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2023 DIGILAW 2825 (PNJ)

Mohinder Kaur v. Harpal Kaur

2023-09-20

VIKRAM AGGARWAL

body2023
JUDGMENT Mr. Vikram Aggarwal, J. This is defendants appeal against the judgment and decree dated 31.08.2022 passed by the Additional District Judge, Sangrur vide which the appeal filed by the respondents No. 1 and 2-plaintiffs was allowed, judgment and decree dated 06.03.2020 passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Malerkotla was set aside and the suit filed by respondents No. 1 and 2-plaintiffs was decreed. The parties shall be referred as per their original status in the suit. 2. The dispute revolves around the land owned by one Sarabjit Singh (1/4th share out of land measuring 49 bighas 16 biswas and 17/23 share out of land measuring 46 bighas 2 biswas) (fully described in the plaint) situated in the revenue estate of Village Daman Mehli, Tehsil Malerkotla, District Sangrur (hereinafter referred to as 'the disputed land'). Sarabjit Singh was married to Harpal Kaur. From the wedlock, there was one son namely Gurvir Singh. Mohinder Kaur was the mother of Sarabjit Singh and he had one sister namely Harwinder Kaur. Sarabjit Singh expired on 11.05.2014. It is after his death that a dispute, as it normally does, though unfortunate, arose between his wife and son on one side and his mother and sister on the other. His widow Harpal Kaur and son Gurvir Singh (hereinafter referred to as 'the plaintiffs') instituted a suit for declaration that they were joint owners in possession of land to the extent of 1/4th share out of the disputed land on the basis of unregistered Will dated 05.04.2014 executed by Sarabjit Singh in favour of the plaintiffs and that, in accordance with the Will, they were entitled to get mutation of the disputed land sanctioned in their favour. Mutation of inheritance No.2658 dated 23.08.2014 was also challenged as per which, the disputed land had devolved upon the plaintiffs and the mother of Sarabjit Singh namely Mohinder Kaur in equal shares. Challenge was also laid to transfer deed No. 1652 dated 26.09.2014 executed by Mohinder Kaur in favour of her daughter Harwinder Kaur with regard to the disputed land as also some other land. Another mutation No.2679 dated 29.09.2014 sanctioned in favour of Harwinder Kaur in pursuance to these transfer deeds was also challenged. Permanent injunction restraining Mohinder Kaur and Harwinder Kaur (hereinafter referred to as 'the defendants') from selling, mortgaging, exchanging or alienating the disputed land was also sought. Another mutation No.2679 dated 29.09.2014 sanctioned in favour of Harwinder Kaur in pursuance to these transfer deeds was also challenged. Permanent injunction restraining Mohinder Kaur and Harwinder Kaur (hereinafter referred to as 'the defendants') from selling, mortgaging, exchanging or alienating the disputed land was also sought. Apart from the defendants, State Bank of India, Malerkotla Branch and State Bank of India, Village Manvi Branch were also impleaded as defendants since some loan had been obtained by Sarabjit Singh from these banks. 2.1 The case set up by the plaintiffs was that Sarabjit Singh had expired on 11.05.2014 and prior to that he had executed a Will dated 05.04.2014 in favour of the plaintiffs with regard to his entire movable and immovable property. In view of the same, after his death, his entire movable and immovable property was to be inherited by the plaintiffs. However, the mother of Sarabjit Singh namely Mohinder Kaur, in connivance with the revenue authorities got mutation of inheritance sanctioned in her favour with regard to the disputed land on the basis of natural succession by concealing the Will dated 05.04.2014. Subsequent to the sanctioning of the mutation, Mohinder Kaur transferred the disputed land in favour of Harwinder Kaur and further another mutation dated 29.09.2014 was sanctioned in favour of Harwinder Kaur. 3. The suit was opposed by the defendants. They denied the execution of the Will dated 05.04.2014 and termed it to be a forged and fabricated document. They defended the mutations and the consequent transfer deeds. 3.1 Defendants No.3 and 4, on the other hand, averred about a loan of Rs. 7 laks and Rs. 5.5 lakhs having been obtained by Sarabjit Singh from defendants No.3 and 4 respectively and having mortgaged his land as collateral security for repayment of the land. 4. From the pleading of the parties, the following issues were framed:- "(1) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the declaration as prayed for? OPP (II) Whether the Will dated 5.4.2014 is legally valid documents?OPP (III) Whether the Will dated 5.4.2014 is forged and fabricated documents prepared after the death of Sarabjit Singh? OPD(Defendant no. 2). (IV) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the permanent injunction as prayed for?OPD (V) Whether the suit of the plaintiffs is not maintainable in the present form? OPD. (VI) Whether the plaintiffs have no cause of action to file the present suit?OPD. OPD(Defendant no. 2). (IV) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the permanent injunction as prayed for?OPD (V) Whether the suit of the plaintiffs is not maintainable in the present form? OPD. (VI) Whether the plaintiffs have no cause of action to file the present suit?OPD. (VII) Whether the plaintiffs have not come to the court with clean hand? OPD (VIII) Whether deceased Sarabjit Singh obtained loan of Rs.7,00,000/- from defendant no.3?OPD(Defendant no.3). (IX) Whether deceased Sarabjit Singh obtained loan of Rs.5,50,000/- from defendant no. 4?OPD (Def. no. 4). IXA. Whether, the transfer of ownership deed vasika no. 1652 dated 26.09.2014 and further mutation no.2679 dated 29.09.2014 on the basis of the above said transfer of ownership deed are wrong, illegal, null and void and the same are liable to be set aside/ignored? OPP (X) Relief. " 5. Parties led their respective evidence. 6. The trial Court dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiffs holding that the Will dated 05.04.2014 had not been proved in accordance with law and that it was shrouded by suspicious circumstances. Much emphasis was not laid upon the reports given by the experts examined by both sides and upon statements while appearing as witnesses. It would be needless to mention that the expert examined by the plaintiffs had opined that the signatures on the Will were genuine whereas the expert examined by the defendants had opined that the signatures were forged. 7. In appeal, the first Appellate Court set aside the judgment of the trial Court and decreed the suit filed by the respondents-plaintiffs. The first Appellate Court was of the opinion that the Will had been proved in accordance with the provisions of section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and that it was not shrouded by suspicious circumstances. 8. Aggrieved by the decision of the first Appellate Court, the present appeal has been preferred. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. 10. Mr. Amit Jain, learned senior counsel representing the appellants strenuously urged that the first Appellate Court had erred in setting aside the well reasoned decision of the trial Court and decreeing the suit filed by the plaintiffs. It was submitted that the Will dated 05.04.2014 had not been proved in accordance with law and that it was shrouded by suspicious circumstances. Amit Jain, learned senior counsel representing the appellants strenuously urged that the first Appellate Court had erred in setting aside the well reasoned decision of the trial Court and decreeing the suit filed by the plaintiffs. It was submitted that the Will dated 05.04.2014 had not been proved in accordance with law and that it was shrouded by suspicious circumstances. Learned counsel submitted that Sarabjit Singh was unwell at the relevant time and was not in a fit state of mind to execute the Will. The plaintiffs took undue advantage of this fact and prepared a forged Will. Reference was made to the cross-examinations of marginal witnesses i.e. PW1 Gurjant Singh and PW2 Karamjit Singh. 10.1 Learned senior counsel also emphasised on the point that the alleged Will was scribed on a plain paper and the plaintiffs could not explain as to who had scribed the same. Reference was again made to cross-examinations of marginal witnesses and it was submitted that both witnesses had been unable to tell as to who had scribed the Will which raises suspicion about the Will. 10.2 It was contended that Sarabjit Singh was 37-38 years old at the time of his death and it would be highly unlikely that a person of this age would execute a Will. 10.3 Learned senior counsel also submitted that both the marginal witnesses had admitted that an FIR had been registered against them with the allegations of having forged the Will in question and, this in itself, would prove that the Will was a forged and fabricated document. 10.4 Learned senior counsel also submitted that the relations between Sarabjit Singh and his mother were not strained and no such evidence had come on record. It was submitted that under the circumstances, there was no occasion for Sarabjit Singh to execute the Will in favour of his wife and son, leaving out his old widow mother. Learned senior counsel submitted that the first Appellate Court set aside the well reasoned judgment of the trial Court without assigning adequate and proper reasons. 11. On the other hand, learned counsel representing the respondents supported the judgment of the first Appellate Court. It was submitted that the Will dated 05.04.2014 had been proved in accordance with law. Learned senior counsel submitted that the first Appellate Court set aside the well reasoned judgment of the trial Court without assigning adequate and proper reasons. 11. On the other hand, learned counsel representing the respondents supported the judgment of the first Appellate Court. It was submitted that the Will dated 05.04.2014 had been proved in accordance with law. It was submitted that both witnesses had submitted that they had signed in each other's presence and that Sarabjit Singh was also present at that time. Learned counsel submitted that the mere non-divulging of the name of the scribe would not be a suspicious circumstance as Sarabjit Singh was ill and, in all likelihood, he got a Will prepared and then got it attested from the marginal witnesses. 11.1 Learned counsel submitted that it had come on record that though Sarabjit Singh was weak in view of the diseases that he had, he was not bedridden and was not in an unfit mental state. 11.2 Learned counsel also submitted that the very purpose of a Will was to deviate from the line of succession and that adequate reasons had been given in the Will for executing the same in favour of his wife and son and leaving out his mother. Learned counsel submitted that the mutation had been sanctioned on the basis of the Will and the revenue authorities would not sanction a mutation on the basis of an unregistered Will without proper verification. 12. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties. 13. Before adverting to the merits of the appeal, it would be essential to observe that that the requirement of framing of a substantial question of law in second appeal in terms of the provisions of section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure and as had been laid down in various pronouncements by the Hon'ble Apex Court including Hero Vinoth (minor) v. Seshammal 2006 (5) SCC 545 , was subsequently held to be not there by the Hon'ble Apex Court. It was held that in the States of Punjab and Haryana, it is the provisions of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 which would be applicable and, therefore, section 100 CPC would not hold the field and, accordingly, there would be no requirement of framing substantial question of law in second appeal. It was held that in the States of Punjab and Haryana, it is the provisions of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 which would be applicable and, therefore, section 100 CPC would not hold the field and, accordingly, there would be no requirement of framing substantial question of law in second appeal. With regard to the States of Punjab and Haryana, it was so held in Kirodi (Since Deceased) through his Lr. v. Ram Parkash & Ors. 2019 (3) RCR (Civil) and Satyender and Ors. v. Saroj and Ors. 2022 (12) Scale 92 respectively. 14. It is sad but true that the moment a person leaves this world, disputes arise with regard to the properties owned by the person. Where he leaves a widow and children on one hand and his widow mother and some siblings on the other, the chances of such disputes arising increase manyfold probably because a daughter-in-law always remains a daughter-in-law even if she has been in the matrimonial home for a number of years and after the death of her husband, it is often thought that she alone cannot succeed to the estate of her husband. 15. In the present case, the dispute revolves around the Will dated 05.04.2014 alleged to have been executed by Sarabjit Singh. The question which arises before this Court is whether the Will was genuine or whether it was a forged and fabricated document. The next question would be as to whether the Will was shrouded by suspicious circumstances or not. 16. The Willison record as Ex.Pl. I have perused the same as the record was duly summoned. It is a document in the Punjabi language and is duly typed. First of all, the layout of the document does not suggest any manipulation with some blank document. The signatures of the testator i.e. Sarabjit Singh are at the bottom, in the middle of the page. On one side there are signatures of PW1 Gurjant Singh and on the other side there are the signatures of PW-2 Karamjit Singh. The names of the attesting witnesses are also typed. There is no particular form of a Will. It can be even oral. A Will is not compulsorily registerable. It can either be handwritten or typed. 17. section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 lays down as under:- "63 Execution of unprivileged Wills. The names of the attesting witnesses are also typed. There is no particular form of a Will. It can be even oral. A Will is not compulsorily registerable. It can either be handwritten or typed. 17. section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 lays down as under:- "63 Execution of unprivileged Wills. - Every testator, not being a soldier employed in an expedition or engaged in actual warfare,12 [or an airman so employed or engaged,] or a mariner at sea, shall execute his Will according to the following rules:- (a) The testator shall sign or shall affix his mark to the Will, or it shall be signed by some other person in his presence and by his direction. (b) The signature or mark of the testator, or the signature of the person signing for him, shall be so placed that it shall appear that it was intended thereby to give effect to the writing as a Will. (c) The Will shall be attested by two or more witnesses, each of whom has seen the testator sign or affix his mark to the Will or has seen some other person sign the Will, in the presence and by the direction of the testator, or has received from the testator a personal acknowledgement of his signature or mark, or the signature of such other person; and each of the witnesses shall sign the Will in the presence of the testator, but it shall not be necessary that more than one witness be present at the same time, and no particular form of attestation shall be necessary. " 18. Further, section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 lays down as under:- "68. " 18. Further, section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 lays down as under:- "68. Proof of execution of document required by law to be attested.-If a document is required by law to be attested, it shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the Court and capable of giving evidence: (Provided that it shall not be necessary to call an attesting witness in proof of the execution of any document, not being a Will, which has been registered in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), unless its execution by the person by whom it purports to have been executed is specifically denied.)" 19. In the case of Shashi Kumar Banetjee and others v. Subodh Kumar Banetjee since deceased and after him his legal representatives and others, AIR 1964 SC 529 , a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court was dealing with the issue of genuineness of a Will. While referring to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of H. Venkata-Chala Iyengar v. B. N. Thimmajamma, AIR 1959 (SC) 443 and Rani Pumima Devi v. Khagendra Narayan Dev, AIR 1962 (SQ 567, it was held that the principles governing the proving of a Will are well settled. It was held that the mode of proving a Will does not ordinarily differ from that of proving any other document except as to the special requirement of attestation prescribed in the case of a Will by section 63 of the Indian Succession Act. It was held that the onus of proving the Will is on the propounder and in the absence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will, proof of testamentary capacity and the signature of the testator as required by law is sufficient to discharge the onus. It was held that where, however, there are suspicious circumstances, the onus is on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the Court before the Court accepts the Will as genuine. It was held that where the caveator alleges undue influence, fraud and coercion, the onus is on him to prove the same. It was held that where, however, there are suspicious circumstances, the onus is on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the Court before the Court accepts the Will as genuine. It was held that where the caveator alleges undue influence, fraud and coercion, the onus is on him to prove the same. It was held that the suspicious circumstances may be as to the genuineness of the signature of the testator, the condition of the testator's mind, the dispositions made in the Will being unnatural improbable or unfair etc. These principles were reiterated recently by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kavita Kanwar v. Pamela Mehta, and others, (2021) 11 SCC 209 . It was held by the Hon'ble Apex Court as under: - "24. We may now take note of the relevant principles settled by the consistent decisions in regard to the process of examination of a Will when propounded before a Court of law. 24.1. In the case of H. Venkatachala Iyengar (supra), a 3-Judge Bench of this Court traversed through the vistas of the issues related with execution and proof of Will and enunciated a few fundamental guiding principles that have consistently been followed and applied in almost all the cases involving such issues. The synthesis and exposition by this Court in paragraphs 18 to 22 of the said decision could be usefully reproduced as under "18. What is the true legal position in the matter of proof of wills? It is well known that the proof of wills presents a recurring topic for decision in courts and there are a large number of judicial pronouncements on the subject. The party propounding a will or otherwise making a claim under a will is no doubt seeking to prove a document and, in deciding how it is to be proved, we must inevitably refer to the statutory provisions which govern the proof of documents. Sections 67 and 68, Evidence Act are relevant for this purpose. Under Section 67, if a document is alleged to be signed by any person, the signature of the said person must be proved to be in his handwriting, and for proving such a handwriting under Sections 45 and 47 of the Act the opinions of experts and of persons acquainted with the handwriting of the person concerned are made relevant. Under Section 67, if a document is alleged to be signed by any person, the signature of the said person must be proved to be in his handwriting, and for proving such a handwriting under Sections 45 and 47 of the Act the opinions of experts and of persons acquainted with the handwriting of the person concerned are made relevant. Section 68 deals with the proof of the execution of the document required by law to be attested; and it provides that such a document shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution. These provisions prescribe the requirements and the nature of proof which must be satisfied by the party who relies on a document in a Court of law. Similarly, sections 59 and 63 of the Indian Succession Act are also relevant. Section 59 provides that every person of sound mind, not being a minor, may dispose of his property by will and the three illustrations to this section indicate what is meant by the expression "a person of sound mind" in the context. Section 63 requires that the testator shall sign or affix his mark to the will or it shall be signed by some other person in his presence and by his direction and that the signature or mark shall be so made that it shall appear that it was intended thereby to give effect to the writing as a will. This section also requires that the will shall be attested by two or more witnesses as prescribed. Thus the question as to whether the will set up by the propounder is proved to be the last will of the testator has to be decided in the light of these provisions. Has the testator signed the will? Did he understand the nature and effect of the dispositions in the will? Did he put his signature to the will knowing what it contained? Stated broadly it is the decision of these questions which determines the nature of the finding on the question of the proof of wills. It would prima facie be true to say that the will has to be proved like any other document except as to the special requirements of attestation prescribed by section 63 of the Indian Succession Act. Stated broadly it is the decision of these questions which determines the nature of the finding on the question of the proof of wills. It would prima facie be true to say that the will has to be proved like any other document except as to the special requirements of attestation prescribed by section 63 of the Indian Succession Act. As in the case of proof of other documents so in the case of proof of wills it would be idle to expect proof with mathematical certainty. The test to be applied would be the usual test of the satisfaction of the prudent mind in such matters. 19. However, there is one important feature which distinguishes wills from other documents. Unlike other documents the will speaks from the death of the testator, and so, when it is propounded or produced before a Court, the testator who has already departed the world cannot say whether it is his will or not; and this aspect naturally introduces an element of solemnity in the decision of the question as to whether the document propounded is proved to be the last will and testament of the departed testator. Even so, in dealing with the proof of wills the Court will start on the same enquiry as in the case of the proof of documents. The propounder would be called upon to show by satisfactory evidence that the will was signed by the testator, that the testator at the relevant time was in a sound and disposing state of mind, that he understood the nature and effect of the dispositions and put his signature to the document of his own free will. Ordinarily when the evidence adduced in support of the will is disinterested, satisfactory and sufficient to prove the sound and disposing state of the testator's mind and his signature as required by law, Courts would be justified in making a finding in favour of the propounder. In other words, the onus on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts just indicated. 20. There may, however, be cases in which the execution of the will may be surrounded by suspicious circumstances. In other words, the onus on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts just indicated. 20. There may, however, be cases in which the execution of the will may be surrounded by suspicious circumstances. The alleged signature of the testator may be very shaky and doubtful and evidence in support of the propounder's case that the signature in question is the signature of the testator may not remove the doubt created by the appearance of the signature; the condition of the testator's mind may appear to be very feeble and debilitated; and evidence adduced may not succeed in removing the legitimate doubt as to the mental capacity of the testator; the dispositions made in the will may appear to be unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances; or, the will may otherwise indicate that the said dispositions may not be the result of the testator's free will and mind. In such cases the Court would naturally expect that all legitimate suspicions should be completely removed before the document is accepted as the last will of the testator. The presence of such suspicious circumstances naturally tends to make the initial onus very heavy; and, unless it is satisfactorily discharged, Courts would be reluctant to treat the document as the last will of the testator. It is true that, if a caveat is filed alleging the exercise of undue influence, fraud or coercion in respect of the execution of the will propounded, such pleas may have to be proved by the caveators; but, even without such pleas circumstances may raise a doubt as to whether the testator was acting of his own free will in executing the will, and in such circumstances, it would be a part of the initial onus to remove any such legitimate doubts in the matter. 21. Apart from the suspicious circumstances to which we have just referred in some cases the wills propounded disclose another infirmity. Propounders themselves take a prominent part in the execution of the wills which confer on them substantial benefits. 21. Apart from the suspicious circumstances to which we have just referred in some cases the wills propounded disclose another infirmity. Propounders themselves take a prominent part in the execution of the wills which confer on them substantial benefits. If it is shown that the propounder has taken a prominent part in the execution of the will and has received substantial benefit under it, that itself is generally treated as a suspicious circumstance attending the execution of the will and the propounder is required to remove the said suspicion by clear and satisfactory evidence. It is in connection with wills that present such suspicious circumstances that decisions of English Courts often mention the test of the satisfaction of judicial conscience. It may be that the reference to judicial conscience in this connection is a heritage from similar observations made by ecclesiastical Courts in England when they exercised jurisdiction with reference to wills; but any objection to the use of the word 'conscience ' in this context would, in our opinion, be purely technical and academic, if not pedantic. The test merely emphasizes that, in determining the question as to whether an instrument produced before the Court is the last will of the testator, the Court is deciding a solemn question and it must be fully satisfied that it had been validly executed by the testator who is no longer alive. 22. It is obvious that for deciding material questions of fact which arise in applications for probate or in actions on wills, no hard and fast or inflexible rules can be laid down for the appreciation of the evidence. It may, however, be stated generally that a propounder of the will has to prove the due and valid execution of the will and that if there are any suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will the propounder must remove the said suspicions from the mind of the Court by cogent and satisfactory evidence. It is hardly necessary to add that the result of the application of these two general and broad principles would always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and on the nature and quality of the evidence adduced by the parties. It is hardly necessary to add that the result of the application of these two general and broad principles would always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and on the nature and quality of the evidence adduced by the parties. It is quite true that, as observed by Lord Du Parcq in Harmes v. Hinkson, 50 Cat W N 895 : AIR 1946 Privy Council 156, "where a will is charged with suspicion, the rules enjoin a reasonable scepticism, not an obdurate persistence in disbelief. They do not demand from the Judge, even in circumstances of grave suspicion, a resolute and impenetrable incredulity. He is never required to close his mind to the truth". It would sound platitudinous to say so, but it is nevertheless true that in discovering truth even in such cases the judicial mind must always be open though vigilant, cautious and circumspect." 24.2. In Rani Purnima Debi (supra), this Court referred to the aforementioned decision in H. Venkatachala Iyengar and further explained the principles which govern the proving of a Will as follows:- "5. Before we consider the facts of this case it is well to set out the principles which govern the proving of a will. This was considered by this Court in H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B. N. Thimmajamma, (1959) Supp (1) SCR 426: AIR 1959 SC 443 . It was observed in that case that the mode of proving a will did not ordinarily differ from that of proving any other document except as to the special requirement of attestation prescribed in the case of a will by section 63 of the Indian Succession Act. The onus of proving the will was on the propounder and in the absence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will proof of testamentary capacity and signature of the testator as required by law was sufficient to discharge the onus. Where, however, there were suspicious circumstances, the onus would be on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the Court before the will could be accepted as genuine. If the caveator alleged undue influence, fraud or coercion, the onus would be on him to prove the same. Even where there were no such pleas but the circumstances gave rise to doubts, it was for the propounder to satisfy the conscience of the Court. If the caveator alleged undue influence, fraud or coercion, the onus would be on him to prove the same. Even where there were no such pleas but the circumstances gave rise to doubts, it was for the propounder to satisfy the conscience of the Court. Further, what are suspicious circumstances was also considered in this case. The alleged signature of the testator might be very shaky and doubtful and evidence in support of the propounder's case that the signature in question was the signature of the testator might not remove the doubt created by the appearance of the signature. The condition of the testator's mind might appear to be very feeble and debilitated and evidence adduced might not succeed in removing the legitimate doubt as to the mental capacity of the testator; the dispositions made in the will might appear to be unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances; or the will might otherwise indicate that the said dispositions might not be the result of the testator's free will and mind. In such cases, the Court would naturally expect that all legitimate suspicions should be completely removed before the document was accepted as the last will of the testator. Further, a propounder himself might take a prominent part in the execution of the will which conferred on him substantial benefits. If this was so it was generally treated as a suspicious circumstance attending the execution of the will and the propounder was required to remove the doubts by clear and satisfactory evidence. But even when where there suspicious circumstances and the propounder succeeded in removing them, the Court would grant probate, though the will might be unnatural and might cut off wholly or in part near relations." (emphasis supplied) 24.3. In the case of Indu Bala Bose (supra), this Court again said,- "7. This Court has held that the mode of proving a Will does not ordinarily differ from that of proving any other document except to the special requirement of attestation prescribed in the case of a Will by section 63 of the Succession Act. The onus of proving the Will is on the propounder and in the absence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will, proof of testamentary capacity and the signature of the testator as required by law is sufficient to discharge the onus. The onus of proving the Will is on the propounder and in the absence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will, proof of testamentary capacity and the signature of the testator as required by law is sufficient to discharge the onus. Where however there are suspicious circumstances, the onus is on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the court before the court accepts the Will as genuine. Even where circumstances give rise to doubts, it is for the propounder to satisfy the conscience of the court. The suspicious circumstances may be as to the genuineness of the signatures of the testator, the condition of the testator's mind, the dispositions made in the Will being unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances, or there might be other indications in the Will to show that the testator's mind was not free. In such a case the court would naturally expect that all legitimate suspicions should be completely removed before the document is accepted as the last Will of the testator. If the propounder himself takes a prominent part in the execution of the Will which confers a substantial benefit on him, that is also a circumstance to be taken into account, and the propounder is required to remove the doubts by clear and satisfactory evidence. If the propounder succeeds in removing the suspicious circumstances the court would grant probate, even if the Will might be unnatural and might cut off wholly or in part near relations. 8. Needless to say that any and every circumstance is not a "suspicious" circumstance. A circumstance would be "suspicious" when it is not normal or is not normally expected in a normal situation or is not expected of a normal person." (emphasis supplied) 24.4. We may also usefully refer to the principles enunciated in the case of Jaswant Kaur (supra) for dealing with a Will shrouded in suspicion, as follows: - "9. In cases where the execution of a will is shrouded in suspicion, its proof ceases to be a simple lis between the plaintiff and the defendant. We may also usefully refer to the principles enunciated in the case of Jaswant Kaur (supra) for dealing with a Will shrouded in suspicion, as follows: - "9. In cases where the execution of a will is shrouded in suspicion, its proof ceases to be a simple lis between the plaintiff and the defendant. What, generally, is an adversary proceeding becomes in such cases a matter of the court's conscience and then the true question which arises for consideration is whether the evidence led by the propounder of the will is such as to satisfy the conscience of the court that the will was duly executed by the testator. It is impossible to reach such satisfaction unless the party which sets up the will offers a cogent and convincing explanation of the suspicious circumstances surrounding the making of the will." (emphasis supplied) 24.5. In the case of Uma Devi Nambiar (supra), this Court extensively reviewed the case law dealing with a Will, including the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of Shashi Kumar Banerjee and Ors. v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee and Ors.: AIR 1964 SC 529 , and observed that mere exclusion of the natural heirs or giving of lesser share to them, by itself, will not be considered to be a suspicious circumstance. This Court observed, inter alia, as under:- "15. Section 63 of the Act deals with execution of unprivileged Wills. It lays down that the testator shall sign or shall affix his mark to the Will or it shall be signed by some other person in his presence and by his direction. It further lays down that the Will shall be attested by two or more witnesses, each of whom has seen the testator signing or affixing his mark to the Will or has seen some other person sign the Will, in the presence and by the direction of the testator and each of the witnesses shall sign the Will in the presence of the testator, section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short the "Evidence Act") mandates examination of one attesting witness in proof of a Will, whether registered or not. The law relating to the manner and onus of proof and also the duty cast upon the court while dealing with a case based upon a Will has been examined in considerable detail in several decisions of this Court .....A Constitution Bench of this Court in Shashi Kumar Banerjee's case succinctly indicated the focal position in law as follows: (AIR p. 531, para 4) "The mode of proving a Will does not ordinarily differ from that of proving any other document except as to the special requirement of attestation prescribed in the case of a Will by section 63 of the Indian Succession Act. The onus of proving the Will is on the propounder and in the absence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will, proof of testamentary capacity and the signature of the testator as required by law is sufficient to discharge the onus. Where however there are suspicious circumstances, the onus is on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the court before the court accepts the Will as genuine. Where the caveator alleges undue influence, fraud and coercion, the onus is on him to prove the same. Even where there are no such pleas but the circumstances give rise to doubts, it is for the propounder to satisfy the conscience of the court. The suspicious circumstances may be as to the genuineness of the signature of the testator, the condition of the testator's mind, the dispositions made in the Will being unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances or there might be other indications in the Will to show that the testator's mind was not free. In such a case the court would naturally expect that all legitimate suspicion should be completely removed before the document is accepted as the last Will of the testator. If the propounder himself takes part in the execution of the Will which confers a substantial benefit on him, that is also a circumstance to be taken into account, and the propounder is required to remove the doubts by clear and satisfactory evidence. If the propounder succeeds in removing the suspicious circumstances the court would grant probate, even if the Will might be unnatural and might cut off wholly or in part near relations." 16. If the propounder succeeds in removing the suspicious circumstances the court would grant probate, even if the Will might be unnatural and might cut off wholly or in part near relations." 16. A Will is executed to alter the ordinary mode of succession and by the very nature of things it is bound to result in earlier reducing or depriving the share of natural heirs. If a person intends his property to pass to his natural heirs, there is no necessity at all of executing a Will. It is true that a propounder of the Will has to remove all suspicious circumstances. Suspicion means doubt, conjecture or mistrust. But the fact that natural heirs have either been excluded or a lesser share has been given to them, by itself without anything more, cannot be held to be a suspicious circumstance specially in a case where the bequest has been made in favour of an off spring. As held in P.P.K. Gopalan Nambiar v. P.P.K. Balakrishnan Nambiar and Ors.: [1995] 2 SCR 585, it is the duty of the propunder of the Will to remove all the suspected features, but there must be real, germane and valid suspicious features and not fantasy of the doubting mind. It has been held that if the propounder succeeds in removing the suspicious circumstances, the court has to give effect to the Will, even if the Will might be unnatural in the sense that it has cut off wholly or in part near relations In Rabindra Nath Mukherjee and Anr. v. Panchanan Banerjee (dead) by LRs. and Ors.: AIR 1995 SC 1684 , it was observed that the circumstance of deprivation of natural heirs should not raise any suspicion because the whole idea behind execution of the Will is to interfere with the normal line of succession and so, natural heirs would be debarred in every case of Will. Of course, it may be that in some cases they are fully debarred and in some cases partly." 24.6. In the case of Mahesh Kumar (supra), this Court indicated the error of approach on the part of the High Court while appreciating the evidence relating to the Will as follows:- "44. Of course, it may be that in some cases they are fully debarred and in some cases partly." 24.6. In the case of Mahesh Kumar (supra), this Court indicated the error of approach on the part of the High Court while appreciating the evidence relating to the Will as follows:- "44. The issue which remains to be examined is whether the High Court was justified in coming to the conclusion that the execution of the will dated 10-21992 was shrouded with suspicion and the appellant failed to dispel the suspicion? At the outset, we deem it necessary to observe that the learned Single Judge misread the statement of Sobhag Chand (DW3) and recorded something which does not appear in his statement. While Sobhag Chand categorically stated that he had signed as the witness after Shri Harishankar had signed the will, the portion of his statement extracted in the impugned judgment gives an impression that the witnesses had signed even before the executant had signed the will. 45. Another patent error committed by the learned Single Judge is that he decided the issue relating to validity of the will by assuming that both the attesting witnesses were required to append their signatures simultaneously. Section 63(c) of the 1925 Act does not contain any such requirement and it is settled law that examination of one of the attesting witnesses is sufficient. Not only this, while recording an adverse finding on this issue, the learned Single Judge omitted to consider the categorical statements made by DW3 and DW4 that the testator had read out and signed the will in their presence and thereafter they had appended their signatures. 46. The other reasons enumerated by the learned Single Judge for holding that the execution of will was highly suspicious are based on mere surmises/conjectures. The observation of the learned Single Judge that the possibility of obtaining signatures of Shri Harishankar and attesting witnesses on blank paper and preparation of the draft by Shri S.K. Agarwal, Advocate on pre-signed papers does not find even a semblance of support from the pleadings and evidence of the parties. If Respondent 1 wanted to show that the will was drafted by the advocate after Shri Harishankar and attesting witnesses had signed blank papers, he could have examined or at least summoned Shri S.K. Agarwal, Advocate, who had represented him before the Board of Revenue " 24.7. If Respondent 1 wanted to show that the will was drafted by the advocate after Shri Harishankar and attesting witnesses had signed blank papers, he could have examined or at least summoned Shri S.K. Agarwal, Advocate, who had represented him before the Board of Revenue " 24.7. Another decision cited on behalf of the appellant in the case of Leela Rajagopal may also be referred where this Court summarised the principles that ultimately, the judicial verdict in relation to a Will and suspicious circumstances shall be on the basis of holistic view of the matter with consideration of all the unusual features and suspicious circumstances put together and not on the impact of any single feature. This Court said,- "13. A will may have certain features and may have been executed in certain circumstances which may appear to be somewhat unnatural. Such unusual features appearing in a will or the unnatural circumstances surrounding its execution will definitely justify a close scrutiny before the same can be accepted. It is the overall assessment of the court on the basis of such scrutiny; the cumulative effect of the unusual features and circumstances which would weigh with the court in the determination required to be made by it. The judicial verdict, in the last resort, will be on the basis of a consideration of all the unusual features and suspicious circumstances put together and not on the impact of any single feature that may be found in a will or a singular circumstance that may appear from the process leading to its execution or registration. This, is the essence of the repeated pronouncements made by this Court on the subject including the decisions referred to and relied upon before us." 24.8. We need not multiply the references to all and other decisions cited at the Bar, which essentially proceed on the aforesaid principles while applying the same in the given set of facts and circumstances. Suffice would be to point out that in a recent decision in Civil Appeal No. 6076 of 2009: Shivakumar & Ors. v. Sharanabasppa & Ors., decided on 24.04.2020, this Court, after traversing through the relevant decisions, has summarised the principles governing the adjudicatory process concerning proof of a Will as follows:- "1. Suffice would be to point out that in a recent decision in Civil Appeal No. 6076 of 2009: Shivakumar & Ors. v. Sharanabasppa & Ors., decided on 24.04.2020, this Court, after traversing through the relevant decisions, has summarised the principles governing the adjudicatory process concerning proof of a Will as follows:- "1. Ordinarily, a Will has to be proved like any other document; the test to be applied being the usual test of the satisfaction of the prudent mind. Alike the principles governing the proof of other documents, in the case of Will too, the proof with mathematical accuracy is not to be insisted upon. 2. Since as per section 63 of the Succession Act, a Will is required to be attested, it cannot be used as evidence until at least one attesting witness has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive and capable of giving evidence. 3. The unique feature of a Will is that it speaks from the death of the testator and, therefore, the maker thereof is not available for deposing about the circumstances in which the same was executed. This introduces an element of solemnity in the decision of the question as to whether the document propounded is the last Will of the testator. The initial onus, naturally, lies on the propounder but the same can be taken to have been primarily discharged on proof of the essential facts which go into the making of a Will. 4. The case in which the execution of the Will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances stands on a different footing. The presence of suspicious circumstances makes the onus heavier on the propounder and, therefore, in cases where the circumstances attendant upon the execution of the document give rise to suspicion, the propounder must remove all legitimate suspicions before the document can be accepted as the last Will of the testator. 5. The presence of suspicious circumstances makes the onus heavier on the propounder and, therefore, in cases where the circumstances attendant upon the execution of the document give rise to suspicion, the propounder must remove all legitimate suspicions before the document can be accepted as the last Will of the testator. 5. If a person challenging the Will alleges fabrication or alleges fraud, undue influence, coercion et cetera in regard to the execution of the Will, such pleas have to be proved by him, but even in the absence of such pleas, the very circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will may give rise to the doubt or as to whether the Will had indeed been executed by the testator and/or as to whether the testator was acting of his own free will. In such eventuality, it is again a part of the initial onus of the propounder to remove all reasonable doubts in the matter. 6. A circumstance is "suspicious" when it is not normal or is 'not normally expected in a normal situation or is not expected of a normal person'. As put by this Court, the suspicious features must be 'real, germane and valid' and not merely the fantasy of the doubting mind.' 7. As to whether any particular feature or a set of features qualify as "suspicious" would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. A shaky or doubtful signature; a feeble or uncertain mind of the testator; an unfair disposition of property; an unjust exclusion of the legal heirs and particularly the dependants; an active or leading part in making of the Will by the beneficiary thereunder et cetera are some of the circumstances which may give rise to suspicion. The circumstances above-noted are only illustrative and by no means exhaustive because there could be any circumstance or set of circumstances which may give rise to legitimate suspicion about the execution of the Will. On the other hand, any of the circumstance qualifying as being suspicious could be legitimately explained by the propounder. However, such suspicion or suspicions cannot be removed by mere proof of sound and disposing state of mind of the testator and his signature coupled with the proof of attestation. 8. On the other hand, any of the circumstance qualifying as being suspicious could be legitimately explained by the propounder. However, such suspicion or suspicions cannot be removed by mere proof of sound and disposing state of mind of the testator and his signature coupled with the proof of attestation. 8. The test of satisfaction of the judicial conscience comes into operation when a document propounded as the Will of the testator is surrounded by suspicious circumstance/s. While applying such test, the Court would address itself to the solemn questions as to whether the testator had signed the Will while being aware of its contents and after understanding the nature and effect of the dispositions in the Will? 9. In the ultimate analysis, where the execution of a Will is shrouded in suspicion, it is a matter essentially of the judicial conscience of the Court and the party which sets up the Will has to offer cogent and convincing explanation of the suspicious circumstances surrounding the Will." 20. Reverting to the facts of the case, both marginal witnesses namely Gurjant Singh and Karamjit Singh stepped into the witness box as PW1 and PW2 respectively and deposed that they had signed the Will as attesting witnesses on the asking of Sarabjit Singh. No doubt, they could not tell who was the scribe of the Will. However, in the considered opinion of this Court, this in itself would not make a difference since the Will may have been typed by Sarabjit Singh himself or he may have got it typed from someone considering the fact that he was unwell. It has to be bome in mind that the starting lines of the Will portray the state of mind of Sarabjit Singh. He stated in the Will that he had been unwell since March 2014 and that his kidneys had failed. It was further mentioned that he had been taking treatment from Kular Hospital and Dhillon Hospital. It was also stated that since his kidneys had failed, he was even unable to walk since the end of March and that he was confined to bed at his house. It was stated that on account of his ill health, he was not sure as to when death may strike. He then stated about his mother and sister. It was stated that his mother was 75 years old and on account of old age, remained unwell. It was stated that on account of his ill health, he was not sure as to when death may strike. He then stated about his mother and sister. It was stated that his mother was 75 years old and on account of old age, remained unwell. It was stated that his sister Harwinder Kaur was married and well settled in her own family. He then went on to Will his entire movable and immovable property in favour of his wife and son i.e. the plaintiffs. The mere non examination of the scribe would not mean that the Will was forged and fabricated. The conditions laid down in section 63 of the Indian Succession Act and section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, as rightly noticed by the first Appellate Court were duly fulfilled. 20.1 In so far as the reports of the experts are concerned, it is quite well known that experts tend to give reports in favour of the parties who engage them. It is also well known that the science of examination of handwriting etc. is not a definite science. The first Appellate Court compared the signatures on the Will and on the other admitted documents and found them to be identical. Another thing that needs to be noticed here is that Sarabjit Singh was unwell for a long time. Under the circumstances, some variation in his signatures could also have come, for a weak man does not have the same signatures as he would have at the time of being fully fit. The variation, therefore, would not assume importance especially once the marginal witnesses had deposed and were found to be trustworthy. This Court, therefore, does not find that the Will Ex.Pl was a forged and fabricated document. In the considered opinion of this Court, the first Appellate Court examined the matter in great detail and gave extremely valid reasons while upholding the Will. I find no reason to interfere in the said sound reasoning given by the first Appellate Court. 21. Coming to the question of the Will being shrouded by suspicious circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that there were no suspicious circumstances. First of all, it has nowhere come on record that Sarabjit Singh was not in a fit state of mind. No doubt, he was ailing and was confined to bed. He was not, however, bedridden. Coming to the question of the Will being shrouded by suspicious circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that there were no suspicious circumstances. First of all, it has nowhere come on record that Sarabjit Singh was not in a fit state of mind. No doubt, he was ailing and was confined to bed. He was not, however, bedridden. There is no evidence worth its name that he was not mentally fit or that someone could have made him sign some document without him knowing as to what he was signing. On the contrary, both witnesses has stated that he was in a fit state of mind though he was weak. 21.1 Merely because he left out his widow mother, it cannot be said that the Will was shrouded by suspicious circumstances. It has to be borne in mind that a Will is executed for deviating from the natural line of succession. Otherwise, there would be no need to execute a Will. He gave adequate reasons in the Will for not making his mother a beneficiary. It was duly stated in the Will that his mother Mohinder Kaur was 75 years old and used to remain unwell. In fact, during the pendency of the appeal she expired also which lays further weight to what was stated in the Will. It would be most natural for Sarabjit Singh to not give anything out of his land to his sister who, as was stated in the Will, was happily married and well settled. In fact, shortly after the mutation was sanctioned in favour of Mohinder Kaur, a transfer deed was executed in favour of the sister namely Harwinder Kaur. Once adequate reasons had been given in the Will, the trial Court erred in coming to the conclusion that the Will was shrouded by suspicious circumstances. Still further, keeping in mind the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Kavita Kanwar's case (supra), it is now well settled that as to whether any particular feature or a set of features qualify as "suspicious" would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. It is well settled that there could be any circumstance or set of circumstances which may give rise to legitimate suspicion about the execution of the Will and on the other hand, any of the circumstance qualifying as being suspicious could be legitimately explained by the propounder. It is well settled that there could be any circumstance or set of circumstances which may give rise to legitimate suspicion about the execution of the Will and on the other hand, any of the circumstance qualifying as being suspicious could be legitimately explained by the propounder. In the present case, as has been observed earlier as well, merely because Sarabjit Singh left out his mother and did not bequeath a part of his property to her would not mean that the Will was shrouded by suspicious circumstances. 21.2 Merely because relations between Sarabjit Singh and his mother were not strained would not mean that he would Will away a part of his property to his mother. As has already been noticed, he gave adequate reasons in the Will for not making his mother a beneficiary of the Will which this Court finds to be sufficient and reasonable. 21.3 Regarding the FIR having been registered against the attesting witnesses, the same would not have any bearing because mere registration of an FIR would not mean that they were guilty. Further, during the course of arguments, it was pointed out by learned counsel representing the plaintiffs that the FIR had been cancelled. This fact was not controverted by the other side. 22. It cannot, therefore, be said that the Will was a forged and fabricated document or that it was shrouded by suspicious circumstances. In the considered opinion of this Court, the first Appellate Court did not commit any illegality in setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and in decreeing the suit filed by the plaintiffs. 23. In view of the above, I do not find any merit in the present appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed.