the State Government whereby the detention order has been approved by the State Government is not under challenge, and the order rejecting the representation of the detenu has also not been challenged in the present proceeding. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the detenu has submitted that any doubt which prevailed in the minds of the writ Court whether or not the representation was submitted by the detenu now stands clarified by the State of Jharkhand itself which has admitted receipt of the representation dated 18th August 2022 by the Jailor. It is submitted that the detenu could have submitted his representation through the Jailor only and that he did on 18th August 2022. While this may be correct to say that the representation of the detenu is dated 18th August 2022, he has failed to explain how he could file a different copy of his representation in the present proceeding which bears endorsement of the Jailor, unlike the one filed before the writ Court. In view of the stand taken by the State of Jharkhand, the Jailor and the Inspector General (Prisons) who only could have explained the circumstances surrounding the controversy were not made parties before the writ Court. This is so necessary also for the reason that the State of Jharkhand has asserted that Mr. Manoj Murmu was the Jailor-In-Charge on 18th August 2022. The detenu has claimed that he is a renowned businessman since last several years, engaged in stone and mining business and has been filing huge income tax returns. This is so necessary also for the reason that the State of Jharkhand has asserted that Mr. Manoj Murmu was the Jailor-In-Charge on 18th August 2022. The detenu has claimed that he is a renowned businessman since last several years, engaged in stone and mining business and has been filing huge income tax returns. The representation dated 18th August 2022 refers to judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and issues in law to convince the authority that the detention order dated 8th August 2022 is not sustainable in law. Either this representation was prepared with the help of a lawyer, or a person having knowledge of law, or by the detenu himself. In every eventuality, this knowledge must be imputed to the detenu that delay in disposal of the representation shall ensue consequences. In the circumstances of the case, the lingering doubt about bona fides of the detenu has continued and we are not inclined to accept his plea that the delay in disposal of his representation was intentional and motivated. 31. Like the last refuge of a losing litigant, Gulam Mustafa v. State of Maharashtra, (1976) 1 SCC 800 , the detenu would attack the detention order on the ground that the order is actuated with malice. The learned counsel for the detenu has laid stress on State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 to submit that the preventive detention order is actuated with mala fide inasmuch as the detaining authority acted with oblique or improper motive for ulterior purpose and the said order has been passed in bad faith. It is submitted that the detention order has been used as a weapon of persecution to silence the rebellious voice of the detenu and his son who made complaints to the government authorities, which led to raids at several places belonging to Pankaj Mishra, Dahu Yadav and their associates. Before the writ Court, the detenu has produced a copy of the complaint made by his son to the Director General of Income Tax (Investigation), Patna dated 19th March 2022, a copy of the summons dated 3rd June 2022 issued to his son by the Enforcement Directorate, press release dated 15th July 2022 and 27th July 2022 by the Enforcement Directorate to substantiate the allegation of mala fides. The writ Court has held that the allegation of mala fides is not against any authority and no person or authority has been made a party in individual capacity. 32. The expression mala fide has its own connotation in the legal field. The allegation of mala fide levelled against the authority for passing the order supposedly with malice in the mind of the authority can only be made by laying factual foundation in the pleadings. There is a presumption in law that the power has been exercised bona fide and in good faith. Therefore, the burden of proving mala fides is very heavy and proving of such facts is always on the person making the allegation. The District Magistrate, Sahibganj is the competent authority to pass the detention order dated 8th August 2022 and he is the person authorized to pass an order under section 12(1) of the Crimes Control Act. There cannot be any allegation of mala fide against the authority which has passed the order under challenge by merely using the expression mala fide or malice. The reason seems to be that the Court is required to look into the factual aspect of the matter to come to its own conclusion about the degree of proof required wherever an allegation of mala fide is made against the authority. Therefore, the burden to prove the charge of mala fide is always on the person who seeks invalidation of the order passed in exercise of a statutory power. The Courts are forbidden from drawing inferences of mala fide or bad faith on the basis of bald allegations. 33. In Chandra Prakash Singh v. Purvanchal Gramin Bank, (2008) 12 SCC 292 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed: “34. Thus as a proposition of law, the burden of providing mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. Mere allegation is not enough Party making such allegations is under the legal obligation to place specific materials before the court to substantiate the said allegations. There has to be very strong and convincing evidence to establish the allegations of mala fides specifically and definitely alleged in the petition as the same cannot merely be presumed. The presumption under law is in favour of the bona fides of the order unless contradicted by acceptable material.” 34. There has to be very strong and convincing evidence to establish the allegations of mala fides specifically and definitely alleged in the petition as the same cannot merely be presumed. The presumption under law is in favour of the bona fides of the order unless contradicted by acceptable material.” 34. Though there is none, even a remote allegation against the District Magistrate of passing the detention order in a biased manner to please the political bosses is required to be proved by producing cogent and convincing materials. If the allegations of mala fide were to be imputed to the Superintendent of Police this needs to be indicated that the concept of “transferred malice” cannot be applied in the present case. The Superintendent of Police who made a recommendation for detaining the detenu preventively is not a party-respondent and there is no allegation of mala fide against this officer of making a recommendation against the detenu in bad faith. 35. The writ Court in exercise of the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution shall not embark upon a fact-finding roving enquiry. Necessarily, the writ Court is required to adjudicate the matter on the basis of the indisputed facts and evidences laid by the parties. Equally true, this Court in exercise of the powers under the Letters Patent cannot go beyond what the writ Court could have done and, moreover, it is not every error in law or of fact which would warrant interference by the Letters Patent Court to the writ Court's decision. Having examined the materials on record, we do not find any reason to differ with the order passed by the writ Court and, accordingly, LPA No. 568 of 2022 is dismissed. 36. I agree.