ORDER : The present writ petition is filed challenging the order in SDE/SRO/HYZO/01/2023 dated 04.01.2023 passed by Respondent No. 1 herein under Section 16 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act, 1999’). 2. Heard Dr. C.P. Ramaswami learned counsel for the Petitioners, Mr. V. Rama Krishna Reddy learned standing counsel for the Directorate of Enforcement appearing for the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and Sri Gadi Praveen Kumar, learned Deputy Solicitor General of India, appearing for respondent No.3. Perused the record. Facts of the case:- 3. Alleging violations under Section 6(3)(b) of the Act, 1999 read with Regulation 5(1) of the Foreign Exchange Management (Transfer or issue of security by a person resident outside India) Regulations, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Regulations’) and violations under Sections 3(b) & 4 of the Act, 1999, a complaint bearing No. T-3/27/HZO/2011 dated 12.07.2017 was filed before the Directorate of Enforcement (hereinafter referred to as ‘ED’) under Section 16(3) of the Act, 1999. 4. Pursuant to the said complaint, a show cause notice dated 14.07.2017 was issued to the Petitioners herein who in turn submitted replies to the said show cause notice on 24.08.2021 and 25.08.2021. An oral hearing was conducted by Respondent No. 1 in which the Petitioners participated and submitted their written submissions. Thereafter, the impugned order dated 04.01.2023 was passed. 5. The Petitioners challenge the impugned order, inter alia, on the ground that they were charged under Section 6(3)(b) of the Act, 1999 which was subsequently omitted from the Act, 1999, w.e.f. 15.10.2019. 6. During the stage of admission, a preliminary objection was raised by Respondent No. 1 regarding the maintainability of the present writ petition. It was contended that the Petitioner has an efficacious alternative remedy under Section 19 of the Act, 1999. Therefore, on hearing the learned counsel for the parties, this court reserved the matter for orders to decide the preliminary objection of maintainability of the writ petition. 7. Since only the question of maintainability is to be decided, this Court deems it appropriate not to go into to the merits of the dispute and other contentions raised by the Petitioners herein. 8. Contentions of the Petitioners i. The present writ petition is maintainable as the impugned order was passed without jurisdiction under Section 6(3) of the Act, 1999 which was subsequently omitted. 8. Contentions of the Petitioners i. The present writ petition is maintainable as the impugned order was passed without jurisdiction under Section 6(3) of the Act, 1999 which was subsequently omitted. Pending proceedings cease to exist under a provision that is omitted. ii. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act, 1897’) is not applicable to omissions and it only applicable to repeals. Reliance is placed on Rayala Corpn. (P) Ltd. v. Director of Enforcement, (1969) 2 SCC 412 . iii. Existence of an alternative remedy is not a bar to file a writ petition. 9. Contentions of Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 i. The present writ petition is not maintainable as the Petitioners have an efficacious and alternative remedy under Section 19 of the Act, 1999. ii. Proceedings which are pending under a provision which is subsequently omitted do not cease to exist and are saved under Section 6 of the Act, 1897. Reliance is placed on Fibre Boards (P) Ltd. v. CIT, (2015) 10 SCC 333 and Shree Bhagwati Steel Rolling Mills v. CCE, (2016) 3 SCC 643 . Findings of the Court:- 10. As stated above, the only issue to be decided is whether the present writ petition is maintainable. It is trite law that a writ petition should not be entertained in case an efficacious alternative remedy is available. Where a statute provides for an appeal mechanism to impugn an order or any proceedings, a party cannot by-pass such mechanism by directly approaching the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, a party can approach the High Court directly against an order, if such order violates fundamental rights of the party before the court; or such order is passed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction; or such order was passed in breach of principles of natural justice; or if the party filing the writ petition challenges the constitutionality of any law. 11. A full bench of the Supreme Court in Assistant Commissioner of State Tax v. Commercial Steel Limited, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 884 held that a writ petition, in presence of an alternative remedy, is maintainable only in exceptional cases. The relevant paragraph is extracted below : 11. The respondent had a statutory remedy under section 107. Instead of availing of the remedy, the respondent instituted a petition under Article 226. The relevant paragraph is extracted below : 11. The respondent had a statutory remedy under section 107. Instead of availing of the remedy, the respondent instituted a petition under Article 226. The existence of an alternate remedy is not an absolute bar to the maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. But a writ petition can be entertained in exceptional circumstances where there is: (i) a breach of fundamental rights; (ii) a violation of the principles of natural justice; (iii) an excess of jurisdiction; or (iv) a challenge to the vires of the statute or delegated legislation. Therefore, to decide the maintainability of the present writ petition, this Court has to decide whether the impugned order was passed without jurisdiction. 12. It is relevant to note that Section 6(3) of the Act, 1999 deals with the power of the Reserve Bank of India to formulate Regulations to regulate, prohibit and restrict capital account transactions. Section 6(3)(b) of the Act, 1999 deals with the power of the Reserve Bank of India to regulate, prohibit and restrict transfer or issue of any security by a person resident outside India. Section 6(3)(b) of the Act, 1999 deals with the power of the Reserve Bank of India to regulate, prohibit and restrict transfer or issue of any security by a person resident outside India. For the sake of convenience, Section 6(3) of the Act, 1999 as it stood then is extracted below : “(3) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of subsection (2), the Reserve Bank may, by regulations, prohibit, restrict or regulate the following— (a) transfer or issue of any foreign security by a person resident in India; (b) transfer or issue of any security by a person resident outside India; (c) transfer or issue of any security or foreign security by any branch, office or agency in India of a person resident outside India; (d) any borrowing or lending in foreign exchange in whatever form or by whatever name called; (e) any borrowing or lending in rupees in whatever form or by whatever name called between a person resident in India and a person resident outside India; (f) deposits between persons resident in India and persons resident outside India; (g) export, import or holding of currency or currency notes; (h) transfer of immovable property outside India, other than a lease not exceeding five years, by a person resident in India; (i) acquisition or transfer of immovable property in India, other than a lease not exceeding five years, by a person resident outside India; (j) giving of a guarantee or surety in respect of any debt, obligation or other liability incurred— (i) by a person resident in India and owed to a person resident outside India; or (ii) by a person resident outside India.” 13. It is also relevant to note that Section 6(3) of the Act, 1999 was omitted from the Act, 1999 in its entirety vide Act No. 20 of 2015 which was brought into effect from 15.10.2019. 14. In the present case, proceedings against the Petitioners were initiated on 12.07.2017 when a complaint was filed with the ED. It is clear that Section 6(3) of the Act, 1999 was in force when the proceedings were initiated against the Petitioners. It was only after Section 6(3) of the Act, 1999 was omitted that the impugned order dated 04.01.2023 was passed. 15. It is clear that Section 6(3) of the Act, 1999 was in force when the proceedings were initiated against the Petitioners. It was only after Section 6(3) of the Act, 1999 was omitted that the impugned order dated 04.01.2023 was passed. 15. As stated above, the Petitioners contend that as Section 6(3) of the Act, 1999 was omitted, any pending proceedings in relation to the contravention of the said section will cease to exist. To buttress the said contention, the Petitioners contend that pending proceedings under an omitted provision are not saved by Section 6 of the Act, 1897 as it is only applicable to repeals and not omissions. This Court does not agree with the contentions raised by the Petitioners for the reasons stated herein below. 16. It is relevant to note that the Parliament has the power to enact laws and bring them into existence and it also has the power to repeal or delete them from existence. However, such repealed or deleted provisions are generally saved and continue to apply to pending proceedings. The idea behind such saving such provision(s) is to not disturb the rights and obligations that have already accrued on parties. Generally, a repealing statute also includes a savings clause by virtue of which the repealed provisions continue to apply to pending proceedings. However, there may be cases where the legislature fails to include a savings clause due to inadvertence and the same may result in injustice to the parties on whom rights under the repealed provisions already accrued. To overcome such cases, Section 6 of the Act, 1897 was enacted and the same is extracted below : 6. However, there may be cases where the legislature fails to include a savings clause due to inadvertence and the same may result in injustice to the parties on whom rights under the repealed provisions already accrued. To overcome such cases, Section 6 of the Act, 1897 was enacted and the same is extracted below : 6. Effect of repeal.— Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not— (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or any thing duly done or suffered thereunder; or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed. 17. It is relevant to note that Section 6 of the Act, 1897 provides for the effect of a repealed statute and how it is saved in relation to pending proceedings. Explaining the effect of repeal of a provision and its saving, the Supreme Court in State of Manipur v. Surjakumar Okram, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 130 held as follows : 24. The power of a legislative body to repeal a law is co-extensive with its power to enact a law. The effect of repealing of a statute is to obliterate it completely from the records of Parliament. While repealing a statute, the Legislature is competent to introduce a clause, saving any right, privilege, liability, penalty, act or deed duly done and any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy arising therefrom, under the repealed statute. There is a distinction between declaration of a statute as unconstitutional by a Court of law and the repeal of a statute by the Legislature. On declaration of a statute as unconstitutional, it becomes void ab initio. There is a distinction between declaration of a statute as unconstitutional by a Court of law and the repeal of a statute by the Legislature. On declaration of a statute as unconstitutional, it becomes void ab initio. Saving past transactions are within the exclusive domain of the Court. On the other hand, though the consequence of repeal is also obliteration of the statute with retrospective effect on past transactions, the Legislature is empowered to introduce a saving clause in the repealing Act. Even in cases where a saving clause is not made, the provisions of the General Clauses Act are applicable to central statutes and the principles of the General Clauses Act can be made applicable to statutes made by the State Legislatures as well (See : State of Punjab v. Harnek Singh (supra). It is relevant to state at this point that the Manipur Legislature enacted the Manipur General Clauses Act, 1966, which came into force on 30.03.1966, by which the provisions of the General Clauses Act, 1897 were made applicable to the statutes of the Manipur Legislature. Explaining the scope and applicability of Section of 6 of the Act, 1897, the Supreme Court in Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. v. Amrit Lal & Co., (2001) 8 SCC 397 , held that pending proceedings under a statute which subsequently repealed are saved. The relevant paragraphs are extracted below : 25. The opening words of Section 6 specify the field over which it is operative. It is operative over all the enactments under the General Clauses Act, Central Act or regulations made after the commencement of the General Clauses Act. It also clarifies in case of repeal of any provision under the aforesaid Act or regulation, unless a different intention appears from such repeal, it would have no effect over the matters covered in its clauses viz. (a) to (e). It clearly specifies that the repeal shall not revive anything not in force or in existence or affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered or affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the repealed statute, affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed under the repealed statute and also does not affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid. Thus the central theme which spells out is that any investigation or legal proceeding pending may be continued and enforced as if the repealing Act or regulation had not come into force. 26. As a general rule, in view of Section 6, the repeal of a statute, which is not retrospective in operation, does not prima facie affect the pending proceedings which may be continued as if the repealed enactment were still in force. In other words, such repeal does not affect the pending cases which would continue to be concluded as if the enactment has not been repealed. In fact when a lis commences, all rights and obligations of the parties get crystallised on that date. The mandate of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act is simply to leave the pending proceedings unaffected which commenced under the unrepealed provisions unless contrary intention is expressed. We find clause (c) of Section 6, refers the words “any right, privilege, obligation … acquired or accrued” under the repealed statute would not be affected by the repealing statute. We may hasten to clarify here, mere existence of a right not being “acquired” or “accrued” on the date of the repeal would not get protection of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Therefore, it is clear that Section 6 of the Act, 1897 saves any proceedings pending under a statute which has been repealed. The question then would be whether Section 6 of the Act, 1897 applies only to repeal of a provision or also to a provision that is omitted. In other words, the question would be whether pending proceedings under a provision that is subsequently omitted are saved under Section 6 of the Act, 1897. 18. As stated above, according to the Petitioners, Section 6 of the Act, 1897 does not save pending proceedings under an omitted provision. It is contended that Section 6 of the Act, 1897 is only applicable to repealed provisions and not omitted provisions. Reliance was placed on the following paragraph of a Constitution Bench decision in Rayala Corpn. (supra) : 17. As stated above, according to the Petitioners, Section 6 of the Act, 1897 does not save pending proceedings under an omitted provision. It is contended that Section 6 of the Act, 1897 is only applicable to repealed provisions and not omitted provisions. Reliance was placed on the following paragraph of a Constitution Bench decision in Rayala Corpn. (supra) : 17. Reference was next made to a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Hiralal Sutwala [ AIR 1959 MP 93 ] but, there again, the accused was sought to be prosecuted for an offence punishable under an Act on the repeal of which Section 6 of the General Clauses Act had been made applicable. In the case before us, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act cannot obviously apply on the omission of Rule 132-A of the DIRs for the two obvious reasons that Section 6 only applies to repeals and not to omissions, and applies when the repeal is of a Central Act or Regulation and not of a rule. If Section 6 of the General Clauses Act had been applied, no doubt this complaint against the two accused for the offence punishable under Rule 132-A of the DIRs could have been instituted even after the repeal of that rule. 19. In the context of omission of a provision and applicability of Section 6 of the Act, 1897, it is also relevant to discuss another Constitution Bench decision in Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. v. Union of India, (2000) 2 SCC 536 , wherein the Supreme Court affirmed the decision in Rayala Corpn. (supra)and held that pending proceedings under a provision that is omitted are not saved under Section 6 of the Act, 1897. The relevant paragraphs are extracted below : 33. In para 21 of the judgment the Full Bench has noted the decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court in Chief Inspector of Mines v. Karam Chand Thapar [ AIR 1961 SC 838 ] and has relied upon the principles laid down therein. The Full Bench overlooked the position that that was a case under Section 24 of the General Clauses Act which makes provision for continuation of orders, notification, scheme, rule, form or bye-law, issued under the repealed Act or regulation under an Act after its repeal and re-enactment. In that case Section 6 did not come up for consideration. The Full Bench overlooked the position that that was a case under Section 24 of the General Clauses Act which makes provision for continuation of orders, notification, scheme, rule, form or bye-law, issued under the repealed Act or regulation under an Act after its repeal and re-enactment. In that case Section 6 did not come up for consideration. Therefore the ratio of that case is not applicable to the present case. With respect we agree with the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench in Rayala Corpn. case [ (1969) 2 SCC 412 : (1970) 1 SCR 639 ]. In our considered view the ratio of the said decision squarely applies to the case on hand. **** 37. The position is well known that at common law, the normal effect of repealing a statute or deleting a provision is to obliterate it from the statute-book as completely as if it had never been passed, and the statute must be considered as a law that never existed. To this rule, an exception is engrafted by the provisions of Section 6(1). If a provision of a statute is unconditionally omitted without a saving clause in favour of pending proceedings, all actions must stop where the omission finds them, and if final relief has not been granted before the omission goes into effect, it cannot be granted afterwards. Savings of the nature contained in Section 6 or in special Acts may modify the position. Thus the operation of repeal or deletion as to the future and the past largely depends on the savings applicable. In a case where a particular provision in a statute is omitted and in its place another provision dealing with the same contingency is introduced without a saving clause in favour of pending proceedings then it can be reasonably inferred that the intention of the legislature is that the pending proceedings shall not continue but fresh proceedings for the same purpose may be initiated under the new provision. 38. In the present case, as noted earlier, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act has no application. There is no saving provision in favour of pending proceedings. Therefore action for realisation of the amount refunded can only be taken under the new provision in accordance with the terms thereof. 20. Going by the decisions in Kolhapur Canesugar (supra) and Rayala Corpn. There is no saving provision in favour of pending proceedings. Therefore action for realisation of the amount refunded can only be taken under the new provision in accordance with the terms thereof. 20. Going by the decisions in Kolhapur Canesugar (supra) and Rayala Corpn. (supra), one might reach a conclusion that Section 6 of the Act, 1897 does not apply to omitted provisions and only applies to repealed provisions. However, such a conclusion would be misplaced and wrong in light of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Fibre Boards (supra) and Shree Bhagwati (supra). 21. The Supreme Court in Fibre Boards (supra) considered the question whether Section 6 of the Act, 1897 is applicable to provisions that are omitted. The Court held that omission of a provision is tantamount to express repeal. Therefore, Section 6 of the Act, 1897 is applicable to provisions that are omitted. Discussing the decision in Rayala Corpn. (supra), the Court held that the finding that Section 6 of the Act, 1897 is not applicable to omissions is only obiter dictum and not the ratio decidendi of the case. It held that the finding in Kolhapur Canesugar (supra) and Rayala Corpn. (supra)regarding the non-applicability of Section 6 of the Act, 1897 to omission of a provision is per incuriam. The relevant paragraphs are extracted below : 25. In Rayala Corpn. (P) Ltd. [ (1969) 2 SCC 412 ], what fell for decision was whether proceedings could be validly continued on a complaint in respect of a charge made under Rule 132-A of the Defence of India Rules, which ceased to be in existence before the accused were convicted in respect of the charge made under the said Rule. The said Rule 132-A was omitted by a Notification dated 30-3-1966. What was decided in that case is set out by para 17 of the said judgment, which is as follows: (SCC p. 424) “17. Reference was next made to a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in State of M.P. v. Hiralal Sutwala [1958 SCC OnLine MP 149 : AIR 1959 MP 93 ] but, there again, the accused was sought to be prosecuted for an offence punishable under an Act on the repeal of which Section 6 of the General Clauses Act had been made applicable. In the case before us, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act cannot obviously apply on the omission of Rule 132-A of the DIRs for the two obvious reasons that Section 6 only applies to repeals and not to omissions, and applies when the repeal is of a Central Act or Regulation and not of a Rule. If Section 6 of the General Clauses Act had been applied, no doubt this complaint against the two accused for the offence punishable under Rule 132-A of the DIRs could have been instituted even after the repeal of that Rule.” 26. It will be clear from a reading of this paragraph that the Madhya Pradesh High Court judgment was distinguished by the Constitution Bench on two grounds. One being that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act does not apply to a rule but only applies to a Central Act or Regulation, and secondly, that Section 6 itself would apply only to a “repeal” not to “an omission”. This statement of law was followed by another Constitution Bench in Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. case [ (2000) 2 SCC 536 ]. After setting out para 17 of the earlier judgment, the second Constitution Bench judgment states as follows: (SCC p. 550, para 33) “33. In para 21 of the judgment the Full Bench [Saurashtra Cement and Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (1993) 1 Guj LR 5 : (1995) 79 ELT 367] has noted the decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court in Chief Inspector of Mines v. Karam Chand Thapar [ AIR 1961 SC 838 : (1961) 2 Cri LJ 1] and has relied upon the principles laid down therein. The Full Bench overlooked the position that that was a case under Section 24 of the General Clauses Act which makes provision for continuation of orders, notification, scheme, rule, form or bye-law, issued under the repealed Act or regulation under an Act after its repeal and re-enactment. In that case Section 6 did not come up for consideration. Therefore the ratio of that case is not applicable to the present case. With respect we agree with the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench in RayalaCorpn. case [ (1969) 2 SCC 412 ]. In our considered view the ratio of the said decision squarely applies to the case on hand.” 27. Therefore the ratio of that case is not applicable to the present case. With respect we agree with the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench in RayalaCorpn. case [ (1969) 2 SCC 412 ]. In our considered view the ratio of the said decision squarely applies to the case on hand.” 27. Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. [ (2000) 2 SCC 536 ] judgment also concerned itself with the applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act to the deletion of Rules 10 and 10-A of the Central Excise Rules on 6-8-1977. 28. An attempt was made in General Finance Co. v. CIT [ (2002) 7 SCC 1 ] to refer these two judgments [ (1969) 2 SCC 412 ], [ (2000) 2 SCC 536 ] to a larger Bench on the point that an omission would not amount to a repeal for the purpose of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Though the Court found substance in the argument favouring the reference to a larger Bench, ultimately it decided that the prosecution in cases of non-compliance with the provision therein contained was only transitional and cases covered by it were few and far between, and hence found on facts that it was not an appropriate case for reference to a larger Bench. 29. We may also point out that in G.P. Singh's Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 12th Edn., the learned author has criticised the aforesaid judgments in the following terms: “Section 6 of the General Clauses Act applies to all types of repeals. The section applies whether the repeal be express or implied, entire or partial or whether it be repeal simpliciter or repeal accompanied by fresh legislation. The section also applies when a temporary statute is repealed before its expiry, but it has no application when such a statute is not repealed but comes to an end by expiry. The section on its own terms is limited to a repeal brought about by a Central Act or Regulation. A rule made under an Act is not a Central Act or Regulation and if a rule be repealed by another rule, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act will not be attracted. It has been so held in two Constitution Bench decisions. A rule made under an Act is not a Central Act or Regulation and if a rule be repealed by another rule, Section 6 of the General Clauses Act will not be attracted. It has been so held in two Constitution Bench decisions. The passing observation in these cases that ‘Section 6 only applies to repeals and not to omissions’ needs reconsideration for omission of a provision results in abrogation or obliteration of that provision in the same way as it happens in repeal. The stress in these cases was on the question that a ‘rule’ not being a Central Act or Regulation, as defined in the General Clauses Act, omission or repeal of a ‘rule’ by another ‘rule’ does not attract Section 6 of the Act and proceedings initiated under the omitted rule cannot continue unless the new rule contains a saving clause to that effect.” (at pp. 697-98.) 30. In view of what has been stated hereinabove, perhaps the appropriate course in the present case would have been to refer the aforesaid judgment to a larger Bench. But we do not find the need to do so in view of what is stated by us hereinbelow. 31. First and foremost, it will be noticed that two reasons were given in Rayala Corpn. (P) Ltd. [ (1969) 2 SCC 412 ] for distinguishing the Madhya Pradesh High Court judgment [1958 SCC OnLine MP 149 : AIR 1959 MP 93 ]. Ordinarily, both reasons would form the ratio decidendi for the said decision and both reasons would be binding upon us. But we find that once it is held that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would itself not apply to a rule which is subordinate legislation as it applies only to a Central Act or Regulation, it would be wholly unnecessary to state that on a construction of the word “repeal” in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, “omissions” made by the legislature would not be included. Assume, on the other hand, that the Constitution Bench had given two reasons for the non-applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. In such a situation, obviously both reasons would be ratio decidendi and would be binding upon a subsequent Bench. Assume, on the other hand, that the Constitution Bench had given two reasons for the non-applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. In such a situation, obviously both reasons would be ratio decidendi and would be binding upon a subsequent Bench. However, once it is found that Section 6 itself would not apply, it would be wholly superfluous to further state that on an interpretation of the word “repeal”, an “omission” would not be included. We are, therefore, of the view that the second so-called ratio of the Constitution Bench in Rayala Corpn. (P) Ltd. [ (1969) 2 SCC 412 ] cannot be said to be a ratio decidendi at all and is really in the nature of obiter dicta. 32. Secondly, we find no reference to Section 6-A of the General Clauses Act in either of these Constitution Bench judgments. Section 6-A reads as follows: “6-A. Repeal of Act making textual amendment in Act or Regulation.—Where any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act repeals any enactment by which the text of any Central Act or Regulation was amended by the express omission, insertion or substitution of any matter, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not affect the continuance of any such amendment made by the enactment so repealed and in operation at the time of such repeal.” 33. A reading of this Section would show that a repeal by an amending Act can be by way of an express omission. This being the case, obviously the word “repeal” in both Section 6 and Section 24 would, therefore, include repeals by express omission. The absence of any reference to Section 6-A, therefore, again undoes the binding effect of these two judgments on an application of the per incuriam principle. [In Mamleshwar Prasad v. Kanhaiya Lal, (1975) 2 SCC 232 : (1975) 3 SCR p. 834, Krishna Iyer, J., succinctly laid down what is meant by the “per incuriam” principle. He stated: (SCC p. 235, para 7 : SCR p. 837) “7. … We do not intend to detract from the rule that, in exceptional instances, where by obvious inadvertence or oversight a judgment fails to notice a plain statutory provision or obligatory authority running counter to the reasoning and result reached, it may not have sway of binding precedents. It should be a glaring case, an obtrusive omission. … We do not intend to detract from the rule that, in exceptional instances, where by obvious inadvertence or oversight a judgment fails to notice a plain statutory provision or obligatory authority running counter to the reasoning and result reached, it may not have sway of binding precedents. It should be a glaring case, an obtrusive omission. No such situation presents itself here and we do not embark on the principle of judgment per incuriam.” (emphasis supplied)An interesting application of the said principle is contained in State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd., (1991) 4 SCC 139 : (1991) 3 SCR 64 , where a Division Bench of this Court held that one particular conclusion of a Bench of seven Judges [Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of U.P., (1990) 1 SCC 109 ] was per incuriam — see: the discussion at SCR pp. 80, 81 and 91: SCC pp. 151, 152 and pp. 161-162, paras 36 to 42 of the said judgment.] 22. Again, in Shree Bhagwati (supra), the Supreme Court discussed its decision and clarified its decision in Fibre Boards (supra). The Court reiterated that Section 6 of the Act, 1897 is equally applicable to omission of a provision. The Court also held that the effect of words ‘omit’ and ‘repeal’ is the same as both result in deletion of a provision. Therefore, it cannot be said that Section 6 of the Act, 1897 is not applicable to omission of a provision. The Court discussed in detail the decision of Rayala Corpn. (supra)and held that the said decision did not consider Section 6A of the Act, 1897, therefore, was rightly held per incuriam in Fibre Boards (supra).The relevant paragraphs are extracted below : 7. First, it may be stated that the judgment of this Court in Fibre Board case [Fibre Boards (P) Ltd. v. CIT, (2015) 10 SCC 333 : (2015) 376 ITR 596] has taken the view that an “omission” would amount to a “repeal”, after referring to several authorities of this Court, G.P. Singh's Principles of Statutory Interpretation, Section 6-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and a passage in Halsbury's Laws of England. Ultimately, this Court arrived at the conclusion that an “omission” would amount to a “repeal” for the purpose of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act. Ultimately, this Court arrived at the conclusion that an “omission” would amount to a “repeal” for the purpose of Section 24 of the General Clauses Act. Since the same expression, namely, “repeal” is used both in Section 6 and Section 24 of the General Clauses Act, the construction of the said expression in both sections would, therefore, include within it “omissions” made by the legislature. 8. Shri Aggarwal, however, argued that there is a fundamental distinction between a “repeal” and an “omission” in that in the case of a “repeal” the statute is obliterated from the very beginning whereas in the case of an “omission” what gets omitted is only from the date of “omission” and not before. This being the case, it is clear that things already done in the case of an “omission” would be saved. However, a “repeal” without a savings clause like Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would not so save things already done under the repealed statute. He further argued that Section 6-A which was relied upon by the Bench in Fibre Board case [Fibre Boards (P) Ltd. v. CIT, (2015) 10 SCC 333 : (2015) 376 ITR 596] did not state that an “omission” would be included within the expression “repeal”, but that if Section 6-A were carefully read, an “omission” would only be included in an “amendment” which, under the section, can be by way of omission, insertion or substitution. Therefore, it is fallacious to state that Section 6-A would lead to the conclusion that “omissions” are included in “repeals”. He further argued that in any event, the true ratio decidendi of the Constitution Bench decision in Rayala Corpn. (P) Ltd. v. Director of Enforcement, (1969) 2 SCC 412 , is that an “omission” cannot amount to a “repeal” inasmuch as the first reason given for distinguishing the Madhya Pradesh High Court judgment [State of M.P. v. Hiralal Sutwala, 1958 SCC OnLine MP 149 : AIR 1959 MP 93 ] in that case was that Section 6 cannot apply to the omission of a rule because an “omission” is not a “repeal”. He further argued that as the Madhya Pradesh High Court's decision was put forward by the respondent in that case in support of their argument, the Constitution Bench's dealing with the said decision in order to overcome it would necessarily be the ratio decidendi of the said decision, and being a Constitution Bench decision, would be binding upon this Bench. He further referred to Section 31 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, which, in his opinion, makes it clear that Parliament itself has understood that a repeal under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would not apply to omissions. He has further argued that it may be true that the expression “repeal” is normally used when an entire statute is done away with, as opposed to an “omission” which is applied only when part of the statute is deleted, but said that this is not invariably the case, and referred to Section 1 of the Contract Act, 1872 in which enactments mentioned in the schedule are repealed not in their entirety but only to the extent provided and, therefore, argued that the expression “repeals” will apply also to a part of an enactment as opposed to the enactment as a whole. **** 12. From this it is clear that when Section 6 of the General Clauses Act speaks of the repeal of any enactment, it refers not merely to the enactment as a whole but also to any provision contained in any Act. Thus, it is clear that if a part of a statute is deleted, Section 6 would nonetheless apply. Secondly, it is clear, as has been stated by referring to a passage in Halsbury's Laws of England in Fibre Board [Fibre Boards (P) Ltd. v. CIT, (2015) 10 SCC 333 : (2015) 376 ITR 596] judgment, that the expression “omission” is nothing but a particular form of words evincing an intention to abrogate an enactment or portion thereof. This is made further clear by the Legal Thesaurus (Deluxe Edition) by William C. Burton, 1979 Edition. This is made further clear by the Legal Thesaurus (Deluxe Edition) by William C. Burton, 1979 Edition. The expression “delete” is defined by the Thesaurus as follows: “Delete:—Blot out, cancel, censor, cross off, cross out, cut, cut out, dele, discard, do away with, drop, edit out, efface, elide, eliminate, eradicate, erase, excise, expel, expunge, extirpate, get rid of, leave out, modify by excisions, obliterate, omit, remove, rub out, rule out, scratch out, strike off, take out, weed, wipe out.” Likewise the expression “omit” is also defined by this Thesaurus as follows: “Omit:— Abstain from inserting, bypass, cast aside, count out, cut out, delete, discard, dodge, drop, exclude, fail to do, fail to include, fail to insert, fail to mention, leave out, leave undone, let go, let pass, let slip, miss, neglect, omittere, pass over, praetermittere, skip, slight, transire.” And the expression “repeal” is defined as follows: “Repeal:— Abolish, abrogare, abrogate, annul, avoid, cancel, counter-mand, declare null and void, delete, eliminate, formally withdraw, invalidate, make void, negate, nullify, obliterate, officially withdraw, override, overrule, quash, recall, render invalid, rescind, rescindere, retract, reverse, revoke, set aside, vacate, void, withdraw.” 13. On a conjoint reading of the three expressions “delete”, “omit”, and “repeal”, it becomes clear that “delete” and “omit” are used interchangeably, so that when the expression “repeal” refers to “delete” it would necessarily take within its ken an omission as well. This being the case, we do not find any substance in the argument that a “repeal” amounts to an obliteration from the very beginning, whereas an “omission” is only in futuro. If the expression “delete” would amount to a “repeal”, which the appellant's counsel does not deny, it is clear that a conjoint reading of Halsbury's Laws of England and the Legal Thesaurus cited hereinabove both lead to the same result, namely, that an “omission” being tantamount to a “deletion” is a form of repeal. 14. The learned counsel's second argument that Section 6-A of the General Clauses Act when it speaks of an “omission” only speaks of an “amendment” which omits and, therefore does not refer to a repeal, is equally fallacious. 14. The learned counsel's second argument that Section 6-A of the General Clauses Act when it speaks of an “omission” only speaks of an “amendment” which omits and, therefore does not refer to a repeal, is equally fallacious. In Bhagat Ram Sharma v. Union of India, 1988 Supp SCC 30 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 404 : (1988) 6 ATC 783, this Court held that there is no real distinction between a repeal and an amendment and that “amendment” is in fact a wider term which includes deletion of a provision in an existing statute. In the said judgment, this Court held: (SCC pp. 40-41, paras 17-18) “17. It is a matter of legislative practice to provide while enacting an amending law, that an existing provision shall be deleted and a new provision substituted. Such deletion has the effect of repeal of the existing provision. Such a law may also provide for the introduction of a new provision. There is no real distinction between ‘repeal’ and an ‘amendment’. In Sutherland's Statutory Construction, 3rd Edn., Vol. 1 at p. 477, the learned author makes the following statement of law: ‘The distinction between repeal and amendment as these terms are used by the courts, is arbitrary. Naturally the use of these terms by the court is based largely on how the legislatures have developed and applied these terms in labelling their enactments. When a section is being added to an Act or a provision added to a section, the legislatures commonly entitled the Act as an amendment…. When a provision is withdrawn from a section, the legislatures call the Act an amendment particularly when a provision is added to replace the one withdrawn. However, when an entire Act or section is abrogated and no new section is added to replace it, legislatures label the Act accomplishing this result a repeal. Thus as used by the legislatures, amendment and repeal may differ in kind—addition as opposed to withdrawal or only in degree—abrogation of part of a section as opposed to abrogation of a whole section or Act; or more commonly, in both kind and degree—addition of a provision to a section to replace a provision being abrogated as opposed by abrogation of a whole section of an Act. This arbitrary distinction has been followed by the courts, and they have developed separate rules of construction for each. This arbitrary distinction has been followed by the courts, and they have developed separate rules of construction for each. However, they have recognised that frequently an Act purporting to be an amendment has the same qualitative effect as a repeal—the abrogation of an existing statutory provision—and have therefore applied the term “implied repeal” and the rules of construction applicable to repeals to such amendments.’ 18. Amendment is, in fact, a wider term and it includes abrogation or deletion of a provision in an existing statute. If the amendment of an existing law is small, the Act professes to amend; if it is extensive, it repeals a law and re-enacts it. An amendment of substantive law is not retrospective unless expressly laid down or by necessary implication inferred.” 15. It is clear, therefore, that when this Court referred to Section 6-A of the General Clauses Act in Fibre Board case [Fibre Boards (P) Ltd. v. CIT, (2015) 10 SCC 333 : (2015) 376 ITR 596] and held that Section 6-A shows that a repeal can be by way of an express omission, obviously what was meant was that an amendment which repealed a provision could do so by way of an express omission. This being the case, it is clear that Section 6-A undisputedly leads to the conclusion that a repeal would include a repeal by way of an express omission. 16. The learned counsel then argued that while distinguishing the Madhya Pradesh High Court judgment [State of M.P. v. Hiralal Sutwala, 1958 SCC OnLine MP 149 : AIR 1959 MP 93 ] in Rayala Corpn. [Rayala Corpn. (P) Ltd. v. Director of Enforcement, (1969) 2 SCC 412 ] a Constitution Bench of this Court expressly held as the first reason that Section 6 applies only to repeals and not to omissions. The Fibre Board [Fibre Boards (P) Ltd. v. CIT, (2015) 10 SCC 333 : (2015) 376 ITR 596] judgment has clearly held as follows: (SCC p. 354, para 31) “31. First and foremost, it will be noticed that two reasons were given in Rayala Corpn. (P) Ltd. [Rayala Corpn. (P) Ltd. v. Director of Enforcement, (1969) 2 SCC 412 ] for distinguishing the Madhya Pradesh High Court judgment [State of M.P. v. Hiralal Sutwala, 1958 SCC OnLine MP 149 : AIR 1959 MP 93 ]. First and foremost, it will be noticed that two reasons were given in Rayala Corpn. (P) Ltd. [Rayala Corpn. (P) Ltd. v. Director of Enforcement, (1969) 2 SCC 412 ] for distinguishing the Madhya Pradesh High Court judgment [State of M.P. v. Hiralal Sutwala, 1958 SCC OnLine MP 149 : AIR 1959 MP 93 ]. Ordinarily, both reasons would form the ratio decidendi for the said decision and both reasons would be binding upon us. But we find that once it is held that Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would itself not apply to a rule which is subordinate legislation as it applies only to a Central Act or Regulation, it would be wholly unnecessary to state that on a construction of the word ‘repeal’ in Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, ‘omissions’ made by the legislature would not be included. Assume, on the other hand, that the Constitution Bench had given two reasons for the non-applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. In such a situation, obviously both reasons would be ratio decidendi and would be binding upon a subsequent Bench. However, once it is found that Section 6 itself would not apply, it would be wholly superfluous to further state that on an interpretation of the word ‘repeal’, an ‘omission’ would not be included. We are, therefore, of the view that the second so-called ratio of the Constitution Bench in RayalaCorpn. (P) Ltd. [Rayala Corpn. (P) Ltd. v. Director of Enforcement, (1969) 2 SCC 412 ] cannot be said to be a ratio decidendi at all and is really in the nature of obiter dicta.” 17. Merely because the Constitution Bench referred to a repeal not amounting to an omission as the first reason given for distinguishing the Madhya Pradesh High Court judgment [State of M.P. v. Hiralal Sutwala, 1958 SCC OnLine MP 149 : AIR 1959 MP 93 ] would not undo the effect of ITR para 27 : SCC para 31 of Fibre Board case [Fibre Boards (P) Ltd. v. CIT, (2015) 10 SCC 333 : (2015) 376 ITR 596] which, as has already been stated, clearly makes the distinction between Section 6 not applying at all and Section 6 being construed in a particular manner. Obviously, if the section were not to apply at all, any construction of the section would necessarily be in the nature of obiter dicta. Obviously, if the section were not to apply at all, any construction of the section would necessarily be in the nature of obiter dicta. **** 21. It is settled law that Parliament is presumed to know the law when it enacts a particular piece of legislation. The Prevention of Corruption Act was passed in the year 1988, that is long after 1969 when the Constitution Bench decision in Rayala Corpn. [Rayala Corpn. (P) Ltd. v. Director of Enforcement, (1969) 2 SCC 412 ] had been delivered. It is, therefore, presumed that Parliament enacted Section 31 knowing that the decision in Rayala Corpn. [Rayala Corpn. (P) Ltd. v. Director of Enforcement, (1969) 2 SCC 412 ] had stated that an omission would not amount to a repeal and it is for this reason that Section 31 was enacted. This again does not take us further as this statement of the law in Rayala Corpn. [Rayala Corpn. (P) Ltd. v. Director of Enforcement, (1969) 2 SCC 412 ] is no longer the law declared by the Supreme Court after the decision in Fibre Board case [Fibre Boards (P) Ltd. v. CIT, (2015) 10 SCC 333 : (2015) 376 ITR 596]. This reason therefore again cannot avail the appellant. 22. The reference to the savings provision in Section 1 of the Contract Act, 1872 again does not take us very much further as the expression “repeal” as has been pointed out above can be of part of an enactment also. This being the case, when the legislature uses the word “omit” it usually does so when it wishes to delete a particular section as opposed to deleting an entire Act. As has been noticed both in Fibre Board case[Fibre Boards (P) Ltd. v. CIT, (2015) 10 SCC 333 : (2015) 376 ITR 596] and hereinabove, these are all expressions which only go to form and not to substance. Even assuming for the sake of argument that we were inclined to agree with Shri Aggarwal, given the force of his inexorable logic, this Court has laid down the parameters of when it would be expedient to have a relook at a particular decision in Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. CIT, (1965) 2 SCR 908 : AIR 1965 SC 1636 , as follows: (SCR pp. 921-22 : AIR pp. 1643-44, para 23) “23. Ltd. v. CIT, (1965) 2 SCR 908 : AIR 1965 SC 1636 , as follows: (SCR pp. 921-22 : AIR pp. 1643-44, para 23) “23. In dealing with the question as to whether the earlier decisions of this Court in New Jehangir Mills case [New Jehangir Vakil Mills Ltd. v. CIT, (1959) 37 ITR 11 (SC)] and Petlad Co. Ltd. case [Petlad Turkey Red Dye Works Co. Ltd. v. CIT, 1963 Supp (1) SCR 871 : AIR 1963 SC 1484 ], should be reconsidered and revised by us, we ought to be clear as to the approach which should be adopted in such cases. Mr. Palkhivala has not disputed the fact that, in a proper case, this Court has inherent jurisdiction to reconsider and revise its earlier decisions, and so, the abstract question as to whether such a power vests in this Court or not need not detain us. In exercising this inherent power, however, this Court would naturally like to impose certain reasonable limitations and would be reluctant to entertain pleas for the reconsideration and revision of its earlier decisions, unless it is satisfied that there are compelling and substantial reasons to do so. It is general judicial experience that in matters of law involving questions of constructing statutory or constitutional provisions, two views are often reasonably possible and when judicial approach has to make a choice between the two reasonably possible views, the process of decision-making is often very difficult and delicate. When this Court hears appeals against decisions of the High Courts and is required to consider the propriety or correctness of the view taken by the High Courts on any point of law, it would be open to this Court to hold that though the view taken by the High Court is reasonably possible, the alternative view which is also reasonably possible is better and should be preferred. In such a case, the choice is between the view taken by the High Court whose judgment is under appeal, and the alternative view which appears to this Court to be more reasonable; and in accepting its own view in preference to that of the High Court, this Court would be discharging its duty as a court of appeal. In such a case, the choice is between the view taken by the High Court whose judgment is under appeal, and the alternative view which appears to this Court to be more reasonable; and in accepting its own view in preference to that of the High Court, this Court would be discharging its duty as a court of appeal. But different considerations must inevitably arise where a previous decision of this Court has taken a particular view as to the construction of a statutory provision as, for instance, Section 66(4) of the Act. When it is urged that the view already taken by this Court should be reviewed and revised it may not necessarily be an adequate reason for such review and revision to hold that though the earlier view is a reasonably possible view, the alternative view which is pressed on the subsequent occasion is more reasonable. In reviewing and revising its earlier decision, this Court should ask itself whether in the interests of the public good or for any other valid and compulsive reasons, it is necessary that the earlier decision should be revised. When this Court decides questions of law, its decisions are, under Article 141, binding on all courts within the territory of India, and so, it must be the constant endeavour and concern of this Court to introduce and maintain an element of certainty and continuity in the interpretation of law in the country. Frequent exercise by this Court of its power to review its earlier decisions on the ground that the view pressed before it later appears to the Court to be more reasonable, may incidentally tend to make law uncertain and introduce confusion which must be consistently avoided. That is not to say that if on a subsequent occasion, the Court is satisfied that its earlier decision was clearly erroneous, it should hesitate to correct the error; but before a previous decision is pronounced to be plainly erroneous, the Court must be satisfied with a fair amount of unanimity amongst its members that a revision of the said view is fully justified. It is not possible or desirable, and in any case it would be inexpedient to lay down any principles which should govern the approach of the Court in dealing with the question of reviewing and revising its earlier decisions. It is not possible or desirable, and in any case it would be inexpedient to lay down any principles which should govern the approach of the Court in dealing with the question of reviewing and revising its earlier decisions. It would always depend upon several relevant considerations —What is the nature of the infirmity or error on which a plea for review and revision of the earlier view is based? On the earlier occasion, did some patent aspects of the question remain unnoticed, or was the attention of the Court not drawn to any relevant and material statutory provision, or was any previous decision of this Court bearing on the point not noticed? Is the Court hearing such plea fairly unanimous that there is such an error in the earlier view? What would be the impact of the error on the general administration of law or on public good? Has the earlier decision been followed on subsequent occasions either by this Court or by the High Courts? And, would the reversal of the earlier decision lead to public inconvenience, hardship or mischief? These and other relevant considerations must be carefully borne in mind whenever this Court is called upon to exercise its jurisdiction to review and revise its earlier decisions.” 23. At this stage, it is relevant to note that the Supreme Court in Chandpaklal Ramanlal Shah v. Reliance Industries Ltd, (2017) 9 SCC 309 held that pending proceedings cannot be quashed or set aside merely on the ground that the provision under which proceedings were initiated was later repealed. This means that pending proceedings are saved, despite the provision under which they were initiated is omitted. The relevant paragraph is extracted below : 6. It is not necessary to go into all the rival contentions. In our view, the matter can be decided on a short point. The charge against the respondent is of evasion of duty. The ingredient of the offence is the evasion. The omission of a procedural rule for availing the credit cannot in any manner affect the said charge. The prosecution cannot be deprived of opportunity to prove evasion which by itself is an offence. In this view of the matter, there was no justification for the High Court to quash the charge merely on the ground of Rule 56-A having been omitted. 24. The prosecution cannot be deprived of opportunity to prove evasion which by itself is an offence. In this view of the matter, there was no justification for the High Court to quash the charge merely on the ground of Rule 56-A having been omitted. 24. In Har Naraini Devi v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1265, the Supreme Court again held that Section 6 of the Act, 1897 is equally applicable to an omission. Therefore, such omission or deletion or repeal cannot affect the previous operation of such omitted/deleted/repealed provision. The relevant paragraphs are extracted below : 27. By virtue of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, the repeal of an enactment would not affect the previous operation of such an enactment. In Shree Bhagwati Steel Rolling Mills v. CCE, this Court has held that repeal is to be treated similarly as an omission and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would apply equally to an omission as it would apply to a repeal. On account of Sections 6(b) and 6(c) of General Clauses Act, the omission of Section 4(2) of 1956 Act cannot affect the previous operation of the said Section 4(2)…….. 28. The deletion of Section 4(2) took place w.e.f 09.09.2005. Therefore, the effect of the deletion can only be in respect of successions which opened on or after 09.09.2005. This is because under Section 6(b) and 6(c) of the General Clauses Act repeal cannot affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed and cannot affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed and cannot affect any right which may have been acquired or accrued. In the present case, it is to be held that succession has opened prior to 09.09.2005, the rights of the descendants in terms of Section 50 became crystallized on account of the said Section read with Section 4(2) of the 1956 Act. Therefore, the deletion of Section 4(2) cannot have retrospective effect. Therefore, it is clear from the aforesaid discussion that Section 6 of the Act, 1897 is applicable to omission of a provision by the legislature. In other words, Section 6 of the Act, 1897 saves all the pending proceedings under a provision that was subsequently omitted. Therefore, the deletion of Section 4(2) cannot have retrospective effect. Therefore, it is clear from the aforesaid discussion that Section 6 of the Act, 1897 is applicable to omission of a provision by the legislature. In other words, Section 6 of the Act, 1897 saves all the pending proceedings under a provision that was subsequently omitted. Now coming to the facts of the case, it is not in dispute that the proceedings for violations of Section 6(3)(b) of the Act, 1999 were initiated in the year 2017. When the proceedings were initiated against the Petitioners, Section 6(3) of the Act, 1999 was still in force. Therefore, by virtue of Section 6 of the Act, 1897 the proceedings against the Petitioners are saved and cannot be disturbed merely because Section 6(3) of the Act, 1999 was subsequently omitted. According to this Court, Respondent No. 1 was well within his jurisdiction to pass the impugned order dated 04.01.2023. As the Petitioner, has an effective alternative remedy in the form of an appeal under Section 19 of the Act, 1999, this Court, in light of the decision in Assistant Commissioner of State Tax (supra) holds that the present writ petition is not maintainable. Therefore, the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 25. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. However, the Petitioners are at liberty to raise all the contentions before the Appellate Tribunal. As a sequel, the miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the Writ Petition shall stand closed.